(INF0003)

Written evidence submitted by Human Security Centre

(Dr Rowan Allport)

Background

The Human Security Centre (HSC) is an international, independent, not-for-profit foreign policy think-tank based in London. The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

Dr Rowan Allport is an HSC Senior Fellow who leads the organisation’s Security and Defence team. He has written extensively on UK defence matters, and recently authored ‘Fire and Ice: A New Maritime Strategy for NATO’s Northern Flank’.[1]

This evidence will seek to address the broad issues raised by the inquiry, but will focus on the under-recognised point that the termination of the INF Treaty will also have consequences for non-nuclear systems.

Summary

• The US and other NATO nations are in agreement that Russia has fielded a ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 (designated by NATO as the SSC-8 Screwdriver) which violates the INF Treaty ban on the US and Russia possessing ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km.
• It is vital to appreciate that the INF Treaty bans any ground-launched missile system that falls within the agreement’s range parameters regardless of the warhead type. Notably, the 9M729 is believed to be capable of carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead.
• Russia has long understood the potential of conventional precision-guided weapons with ranges that fall within the spectrum covered by the INF Treaty. In recent years, Moscow has modified its military doctrine to incorporate such systems into its approach to deterrence and warfighting, and developed weapons systems required to implement this new doctrine.
• Moscow possesses a number of INF Treaty-compliant conventionally armed missile systems, including some capable of reaching the UK such as the ship and submarine-launched Kalibr 3M-14 and the air-launched Kh-101. Whether the 9M729 could reach Britain is unclear.
• It would be more economical for Russia to field ground-launched missile systems with an INF Treaty-violating range than to depend on treaty-compliant air and sea-launched weapons for long-range conventional strikes against targets in Eastern and Central Europe. Such a shift would also potentially release air and sea-launched systems for wartime use against more challenging targets – including in the UK.
• Without the INF Treaty, Russia would be free not only to widely deploy the 7M729, but also to develop new ground-launched conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles capable of reaching the UK from Russian territory.
• Russia’s unsupportable accusations that the US is itself violating the INF Treaty do not indicate that a good-faith effort on Moscow’s part to sustain the agreement is likely, and transforming the treaty into a multilateral agreement encompassing countries such as China appears impractical.
• NATO’s already extensive range of air and sea-launched cruise missiles, a possible multi-national ground-launched capability, and the potential for enhancing the alliance’s ground-based air defence system all offer avenues to counter the non-nuclear consequence of the INF Treaty’s termination.

Context

1. The US and the then Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty in 1987 – an agreement which required the elimination of all ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles possessed by these countries with a range of 500-5,500 km. By the treaty’s implementation deadline of June 1991, a total of 2,692 cruise and ballistic missiles had been destroyed. As an agreement which bans an entire category of delivery system, it is considered one of the cornerstones of the nuclear arms control effort.
2. The US first publically raised concerns that Moscow had violated the INF Treaty through the development of a new ground-launched cruise missile that fell within its range parameters in 2014. In late 2017, the US publicised the Russian designation of the missile – the 9M729 – and claimed that it had been fielded in limited numbers. It was also announced that the US would take measures to counter Russia’s treaty violation.
3. On 20 October, 2018, President Trump announced that the US would pull out of the agreement. On 4 December, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, gave Russia 60 days to return to compliance with the treaty, and indicated that failure to do so would result in the US giving the required six-month notice of its own withdrawal. On the same day, NATO released a statement agreeing with the US assessment that Moscow had deployed an illegal weapon. Russia has continuously denied any wrong-doing, whilst at the same time raising dubious claims about US compliance with the agreement.
4. Examining the text of the two sessions of oral evidence held in support of this inquiry, it is clear that the committee has been given a solid insight into the nuclear dimension of the potential end of the INF Treaty. However, there has been very little reference in the evidence submitted so far to the fact that the INF Treaty is not solely concerned with nuclear systems. In reality, it bans the US and Russia from possessing any ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles that fall within the specified range spectrum regardless of their payloads. Our evidence will focus on the non-nuclear implications in the European theatre of the INF Treaty’s demise – specifically on the potential for the treaty’s termination to provide Moscow with a pathway to enhance its potential to deliver conventional precision strikes across the continent.

Russia’s interest in conventional long-range strike capability

5. Moscow has long recognised the value of long-range[2] precision conventional weapons, and their potential for supplementing and even replacing nuclear weapons in certain deterrence and warfighting roles. In 1984, then Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Ogarkov, observed that such systems could “make it possible to sharply increase (by at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional weapons… bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction in terms of effectiveness”.[3] However, it took until the 1991 Gulf War for the concept to be fully proven by the US and its allies through the use of weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missile.
6. Russia has moved to incorporate the use of long-range precision-guided systems into its deterrence (as a component of a ‘pre-nuclear deterrent’) and warfighting doctrine. Russia’s most recent Military Doctrine, published in 2014, notes that “Within the framework of strategic deterrence measures of a forceful nature the use of high-precision weapons is envisaged by the Russian Federation”.[4] Russia’s most up-to-date Naval Doctrine, published in 2017, states that “With the development of high-precision weapons, the Navy faces a qualitatively new objective: destruction of [the] enemy's military and economic potential by striking its vital facilities from the sea.”[5] Supporting this shift in doctrine are a broad array of new sea, air and ground-launched missile systems (see points 10-13). Several of these systems have been used in Syria.
7. Conventional precision-guided weapons have now displaced nuclear weapons in certain roles. As Russia’s Chief of General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, noted in November 2017, “Due to the gained momentum in high-precision weapons and current research in hypersonic missiles, main part [sic] of strategic deterrence tasks can be transfer [sic] from nuclear to non-nuclear sphere.”[6] This is to some extent desirable, as it is likely to mean Russia would be slower to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis. On the other hand, a perception that the use of such weapons would carry a lower risk may result in a heightened willingness to use them.
8. When the INF Treaty was signed in 1987, the non-nuclear consequences were of marginal importance, as conventionally-armed precision-guided variants of the weapons covered were only just being fielded and had yet to be fully proven in combat. However, the subsequent proliferation and use of conventional precision-guided cruise and ballistic missiles – together with their higher degree of usability in comparison to nuclear systems – means that the conventional aspect of the INF Treaty breakdown is vital to understand.
9. There are strong indications that the current Russian leadership views the INF Treaty as a historical mistake. In December 2018, when discussing the provisions of the INF Treaty, President Putin stated that "Land-based missiles were liquidated. And the Soviet Union did not have others. The United States had both sea and air-based ones. And we did not.[7] Therefore, from the point of view of the Soviet Union, this was unilateral disarmament. Why did the Soviet leadership take this unilateral disarmament - God only knows."[8] Although keen to highlight contemporary Russian strength by noting the air and sea-launched systems Moscow now possesses, President Putin also stated that it would be a relatively easy task for Russia to modify these missiles to be fired from the ground. Whilst he did not make specific reference to conventional systems, the Russian leader has often highlighted the threat NATO’s long-range precision-guided conventional weapons pose to Russia, and is likely to wish to emulate this capability.

Russian conventional long-range strike capabilities

10. Key Russian ship, submarine and air-launched conventional systems with ranges that fall within the parameters of the INF Treaty, but are legal because they are not ground-launched, include:

• Kalibr 3M-14: a cruise missile launched from Russian Navy ships and submarines with a range of 1,500 – 2,500 km;
• Kh-101: a cruise missile fired from Russian Aerospace Force Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers with a range of 2,500 – 4,500 km;
• Kh-555: an older model cruise missile fired from Russian Aerospace Force Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers with a range of around 3,500 km;
• Kh-47M2 Kinzhal: an air-launched ballistic missile fired from Russian Aerospace Force MiG-31 fighters with a claimed range of 2,000 km.

Additional systems in development include the air-launched Kh-50 (range around 2,000 km) and Kh-MT (range around 1,000 km) cruise missiles.

11. The Kalibr, Kh-101 and Kh-555 have all been deployed against targets in Syria. Their use was unnecessary given the Islamic State’s lack of air defences, so it is widely perceived that they were employed to demonstrate Moscow’s capabilities.
12. Additionally, Russia fields at least two ground-launched systems with a conventional capability that have ranges that (at least officially) fall just short of the lower INF Treaty limit of 500 km. These are the 9M723 Iskander-M quasi-ballistic and the 9M728 Iskander-K cruise missile. The P-800 Oniks anti-ship missile also has a land attack capability.
13. The deployment of the 9M729 provides a capability for Russia to strike targets across large areas of Europe using ground-launched missiles. Beyond Western agreement that the weapon violates the INF Treaty, details on the missile are sparse. It is thought by some analysts that the 9M729 is a ground-launched version of the Russian Navy Kalibr.[9] If this proves to be the case, it would potentially see much of Europe within range of 9M729 launchers based in Western Russia, and most of the continent in range of launchers based in Kaliningrad.

The threat to the UK

14. At present, Russia’s ability to threaten Britain with conventional strikes is built upon the ship and submarine-launched Kalibr land-attack missile and the Kh-101 and Kh-555 air-launched cruise missiles. Such missiles would likely be launched towards the UK from Russian platforms operating north of the British Isles – a point partly reflected in the re-opening of RAF Saxa Vord radar station in the Shetland Islands in 2018.
15. For defence against subsonic cruise missiles, the UK would depend on a mix of actions to destroy the launch platforms, and intercepting the missiles in flight. The latter would require either fighters or surface-to-air missiles to accomplish. However, in the event of hostilities, the already limited pool of UK combat aircraft and ground-based air defence capability would be unable to cope with the requirements of both supporting the deployed force and homeland defence. As a result, a comprehensive effort to protect Britain from air attack would require allied support.
16. In the near future, it is possible that the wider fielding of the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal – possibly on Tu-22M bombers – will add an additional dimension Moscow’s ability to strike the UK.
17. At the same time, however, the Russian conventional threat to the UK is currently quantitively limited. In a non-nuclear general conflict, Moscow’s present conventional strategic systems would currently be largely responsible for engaging NATO targets across Europe that sit outside the range of Russia’s sub-500 km range ground-launched systems. Russian submarines and ships, in particular, would also have other missions to undertake beyond land-attack. Strikes against the mainland UK would, therefore, have to be juggled with other priorities. Nevertheless, Moscow recognises that the psychological value of such strikes may produce a political impact out of proportion to the material damage caused.
18. The threat the currently limited deployment of the 9M729 represents to the UK is difficult to assess for several reasons:

• It is unclear as to whether the current units fielding the weapons have a nuclear, conventional or mixed-mission tasking.
• The range of the system is unknown. If – as has been speculated – the missile is a ground-launched version of the Kalibr, it might be capable of travelling the roughly 2,000 km from Western Russia to the UK. Whatever the heritage of the 9M729, it would require a minimum range of 1,300 km to reach Britain from a launch site in Kaliningrad.
• It is questionable as to whether a subsonic non-stealth cruise missile could successfully complete a long journey through the heart of NATO’s European air defences without being intercepted.

19. Probably the greatest threat the 9M729 could prove to the UK is indirect. By placing much of Europe within range of surface-to-surface missiles based on Russian territory, strategic air and sea-launched conventional systems would be released for use against more challenging targets – with locations in the UK, Iceland and sites on or near the European Atlantic coast all being possibilities.
20. Additionally, a large 9M729 force could increase the threat faced by UK forces deployed in Europe during a conflict. British troops in Estonia and Poland are already within range of legal Russian ground-launched systems such as the Iskander-M. A larger longer-range strike force could help Moscow interdict the deployment of reinforcements and destroy equipment stored in Europe. The British Army’s vehicle storage site in Ayrshire Barracks in Mönchengladbach would be one potential target.

The potential consequences of the treaty’s termination for Russia’s conventional strike capability

21. By fully abandoning the INF Treaty, Russia would be able to begin to address the disadvantage it has when compared to the West in its ability to field conventional strategic strike systems. The US Navy and Air Force, in particular, allow NATO to deploy a huge number of munitions such as the Tomahawk and JASSM-ER missiles without violating the INF Treaty. Russia could never hope to compete by building large numbers of ships, submarines and combat aircraft. Ground vehicle launchers – known as transporter erector launchers (TEL) – are, however, far more affordable, and would allow Moscow to develop a powerful striking force at an acceptable cost.
22. The most basic path forward after the demise of the INF Treaty would be to bring the 9M729 into mass production. There are financial and industrial capacity constraints on Russia’s ability to manufacture missiles in quantity, but these could be overcome in the medium-term if production was granted sufficient priority. The possible compatibility of the missile with the launch platform used by the 9M723 and 9M728 would potentially ease this process of deployment on a large scale.
23. A further option would be to move to extend the range of the 9M723 quasi-ballistic missile beyond its currently stated sub-500 km reach. Such a weapon would prove more challenging to intercept than a cruise missile.
24. The path that would arguably produce the greatest result for investment would be to field a ground-launched version of the Kh-101 – a process that President Putin himself has stated would be relatively easy (see point 9). Both the range of the missile (2,500 – 4,500 km) and stealth properties of the weapon would provide a system with a longer reach and greater survivability than a Kalibr-derived ground-launched system.
25. In the longer-term, it is the development of intermediate-range hypersonic missiles that poses the greatest threat, as these would prove a significant challenge to intercept. The Russian Navy already plans to replace its current generation of cruise missiles with hypersonic models after 2025, and is making progress with bringing the 3K22 Tsirkon anti-ship missile into service. This weapon, with a speed of up to Mach 6 and a range of 500-1,000 km, is also thought to have a land-attack capability, and could be modified to be fired from the ground and granted an extended range. An air-launched hypersonic missile – referred to as the GZUR – is also in development, and it may be possible to develop a ground-launched version of this system. 

Potential paths to preserve the treaty

26. All apparent paths to preserving the treaty are problematic, and will in part depend on how desirable Moscow deems the maintenance of the agreement to be. At present, the signs are not encouraging. The disingenuous claim by Russia that the land-based European element of the US ballistic missile defence system represents a violation of the INF Treaty owing to the theoretical ability of the launch system to be converted to fire Tomahawk missiles does not indicate that Moscow is acting in good faith. There would also have to be at least an implicit recognition by the Kremlin that the 9M729 violates the agreement in order to move towards resolving the situation. The climb-down required by Russia to prevent a US withdrawal is, therefore, unlikely to be forthcoming.
27. Attempts to translate the treaty into a multilateral agreement are unlikely to succeed. Most notably, China has no incentive to surrender a huge proportion of its offensive missile force. Similarly, the security challenges facing countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea mean that signing an INF Treaty-type agreement would not make logical sense.

Potential NATO countermeasures

28. It has been noted that on the nuclear front, there is no appetite to field the modern-day equivalent of the Cold War-era BGM-109G Gryphon cruise missile or Pershing II ballistic missile in Europe. Even ignoring the political dimension, it would take years to develop such systems, and the theatre nuclear defence of Europe can be easily supported by US-based air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and – in the future – a similar submarine-launched system.
29. There is likely to be considerably more tolerance for a conventional deterrent force. European countries including the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Poland already operate non-nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, and both the UK and France possess sea-launched cruise missiles. Deployments of US aircraft capable of carrying the JASSM-ER – a missile with a range of over 900km – draw little attention. The UK also plays permanent host to two squadrons of JASSM-ER compatible F-15E strike aircraft at RAF Lakenheath. Expanding this capability is likely to act as a major conventional deterrent against Russia.
30. If it were felt desirable to create a ground-based conventional deterrent force to mirror that of Russia, the most logical path would be to use the current US Army Deep Strike tactical ballistic missile programme to develop a new system. Although the range of Deep Strike is capped at 499 km out of respect for the INF Treaty, it could be modified to extend its reach. Importantly, Deep Strike is designed to be compatible with M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (operated by countries including the UK, US, France and Germany) and the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) (operated by the US and being procured by countries including Poland and Romania). As such, a multi-national NATO force would be possible to assemble quickly if the political will was present. A ground-launched variant of the JASSM-ER is also a possibility.
31. There are also defensive measures that could be instigated, including improvements to NATO’s own air defence systems. As noted, the UK has a desperately weak ground-based air defence capability. However, deploying a comprehensive system would be expensive, and risk only offering limited protection from the type of hypersonic missiles likely to emerge in the 2020s.

5 January 2019