HYB0003
Written evidence submitted by Dr Andrew Mumford, University of Nottingham
Defence Select Committee ‘UK Response to Hybrid Threats’ inquiry
1.1 This written evidence will develop a working definition of hybrid warfare, trace its strategic roots, and assess the threats and opportunities that its key characteristic – ambiguity - poses for UK policymakers. The evidence has three main parts: the first section will develop a working definition of hybrid warfare and categorising its key constituent activities; the second section will identify key policy challenges that hybrid threats pose; and the third section develops analysis on future trends in both the spread and the evolution of hybrid threats.
1.2 It is clear that the UK currently faces important hybrid threats that impinge upon national interest. The first is Russian annexation activities on the eastern fringes of NATO, especially inside Ukraine. The second is the infiltration of self-styled ISIL/Daesh fighters returning to their home countries in the West from their experiences fighting in Syria or Iraq. Although acknowledging that hybrid warfare as a concept is certainly not new, this evidence argues that it has now attained a level of usage never before seen amongst multiple state and non-state actors on different continents.
1.3 By its very nature, hybrid warfare creates difficulties in understanding the origin or meaning of a hostile action given the way in which intention and involvement are masked – the result of which is a form of warfare shrouded in ambiguity. When applied to a conflict setting, hybridity poses a specific set of challenges to policy makers and military commanders given the unclear lines of responsibility for actions deemed threats to target states. Hybrid warfare needs a sound conceptual basis because all warfare, especially that involving large degree of ambiguity regarding the origin of (para)military action, necessitates coping effectively with strategic surprise. The challenge is to understand the causes and conduct of hybrid warfare as a means of accounting for the high degree of ambiguity in perpetrating acts of irregular or unconventional war on behalf of sponsor states. Modern warfare may be more ambiguous in nature but this does not mean it is unfathomable.
2.1 Hybrid warfare, as a concept, transcends the mono-causal modes of conflict that have dominated recent strategic discourse, such as insurgency or piracy. Instead, it encompasses a complex set of relationships, dynamics and processes. This evidence defines hybrid warfare as a multi-causal mode of conflict that takes place in multi-threat environments in which states and non-state actors interact (both covertly and overtly) using a mixture of regular and irregular war-fighting tactics for the purposes of extending influence, interest and, in some cases, territory. This goal does not have to be achieved through kinetic means alone, and can indeed be conducted ‘virtually’ in cyber space.
2.2 The hybrid component of modern war refers to both the source of the threat (acts of conventional war that are complemented, and indeed complicated, by the use of terrorist proxies or cyber attacks) and the covert methods often utilised (that are seen as a way of maintaining the ‘plausible deniability’ of the perpetrator in certain instances). The strategic use of hybrid warfare in an irregular manner can manifest itself in different ways, including the use of cyber attacks, information operations, psychological operations, economic attacks and the sponsorship of a proxy terrorist attack.
2.3 Hybrid wars occur when networks of states and violent non-state actors use utilise ambiguous uses of force in localised settings to exploit geo-political faultlines. Hybrid war is political and communication warfare first and foremost. Kinetic effect is a second order issue. It is a term that should not be merely used to describe any or all aspects of contemporary Russian military strategy. It is bigger than Russia, even if they have been effective exponents. It is also important to consider that the Russian conceptualisation of hybrid warfare (or gibridnaya voyna) differs from that in the West.
2.4 Despite some variations in definition of the phenomena, hybrid war poses key questions in the formulation of strategy for Western policymakers. Strategy, as commonly understood in the West, is ‘a course of action integrating ends, ways and means to meet policy objectives’ (House of Commons Defence Select Committee 2014). The need for a strategy that adequately balances ends, ways and means in a policy context requires a fundamental self-assessment of the realistic attainability of the endgame, the restriction on the number of ways it can be achieved and the availability of means. Limitations placed on any of these factors can cause a state to pursue non-conventional or irregular strategies that are hybrid in nature in order to nullify any material or power disadvantages they have in relation to adversaries. By taking the immediate belligerency out of war, via the conduct of operations on multiple levels, and indeed the obfuscation of responsibility for what could be construed as an act of war, the recourse to hybrid warfare is strategically creative because of the way in which it makes strategic strengths (such as surprise and deniability) out of weaknesses (such as economic constraints and a poor conventional military capacity).
2.5 Hybrid warfare needs to be fully sketched out and conceptually understood to avoid strategic confusion, which often arises when conflicts involving multiple competing actors in confusing political environments are conceived of as using traditional concepts of war. Hybrid warfare takes place on multiple platforms using multiple actors. Yet by being strategically designed to circumvent situations that look like or could lead to conventional conflict hybrid warfare will take a position of near permanence on the strategic landscape. Ambiguity will become pervasive. This permanence is reinforced by the fact that hybrid war is designed to prolong belligerency, perpetually frustrate an opponent, and leverage protracted political pressure. By tackling and engaging in hybrid warfare we are both perpetually avoiding and committing to a continuous conflict – even if the prosecution and countering of hybrid warfare looks like neither war nor peace. Hybrid warfare is fought in the increasingly militarised grey area in between.
3.1 Modern ‘hybrid warriors’ pose a fundamental threat to Western states, including the UK, because they operate outside of the system of sovereign statehood that NATO member states belong, do not respect international law or the norms and rules of the international system, and crucially, fuse kinetic and non-kinetic objectives in such a way as to make the use of force ambiguous. Furthermore, they operate in spaces outside of strong state control – grey zones – that make penetration (or even monitoring) by the West difficult.
3.2 The UKs response to hybrid threats is best served through collective action via our membership of NATO given the pervasive transnational threats posed by hybrid warriors. Hybrid warfare requires an increased cross-alliance emphasis on strengthening the resilience of critical national infrastructure. A more integrated political, diplomatic, military and legal response is needed in the face of an increasingly diverse and obfuscated set of threats to the security of NATO member states (House of Commons Defence Select Committee 2014). As such, the response to hybrid warfare by other states may require intermingling different sorts of military operation including counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and peacekeeping. Increasing NATOs military presence in these grey zones would require a cross-alliance willingness to engage in operations that would be politically sensitive.
3.3 The prevalence of hybrid warfare amongst adversaries on the global stage increases the importance of taking the opportunity to engage in unambiguous and on-going talks with states NATO suspects of waging hybrid war as a way of openly dissuading them from resorting to subversive acts. As the military actions of NATOs adversaries become more ambiguous, diplomatic efforts need to become increasingly open as a means of diverting other states from the recourse to hybrid war.
3.4 The rise of hybrid warfare and the centrality of ambiguity to adversarial use of force poses several fundamental questions for UK policymakers in the medium-term. The most pressing surrounds that of the collective security implications (NATO Article 5) of responding to an ambiguous use of force. If an enemy acts by using an act of terrorism, and a direct line of responsibility for an attack is blurred, can a collective security clause be legitimately invoked? The 2014 NATO Summit in Wales confirmed that in the event of a cyber attack Article 5 would be triggered – but can the same be said for a terrorist attack that is tied to a state as part of a hybrid war strategy? Demonstrating the origin and intent to such an attack in order to meet a legitimate threshold of retaliation can prove difficult.
3.5 Challenges to the UK posed by hybrid use of terrorist tactics are multiple. What is clear is that NATO’s (2012) counter-terrorism mantra of being ‘Aware, Capable and Engaged’ for a future safe from terrorist attacks is jeopardised by the dangers posed by hybrid threats. Counter-terrorist awareness will be blind-sided by the ambiguous qualities of modern hybrid threats. Counter-terrorism capabilities are in need of reassessment based on the fact that hybrid terror threats can emerge from state and non-state sources, testing intelligence functions, as well as the notion of effective deterrence. Counter-terrorism engagement with partner institutions is heightened given the mutual threat posed by the spectre of hybrid warfare. This is especially true of capacity-building and crisis management as a means of enhancing preparedness and resilience against hybrid threats.
4.1 Trends of future warfare will be dictated by the confluence between people, place and politics. This author would add to this analysis that the threats will also be manifest in an increasingly ambiguous way.
4.2 Strategic thought is the product of the conflict environment around it. Threats to security today are myriad in nature, complex in cause and frequently hybrid in origin. Hybrid war in the future will arguably continue to try and weaken the social cohesion of target states, including the UK, by using ambiguous activity to serve the broader strategic objective of political domination. As such, hybrid war will continue to hold a fundamental appeal to illiberal states aiming to use the openness of liberal states against them (especially the concept of the free press).
4.3 In order to understand where conflict, especially hybrid ones, will occur in the future we need to return to our maps. Although our era of globalisation renders universal the possibilities of cyber war or the implications of the weaponisation of space, geography offers not just impenetrable physical barriers to the conduct of war but throws up divisions between ethnic groups, boundaries that contentiously split control of natural resources, and borders that create claim and counter-claim to territory. Geography is a prime catalyst to hybrid wars. Indeed, when taking acts of cyber war out of the equation, many acts of hybrid war take place between neighbouring countries, as witnessed between Russia and Ukraine . Geography tells us that there is little reason to assume this pattern with change in the near future.
4.4 In addition to a fundamental geographical element, hybrid warfare contains an intrinsic psychological component as well given the way in which it uses ambiguous use of force to foster second thoughts about a retaliatory response within the target state. Countering the application of hybrid warfare by adversarial states requires investment in information warfare and influence operations in areas of strategic concern. Furthermore, UK policymakers and strategic planners should be prepared to expect the unexpected given its reliance on strategic surprise. Effectively countering the use of hybrid warfare by adversaries cannot rely on concentrating superior forces in a region. Planning must transcend notions of separate ‘domestic’ and ‘expeditionary’ theatres.
4.5 Furthermore, there are several important environmental factors that may well influence the spread of hybrid warfare in the future. The United Nations (UN) has estimated that by the end of the next decade nearly 50% of the world’s population will be living in areas under ‘high water stress’. The capacity for inter-country conflict being propelled by disputes over access to water from rivers, dams and reservoirs is significant and recourse to subversive methods is highly probable. Water is a weapon of hybrid warfare. Approximately half of the world’s land surface contains river basins that cross national borders, including in some conflict hot spots that are also experiencing heavy stress on water access such as the West Bank, Kashmir and the Tibetan Plateau. A hypothetical act of hybrid water warfare would see the re-engineering of a cross-border river flow or the terrorist destruction of a dam that could exacerbate pre-existing tensions. When water, or indeed energy resources such as oil or gas, run low or such resources are used as political tools (such as Russia’s cutting of gas supply lines to Ukraine), we can see how the subversion of energy resources can be another weapon of hybrid warfare.
4.6 Another way that competition for resources can lead to a proliferation in hybrid warfare in the future is via an intensification of experiences of food insecurity across parts of the globe. Tensions over land valuable for the cultivation of crops or grazing of cattle can lead to competition that seeks hybrid outlets such as ‘spontaneous’ land grabs or raids on cross-border food storage facilities.
5.1 Hybrid warfare is a form of conflict predominantly designed to deter competitor states from staking significant strategic resources of their own. This is in large part based on acute calculations of political risk and a desire to maximise self-interest that is greater than the will of an adversary to aggressively respond. This in-built logic of deterrence is re-enforced by other key components of hybrid warfare, namely the implausible deniability created because victim states might be deterred from retaliating in a conventional way because of the unclear lines of responsibility for the initial attack. As a form of deterrence itself, the prosecution of hybrid warfare by adversaries is arguably immune to rival forms of deterrence. Nuclear weapons are not enough to counter the resort to hybrid warfare by competitor states (even if they may prevent the escalation of hostilities that encompass conventional modes of confrontation). This is because the threat posed by hybrid warfare is couched in frustrating levels of calculated ambiguity. This is the dilemma of allowing unchecked ambiguity in modern hybrid war. Countering acts of militarised ambiguity may be the strategic equivalent of trying to catch fog, but acknowledging the way in which hybrid threats try and undermine not just military capabilities but political, social and economic cohesion in a target state shows how countering hybrid war requires a whole-of-government response.
About the author
Dr Andrew Mumford is an Associate Professor at the University of Nottingham (UK) where he is Deputy Head of the School of Politics and International Relations. He has written three books on elements of modern war and its political management. His latest book Counter-Insurgency Warfare and the Anglo-American Alliance was published in 2018 with Georgetown University Press. His previous books include The Counter-Insurgency Myth (2011) and Proxy Warfare (2013), and two edited collections. He has acted as a consultant to the MoD’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and NATO on issues pertaining to hybrid warfare. Email: Andrew.Mumford@nottingham.ac.uk
16 January 2019