Defence Committee
Oral evidence: Defence and Climate Change, HC 179
Tuesday 24 January 2023
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 24 January 2023.
Members present: Mr Tobias Ellwood (Chair); Sarah Atherton; Robert Courts; Richard Drax; Mr Mark Francois; Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck; Gavin Robinson; John Spellar; Derek Twigg.
Questions 56-99
Witnesses
I: Dr Stuart Parkinson, Executive Director, Scientists for Global Responsibility; and Linsey Cottrell, Environmental Policy Officer, Conflict and Environment Observatory.
Written evidence from witnesses:
– Scientists for Global Responsibility (DCC0002)
- The Conflict and Environment Observatory (DCC0014)
Witnesses: Dr Stuart Parkinson and Linsey Cottrell.
Chair: Welcome to this Defence Select Committee hearing on Tuesday 24 January 2023, at which we will be looking at defence and climate change. I am delighted to welcome Dr Stuart Parkinson, who is the executive director of Scientists for Global Responsibility, and Linsey Cottrell, who is the environmental policy officer at the Conflict and Environment Observatory. I welcome you both. We are very grateful to you for taking time out to talk to us. We will be looking at a number of questions on defence’s challenge in measuring, reporting and setting targets for climate change. We are also looking at the military’s ability—given that their main objective is to provide defence—to reduce their own emissions. Thanks very much indeed.
Q56 John Spellar: I have a general question to start with. What are the principal climate change issues for UK defence and security?
Dr Parkinson: There are two broad issues that I want briefly to touch on at the start. One is greenhouse gas emissions themselves and one is the impact of climate change. The world, and indeed the UK, are not reducing greenhouse gas emissions nearly fast enough. We are on track for a global temperature rise of about 2.7° if even more climate tipping points are passed.
Militaries are large greenhouse gas emitters, and in general have been quite slow in taking action in this area. We published a report last year where we estimated the carbon footprint of the world’s militaries to be about 5.5% of global emissions. Although there is a lot of uncertainty around that—the data is not good, as we will discuss—that gives you an idea of the scale of the problem. Those emissions are larger than the Russian carbon footprint, for example.
Q57 John Spellar: Where primarily do they come from? Have you disaggregated that at all?
Dr Parkinson: We have tried to. There is a lot around fuel use and supply chains, and there is a very uncertain amount around the impacts of emissions. Those are the main categories.
Linsey Cottrell: I will interject there. That 5.5% estimate is just based on day-to-day military activities; it does not include the impact of actually fighting a conflict.
Q58 John Spellar: How is your estimate disaggregated between the different arms of the services, even if it is rough?
Dr Parkinson: Are you talking about Army, Navy and military, for example?
John Spellar: Army, Navy and Air Force.
Dr Parkinson: Sorry—Army, Navy and Air Force. That is difficult to tell with the data that is available. In Britain we have a sizeable Air Force, so that will be the dominant service. Again, we have a large Navy, so that will be large. In somewhere like Germany, the Army is a bigger emitter, or a bigger fraction.
Q59 John Spellar: Anything to add to that?
Dr Parkinson: Yes, there are two implications that I want to draw out of what I was saying about greenhouse gas emission. One is that the military should take more action to reduce its emissions, which we will be talking about today. There is also an issue around military communication, particularly to central Government, about the increased security risks if we do not reduce emissions faster. I think it needs to be heard more loudly in central Government that this is a priority issue—a central issue. Despite everything that is going on in the world, we should not put this on the back burner. The key reason for that is climate change impact. We are already starting to feel that through extreme weather. Militaries are being called in to help in emergency situations. An implication of that is that the military itself needs to adapt, although we are not going to talk about that today. There is also the implication that civilian agencies should be strengthened so that militaries are used less for those tasks. It would be good to hear a message from military sources about strengthening civilian agencies.
Q60 John Spellar: Linsey, do you have anything to add?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes. I would probably just reiterate the concern with respect to the current political tensions and the pressures on reducing greenhouse gas emissions for the military. Obviously, that will seem possibly to be a low priority because of other military priorities at the moment, but of course all this increased expenditure is going to lead to further greenhouse gas emissions. This is not going to go away: the pressures on the environment remain. Just this month, the World Economic Forum issued “The Global Risks Report 2023”, and like last year all the top global risks are environmental: failing to mitigate with respect to climate change, failing to adapt, and biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse. Geopolitical tensions are down around about 10th compared to the environmental. This is looking over the next 10 years.
We have to look long term; we cannot just think about the short-term political risks with respect to Ukraine. It must be kept there as a priority, despite the fact that Governments are increasing their military expenditure. The focus is changing. A lot of the talk has been around climate security—how the military may need to think about how conflicts are generated differently because of all the risks of climate change causing greater impact on resources, people moving, the risks of increased conflict, and how and where wars will be fought—but obviously our focus is the fact that the military contributes such a large amount of those emissions, so they need to be tackled. It is not just about climate security and the military adapting and adapting its assets: it is about the military reducing its emissions. That is of key importance to us.
Q61 Chair: Thank you. Let me explore that a bit further, Linsey, because you raise it. Some of the news that came out of COP27 was quite grim: we are not meeting the targets; we are perhaps not able to change the direction of travel of us harming our fragile planet. On what timescale do you think we will start to see climate change impacting on areas such as Africa, such that there will then be larger-scale disturbances in security and the economy that will warrant a concern for the armed forces?
Linsey Cottrell: It is very difficult to link conflict and climate change directly. We already know that climate change is causing big effects in Africa. We already have extreme weather events and environmental degradation. We have already had 40 major conflicts this century. Irrespective of whether climate change causes conflict, we need to adapt, and the military must reduce its influence on that, from our point of view.
Q62 Chair: I do not disagree with that. My question was: do we need to qualify and recognise the fact that climate change is now contributing to greater insecurity when we, for example, address our refresh of the integrated review and our defence posture? Are we factoring in the impact of climate change on international security enough?
Linsey Cottrell: I am not really in a position to say, because that is not my focus or area of work. I do not know whether Stuart has a comment.
Dr Parkinson: Yes, I would like to try to answer that. I think the security issues are growing, but there are a wide range of ways in which you deal with those climate security issues. It is important not to skimp on overseas development aid, which can help to strengthen governance so that countries do not descend into major problems. Poverty alleviation is important so there are not so many people at risk when climate disasters happen. Diplomacy and mediation are also important—Britain getting involved in mediation between conflicts. There are many other steps that need to be taken and supported to tackle climate change, before you get to military involvement. They are often not given enough priority, so that is where I would focus the extra resources to tackle the climate risks we are starting to see on a year-to-year basis.
Q63 Richard Drax: Good afternoon to you both. What particular challenges do the armed forces face in measuring, reporting and setting targets to reduce military emissions?
Dr Parkinson: Can I pass this one to Linsey? We agreed that she would answer this first and then I would add some material.
Linsey Cottrell: Overall, obviously the MoD is not dissimilar to other very large organisations and bodies. There are large organisations that are already tackling this issue, but we appreciate that the MoD is extremely complex in its structure and that it has a large and complex supply chain, which makes it very difficult.
The MoD has responsibilities across the different top-level budget organisations—the Navy, the Air Force, the Army, Strategic Command, Defence Equipment, Defence Infrastructure Organisation and so on—so where does the lead come from, how co-ordinated is the response, and is there enough co-operation and collaboration across the whole organisation to achieve this? It is also about identifying budget commitments. It is critical to ask whether the resourcing is in place within the MoD to allocate and provide the specialisms and skillsets needed to deliver this.
Another point is the overall auditing in the MoD and the verification of its own datasets. I was looking at some of the Defence Safety Authority annual reports, which have identified a lack of resourcing on the environmental protection side. It is about emphasising the need for resources to be able to deliver the policies that have been put in place.
The Defence Environmental Protection Regulator was set up last April. I am not sure what its remit is. It is looking at third-party assurance processing and environmental reporting across the MoD, but I am not too clear whether that will include the greenhouse gas emission reporting requirements because I have not been able to find an overview of its remit. It would be incredibly important and useful if it did cover that; hopefully it will.
There is another big problem for the MoD that I think Stuart touched on. We looked at the global emission estimates for militaries of 5.5%. That estimate took into account all the direct and indirect emissions of the militaries’ activities. I do not know whether you are familiar with scopes 1, 2 and 3 with respect to greenhouse gas emissions reporting, but there is a whole other category, which we call scope 3+. That is all the other indirect emissions linked to fighting a war. That might include landscape fires, reconstruction costs and all the debris management that is needed after a conflict. At the moment, how on earth are those scope 3+ indirect emissions looked at? They are not looked at yet. We have developed some kind of framework to do that, but we know that a lot more research is needed to support the military to do that kind of reporting, because it is all important in order for us to understand the whole carbon footprint of military activities.
I have a long list. Another thing is independent verification. There is the risk of greenwashing—you have heard that phrase—across other organisations; the same could be true for the military. If it is providing data, how can that be independently verified from an external assurance point of view? I think it will be really important to take that forward and see how that could be done as well.
I will pass over to Stuart now. I have some other things to say but I will give him a chance to say something too.
Dr Parkinson: I will add a few things at this point. There is a historical weakness on the measuring and reporting side because of the UN climate convention. Because a number of exemptions were agreed in 1997 for the reporting of military emissions, a lot of the data is either not counted or hidden within civilian categories. That issue needs to be dealt with. It has led to limited experience within militaries in being able to count emissions effectively, reliably and in a standardised way that is comparable with other sectors. That is a particular problem.
There are national security issues, but I think those are slowly being overcome. We will come on to what data the UK military publishes, which is a lot more than many other militaries publish. That shows that a lot of the national security concerns are being overcome.
Another issue is around estimations of supply chain emissions, which are complex. Many organisations are still developing methodologies to calculate them. The militaries and the MoD will need to look at that. It is a big part of the carbon footprint that I was talking about earlier. Knowledge in this area is very limited at the moment. In my reading, when people refer to carbon footprints, they often don’t refer to carbon footprints—they are using the terminology mistakenly. There is a lot of stuff there.
On target setting, if I can move on to that, the experience in the MoD has been using the greening government commitments as a basis for setting targets, which is a good start. But those have only been on greenhouse gas emissions related to the estate emissions, not on military equipment or military capability. They haven’t been subject to any absolute, overarching targets to date. That is an issue there.
There are a couple of other areas. There is an issue of a potential incompatibility—we will go on to talk about this in particular reference to the MoD—between what emissions are measured and what emissions the targets are set for. If you are measuring a different category than you are setting a target for, that incompatibility means that you cannot actually track how well you are doing. We are seeing problems of that nature.
Richard Drax: Thank you very much.
Q64 Gavin Robinson: Dr Parkinson, I get a sense with some of our questions and answers that we are going to have a bit of seepage from one area to another, given the nature of the questions we have for you. I will pick up on the 1997 UN agreement that you referred to in respect of measuring and reporting. Do you have a compare and contrast between what was agreed then, with the associated exemptions, and what MoD does today? Does MoD measure and report more, less or in keeping with what was agreed in 1997?
Dr Parkinson: This is where it gets complicated, because the MoD reports both. Within the data that the UK Government report as a whole to the UN climate agency, there is a reporting framework that has some categories that include some military emissions. The MoD, in collaboration with the other Government climate statisticians, provides data in that reporting format. The MoD also does a separate report, which is currently published in the annual report and accounts, that has a separate set of data on what its emissions are. That statement is much more in-depth than the statement to the UN climate convention.
One of our arguments in general is that we need more openness at the UN level so that we can see much more of the data that militaries are responsible for internationally. Some push on this from the UK Government and UK military, through either the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change or the Conference of the Parties systems, would be very helpful.
Q65 Gavin Robinson: I take it you are saying that MoD publish additional materials separately, which you are now using as a sort of benchmark and encouraging others to do similarly. Ms Cottrell, do you have a view on this? Are the MoD publishing additional information that is additional to other countries that are doing so?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes, they are.
Q66 Gavin Robinson: And are other countries noticing? Are others, like your contemporaries in other countries, advocating similar additional publication in their nations, using the UK as a benchmark, or is it something that is becoming standardised?
Linsey Cottrell: This is exactly what we are trying to advocate. We call it a military emissions gap—what the UN ask of countries with respect to their military data, but they only have to provide it voluntarily, so it does not have to be disaggregated. There are about 40 or so countries that are required to submit the data on military fuel use—just one aspect of military emissions. It does not account for all the emissions; it just looks at fuel use. Less than half of the countries provide good quality disaggregated data. We provide just a bit of it, and it is mixed up with all the other reporting for the country. This global emission estimate is so difficult to do because the data is not there to do it.
Because the UK Government are doing better than a lot of other countries, this is what we want to do, and we want the UK Government to advocate for other militaries to do the same, because it is so important. Because the contribution is so large, we get a much better understanding, and more countries recognise the need to keep a check on what their military emissions are so that they can manage and account for them and see how they sit within their countries’ carbon budgets.
Q67 Mr Francois: Last week the Committee visited RAF Marham. We told them in advance that we were interested in—among other things, as well as the operational side—the sustainability of aviation fuel. There must have been a slightly crossed wire somewhere because we did not get any information on that. We came back none the wiser, but we got an extensive briefing on the use of plant-based substitutes in food. At one point we thought we were not in a military establishment, but in the middle of an episode of “MasterChef”.
Dr Parkinson, can you say anything about fuel, as that is the greatest component of the MoD’s contribution to climate change? What information and measurement do the Ministry have specifically of fuel emissions, particularly in terms of aviation? If you could touch, for instance, on ships and armoured vehicles, is there any data on that?
Dr Parkinson: The MoD does publish data on its use of aviation fuel, and it uses that as a basis for its estimate of its total carbon emissions. Similarly, there are figures for the use of naval fuels and fuels for ground vehicles. Those figures are published and then used as a basis to calculate the carbon emissions related to those fuels.
There are proposals to start using sustainable aviation fuels and there have been trials. There is a lot of controversy around those fuels, particularly over the degree to which they save emissions, and whether the lifecycle impacts are sufficiently included in estimates of how much emissions they save. That is one element of the debate.
Another element is to do with where the fuels are sourced, as there are different types of fuels. They can be sourced from waste materials, but the trouble with that one is that the supply of waste biofuels is pretty much all used up globally because the automotive sector uses it as a drop-in fuel for cars, so there is not much left over for aviation to use. Again, it becomes a competition—who can pay the most for that fuel?
Then, you have the possibility of getting it from virgin material, but if you get it from energy crops, then you come into land-use conflict with food crops, so the industry is trying to move away from that. Then, you move to second-generation fuels, which are harder and more expensive to produce. The resource is uncertain; there are technical obstacles to producing it, and it certainly will not be produced in large quantities soon.
Q68 Mr Francois: Just to save time, I think what you are telling the Committee is that a lot of research work is going on in these areas. However, if you are flying a fast jet in combat and people are trying to kill you, and you hit the afterburner, you are going to want a full-throated response, for obvious operational reasons. So, is there any actual hard evidence of fuel substitution in any of the three services? Has anybody actually started using a different fuel that is more environmentally friendly? Or, in all three services, is this still very much at the research stage?
Dr Parkinson: This is generally at the research stage. We are starting to see some—the MoD has approved fuel standards that include up to 50% of biofuels within aviation fuel, for example, but the resource is not there. To my knowledge, it has not been tested in fast jets. I think the last test was a Voyager flight, so for cargo transport, but not for combat aviation. I think that is another step, as well.
Q69 Sarah Atherton: Just to pick up on a point that Mark has just mentioned, defence, to be operationally effective right now, is a high carbon user. I just hope that the MoD are making objective, robust climate assumptions for the future.
I want to pick up on the MoD’s emission targets. Stuart, you have already mentioned some restrictions with the greening government commitments, but, Linsey, do you want to say anything about those commitments? How do they fit into defence, and do you have any reflections or opinions?
Linsey Cottrell: Well, the MoD’s climate strategy, which was published in 2021, sets out a commitment to contribute to the UK Government’s net zero goal for 2050, so it has not actually set a target itself for net zero. However, this is where it gets a little bit confusing, because the RAF has set a net zero goal for 2040, which, from the issues we have just heard about relating to sustainable fuels—biofuels or synthetic fuels—does seem very optimistic. I am not sure that the Navy has set one. It did refer in its written evidence to working towards net zero, so I am not quite sure what that means. I am also not aware of a goal relating to the Army.
So, regarding actual targets, those are not really being set. DE&S actually have also issued targets for, I think, 2040, but again that is to do with operations and infrastructure, so I am not quite sure how that includes its supply chain. It should not be this confusing. I think that is the point. It should be much more clearly set out. What are targets? Are there targets? What are those targets? Do they cover certain TLBs or do they cover the whole MoD?
Q70 Sarah Atherton: Thank you. The MoD have declared GGC measured emission targets and they seem to be doing very well very quickly, because the targets are to be achieved by 2025. For overall emission reductions, the target is 30%; they have already achieved 29%. For direct emissions, it was 10%; they have achieved 8%. For travel, it was 30%; they have achieved 27%. And for business flights, it was a 30% target and they have actually reduced this by 62%, which we think is probably due to covid. So are these targets ambitious enough, or are they quite realistic, given the current climate we are in and we do have a war on the fringes of Europe.
Dr Parkinson: Those targets are very narrow. The targets and the measuring do not easily match up with each other. The targets apply only to very narrow sections of the organisation. We have, for example, emissions data on the whole of the estate. We have emissions data on the whole of equipment capability. Those data are broken down into UK and overseas. Then we have a bit of further data on things like business travel, and some new data, just published, about family accommodation. So we are starting to get a picture here, but then we are starting to hear targets being set for small parts of that. The greening government targets apply only to the estate. The RAF target applies only to the RAF, but that includes part of the estate. What we would like to see are targets, or at least some indication of what the total RAF emissions are, so that we can see what a net zero target would actually require. You cannot take clear action and know how well you are doing unless you have clear emissions data to track that. The greening government targets apply only to the estate; they do not apply to capability emissions, and that is two thirds of what is called scope 1 and scope 2 emissions, which are the core emissions.
Any comparable organisation would have targets for the whole of the organisation and would have either annual targets or five-year budget targets, and you would be able to track that. That is standard practice that many climate-leading organisations are doing and others are moving towards. Without that clear target setting—well, we are starting to see it on estates, but we are not seeing very much beyond that, and for the supply chain there is very little at all. Again, we need some data on what those emissions are and how they are measured, and that is going to take a bit of research. And then there are the war-fighting emissions themselves, for which the methodologies do not exist at the moment.
Sarah Atherton: Thank you, Stuart. Do you have anything to add, Linsey?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes. I want to touch on the fact that it is a big supply chain with the MoD and therefore all this understanding of what the emissions are, locked in with other things, is obviously very difficult, but I want to highlight what is happening across other very large organisations. The NHS social care and healthcare budgets are about—what?—four times as big as the MoD budget, but they are still taking the steps for much better reporting, including in their supply chain. They have already made an estimate of their carbon footprint—they call it carbon footprint plus. They have made that estimate. So, if it can be done by organisations as large as the NHS in England, there is no reason why the MoD cannot do the same as well.
Chair: Let us step back and look internationally, with Emma.
Q71 Mrs Lewell-Buck: I think this question is probably best directed to you first, Dr Parkinson. Is there any international best practice for military emissions reporting?
Dr Parkinson: In general there is not. NATO has said that it is publishing a framework, or it has produced a framework but has not yet put it into the public domain. We would urge it to do so, so that we have some idea of what it is saying. Linsey can speak to the best-practice guidance that she put together last year. It is worth reiterating that the reporting under the UN framework convention has many flaws and we would urge for that to be improved. The MoD in general is publishing more emissions data than most militaries; it is in the leading group of militaries in terms of how much data it is publishing. As I have said, there are still problems with what is published and where targets are being set. You need to have the two matched up, otherwise your emissions data is not being utilised to help you set the targets, and you are not able to track how well you are doing against those targets.
Q72 Mrs Lewell-Buck: Linsey, do you want to come in?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes, just to reiterate how terribly useful it would be if NATO published the guidance that it developed, which was apparently issued to members in 2022. It said that it would do it back in 2021, so we said, “Oh, great. This will help to inform and instruct other militaries. This is good practice.” But we have not seen that. We did develop this framework to set out what we think are the key emissions. One big problem is that when you talk about military emissions, people just think about fuel use, but there is a whole host of other emissions. I mentioned earlier the indirect emissions link not just to the supply chain, but to when a conflict may take place.
When militaries are reporting, it is important to understand what that reporting covers or entails, what is being missed and what they cannot yet report. If it is too difficult to do, that does not mean you do not acknowledge an element that you have not been able to quantify. You can make some kind of estimate at that stage, or say that it will be done at a later date. We know there is much more research needed to do this, but it is so important.
The UK Government are ahead of others with respect to the reporting that they are doing in-house and the structures and policies that are already in place. They can take the lead and ask NATO to publicise the guidance so that other militaries, not just NATO members, can see it and take steps to do the same. We need to see the improvements that Stuart mentioned about reporting to the UN. It is about not just what reporting is delivered by Governments, but the whole framework of what the UN is asking for. It should not just be asking for fuel use. The categories for military emissions should be much broader. At the moment, the framework does not properly allow us to understand the impact that emissions have on the climate.
The other thing is that NATO is in the process of setting up the new climate change and security centre of excellence. Canada will be hosting that, and I am not sure when it is due to be launched. With that in place as well, it is important, now more than ever, to push this. The UK MoD can be part of pushing it forward.
Q73 Mrs Lewell-Buck: Thanks for that. Where do the UK armed forces sit in relation to other militaries in terms of our emissions targets and climate change initiatives? Where would we rank compared with elsewhere?
Dr Parkinson: It is very difficult to provide a ranking when there is such poor data out there. For example, the US military has published strategy reports in open literature for its air force, navy and army. They include a set of plans and a set of targets. We think the targets are quite weak and have various loopholes, but at least they are there. You can see what they are, what was agreed and committed to, what is being done and where flaws might be. In the UK, we have not done that yet. It would be good to see that.
Some other European militaries are taking some action. I have not seen detailed plans, but at least their emissions reporting is better and they say they are starting to take action. Norway, Denmark, Luxembourg, France and Germany have all highlighted that they are taking action in this area. In terms of acknowledging the problem, basic strategy documents, improvements in emissions reporting and starting to make targets, there is a leading group, of which the UK is a part.
It is hard to talk about leadership when they are so far behind the commercial sector and other Government Departments in terms of a robust counting of emissions. That is a problem, and globally it is much worse—that is the thing.
Q74 Mrs Lewell-Buck: Linsey, do you want to add anything to that?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes. I would say that the UK MoD has a fairly decent track record in establishing environmental initiatives. For example, energy efficiency in buildings has been looked at. For new builds, there has been the defence-related environmental assessment methodology, and things like that. There is the environmental protection policy. There are lots of systems in place, and it has been doing a lot on environmental protection across the estate, and in its operations on its assets. Also, on land quality, it has had a framework set up for many years—since the mid-’90s—on looking at the contaminated land framework and its liabilities associated with contaminated land. When you think that the MoD owns about 1% of UK land, that is quite a lot of liability—especially considering all the historical activities that have happened on MoD land.
My point is that the MoD has got procedures in place and has a history of being able to meet those difficult challenges in respect to environmental issues. It has taken steps to manage that. Something like contaminated land is very different from the global issue of climate, but it still means that you are having to work across TLBs and the different organisations within the MoD to understand what the environmental liabilities are with that contaminated land. It means the MoD can step up and do that, because it has put other frameworks in place. But it needs to have the resourcing behind it so it can deliver this.
Q75 Robert Courts: We have talked about the measuring and targets from a military perspective. I wanted to ask from a slightly broader perspective whether there were any best-practice examples of what organisations you would regard as being climate leading—in the military sphere or any other—are doing in terms of measuring, reporting and target setting.
Dr Parkinson: The most widely used scheme—it is becoming more of a standard—is something called the science-based targets initiative. Organisations can sign up with this international body and it helps them set targets that are compatible with either well below 2° or 1.5° pathways that lead to zero. You are getting a number of large companies signing up, and you are even getting some military technologies that are starting the process, even if they haven’t got to the point of having an approved, certified net-zero target.
Within that process, these targets are intended to be compatible with hitting 1.5° or 2°. That implies total scope 1 and scope 2 emissions falling by about 4% per year, carbon offsets being limited to 5% to 10% of their baseline emissions, and external validation and certification. These are really quite stringent targets. It would be great if the MoD could sign up to something like that, but I suspect you will find it very difficult. Moving in that direction as rapidly as you can, would at least be something. I would argue that is your aim—that is where you should be. If you could get to the point of reaching such targets, that would be a change indeed.
Q76 Robert Courts: That is very helpful, Stuart. Thank you. Linsey?
Linsey Cottrell: I am going to go back to my example of the NHS, I’m afraid. To reiterate, you have the Health and Care Act 2022, which placed a duty on trusts, care bodies and so on to commit to making a contribution to net zero. That has helped to lead the way with respect to the road-mapping for the health service to reduce its carbon emissions. They have set some really clear targets, and I will just read some of them out. From April 2022, all NHS procurements will require a minimum 10% net zero and social value weighting.
Q77 Robert Courts: Can I just pause you there? There is a granularity of targets that you are pointing to. The MoD would say that they have got their targets.
Linsey Cottrell: Yes. The NHS have set things out. From April 2023, all contracts above £5 million require this carbon reduction plan. The MoD are doing that as well, so that is a tick there as well. From April 2024, that will apply to all contracts, not just ones that are £5 million and over per year. From April 2027, all suppliers will be required to publicly report their targets and emissions, and to publish a carbon reduction plan. That includes all their supply chain—scopes 1, 2 and 3. From April 2028, all individual products to the NHS will have to be carbon-footprinted. Then, from 2030, all suppliers will only qualify for NHS contracts if they demonstrate their progress through published progress reports and so on. That is just to give you a flavour—
Robert Courts: Of what others do and a good way of doing it.
Linsey Cottrell: There is a separate but slightly different example: the humanitarian sector. The MoD are saying, “Well, that’s not our core business,” which might be one of the excuses why it has not been prioritised before. But it is worth thinking about how the humanitarian sector are stepping up to this as well. The International Committee of the Red Cross have had for a year or two a charter that over 300 humanitarian organisations have signed up to, committing to tackle the environmental impacts of their operations when they go and provide humanitarian support and aid. This month, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued a carbon calculator tool to help all these organisations to estimate their carbon emissions, and that includes all scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions as well, looking at the supply chain of the humanitarian sector. If they can do it, there are no excuses for why it cannot be done, and it needs to be done fast.
Within the MoD climate structure, it is phrased as epochs one, two and three. I know that a lot of these things, with respect to baselining, are covered within epoch one, which is until 2025, I think—the first phase. It is about making sure that the pressure is still on to ensure that the MoD meet the targets—with respect to the epoch targets; I don’t mean climate reduction targets—to get that baseline done and to start understanding what the overall carbon footprint is.
I was going to mention one other thing. It is accessible; you can go into the Knowledge in Defence portal and have a look at the policies and standards across the MoD. You can see what the requirements are with respect to procurement policy and carbon-reduction requirements. The policies are there, and they have been updated recently. A few of them were updated last year, which is very good and welcome, but the requirements in there are very qualitative. They are not matching against a target, because obviously there isn’t a target and there isn’t a carbon budget within the MoD. How do you quantify what is significant, with respect to a carbon reduction of a supplier or a product, if you do not know what the carbon budget of the MoD is?
Guidance is out there for other organisations—for example, National Highways when they are building big road structures, bridges and so on. They have requirements, because obviously a lot of their structures and projects need to fall under the environmental impact assessment regulations, which requires looking at climate and greenhouse gas emissions. There is a guidance there on how you look at and quantify the significance of the greenhouse gas emissions relating to a project. There is other guidance that has been issued, and the same applies within the MoD.
Robert Courts: Thank you very much.
Q78 Richard Drax: Just to butt in quickly, you have both talked a lot about targets. I wonder where they fit in to the military’s ability to fight a war.
Dr Parkinson: This is a difficulty.
Richard Drax: I say that because we see a war in Europe, which could spread to the west. We hope not, of course. I would have thought that carbon emissions would go through the roof now, as fighters take to the sky and ships to the sea, and exercises all over Europe are taken to counter any possible threat. Where do your targets fit in to the military’s ability to fight a war?
Linsey Cottrell: You may have a target; you may not reach that target, but you need to know whether you can reach it or not. There is no point just ignoring the problem. It is a problem. You may not be able to get there, but that means that another sector is going to have to work a lot harder somewhere else to meet our overall carbon budget.
At the moment, the whole point about the reporting and understanding of the overall footprints is not there. You need to know, so you can make informed decisions about future military strategy and spending. At the moment, those decisions are not based on the impact it has on greenhouse gas emissions, because the data is not there. You need to have an informed choice, so that you can decide whether that is what you want, or whether it affects your military strategy. That is what I would say.
Q79 Richard Drax: Can I come back to you on the data? The data is not there, but it is not the data we need; it is the fuel, I would suggest. We do not have an alternative right now to fossil fuel. People are working very hard to reduce carbon emissions, but right now we do not have that. Until we do, and until it works, is affordable and every country in NATO can use it, and every aircraft and ship, and mankind can benefit from it, it is unlikely to be universally rolled out. The future is surely looking for this technology but, until then, we are going to have to—
Linsey Cottrell: But you don’t not measure it before you know you can solve the problem. You need to measure it from the beginning to know where you are going to get to, and how you are going to get there. You can’t be blinkered about the solution without knowing what the problem is.
You need to know what the problem is to sort out the solution. You need to know how big the problem is. You need to start measuring and reporting properly now, so that you can scale as to where you are above or below that target. It may be an unachievable target, but you will know where you are with it, and you can make that informed decision of where you want to be.
Q80 Richard Drax: Dr Parkinson, do you want to add anything to that?
Dr Parkinson: Yes. It is important to know what military emissions are. If the argument goes that, okay, the military cannot reduce their emissions this year, for whatever reason, such as being in a war, then civilian society needs to reduce more to compensate. There are a number of ways of doing that.
That can be done centrally through Government, through increasing targets for the civilian sector, or it could be done through an emissions trading scheme. The UK has an emissions trading scheme; the MoD or parts of the MoD could join that. Then there would be a trade around emission credits, and that would have the knock-on effect of encouraging civilian sectors to do more to compensate for what the military is doing. There are ways to include it.
There is also the issue of budgeting. If you have a five-year budget period and your emissions on average over that period have to reach a certain level, and you have increased emissions in one or two years, averaging out will allow you to be closer to the target. There are ways of dealing with it.
I do not want to be trite about this, and I am very aware of the bigger problems at the moment, but we do need to ensure that we properly fund diplomacy, overseas aid and those softer areas to try to reduce the possibilities of conflicts becoming armed, and of diplomatic conflicts getting worse.
Richard Drax: Thank you very much.
Q81 Gavin Robinson: Ms Cottrell, you have helpfully outlined how our Ministry of Defence is benchmarked internationally and how the different armed services have a different approach to targets. You indicated that, although you are not quite sure what the Royal Navy mean by “working towards” net zero, they do have something, whereas, with the Army, it is not so clear. Having looked at the Knowledge in Defence portal, who within Defence is doing really well?
Linsey Cottrell: We don’t know.
Q82 Gavin Robinson: At all?
Linsey Cottrell: We don’t know, because the reporting is not disaggregated like that.
Q83 Gavin Robinson: Okay. And you have not picked up anything anecdotally.
Linsey Cottrell: The only thing I could say, from looking at the Defence Safety Authority annual reviews, is that it looked like the Navy was struggling—I am talking about overall environmental protection issues. Again, resourcing was highlighted there, and I just reiterate the point I made before: you are not going to deliver any of this if you do not provide the proper resources for the military to step up, train its staff and get the specialism in there to do these things and to make sure that the data collection, auditing and verification are there.
Q84 Gavin Robinson: Thank you. Dr Parkinson, do you have anything to add? Are you aware of anybody exceeding their targets or excelling in this endeavour?
Dr Parkinson: It is good to see that the RAF have a net zero target before 2050 and some idea of some of the things they are going to do to get to that target. But the target is very dependent on alternative fuels being available in sufficient quantity by that time, and there is a huge question mark over that. The target is not very credible until you have intermediate steps. If you do not have the emissions reporting at the moment, and we do not know what the Air Force’s emissions are, that target looks shaky.
Linsey Cottrell: Can I just add another thing? We keep going on about reporting, and the MoD are doing annual reporting, which does include sustainability reporting and greenhouse gas emissions. But it is unfortunate that the detail—I will not say the quality—of that reporting has gone down over the last few years in terms of what is in the public domain. Back in 2009, when I think we had the first MoD sustainability report, it was independently verified, but I don’t think one has been independently verified since. It is now aggregated into the annual report, which is a good thing in a way, because it should sit there—sustainability is part of the whole way the MoD operates, and it should be embedded in there—but that does mean that there is no detail any more. I do not think the amount of detail is enough. There used to be separate reports, until about 2017. It is unfortunate that the level of reporting that is in the public domain seems to have gone down in the last few years, and I think that that could change—hopefully for the better.
Gavin Robinson: Thank you very much indeed.
Q85 Mr Francois: What lessons can be learned from UK military efforts to reduce emissions to date? What is the best example you can give this Committee of a significant reduction in emissions by the Ministry of Defence?
Dr Parkinson: I can give you some examples. First, to explain, there is some data on some military emissions that goes back to 1990. For example, under the national statistics on climate, there is data on military aviation and shipping fuel use going back to 1990. The most striking conclusion from looking at that data is that military emissions fall most during periods of peace and periods of military spending reductions. You possibly do not want to hear that, but that is when you get the big reductions.
Q86 Mr Francois: I would just remind you that this Committee has campaigned for years to increase defence spending to 3% of gross domestic product—I just throw that in there.
Dr Parkinson: Yes. Again using this dataset, of the reductions between 2010 and 2020, 80% occurred between 2010 and 2015—again, that is when military spending was falling—and 20% occurred between 2019 and 2020, which was due to covid. At the moment there is not much evidence that actions to reduce aviation and shipping fuel use have reduced carbon emissions very much.
Q87 Mr Francois: It is not terribly surprising that during a lockdown, military emissions might reduce. I do not think we are stunned by that. But is there one particular programme or initiative that the MoD has undertaken in recent years that has significantly reduced its emissions? Is there any particular area of MoD activity that you, or perhaps Linsey, can point to? Does the MoD have a poster child for emission reductions?
Dr Parkinson: No.
Q88 Mr Francois: Okay, fine. Linsey, is there anything to add? If your answer is no, we will move on.
Dr Parkinson: I would just like to point out that the data that has been reported over the last 10 years, between 2010 and 2020, shows reductions in military emissions of 54%. That is widely quoted, and that is great. There are four big reasons, in my analysis. I have already mentioned spending cuts and reductions in military personnel. The other big one is decarbonisation of the national grid, which is being done by civilian organisations—electricity generators. That has made a big difference to the carbon emissions from electricity use in MoD buildings, but, again, that has not been done by the MoD. The four biggest reasons why military emissions have fallen over the last 10 years have not been due to intentional MoD action.
Q89 Mr Francois: Okay—Linsey, you have been very patient. From what you are saying, the biggest overall reason for the reduction in emissions by the Ministry of Defence over the last decade or so is because there has been a significant shrinkage in the size of the armed forces, so there have been many fewer people emitting. Is that right?
Dr Parkinson: Yes.
Q90 Mr Francois: Linsey, is there anything you want to add to that?
Linsey Cottrell: Not really; I think that says it all. You have had disposals of the estate as well, of course, which reduces the size of emissions. There are energy efficiency initiatives across the MoD. As I mentioned before, looking at new builds, there is a whole host of sustainability criteria and assessment tools for ensuring that projects look at the whole aspect of the new build with respect to its environmental impact and its sustainability. Those initiatives are all in place, but I would not be able to tell you how they have directly contributed to great reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
Q91 Mr Francois: You could extrapolate and say that if you wanted to reduce military emissions virtually to zero, you could abolish the armed forces. But it could be argued that there might be some policy knock-ons from that.
Linsey Cottrell: Absolutely, yes, there would be.
Mr Francois: Like the end of freedom and democracy—stuff like that.
Linsey Cottrell: To reiterate, we need informed decisions, so that the Government and society completely understand where these carbon budgets sit—under which Government Departments—and decisions about any procurement, whether that is for energy, the health service or education, can be based not only on social and economic value but on how they impact the climate and what greenhouse gas emissions are attributed to them.
Q92 Mr Francois: Just quickly, would you agree that nuclear war would be bad for the environment?
Linsey Cottrell: Absolutely, yes.
Mr Francois: Okay, good. I thought it was important to get that on the record.
Q93 Chair: A rather curious line of questioning from Mark there, but there is a serious aspect of this—
Mr Francois: Sorry, it wasn’t curious at all.
Chair: Well, I am curious, because we face a dilemma here. I am looking at the World Economic Forum’s global risks and, as you mentioned earlier, the first six are all linked to climate change: failure to mitigate climate change; failure of climate change adaptation; natural disasters and extreme weather patterns; biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse; large-scale involuntary migration; and natural resource crises. These all point to the fact that we are going to place an ever greater burden on security and, indeed, by extension, the duties, requirements and obligations that we are going to place on our armed forces in order to meet the challenges that are coming over the horizon.
Should there perhaps be an acceptance that, while we quite rightly chase a target of net zero by 2050, the “net” part is our overall ambition, and perhaps there needs to be a latitude given to our armed forces to acknowledge that they will not necessarily be able to meet those targets in full, given the threats that are coming over the horizon and the timescale that we face? To Richard’s point, we are not going to have the replacement fuels that will allow our military to be net zero, but we could still meet our net zero target as a country. Would you concur?
Dr Parkinson: There is a question to be asked about the reasonable size of the military in a climate-constrained world. That is related to a country’s level of resource consumption, and whether we have a lot of luxury consumption, for example, that relies on insecure supply chains that the military is called on to secure. Is it better to reduce that consumption at home so that we do not need such a large military to try to secure those supply chains? There are much wider questions about the type of society that is sustainable in a climate-constrained world. The size of the military that you have is related to that question. It is a big question, and I don’t think we have time to go into it today. I think that is a question that needs to be considered across Government, with input from the military as well.
Q94 Chair: It goes to the heart of why I wanted us to study this particular subject, because I do believe that the insecurity caused by climate change over the next 10 to 20 years—or indeed the next couple of years—is going to be so significant and we are not bracing ourselves. We are not anticipating. We are still in denial as to the scale of the difficulties to global security, particularly when you have countries such as Russia, China and, to some degree, India not meeting their climate change targets, meaning that we are not going to meet our overall ambitions, according to the Paris agreement. Linsey, do you have any comment on this?
Linsey Cottrell: I agree with you that we cannot be in denial at all, but we also cannot be in denial—I am banging the same message—about the contribution that the military makes to that, so that it is understood and decisions are based on the right decisions. That includes decisions on what the climate impact will be of additional military expenditure or whether you want it to be compensated for elsewhere in society. That is why we want to reiterate the importance of understanding the overall footprint of the military.
Q95 Derek Twigg: I have a brief question following on from Richard’s and Mark’s comments. I have heard various comments you have made, which relate to the fact that we have to have targets, even though they are unlikely to be met. Yes, there are problems: the size of the armed forces is a question that needs to be looked at in terms of climate change, and so on. In terms of the size of the armed forces and its impact on climate change, wouldn’t any Government, because its first duty is the security of the country, decide what size the armed forces are based purely on the security and defence needs of the country, and not on climate change? The bottom line is that I do not think the Russians, for instance, will be spending too much resource on dealing with the climate change issues that arise out of the work of the armed forces, so why should the British armed forces—the war machine, the fighting part of it—be spending scarce resources on that side of things?
Dr Parkinson: Your comparison with Russia is interesting because one of the arguments is about the vulnerabilities. If you look at countries that are vulnerable to climate change, Russia has the world’s largest area to deal with. The permafrost is melting and Russia has a lot of infrastructure based on that permafrost. Its military could spend an awful lot of time responding to disasters and wildfires in northern Russia, and defending a far longer coastline because of ice cap melting. In China, flooding will be a major issue. You will see militaries being drawn more and more into disaster relief, rather than the war-fighting capability they have been focused on before. That will stretch everybody. There is an argument that you can make to those countries and Governments at an international level that we all need to step up and do a lot more, and the military is part of that.
Q96 Derek Twigg: There is a difference between what the country as a whole should be doing—in other words, the policy of a country or a group of countries and nations—to combat climate change, which I am sure we are all on board with, and the issue that I am trying to get to. Why should so much pressure be put on the military to try to deliver on climate change, when its prime aim is war-fighting, or certainly the defence and security of the country?
Military resources are scarce and the size of the armed forces has to be completely based on security needs. Doesn’t that have to be the first priority? What happens with the general policy of a country or countries is one thing—I am sure we are all on board with that—but why put the pressure on our armed forces to commit to that purpose their much-needed resources that are already scarce, when we know the Russians certainly will not be doing that?
Linsey Cottrell: Because you have no choice. It is not just us saying this; they are also talking about energy security in the MoD. The added benefit is obviously reduced carbon emissions. But why is the military so important? It is because they contribute so much—the estimate is 50% or more of central Government’s greenhouse gas emissions. They contribute a lot. They are hugely dependent on fossil fuel at the moment. A lot of the initial discussions about energy efficiency and so on are linked with security of supply in-theatre, so that when you are operating you can secure your fuel logistics supply. It would be better, and you would be more resilient as an operating military, if you could rely on renewables, because you would not have to rely on a vulnerable fuel supply chain. In that sense, there is a reason why you should be doing it.
You then have the added benefit that you would be reducing greenhouse gas emissions. I don’t really want to use that as an argument, because obviously my position is that we need to look at every single aspect of our society to see how and where reductions can be made. It is that critical. The science is there. We know we need to act quickly as a whole society, and I am afraid that includes the military.
Q97 Mr Francois: Dr Parkinson made the point that the Russian armed forces, which are large, could play a valuable role—for instance, in disaster relief. He said they could spend a lot of time doing that, which is theoretically true. Unfortunately, at the moment they are spending rather a lot of time blowing innocent civilians in Ukraine to pieces, aren’t they? Shouldn’t we just appreciate the reality in military terms of what is actually going on in front of our eyes?
Dr Parkinson: I’m not going to dispute that.
Mr Francois: You are not disputing that?
Dr Parkinson: I am not disputing that we should take account of what is going on on the ground in any particular war, but I think there are more things that we can do globally. The Ukraine situation is very difficult, obviously, but if we had taken more notice of climate change to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, as people like us have been arguing for in the years running up to this conflict, we would have been in a much more secure position in terms of not having to experience such fast rises in energy prices.
Mr Francois: The Ukrainians did that by investing heavily in nuclear energy, but unfortunately a lot of those nuclear energy plants have now been overrun by the Russians, haven’t they?
Dr Parkinson: Yes.
Chair: We are wandering into Ukraine, which is important. You make an important point on security of supply, though: yes, it would be a lot different had we weaned ourselves off Russian energy requirements.
Linsey Cottrell: I am just going to interject that if you forget the military aspect, this is the kind of conversation that was happening 10, 15 or 20 years ago about the UK climate Act—“Should the UK be taking a lead on climate change when no one else is?”—and look at the mess we are in now. Yes, we do have to take the lead, and that now includes making sure that the military are included within that.
Chair: The consensus here is not that we are arguing for that: any effort to reduce the carbon footprint of the armed forces would be welcome. The message I am picking up, which again is why we are highlighting this issue, is that while you are chasing net zero, there has to be an exemption, to some degree, for the military, who maybe have to exceed net zero because of the very insecurity that the wider implications of climate change are going to bring about. There will be more insecurity because of climate change, necessitating greater utility of our armed forces. That is perhaps the argument that is being made, but we are going to get differences of opinion on this matter.
Q98 Robert Courts: On a linked point, to what extent can we expect technological advances to fill the gap, so that the military can benefit from technological advances in the route to net zero and reducing carbon emissions? To the extent that they cannot, is this where we just have to accept that they will do a certain amount of good, but we need a properly equipped military that can do what we need them to do?
Dr Parkinson: Shall I go first, Linsey?
Linsey Cottrell: Yes, I think you have touched on that already, haven’t you, Stuart?
Dr Parkinson: Yes. There are certain elements that are relatively straightforward and where the technology is clear, such as building energy efficiency improvements—improving the efficiency of a lot of the buildings used by the military in the UK through things like insulation and installing heat pumps. Electrifying heat would go a long way towards reducing those emissions, particularly as that is starting to be pushed—it really should have been pushed much faster and much earlier—in the civilian sector. That can be built upon, and could be done progressively.
There is also the issue of on-site renewable energy generation at military bases: solar photovoltaics in particular, perhaps wind in certain cases and maybe biogas in certain cases—I know that work is already going on on those issues—and microgrids using battery storage. These are areas where there is established technology that is being more and more widely deployed. Arguably, we have been slow in doing this across the economy; we need to speed up, and the MoD could be part of that. Those are important.
There are also some wider issues about increasing the resilience of civilian public services so that the military does not get called in so often to emergencies. It is kind of an indirect way, but I think that is important, so we need to appreciate that.
Q99 Robert Courts: To reduce the demand, essentially. But do you see a point where the technology will advance such that it replaces 100% of defence’s need? This is what I am getting at: do you see that technology will provide the solution, and then we will just carry on as we have before but with a different, cleaner, greener way of doing it? The difficulty, and the point that everyone has been getting at, is that you cannot have a reduction of the ask in defence.
Dr Parkinson: I think it is very difficult. The technologies that are being talked about optimistically around things such as biofuels, synthetic fuels, batteries, hydrogen and nuclear all have issues that mean that it is not going to be as easy as some of their advocates claim. I could talk about some of those problems, if you want me to go into a more bit detail. But yes, it is going to be difficult, and it is not clear which of the options that are at an early stage of development might be rolled out more widely and might be widely used by the military, or whether the military can build on what the civilian area is doing. If you want to ask about particular fuels, I am happy to give you any feedback that I am aware of.
Chair: Linsey, do you have anything to add?
Linsey Cottrell: I am just thinking generally about other initiatives across the MoD, other than technology. I talked before about the standards that are out there, the policies that are available already and the screening tools, but contract awards are the obvious one: there needs to be proper weighting of greenhouse gas and carbon footprints with respect to contract awards, like the NHS is doing. We need to make sure that the new Defence Environmental Protection Regulator also includes greenhouse gas emissions, and that it is effective and properly resourced.
I think the MoD climate strategy, under epoch one, talked about the baseline for natural capital across the MoD estate, and I mentioned the 1% of the MoD landholdings. That is 1%, and I think 38% of those are sites of special scientific interest. Less than half of those are in a favourable condition. It is about biodiversity and all the improvements that can be made across the MoD’s own estate. That could be a huge advantage not just for the carbon sinks, but for general biodiversity and improvements with respect to the environmental degradation of those SSSIs.
The other thing came out of the Chris Skidmore review that was out this month, which looked at the Government meeting its net zero target. He recommended having an office for net zero delivery, and it would be excellent to see the MoD included in that remit. Whether that could happen, I don’t know, but I think that would be a very good step to take.
Chair: Thank you. We are, I think, highlighting the huge dilemma that the military faces as we try to meet our net zero targets, given the overall requirement of our armed forces to provide the necessary defence in an ever-dangerous world. Thank you, Dr Stuart Parkinson and Linsey Cottrell, for your contributions today. You have added a lot of value and insight into this important subject. Thank you very much indeed to you and to my colleagues here today. That brings this Defence Committee session to a conclusion.