DCC0002

Written evidence submitted by Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR)

About SGR

SGR is an independent UK-based membership organisation of about 700 scientists, engineers and others in related professions. It was founded in 1992 and its main aim is to promote science and technology that contributes to peace, social justice and environmental sustainability. It has published three reports on military greenhouse gas emissions and related issues in the last three years, and numerous articles and related material in these areas for over 10 years. SGR’s lead in this area is Dr Stuart Parkinson, who has a PhD in climate science, is a former expert reviewer for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has engineering experience in the military technology industry, and is lead author of the three SGR reports. He is assisted by Dr Philip Webber, who has written several books and reports on defence and security issues. More information can be found on our website.[1]

Summary

This submission includes SGR’s analysis and recommendations on:

• robust reporting of military greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions;
• technological and non-technological options for reducing military GHG emissions; and
• wider security questions relevant to the UK government’s approach to tackling climate change.

The submission is structured around answers to the inquiry questions, with the main emphasis being on two of the four.

With defence alone accounting for half of central government’s greenhouse gas emissions, what should be the MoD’s contribution towards achieving the UK’s net zero target by 2050?

1. SGR’s view is that the MOD has a responsibility to cut its GHG emissions in line with national and international targets, much as civilian sectors of the UK economy are mandated to do. Our comments and recommendations on how to achieve this goal are divided into two sections: the reporting of military GHG emissions; and the reduction of military GHG emissions.

Reporting of military GHG emissions
 

2. The UK’s military greenhouse gas emissions need to be measured and reported in an accurate, consistent, and transparent way. At present, they are not – as SGR has discussed in some depth in reports in 2020[2] and 2022.[3]
3. Even the statement “defence alone account[s] for half of central government’s greenhouse gas emissions” is misleading since this figure only includes emissions covered by the Greening Government Commitments and excludes all GHG emissions related to the operation and support of military equipment (including production of that equipment).[4]
4. At present, within the UK’s national GHG emissions statistics,[5] the only military-related emissions that are specifically identified are ‘military aviation and shipping’. Other military emissions are either not separately reported (e.g. from military bases, military ground vehicles, military technology industries) or are only reported in technical appendices (e.g. ‘F’ gases from military equipment).
5. A more complete inventory – for most ‘Scope 1 and Scope 2’ emissions – is included in a technical annex of the MOD’s annual reports.[6] However, these figures do not include estimates for ‘F’ gases. These figures also appear not to have been certified as ‘national statistics’ by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), so there remains doubt over their robustness. The doubt is compounded by the partial reporting above. If these statistics are robust, why are they not fully and transparently incorporated within the national GHG emissions statistics?
6. A further problem is the presentation of GHG emissions statistics within the MOD’s annual reports.[7] The headline figure – included prominently in an infographic in the main body of the report – only covers GHG emissions from military bases (designated ‘Estate’).[8] Figures for GHG emissions from the fuel consumption of military equipment (designated ‘Capability’) – and importantly, total GHG emissions – are only specified in a technical annex.[9]
7. The MOD – nor any other government body – has yet to publish estimates of the ‘carbon footprint’ of UK military spending, including estimates of the UK’s military technology industry. SGR calculated estimates in a 2020 report.[10] While estimating a carbon footprint is methodologically complex to carry out, it is important that estimates are produced to indicate the full lifecycle GHG emissions of this sector, and to help guide efforts to reduce emissions across the whole lifecycle, including production of military equipment. These estimates should also attempt to include the impacts of war-fighting.
8. Hence, on the reporting of UK military GHG emissions, SGR recommends that:

a.      MOD statistics on GHG emissions are integrated fully and explicitly into the UK’s national GHG emissions statistics, ensuring statistical quality is not compromised;

b.      In its annual reports, the MOD states figures for total GHG emissions (scope 1 and 2) prominently within the main body of the report – and therefore easily accessible to policy-makers and other stakeholders. These should include figures for the emissions of ‘F’ gases.

c.       The MOD should – in association with the ONS and other research and regulatory bodies as necessary – compile annual estimates for the carbon footprint of UK military spending, including figures for the UK military technology industry.

Reduction of military GHG emissions

9. SGR recommends that the MOD should be subject to the same GHG emissions targets as the rest of the UK economy, given the imperative for concerted action to keep open the possibility of meeting the 1.5C temperature target in the Paris Agreement.
10. For organisational target-setting, SGR recommends, as a minimum, the use of the ‘Net-Zero Standard’ – as defined by the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi).[11] In particular, we urge the adoption of a 1.5C-compatible pathway, which is stricter than that currently used by the UK government or US Department of Defense plans. One specific element of this pathway is that the use of nature-based solutions (e.g. reforestation) or other negative emissions options or offsetting should only be used to contribute to a maximum of 10% of the GHG emissions reduction. We explain more about this pathway in the next section.
11. There exists a widespread preference among policy-makers for technological options to be used to try to meet GHG emissions reduction targets to avoid making difficult political choices. However, the potential of technological options is widely overestimated, often failing to take sufficient account of: the long timescales necessary to develop, test and deploy new options; their technical infeasibility or high cost; or their undesirable social and/or environmental side-effects. This technological over-optimism can be seen in current government approaches to GHG emissions reduction, which is contributing to the UK falling behind on meeting its targets.[12]
12. We also see this over-optimism in the MOD’s Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach. In particular, the options for minimising the GHG emissions of military equipment use are often technically or environmental problematic, not least because of the very high energy consumption of combat planes, warships, armoured vehicles, etc. While some energy-efficiency measures can be introduced, the replacement of, for example, fossil fuels with alternative fuels have numerous technical and environmental obstacles. This is especially the case for aircraft – as discussed in a recent article by former aircraft engine designer, Finlay Asher.[13]
13. Therefore, SGR recommends a major expansion of the UK government’s use of political options for the defusing and tackling of international security problems. In the case of reducing military emissions through reduced military spending and/or reduced deployment of military forces, political options include greater use of: diplomacy; common security agreements; arms control and disarmament treaties; anti-corruption measures; and more defensive military postures and technologies. A key priority is increased funding for measures to improve ‘human security’, such as the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.[14] These measures are discussed in terms of the economic and social benefits in reports by, for example, SIPRI,[15] the UN,[16] and SGR,[17] but the environmental benefits are potentially very large as well. More discussion of these options is given in the next section.
14. One area where the options for minimising military GHG emissions are potentially more straightforward and less controversial is in relation to military bases. Some of these measures are starting to be implemented by the MOD, but SGR recommends more urgency in their pursuit. They include: energy conservation technologies, including building insulation; onsite solar and wind energy technologies, and associated energy storage technologies; power purchase agreements with commercial renewable energy generation companies; electric technologies for heating (i.e. heat pumps) and transport (i.e electric vehicles); and energy-conscious employee behaviours. As military bases are potential military targets, we strongly urge that nuclear reactors should not be installed at these sites as part of any GHG emissions reduction programme. The war in Ukraine is a clear demonstration of the major risks of this technology in this context.

What needs to be done to achieve the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy’s number one international priority of meeting climate change and biodiversity loss commitments over the next decade?

The IR’s lack of metrics to assess its priorities

15. The Integrated Review[18] (IR) states that “tackling climate change and biodiversity loss” is the government’s “number one international priority” but it is unclear what metrics it has been using to define and measure this commitment.
16. One metric could be spending levels. Annex A of the IR – titled “Integrated Review priorities funded in Spending Review 2020” – lists numerous associated funding commitments. However, the largest of these is the £24bn increase for the MOD – which does not have a specific climate component. Indeed, it is focused on funding military technology upgrades and new force deployments, including a more than 40% increase in the UK’s nuclear weapons stockpile, and the regular deployment of British forces – including a Carrier Strike Group – in the Asia-Pacific. These are highly likely to increase military carbon emissions. It is also unclear to what extent all the listed spending commitments are considered as ‘national’ or ‘international’ commitments, confusing the situation further.
17. Another way of assessing relative spending levels is to compare annual budgets. Recently, SGR helped carry out an independent analysis of total government spending commitments during the period 2021-2025 for the MOD, the Net Zero Strategy (NZS) and the overseas aid budget.[19] This showed that core military spending was more than seven times that for the NZS. Even if the spending for the NZS is added to that allocated to International Climate Finance (a ring-fenced part of the aid budget) for the period, MOD spending is still more than five times the total allocated to tackling climate change. Furthermore, the IR had effectively led to cuts in the aid budget being used to fund the increase in the MOD’s equipment budget – critically undermining measures to alleviate global poverty and related problems, and potentially fuelling political instability.

Making climate change the UK’s number one international priority – the importance of a 1.5C-compatible pathway

18. SGR recommends that the interpretation of ‘making climate change and biodiversity loss the number one international priority’ is for the UK to lead international action in reducing GHG emissions consistent with the targets laid out in the Paris Agreement – in particular, the 1.5C target.
19. As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has pointed out,[20] the international consequences of failing to keep global temperature change below 1.5C would be devastating across the world – especially for the most vulnerable in society. Of particular note is the way in which the risks of passing ‘climate tipping points’ increases rapidly above this temperature level. If climate tipping points are passed, then rapid, global-scale, and irreversible change becomes inevitable – and the future of human civilisation itself is threatened.
20. In order for the UK to lead international climate action, SGR recommends that it should rapidly decrease the UK’s national carbon footprint – i.e. including both territorial and lifecycle emissions – as close as possible to a 1.5C-compatible pathway. If this is carried out on a globally equitable basis – and not relying on speculative ‘negative emissions technologies’, which are unproven at scale – the transition would need to be carried out considerably faster than advocated by the Climate Change Committee. Indeed, Prof Kevin Anderson and colleagues from the world-renowned Tyndall Centre at Manchester University argue that the target remains in reach only if industrialised nations reduce GHG emissions at speeds of more than 10% per year.[21]
21. Such a rapid transition would obviously have major implications for the UK’s approach to international security. It would mean, for example, that the main focus would need to be on ‘soft power’ – with priority for diplomacy, overseas aid focused on the most vulnerable, and tackling the root causes of conflict – and a major shift away from carbon-intensive ‘hard power’.[22] SGR recommends that the current focus on long-range force projection, through wide deployment of offensive weapons systems such as Carrier Strike Groups, should be replaced by a focus on defensive military postures and equipment.[23]
22. Indeed, the current war in Ukraine is providing much evidence relevant to future security strategies. For example, the confrontational approach followed by both Russia and NATO in recent years, including through arms races, is unlikely to lead to long-term peace – and approaches based on ‘common security’ concepts deserve re-examination.[24] Another example is that well-organised defensive forces can provide considerable resistance to much larger and more heavily-armed offensive military forces – and re-examination of military postures based on the latter (such as in the UK) is needed. A further issue is that large-scale war can jeopardise lives and livelihoods far from the battlefield – as shown by the food security threat to “tens of millions of people” in developing countries caused by the Ukraine conflict.[25] This alone should focus the minds of international policy-makers on the need to support negotiations to bring the war to a swift end.

What will be the impacts of climate change on future conflict and how are UK Armed Forces adapting to them?

23. The IPCC – in its latest report on impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, published in February[26] – points out that in the near future factors other than climate change will remain dominant causes of conflict. Specifically, in its summary for policy-makers, it says “Compared to other socioeconomic factors the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak (high confidence).” It adds “Violent conflict and, separately, migration patterns, in the near-term will be driven by socio-economic conditions and governance more than by climate change (medium confidence).”
24. The IPCC report also points out that “Along long-term socioeconomic pathways that reduce non-climatic drivers, risk of violent conflict would decline (medium confidence).”
25. This means that – from an international security perspective – SGR recommends the priority should be on measures to improve governance and social justice across nations, while rapidly reducing carbon emissions and supporting adaptation programmes. Failure to adequately fund these – through, for example, cuts in overseas aid – while increasing military spending will, in our view, decrease security in both the near- and long-term.

Are UK Armed Forces prepared for the probable increase in requests for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) tasks as a result of more extreme weather conditions in the UK, and the increased risk of flooding and rising sea levels?

26. Using military resources to deal with civilian emergencies demonstrates a lack of funding of civilian bodies for preparedness. Rather than diverting more money into the military for MACA, SGR recommends that more funding should be directed towards improving the resilience of civilian agencies and infrastructure.

16th June 2022