Written Evidence from India Dialogue (University of East Anglia) (GBI0035)

Submitted by Dr Daniel J. Rycroft, prepared as Chair of the India Dialogue (UEA)

Contents

Page 1 – Contents

Page 2 – Executive Summary

Page 3 – Preamble on UEA and Global Britain

Page 5 – Academic Diplomacy in Action

Page 7 – Overview of the First Roundtable, November 2016, Federation House, New Delhi

Page 11 – Overview of the Second Roundtable, February 2017, High Commission of India, London

Page 15 – Points for Ongoing Reflection, Deliberation and Engagement

Page 16 – Appendix 1: Extracts from the Policy Dialogue on ‘India-UK Relations post-Brexit’, 10th November 2016, Federation House, New Delhi

Page 21 – Appendix 2: Talk on ‘Gateways to Global Responsibility’ by Dr Daniel J. Rycroft, Chair of the India Dialogue, UEA, at FICCI Higher Education Summit, New Delhi, 30th October 2018

 

 


Executive Summary

 

      How strong and how significant is the UK-India relationship at present?

      What does the leveraging of soft power mean to different sectors?

      What should be the main objectives for the UK’s future relationship with India?

      Why is it important for the India-UK strategic partnership to be envisaged on an equal footing?

      In which areas can the UK and India work effectively towards shared objectives within multilateral settings? 

      How should relations between the UK and India be developed and managed after Brexit?

      How do Higher Education institutions self-identify as international stakeholders in bilateral and multilateral partnerships?

 


Preamble on UEA and Global Britain

1. The India Dialogue (UEA) welcomes all opportunities to engage, in an inclusive manner, issues that inform policy developments and associated commitments amongst a range of stakeholders concerned with ‘global’ Britain. In the light of the EU referendum in 2016 (Brexit) and other shifts in geopolitics, it is evident that the ideas and values associated with various kinds of economic, political and intellectual ‘integration’ have been undergoing significant changes in meaning and relevance for different social and political constituencies. Amongst the multitude of social and political forces that define the identities and priorities of nations and nation-states, how is it possible to reach a consensus on the future prospects being developed by, for, and with a ‘global’ Britain? One answer is to encourage political representatives and the ‘outward-looking’ elements of the nation-state as it currently exists to purposefully connect to civil society, business and academia on this issue. The India Dialogue (UEA) applauds the Inquiry on Global Britain in its efforts to begin this consultation.   

2. As demonstrated by its commitments to international students and its efforts to generate sustainability and global responsibility at all levels, the India Dialogue (UEA) broadly aligns itself to the ‘keeping Britain global’ mandate of the UK’s UN Association and related institutions. Having recently hosted a public seminar series on the topic, UEA also welcomes both official and non-official inquiries that involve organisations who propel international and internationalist agendas, in an effort to cohere or integrate the ideas, values and prospects that have made multilateralism more effective in recent decades. UEA notes that understandings of Global Britain – and related policy implications beyond Brexit – are still in their infancy, and that articulations of what a ‘global’ Britain either means or might aspire to are extremely diverse.

3. In this evolving context, and keeping in view the need both for diplomatic discretion as well as for national adaptability, the India Dialogue (UEA) cautions against too hasty an imposition or implementation of any ‘foreign’ policy agenda labelled Global Britain, or some such. This is because the process of recalibrating the (at times competing and at time complementary) domains of the national and the international is not only complex but also demands a holistic, inclusive and altogether far-sighted approach that will by definition need to engage multiple sectors, as well as multiple regions and social groups across the UK. In other words, in order for it to be both productive and sustainable any ‘global’ Britain policy will require the involvement of people, industry and state, as well as their cooperation and collaboration.          

4. With a view to creating the conditions both for a nation-wide assessment and an international appreciation of ‘global’ Britain – whether in view of overtly Global Britain agendas or not – the India Dialogue (UEA) recommends that a new inter-sectoral policy dialogue is created. In these terms, opportunities will arise to sharpen the tenor, and to enrich the scope as well as the internal coherence of different viewpoints, definitions, outlooks, priorities and aspirations. It may be suggested that as an evolving (yet dominant) concept, Global Britain should be given the chance to prove itself as the inclusive and far-reaching policy platform that it alludes to. No doubt, opportunities will arise therein to question whether the term Global Britain is the most prescient one to apply. At any rate, it will be important to identify across sectors those who are well-placed to mobilise resources, and to generate relevant ideas and international networks, to achieve a diverse set goals and targets.

5. As with the UN’s Agenda 2030, which was devised in 2015 to identify and implement a plethora of inter-connected sustainability and development objectives, the UK’s aspiration to re-think and re-energise its ‘global’ influence, responsibility and productivity requires a fresh delineation. The aforementioned inter-sectoral dialogue could be used to delineate UK-specific goals and targets, with a view to making these both compatible (to an extent) with the UN’s SDG targets and expressive of the reworked power-relations and horizons anticipated by advocates of a ‘global’ Britain ethos. As these targets become deliberated upon and agreed, so they instil in different sectors a degree of confidence, and the impetus necessary to move forward purposefully and coherently. In turn, the agenda to enhance Britain’s ‘global’ influence, responsibility and productivity will demand of organisations like HMG and the FCO an attitude of ‘global’ inclusion and representativeness. There may be real opportunities therefore to connect this ‘global’ Britain to existing multilateral mandates for sustainable development and global justice.

6. In any event, the India Dialogue (UEA) commends the Foreign Affairs Committee for providing further impetus towards an inscription of these as yet unwritten targets. UEA will maintain its own commitments, as a representative not only of a national community of Higher Education institutions with distinctively international credentials, responsibilities and competencies, but also of a wider array of international stakeholders connected to and concerned with the welfare of ‘global’ Britain. It is in this regard that the following written evidence is submitted. It may be noted at the outset that the India Dialogue (UEA) has addressed similar questions in other arenas too, involving the UK’s Permanent Mission to the UN, India’s Permanent Mission to the UN, India’s Ministry of External Affairs, the UN’s Economic and Social Council, and is able to provide additional evidence on the future of the UN, as required.   

 

 


Academic Diplomacy in Action

7. The evidence pertains directly to two policy-oriented roundtable events convened jointly by the University of East Anglia (India Dialogue) and the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The first, entitled ‘India-UK Relations post-Brexit’ was held on 10th November 2016 at Federation House, New Delhi in association with Universities UK (International) and the British Council (India). The second, entitled ‘A New Interdependence: Activating a New Diplomacy’ was held on 20th February 2017, at India House, London in association with the High Commission of India and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

8. The two dialogues focused on the evolving India-UK relationship amidst regional and global changes, and were set up as a means of marking India’s 70th anniversary of national independence (India@70). Demonstrating the historical strength, current breadth, and future value of the India-UK relationship, India@70 was taken up as more than an anniversary. Rather, UEA’s diplomacy dialogues on the India-UK relations post-Brexit became an opportunity for shared issues and challenges to be engaged in ways that envision and promote further decades of partnership, institution-building and prosperity.

9. Considered primarily in terms of the inter-governmental ‘strategic partnership’, which covers sectors as diverse as higher education, trade, defence, energy and information technology, the India-UK relationship assumes deep political currency and broad diplomatic relevance in the post-Brexit era. The wide range of sectors involved is reflected in this written evidence, including the appendices, which contains detailed summaries of the roundtables with a view to capturing the policy implications of the diverse contributions.   

10. The dialogues focused on the interconnection (across the India-UK nexus) of the business and higher educational sectors, with the aim of making the contemporary relevance of these interconnections more visible and better understood. Rather than using the term ‘soft power’, the organisers preferred to see both their work and the dialogue events as manifestations of academic diplomacy and business diplomacy, to highlight the interconnections therein. The first event coincided with the visit of the Rt. Hon. Theresa May MP to Delhi, which assumed importance as her first major international engagement as Prime Minister of the UK. It also accompanied visits to Delhi by the Rt. Hon. Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade, and the Rt. Hon. Jo Johnson, then Minister of State for Universities, Science, Research and Innovation.

11. The dialogue ‘architecture’ was constructed to facilitate synergy and cooperation, in ways that acknowledged the specific input of the organisations and colleagues involved with a view to channelling particular outcomes: such as policy recommendations and institutional partnerships that could pertain (in the manner of SDG 17 on global partnerships and multi-stakeholder connectivity) to the topics at hand.

12. The economic, political, educational and diplomatic significance of the India-UK strategic partnership merits long-term re-evaluation beyond Brexit. Emphasising their roles (i) as joint advocates of a liberal international order, (ii) as complementary forces in the development of global peace and security, and (iii) as two states with a long and intertwined history, the relationship between India and the UK is gaining centre stage in the imagination of the international community. It will be in the interests of UK stakeholders to nurture this relationship carefully and in a fully inclusive way, to demonstrate to third parties its far-reaching and global significance.

13. Many participants at the two roundtable events noted that the evolving India-UK relationship is both dependent upon and characterised by new kinds of interdependence, which play out in differently according to the arenas or sectors involved, and that involve different levels of diplomacy (e.g. Track 1 intergovernmental; Track 1.5 intergovernmental plus associates; Track 2 nongovernmental with some governmental input or significance; Track 3 citizen-to-citizen). Advocates of these new forms of diplomacy claim that the bonds of interdependence, which are built into and emanate from India and the UK’s shared priorities, shared interests and shared values, will provide the necessary building blocks for future bilateral and multilateral cooperation, whether in the form of mutual growth, strategic influence or human creativity and connectivity.

14. During these two policy dialogues they therefore engaged the past, present and future parameters of the India-UK relationship from multiple angles: not so much to either promote or challenge the Global Britain concept but to identify and prepare the way for enhanced cooperation in the business, academic and civil society sectors, with the longer-term aim of combining these sectors more effectively at the level of Track 2 (governmental and non-governmental) diplomacy.

 


Overview of the First Roundtable, 10th November 2016, Federation House, New Delhi

15. The November 2016 event assumed the form of three short panel discussions, which cohered around the issues and prospects in (1) business diplomacy, (2) international relations, and (3) knowledge diplomacy, with each field providing compelling entry points through which to engage and understand afresh the prospect of India-UK bilateralism. Just as the contributors to the business diplomacy panel fed into the subsequent panel on international relations, so speakers on the topic of knowledge diplomacy heralded opportunities for an international order premised on the freedom of thought and expression, thereby consolidating the public role of international universities, and their variously non-academic or academic ‘knowledge partners’, as guardians of liberal debate and internationalism.

 

Outline of Panel on Business Diplomacy:

16. The future of India-UK relations in respect of trade agreements and emerging markets took on a new significance in the light of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the European Union. Whilst business leaders in diverse societies have found common goals and values, for example via the Global Compact, the make-up of what we refer to as the international community is uncertain as Europe and its member states can no longer be assumed to exist together as a cornerstone. India’s economic power and capacity is now well-known, but how will her resources and membership of groupings such as BRICS translate, whether in political or diplomatic terms, and in ways that have a bearing on other regions and other international organisations?

 

Outline of Panel on International Relations:

17. Anticipating a new wave of academic and diplomatic engagement on issues related to the UN, such as sustainable development, democratic legitimacy, peace-keeping and human rights, the panel addressed the significance of the UK’s and India’s strategic relations with the P5, the UN General Assembly, and other sectors. It was anticipated that these relations would need to be factored into Track 2 diplomacy initiatives in respect of two key themes: (1) how might ‘global’ responsibility be generated and sustained across bilateral and multilateral contexts involving India and the UK, and (2) how might such kinds of responsibility either translate into or else inform the global ‘leadership’ aspirations of India and the UK, as well as into inter-sectoral partnerships? In the light of the relatively new understanding of India as an equal international partner for both leading and emerging economies, the ideas of global ‘leadership’ and global power-sharing are hugely important, for they redefine the terms through which partnerships are developed at all levels.     

 

Outline of Panel on Knowledge Diplomacy:

18. What can knowledge diplomacy contribute in the light of those historical and contemporary issues that affect India, the UK and the UN, and in view of the new opportunities for India-UK cooperation posed by Brexit? The concept of knowledge diplomacy alludes primarily to three areas in international relations: (1) the role of universities and other educational organizations in defining and fostering the terms through which intercultural and transnational understanding can develop; (2) the practical interfacing of academic institutions with other (non-academic) stakeholders in the realization of diplomatic aims; and (3) the production and dissemination of knowledge associated with various inter-governmental agreements, exchanges and transactions. The arena of knowledge diplomacy thereby has a real bearing on the future of inter-institutional cooperation, especially in respect of both India and the UK’s commitment to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. UEA and other stakeholders/participants are working together to ascertain and further nuance the ethos of multilateral cooperation in respect of their own teaching, research and responsibility agendas.

 

Summary of Findings of Panels

19. Business needs to be a part of academic diplomacy and vice versa: The single most important reasons for a global order to hold out are (i) knowledge and (ii) business meaning that we should actively aim to connect each domain. Connectivity, in terms of people, knowledge and business, is crucial to the success of the ‘global’ agendas. A new understanding of what interconnectivity implies is required, with a view to enhancing the India-UK relationship. This is also the precursor to the possible India-UK collaboration on the larger global agenda.

20. This is why the educational links are critical. It is through our ability to translate the collaborations – into specific programmes of learning, specific programmes of cooperation, and specific opportunities for students and researchers – that we will shape future relations. We need to identify the new dynamics of the relationships between India and the UK not only in terms of coordination and cooperation, but also of complementarity: to figure out how, as members of different nation states, we can engage similar issues, and not necessarily arrive at similar conclusions but at least be thinking – through dialogue – together.

21. In the Information and Communication Technology sector, there are tremendous opportunities for collaboration, for the simple reason that ICTs are at the heart of delivering many of the Sustainable Development Goals. An India-UK ICT dialogue should go beyond business, but the reason why business should be involved in this along with academia and the technical industries, is because the private sector – incorporating national and multinational companies – owns and runs almost the entire ICT sector in both of these countries. If we can find ways to collaborate, for example on capacity-building, learning from each other, and expanding through investment (as per the generous levels of UK investment in India’s ICT sector), there will be a real platform for the envisaged India-UK ICT dialogue.

22. India will no longer be willing to be brought in at the end, for example to ratify what everybody else has worked out. India’s approach is that representatives must be there on the ground: if you want India to take responsibility, India’s representatives have to be involved in the shaping of [the consensual or bilateral approach to] the issue. The question is: do we – the India and the UK – need to work bilaterally, or do we need to form new organisations?

23. Britain’s exit from the EU should not deter India from having a very strong and continuing partnership either with the EU or with the UK. India is now able very comfortably to manage the competing interests. The Government of India has done the same, with competing countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, where India now has good diplomatic and economic relations. Our ability to manage transitions like this is good for Britain-India relations post-Brexit. The most important part of the India-Britain relationship is the presence of a very strong and vibrant diaspora, the importance of which we sometimes do not take into consideration.

24. The internationalisation of education is something that plays out very differently in different sectors. This is one of the most exciting aspects of working in international education: the constant challenge to oneself, about one’s own beliefs and systems. Internationalisation is not a neutral process, by any means. We therefore have to be very careful when we are positioning educational work, for we need to continue to work in the students’ interests and in view of what researchers need, whilst thinking about how to deliver the best kind of capacity for the systems that we are working with. We need to have hold onto that focus in any bilateral relationship building whether that is done through education or research.   

 

25. The Business Diplomacy panel consisted of:

Dr. A Didar Singh, Secretary General, FICCI

Mr. Man Mohan Bhagat, Chairman, Bhagat Global Group

Prof. Swagata Sen, Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of Calcutta

Mr. Virat Bhatia, Chairman FICCI ICT and Digital Economy Committee

Dr. Arvind Virmani, Mentor to FICCI

 

26. The International Relations panel consisted of:

Dr. Vijay Chauthaiwale, Foreign Affairs Department and Overseas Friends of BJP 

Prof. Hari Shankar Vasudevan, Professor in History, University of Calcutta

Dr. Kate Ferguson, University of East Anglia

 

27. The Knowledge Diplomacy panel consisted of: 

Dr. Kingshuk Chatterjee, Associate Professor in History, University of Calcutta

Prof. Rebecca Hughes, Director of Education, British Council (UK)

Dr. Balasubramanyam Chandramohan, Senior Research Fellow, School of Advanced Study, University of London

 


Overview of the Second Roundtable, 20th February 2017, High Commission of India, London

28. The second roundtable aimed to catalyse the process of defining new values and shared priorities in higher education and business diplomacy. The interactive dialogue addressed two key issues that have immense relevance to evolving relationships between India and the UK especially in the context of post-Brexit developments: How and why do India’s new economic, diplomatic and educational landscapes matter to the UK, and to the international community? How and why will post-Brexit policies, attitudes and opportunities inform the mid-term development of the UK-India relationship? The roundtable was organised as two panels, focusing first on ‘Defining the India-UK Strategic Partnership beyond Brexit’ followed by the second on ‘Activating Academic Diplomacy’. 

 

Inauguration

29. Mr Shailesh Vara, MP highlighted the significance of the roundtable event in the ‘two-way traffic’ between UK and India: both historical and contemporary. He stressed the bilateral and mutually beneficial opportunities that await the two countries in post-Brexit engagements, especially in matters of trade and political understanding.

30. Dr Rycroft, UEA, introduced the roundtable in its wider context of the India Dialogue initiatives of UEA, and the collaboration with FICCI (UK) led by Mr Pratik Dattani. Addressing the question of what interdependence means in conceptual and practical terms, Dr Rycroft explained that interdependence is an ethos that works to realise mutual interests and mutual understanding. In the case of India and the UK post-Brexit, interdependence may generate multifaceted connections that have a real bearing on relationship building and partnership development. Looking to the future, the ethos of interdependence both broaches and extends beyond the political, economic and cultural predicaments engendered singularly by Brexit.

31. Mr Asoke Mukerji, Former Ambassador of India to the United Nations, then gave an overview of his earlier work with the India Dialogue (UEA), and of related activities at the UN that took place the build-up to the roundtable.

 

Keynotes

32. His Excellency Mr Y.K. Sinha, High Commissioner of India delivered the first keynote address. He highlighted the long journey that India has made over the last 70 years in various fields, citing statistics and recent achievements such as the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) creating a world first by successfully launching 104 satellites into space in one go. Mr Sinha said that India wants to deepen its connections with the wider world and that the UK should be an important partner. He intimated that this partnership be reinforced through two-way inward investment. His Excellency also touched on the uncertainties arising from the Brexit negotiations that either may proceed smoothly for two years or, alternatively, breakdown becoming ‘a catastrophe for everyone’. He cited the research carried out by the Commonwealth which concluded that implementing a UK-India post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement could boost mutual trade by 25%. He felt that a bilateral trade deal might be easier to achieve than the one India has been engaged in with a large grouping such as the EU. Voicing some of India’s concerns, His Excellency said that mobility of professionals was key for India’s service sector, and easier visa arrangements to study at UK’s higher education institutions was important to attract the brightest and best from India. He also stressed the positive role that Indian diasporic community can play in building and sustaining links between the two countries.

33. Dr A. Didar Singh, Secretary General (FICCI), then gave an overview of issues in developing bilateral business diplomacy, which provided the background for the subsequent panel. Dr Singh focussed on the global context, or ‘the interesting geo-political and geo-economic’ times within which the India@70 dialogues acquire their significance. He highlighted FICCI’s contribution to business development and business diplomacy in India, and that the organisation has been celebrating FICCI@90. FICCI has responded to Brexit by commissioning a survey of Indian companies on the potential impact of Brexit. Dr Singh saw the strength of India’s economy and business sectors as evidence of the unique combination of market, industry, and human capital available in the country, which gives India an ability and an advantage in pursuing the best trade deals, wherever they are available.

 

Session One: Defining the India-UK Strategic Partnership beyond Brexit

Outline of Session One

34. Rt. Hon Theresa May’s first prime ministerial visit outside the EU was to India, in November 2016. The timing and destination of this visit underlined the importance of the strategic partnership between the two countries. As the UK’s international presence develops in new ways, the long-term significance of the India-UK bilateral must be considered both in respect of and also beyond Brexit. Contemporary events suggest that the India-UK partnership will become even more highly valued by diverse stakeholders in future years and decades. What are the political and economic contours of the evolving relationship, and how will these inform the India-UK partnership in the short and mid-terms? Members of the panel made key observations on a range of issues and responses to Brexit. They also considered long-term potential trends beyond Brexit.

 

Summary of Findings of Session One

35. India-UK bilateral relations are strong and they receive attention and commitment at very senior political levels in both countries. These relationships are also wide ranging and cover a broad spectrum of activities in state, private and civil society fields. The bilateral relationship is not only robust but also resilient, as it rests on three strong pillars: (i) complementarity of interests in economic and commercial matters, (ii) shared priorities in security cooperation, and (iii) people-to-people contacts. The challenge is how to take the historical links forward by preparing the ground for post-Brexit relations. There are ongoing links and partnership development activities between the UK and India in several areas of security and defence, including counter-terrorism initiatives that focus on the disruption of financial flows to terrorist organisations. Cooperation in bilateral relations in security and defence can be enhanced independently from negotiations in trade and other areas.

36. Stakeholder groups vary, in terms of their approaches to relationship building initiatives, meaning that at intergovernmental level multi-pronged and multifaceted inter-sectoral engagements are more likely to succeed. Enhanced cooperation in security and defence could be characterised by (a) the UK sharing high-end military technology with India, and (b) India affording to the UK the status of a top Strategic Partner.

37. The UK has a strong Small and Medium Enterprises sectors, which are trusted for their strict compliance to standards, quality and customer-oriented approaches. The UK can leverage its wealth of experience and expertise in making SMEs an engine of growth and development. Several UK SMEs are built around research and development carried out in prestigious universities and, as a result, are linked to cutting-edge work in science and technology. Some UK-based SMEs could help to address the priorities of the Government of India, such as cleaning the river Ganges (Ganga).

38. Preparations were under way for holding the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in the UK in 2018. As working democracies with periodic elections, the current political will in the two countries for widespread and multidimensional cooperation should be leveraged, as and when time permits before general elections and related campaigns.

 

Outline of Session Two: Activating Academic Diplomacy

39. Considering its joint advocacy of democracy, liberalism and a rules-based international order, the India-UK partnership has a particular bearing on the future of the knowledge economy. International cooperation through academic partnerships, inter-university and inter-sectoral agreements, and research and student mobility is widely considered as both a necessity and a new opportunity after the Brexit vote. What kinds of educational and intellectual futures are anticipated, envisaged or promised when India and the UK join together as equal partners on the world stage? The panel focused on Academic Diplomacy and on the mobility of students and researchers between the two countries.

 

Summary of Findings of Session Two

40. Academic diplomacy as a Track 2 channel can facilitate free and frank discussion and has the potential for generating solutions for problems difficult to handle via intergovernmental or business diplomacy. International education programmes generate diversity, goodwill and understanding between students and this proposition may be taken up whether as ‘education diplomacy’ or ‘knowledge diplomacy’. Educational links can help in projecting soft power and the UK has the right mix of subjects and types of institutions that suit the needs of India. Exchange programmes to enable students to visit/study/train at institutions in each other’s country are in place.

41. In the past, the UK provided education and training for a large section of India’s political elite, but the USA is emerging as the preferred destination for international study in recent years. Both governments are tapping into the resources afforded by academic or knowledge diplomacy in their bilateral negotiations. In respect of academic and other forms of diplomacy, there is a need to continue to foster a rules-based international order.

42. Academic institutions can help to build data-driven and evidence-led systems and communities of practice, and provide guidance as well as reliability in ‘post-truth’ milieus. Academic institutions can also inculcate critical thinking especially in the context of the polarisation of power and influence. Civil society institutions that serve as independent critical friends can help to establish norm-based international governance, a process to which higher education institutions could make a significant contribution, for example via a joined-up approach to realising the UN’s Agenda 2030.

43. UEA is developing curriculum collaboration with institutions in India and encourages the development of international perspectives among students. In recent years UEA has provided leadership on academic diplomacy initiatives that concern the UN’s Agenda 2030 and the issue of UN Security Council reform.

 

44. The Strategic Partnership panel consisted of:

Ms Laura Clarke, Head, South Asia, FCO

Mr Rakeshh Gupta, President, Hinduja Group

Mr Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, IISS

Ms Hannah Simcoe-Read, CEO, NVH Global Ltd.

 

45. The Academic Diplomacy panel consisted of:

Dr Kingshuk Chatterjee, University of Calcutta

Mr Richard Everitt, Head, Education and Society, British Council, India

Dr Kate Ferguson, University of East Anglia

Mr Fred Carver, Head of Policy, UNA-UK


Points for Ongoing Reflection, Deliberation and Engagement

 

 

  1. How to facilitate the connection of academic and business sectors, as well as representatives of academic diplomacy and business diplomacy, in ways that engage global as well as bilateral concerns.
  2. How to nurture Track 2 diplomacy both alongside and in tandem with Track 1 and Track 1.5 (as well as Track 3) diplomacy initiatives, whether through intergovernmental support or through global institutional commitments.
  3. How to engage the changing parameters of the India-UK strategic partnership in respect of the UN’s Agenda 2030.
  4. How to involve Higher Education Institutions, with international connections and responsibilities, in policy dialogues to enhance or redefine the fields of global responsibility and social responsibility in ways that promote innovation, knowledge co-creation, creativity and criticality.   

 

 

 


Appendix 1

Extracts from the Policy Dialogue on ‘India-UK Relations post-Brexit’, November 2016, Federation House, New Delhi

 

Opening remarks, by Dr A. Didar Singh, Secretary General, FICCI:

This new initiative – India@70 – was started by the University of East Anglia and the University of Calcutta, and now it involves FICCI. It is great to do this event with UEA’s India Dialogue. Business needs to be a part of this initiative, and we are discussing what the initiative and the involvement of business actually implies. Following the visit to India of Prime Minister Theresa May, there is a need to redefine India-UK relations. This is something that is even more opportune, in view of the global changes that all of us are experiencing. Geopolitically we are seeing major changes that we did not expect (for example the election of President Trump). The entire concept of globalisation may be under threat. We hope that a return to a multi-polar world order is not true. The single most important reasons for a global order to hold out are (i) knowledge and (ii) business meaning that we should actively aim to connect each domain. Connectivity, in terms of people, knowledge and business, is absolutely crucial. There are changes that are coming about. Therefore organisations like FICCI and the university sector need to study this connectivity so as to understand what it implies, for the India-UK relationship. This is also the precursor to the possible India-UK collaboration on the larger global agenda.

 

Introduction to the Roundtables, by Dr Daniel J. Rycroft, Chair, India Dialogue (UEA):

The conjoining of academic and business forces via the FICCI-UEA partnership is setting a new agenda. The University of East Anglia’s India Dialogue aims to develop the relationships between these different stakeholders and institutions. Not only that, it also aims to make the dialogue – through which the partnerships develop – work at different levels. In terms of higher education, the dialogue needs to make sense according to the different disciplines, institutions and sectors involved. It also needs to make sense to the India-UK relationship, as well as to the evolution of that. For amidst widespread forces of provincialism – of social and other kinds of polarisation, and of disintegration – dialogue needs now to demonstrate is value. Given that we have the support of intergovernmental stakeholders, we want to prove that ‘dialogue’ actual does work. This is where the educational links are really critical. It is through our ability to translate the dialogue – into specific programmes of learning, specific programmes of cooperation, and specific opportunities for students and researchers – that we will shape future relations. We need to identify the new dynamics of the relationships between India and the UK not only in terms of coordination and cooperation, but also of complementarity: to figure out how, as members of different nation states, we can engage similar issues, and not necessarily arrive at similar conclusions but at least be thinking – through dialogue – together. We know, through various statements, that the evolving relationship between the India and the UK, especially in terms of the UN Security Council reforms, is very much on the table. In terms of defining some future programmes, there are other areas that we can engage, such as the concept of city diplomacy, or what some people refer to as para-diplomacy, as well. This alludes to the role not only of the metropolitan centres and capital cities in the creation of diplomatic networks, but other cities and other sectors.

 

Key Extracts from Business Diplomacy Panel

Mr Virat Bhatia, Chairman FICCI-ICT and Digital Economy Committee:

After the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015, the whole world is now getting together to implement the Sustainable Development agenda. In the Information and Communication Technology sector, we believe that there are tremendous opportunities for collaboration, for the simple reason that ICTs are at the heart of delivering many of the Sustainable Development Goals. India has a few ICT bilateral dialogues with some countries. Primary amongst these is the twice-yearly dialogue with the United States. This is one of the most effective and regular dialogues. We strongly believe that this is the time for India and the UK to consider an ICT dialogue. This ICT dialogue should go beyond business, but the reason why business should be involved in this along with academia and the technical industries, is because the private sector – incorporating national and multinational companies – owns and runs almost the entire ICT sector in both of these countries. If we can find ways to collaborate, for example on capacity-building, learning from each other, and expanding through investment (as per the generous levels of UK investment in India’s ICT sector), there will be a real platform for the envisaged India-UK ICT dialogue. India and the UK are extremely well-placed, with the long history trust and the background that we have, in terms of numbers, industry and bilateral exchanges, to build this future.

 

Dr Arvind Virmani, Mentor to FICCI (Former Chief Economic Advisor to Govt. of India, Former Representative of India to IMF):

There are three points on the India-UK relationship to emphasise. The first is India’s global presence. The second is about the UK’s freedom from the EU, and how this can help regenerate India-UK bilateral strategy. The third is how this may play out in respect of global issues. When we talk about global governance, especially in the economic or business field, it is very important to think about the two major global institutions for finance: the IMF and the World Bank. Unfortunately, they do not reflect the rising size and importance of India. We know that India is the third largest economy in terms of PPP [Purchasing Power Parity] and seventh or eighth largest in terms of US Dollars, yet India’s vote and equity share in these institutions is down somewhere, around 20th to 25th or worse. When we talk about global issues, unless these institutions are reformed, there is a problem. There are two types of problems: (i) When countries are not given their due share you get things like the New Development Bank, which India initiated. Unless India is given increased participation in institutions like the IMF, global governance will not work. How can you expect India to do a lot on global issues, without India being a full partner? (ii) There are certain issues that are global, or outside the national interest, and that the UK has taken a lot of interest in these, such as climate change or TAPP [Technical Assistance Projects and Programmes]. One positive feature that arises from Brexit is that Britain will be less constrained by the EU, as I witnessed at the IMF. And I hope that this will mean much better interactions between Indian and the UK. The flexibility will be there, and I hope that it will be utilised. The issue that crops up for India, is that we will no longer be willing to be brought in at the end, for example to ratify what everybody else has worked out. Our approach is that we must be there on the ground: if you want us to take responsibility, we have to be involved in the shaping of [the consensual or bilateral approach to] the issue. The question is: do we – the India and the UK – need to work bilaterally, or do we need to form new organisations? Thirdly, we have a lot of discussion these days on Asian and Asia-Pacific economic and security architecture. Again, the UK is missing. I do not mean this as a criticism, but after Brexit you will also be outside the Eurasia debates too. Here is my suggestion. One of the big things that is happening here is the question of the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. The UK has taken up a lot of initiatives and actions in Africa. So I think that in terms of India-UK relations we should explore the re-found Indian interest in the Indian Ocean region, particularly the African countries on the periphery, and set this interest up in relation to the UK’s existing interest and thrust, as this may give us opportunities to cooperate more closely.            

 

Key Extract from International Relations Panel

Dr. Vijay Chauthaiwale, Foreign Affairs Department and Overseas Friends of BJP

As many people have already highlighted, under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership there is a very tight integration between (a) India’s domestic policies and domestic priorities, and (b) international politics and international relations. For examples like ‘Make in India’ and even social initiatives like ‘Start-up India’ have both domestic connotations as well as global connotations. Britain’s exit from the EU per se, should not deter us from having a very strong and continuing partnership either with the EU or with the UK. India is now able very comfortably to manage the competing interests. The Government of India has done the same, with competing countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, where India now has good diplomatic and economic relations. Our ability to manage transitions like this is good for Britain-India relations post-Brexit. The most important part of the India-Britain relationship is the presence of a very strong and vibrant diaspora, the importance of which we sometimes do not take into consideration. Because of the legacy of the British Raj we also have a kind of civilizational connection, which goes well beyond trade and economic relations. And that is likely to be a positive factor [in terms of developing India-Britain relations]. The flip side is that a lot of uncertainties are involved, notably from Britain’s side about the future shape of Brexit. In today’s fast-moving and multi-polar world, where India is trying to develop country-to-country and region-to-region partnerships, and to develop new civilizational connections, India is unlikely to wait. We are interested in developing good partnerships, so we are all concerned that if Brexit takes more time, it will complicate matters from Britain’s point of view. If we evaluate the visit of PM Theresa May, we don’t see a lot of significant movement, even though the intentions expressed by Britain were very positive. We can clearly see the impact of the Brexit uncertainties: the lack of progress in either direction. If you put the issue of UK education in that context, it becomes much more complicated, because of the denial to give the work permits to Indian students. There are several multilateral ways to strengthen this relationship, apart from education (policy). The issue of skill development has already been discussed here. The use of dual purpose technologies – for which the UK might have previously been restricted as a part of the EU – could be important. Because India needs access to such technologies, from wherever possible, this is something that we should look for, especially if the UK could come out of the EU restrictions. In the case of infrastructure, the UK can develop new collaborative plans with India. Post-Brexit, the picture is mixed. It is certainly not rosy. It is on the edge of uncertainty, and most likely we will have to live with these uncertainties for at least two or three years, until we have more clarity. 

 

Key Extract from Knowledge Diplomacy Panel

Prof Rebecca Hughes, Head of Education, British Council:

As soon as you start to use the term diplomacy, you are positioning your conversation in spaces related to the nation-state or, as we are talking about here, more complex multilateral relationships across borders. So, it is very interesting how you then position academic work or indeed schools level work. The internationalisation of education is something that plays out very differently in different sectors. I was really pleased to hear the word ‘values’ being used, as we are thinking about how we transfer, share, and build new expertise as parts of internationalisation. Quite subtly, we also explore some of the contrasting sets of values that we take for granted. It is particularly through international engagement in education that the contrasts between what your and others’ beliefs about the world, and what your and others’ values-system are, become apparent. If we are doing international education well, we are actually changing one another’s thinking about the world, about ourselves, about what we take for granted, about what is normal, and what is evidence. This is one of the most exciting aspects of working in international education: the constant challenge to oneself, about one’s own beliefs and systems. Internationalisation is not a neutral process, by any means. We therefore have to be very careful when we are positioning educational work, for we need to continue to group our work in the students’ interests and what researchers need, and how to deliver the best kind of capacity for the system that we are working with. We need to have hold onto that focus in any bilateral relationship-building that is done through education or research. We are moving away from quite traditional models of international education, based on mobility, campus development, curricula, and open on-line courses, and we are seeing new patterns of [strategic] internationalisation. These are to do with the drawing in and reaching out to different parts of the globe. The ASEAN is of increased interest to the UK system. The UK is working harder at its EU relationship than ever before. The Commonwealth is also relevant. These are really good things. Very interestingly, things are happening around the Anglo-sphere, or where there is a strength in the English language, which is a fantastic tool for developing international education activities. Understanding people who are very different from ourselves also links into how we respond to some of the splits that have happened recently, for example the EU and Scotland referenda. These make us question how we are dealing with our own populations when we talk about internationalisation and opportunities.

November 2018


Appendix 2

Talk on ‘Gateways to Global Responsibility’ by Dr Daniel J. Rycroft, Chair of India Dialogue, University of East Anglia, at FICCI Higher Education Summit, New Delhi, 30th October 2018

 

I will be speaking with you today about the role of international universities in cultivating – amongst their students and faculty – a clear sense of world citizenship. In doing so, they enhance the value of world citizenship by making it current and resonant, and the means through which shared concerns are addressed and, one might hope, resolved. The talk responds to the Government of India’s mission statement for its evolving higher education system: to engage ‘values that promote responsible citizenship’ so that all students ‘participate in the development process and respond to the emerging global challenges’. Our primary contention is that if universities chose to prioritise the pathways signposted ‘world citizenship’, they are better equipped to fulfil their duties to society. Full expositions of these ideas can be found in the Global University Network for Innovation’s documents on academic responsibility. The mandate that privileges universities as vehicles of responsible world-making itself is enshrined in the United Nations as one criteria for what is calls ‘academic impact’. So, my talk aims to instil confidence in the proposition that universities can and should align their strategies with such long-term and global futures.

I speak today about the challenge of making global responsibility a more prominent part of our university-level international partnerships. I speak as a member of the UK-India Business Council’s delegation, which is involved in advocacy work around India’s new Higher Education policy, and as a permanent member of the University of East Anglia’s international executive, tasked with implementing our Vision 2030. The University of East Anglia has reached this point by virtue of our international collaborations with preeminent academic, industry and policy partners such as FICCI and the UN’s Economic and Social Council. Inasmuch, world citizenship and global responsibility sit at the heart of UEA’s Vision 2030. It is a vision that seeks to create, via international partnership development, university-level commitments for future transnational and transdisciplinary teaching and research. Our Vision 2030 was written into our international strategy at the same time as FICCI issued its own Vision 2030 document and the United Nations inaugurated their 2030 Agenda.

This timing was no coincidence, given that some members of the UN and FICCI comprise some of our major knowledge exchange partners. The 2030 targets force us to consider the medium- and long-term futures facing not only our institutions, as centres of knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and of knowledge exchange, but also the international community and the planet as a whole. We advocate a world citizenship that pertains to an awareness of the interconnected nature of the global condition, and to the capacity of individuals, groups, institutions and society at large to shape their own futures as mobile, cosmopolitan, and mutually engaged entities. We acknowledge that world citizenship is a rather peculiar condition, defined as much by diversity and difference as by unity and togetherness. In all contexts, however, it lends itself to a refinement of a particularly human consciousness: a sensitivity to the interests, needs, aspirations, visions and capabilities of others; to the development of international understanding; and to what early practitioners at UNESCO called the ‘world mind’. The present role of Higher Education Institutions, and their capacity to generate international and sustainable partnerships, is here brought into focus. HEIs have a specific role to play in defining, shaping and implementing projects that broach these kinds of shared futures. We can go so far as to say that international university partnerships are, almost by definition, ‘gateways to global responsibility’. They nourish what cooperation, collaboration and convergence offers, not only for our lives and economies in the present, but also for future generations.

We all prioritise the international, not at the expense of the national, but as the necessary cohesion that provides our institutions and students with the relatively transportable and transformative rationale that we coexist: that we are working and developing together. In our Higher Education sector, we call these meaningful connections ‘partnerships’. They may involve non-academic sectors, whether as knowledge partners or as more clearly defined stakeholders: stakeholders in a future world that requires constant re-making. The prospect of global responsibility requires further nuancing, not only at policy level but also across different levels of academia. This is why I am advocating agendas that enable universities and academics to envisage new methods of inter-sectoral engagement, delivery and implementation. These agendas are in the process of being made and for us they appear under the auspices of University Social Responsibility.  

Interestingly, our understanding of social responsibility may benefit greatly if we refer closely to India’s new Higher Education policy document, which clearly set out possibilities for the Higher Education sector, involving old and new universities alike, to become torchbearers of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals: in particular SDG 4 on global citizenship education, SDG 16 on public institutions and public goods, and SDG 17 on global partnerships and global interdependence. The Government of India’s 2016 document, entitled Some Inputs for Draft National Education Policy, is remarkable in its capacity to link present-day concerns not only to earlier articulations of Higher Education policy in India, which made India’s educational heritage – complete with integrationist ideas and value systems – resonate at national and international levels, but also to link present and future global challenges. There is, quite rightly talk of ‘world knowledge’ being shaped in India, and of higher education cultivating ‘moral and social values’ that codify and propel the relation between knowledge and the lives ‘of the people’. Given decades of decolonisation and nation building in India, the references to social heritage and social reconstruction are very powerful, especially when contemporary threats to social equality and social inclusion are taken up. One element of university social responsibility therefore is to address these global challenges, both together with each other, and together with the future citizens of the world, as if they were co-present with us. For sure, a leap of the imagination is required, but it is one that interestingly also finds its way into discussions of India’s future Higher Education policy complete with the challenge of combining local and global citizenship agendas.

So, one might contend that universities need to work harder, to fulfil the vision, whether as individual and independent institutions or as connected and interdependent entities that enrich the complexity and the value of world knowledge. In doing so, I would argue that they become vehicles for what a former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, termed ‘international democracy’. International democracy was a phrase made famous by Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary General of the United Nations in his efforts to create an Agenda for Democratisation. This Agenda was issued in the 1990s as a sequel to the Agenda for Peace. As the reform of the United Nations is now underway, under the leadership or Antonio Guterres, and given that the UN’s own 2030 Agenda to implement the Sustainable Development Goals is now moving ahead with some purpose, as international universities we are better placed to consider how and why we should cooperate. Interestingly, the Agenda for Democratisation earmarked the need for enhanced cooperation and dialogue between such stakeholder groups as academia, business and journalism who nowadays may quite legitimately see themselves as facilitators of sustainable development, global governance and sustainable peace. Our shared partnership objectives, therefore, should focus not only on the social and global contours of the agenda for democratisation in all of its forms, which surely have a clear bearing on many of our key disciplines and skill sets, but also on the agendas of social and global responsibility that universities might recognise rather differently from other stakeholders.

We need to reach a conclusion whereby universities become better equipped to see themselves as the harbingers of future peace: as alert to and willing to broach the challenges that confront internationalism, as well as humanity’s ‘moral and intellectual solidarity’ (quoting Government of India, 1948 preface, ‘UNESCO in India’). As such they transcend national boundaries and reach out to involve and engage broad ideals like sustainable human development, and socio-economic and environmental justice. International democracy thereby becomes the means and the ends of higher education as an international entity. It makes international higher education relevant and marketable across borders. As higher education becomes global, an as international students become conscious of their participation in the making of global citizenship, academia inevitably has to address the parameters of its new responsibilities. International democracy therein becomes the conceptual linkage that connects not only citizens of different nation-states or of diverse regions, but also the world’s citizens to the world’s shared problems.

 

 

 

 

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