Written submission from the Policy Exchange (HCL0038)

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Executive Summary

• The question of how to define Islamophobia has risen to the top of the political agenda. In November 2018, the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims published a report that proposed a new definition of Islamophobia: “Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness”. The APPG has urged the government to adopt this definition. 
• Policy Exchange has elsewhere published a briefing note, authored by Sir John Jenkins and with a Foreword by Trevor Phillips, highlighting the serious problems with the above APPG definition. In short, we believe that the proposed definition is not only inadequate but also divisive and potentially damaging to social cohesion. Furthermore, we queried the degree to which the APPG inquiry process met the required standards of rigour and due diligence – not least in terms of the groups and individuals that appeared to exert an influence over the final report.
• The following submission builds on that earlier report and focuses on ‘the role of politics’ and the possible ‘impact of an official adoption of a definition of Islamophobia’ – as per the HASC inquiry terms of reference.
• We therefore outline how the legitimate campaign against anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination has been instrumentalised and exploited by groups whose activities have helped drive the rise of identity politics. They seek to position themselves as the gatekeepers of Britain’s Muslim communities – and in their hands the drive to secure a definition of Islamophobia risks becoming one more tool towards fostering a ‘new communalism’.
• It is surely worth asking why the British state should wish to encourage such communalism – and the attendant gatekeeper politics – that stands at the antithesis of a modern, liberal and secular society.
• Finally, we argue that a number of important questions remain to be answered about the contours and character of anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination.
• It is essential that the problem be correctly diagnosed, if any kind of robust definition is to be constructed.

1. Islamophobia: A definition that will protect British Muslims and society or serve to undermine public policy and press freedom?

1.1   Tackling anti-Muslim hatred in the UK is an important challenge that the Government should take seriously. Over the last 30 years the UK has become a more tolerant place but too many people are still attacked for no other reason than belonging to (or who are perceived to belong to) a certain group – be it race, religion or gender. More broadly, the persecution of Muslims in western China is a vivid reminder that religious freedom is not protected in significant parts of the world.

1.2   To address one particular aspect of this hatred, anti-Muslim hate, a well-meaning group of Parliamentarians (the APPG on British Muslims) published a proposed definition of Islamophobia in November 2018. They called on the Government to adopt this definition and for it to be applied to all the work of the state and be promulgated throughout society.

1.3   In a research briefing for Policy Exchange, Sir John Jenkins (former UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and author of the Government’s 2015 review of the Muslim Brotherhood) set out a number of concerns with the proposed definition. Former equalities chief, Trevor Phillips, wrote a Foreword to the study, endorsing the research and adding his own critique. Their concerns are as follows:

1.4   Firstly, that the APPG-proposed definition will not protect Muslims. As Trevor Phillips has said: “To define Islamophobia as ‘anti-Muslim’ racism means, in effect, that all Muslims should be treated exactly as others are. Tackling Muslim disadvantage demands different treatment for those who declare themselves to be Muslims – with prayer rooms, holiday arrangements and so on.”[1] 

1.5   Secondly, that elevating Islam above other religions, through this effort to codify an expansive definition of ‘Islamophobia’, risks playing into the hands of both the Far Right and Islamists. The APPG-proposed definition, especially if officially adopted, would likely be seized upon by the Far Right as a sign of ‘special treatment’ for Muslims. Islamists meanwhile would exploit such a definition to advance their own divisive agenda, which requires British Muslims to see themselves as both a community apart, and a community under constant threat – whose best hope for a quiet life lies in their representation by ersatz communal leaders.[2]

1.6   Thirdly, that the APPG’s definition, if officially endorsed, could significantly undermine freedom of the media, as legitimate reporting and commentary could potentially be labelled ‘Islamophobic’.  As Sir John Jenkins noted: “a capacious definition of Islamophobia might make it more difficult to investigate future stories like the Rotherham grooming scandals.”[3]

1.7   And finally, that Government policy could be undermined – or even see it struck down by the courts – if the APPG’s definition were to be officially adopted. At the launch of the APPG’s definition of Islamophobia, supporters of the proposed definition repeatedly denounced the Prevent programme – started under the previous Labour Government and continued under the subsequent Coalition and Conservative governments – as ‘institutionally Islamophobic’. It is almost certain that such groups would seek to use such a loosely worded definition to overturn the policies of the democratically elected government.[4]  

2. Islamophobia: A Politicised History and Problematic Exponents

2.1  The word ‘Islamophobia’ is of recent provenance.[5] It was in 1997 that the Runnymede Trust popularised a hitherto little-known term, when it released a report identifying ‘Islamophobia’ as a major problem in the UK.[6] As the then chairman of the Runnymede Trust, Trevor Phillips later recalled, “We thought that the real risk of the arrival of new communities was discrimination against Muslims.”[7] 

2.2  However, from the start, it was clear that many of those most vociferous in taking up the cause of ‘Islamophobia’ held an entirely different agenda. Its rise to public prominence was intertwined with the creation of various new organisations that claimed to speak for Muslim communities in the West – many of which had their origins in Islamist movements of the Middle East and South Asia.[8]

2.3  These groups have sought to exploit legitimate concerns about anti-Muslim prejudice and discrimination in order to advance a broader agenda: specifically, to encourage a strident form of Muslim identity politics; and to thereby foster a new kind of communalism, by which the State would always deal with its Muslim citizens on the basis of their religion above all else.

2.4  Those who have exploited the use of this term in this way include the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and MEND – highly vocal supporters of the APPG recommendations[9] – but it is used far more widely than by these groups.

2.5  Some of the public figures to have been accused of being Islamophobic – or otherwise stoking Islamophobia – include : Theresa May – the Prime Minister;[10] Yasmin Alibhai Brown – journalist and author;[11] Sarah Champion, the Labour MP for Rotherham who publicly raised the issue of grooming gangs;[12] Peter Clarke, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons;[13] Sara Khan,  Lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism;[14] the journalist Polly Toynbee;[15] Maajid Nawaz, founder of the Quilliam Foundation;[16] former US President Barack Obama; former chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Trevor Phillips; the government’s former community cohesion tsar, Louise Casey;[17] and Amanda Spielman, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted).[18]

3. The Exploitation of Islamophobia

3.1  As the above history demonstrates, the debate about ‘Islamophobia’ has been far from neutral in the past thirty years. Instead this issue has been instrumentalised and exploited by a number of organisations, which emerged from, or were influenced by, the broader Islamist trend. These are the same groups whose activities have helped drive the rise of identity politics.

3.2  At the heart of demands for the government to do more about Islamophobia is the insistence that the government recognise these groups as the authoritative representatives of Muslim communities. They assert their right to speak for those communities and insist that the State treats Muslims first and foremost as members of a discrete faith bloc. As scholars like Gilles Kepel have noted, such an approach runs counter to the norms of a liberal, secular polity; rather it represents a throwback to the communalist politics of the imperial age, updated for the twenty-first century.[19]

3.3  In addition, there is a strong suspicion that these groups use allegations of Islamophobia to bolster their own support and shield themselves from criticism.[20] To criticise them is once more to run the risk of being labelled an Islamophobe, even if one is a Muslim oneself. Such has been the experience of prominent Muslim figures such as the new Commissioner on Counter Extremism, Sara Khan.[21] The cry of ‘Islamophobia’ has, to some extent, become a modern-day heckler’s veto.

3.4  Needless to say, this dynamic is extremely powerful and difficult to counter. It makes the job of government, which wants to engage positively with its Muslim communities, that much more difficult. Equally, it serves to empower the would-be ‘gatekeeper’ organisations that seek to position themselves as the authoritative arbiters of the Muslim faith.  The concern must be that the proposed definitions of ‘Islamophobia’ would become merely one more lever with which to seek to exert their authority over Muslim communities. Why should the British state encourage this new communalism? What are the potential costs of such an outcome? What is the likely damage to the fabric of our liberal and secular society, of a set of policies that insist on treating BAME Britons as members of faith-defined communal blocs? Why should the British government deal with citizens who happen to be Muslims through the prism of that faith, or through the medium of self-appointed communal leaders who seek to police the boundaries of that community?

3.5  Moreover, an embrace of the ‘Islamophobia’ agenda is likely to stifle debate and dissenting voices within Muslim communities. Such voices have never been more necessary. Over the last three decades, Islamist extremist narratives have exerted disproportionate influence within many Muslim communities around the globe. To reverse this trend requires intellectual and rhetorical space – to allow challenge and debate. Yet too many of the proponents of ‘Islamophobia’ seek explicitly to narrow the parameters of the acceptable. The recent APPG report exhibited precisely this mind-set with its references to ‘fair and legitimate’ criticism of Islam. Such statements raise the obvious question of: who gets to decide?

4. Unanswered questions

4.1  There must be no tolerance of anti-Muslim hatred or discrimination in Britain. Likewise, one should be cautious about simplified narratives that the overriding experience of British Muslims is a feeling of communal victimhood. In a country where the Home Secretary is of Pakistani Muslim heritage; where the same man can top polls for potential future leaders of the allegedly ‘Islamophobic’ Conservative party; where the winner of The Great British Bake Off, a family TV show watched by millions of Britons, can be a hijab-wearing second generation Bangladeshi immigrant;[22] where 93% of Muslims say they have a strong sense of belonging to the UK;[23] where 94% of Muslims feel able to practise their religion freely;[24] and where Muslims have a long and distinguished record of service in the British armed forces, it is clear that anti-Muslim hatred runs completely counter to our established national culture. Such realities also require a detailed examination of the scope and character of anti-Muslim hatred.  Until now, ‘Islamophobia’ has been used as a term to cover all manner of injustices and crimes. The recent APPG definition actually does little to provide greater clarity. That report takes such an expansive view of what Islamophobia is that it effectively becomes everything and nothing. Again, it is worth asking what the consequences of this would be?

4.2  The potential impact of proposed definitions of Islamophobia on freedom of speech – especially media freedoms – are of particular concern. A capacious definition of Islamophobia might make it more difficult to investigate future stories like the Rotherham grooming scandals.[25] The same may apply to journalistic investigations such as those into Lutfur Rahman, the disgraced Mayor of Tower Hamlets, who was found guilty of corrupt and illegal practices.[26] What work has been undertaken to identify potential restrictions on media freedom that the official adoption of such a definition would impose?

4.3  On a related note, it is surely worth asking how a definition of Islamophobia would be made functional. It is perhaps useful here to recall Karl Popper’s injunction that for a concept to be scientific, it must be analysable, testable and refutable.  Viewed against this standard, the recent APPG definition seems so broad as to lack any meaningful analytical rigour – or any clear boundaries at all.  It is not obvious how anyone accused of ‘Islamophobia’ under that definition could demonstrate the falsity of the accusation.  But if it is not possible to rebut an accusation, then it is hard to see how it can qualify as reasonable, factual or logical.  Furthermore, if an accusation is not rebuttable, then how can it be justiciable? If it is non-justiciable, is it not only non-legal, but also extra-legal?  And finally, is such an approach truly the direction in which parliament wishes to head?

4.4  One final issue that has been largely neglected until now in debates about defining ‘Islamophobia’ is that of intra-Muslim sectarianism, hatred and discrimination. This is all the more striking when one considers that one of the most shocking hate crimes in recent years was the murder of an Ahmadi Muslim shopkeeper in Glasgow, Asad Shah, by a Sunni extremist.[27] Yet the recent APPG report explicitly seeks to rule out treating such problems as ‘Islamophobia’; it pointedly fails to mention the Ahmadiyya community. But why should hatred and discrimination inspired by anti-Muslim sentiments be treated differently, whether the perpetrator is a Muslim or non-Muslim? Is there not a danger that the embrace of one particular version of ‘Muslimness’ might actually facilitate prejudice and discrimination against those excluded? At a minimum, do we not need to know more about the scope and scale of intra-Muslim hate crime and weigh it in the balance of any debate over definitions?

January 2019