FKN0115 - Evidence on Disinformation and ‘fake news’

Written evidence submitted by Mike Kiely

Trident Debate July 18th 2016: Fact or Fiction - Analysis of the arguments made by MPs supporting the replacement of Vanguard submarines.

Thanks for the opportunity to make a written submission to the inquiry on ‘Fake News’. I found Parliaments debate on the replacement of the Trident-Vanguards submarines in July 2016 deeply partisan, packed with arguments which were flaky at best. I have gone through Hansard record of that debate, grouped the MPs name next the argument they were supporting or repeating, paraphrased the argument and provided an analysis of what I could find in the MOD submissions, and reports by BASIC and the Nuclear Information Service. The gap between the argument relied upon and the supporting evidence appears huge.

What is Fake News? I think it is any opinion or declaration which is not informed by rigorous analysis and the facts available. The fundamental hubris relied upon in the July18th Trident debate, meant the fundamental question on whether the current ‘several days to launch’ status could not be extended to ‘several weeks or several months to launch’. The facts would support such a question but it was never raised. If they were it would be permit the MOD some flexibility in re-defining the UK Deterrent for a post cold-war era.

Impact of Fake News? The change in posture of the UK Doomsday Machine in 1994, (de-targeting if all nuclear missiles, thus cancelling the NATO operational plan) could if it was transparently reported resulted in two further peace dividends, - savings from relaxing the continuous at sea patrols, and the cancellation of the production of at least 100 W76 100 kt nuclear warheads at Aldermaston produced between 1994 and 1998.

Fake News has meant the UK has missed significant cost savings over 24 years and is likely to waste billions of tax payers funds in the next 40 years if the fake news is not replaced by informed debate.

Introduction

The end of the cold-war in 1991 and the subsequent de-targeting of the UK’s Doomsday Machine(Trident Missiles and warheads) in 1994 and consequential cancellation of the NATO operational plan for the UK’s Doomsday Machine (Nuclear Deterrent), for some reason did not result in a change to the Continuous At Sea patrols costing some £xbn a year.

The lack of a Stalin-esque or Hitler-like existential threat suggests that turning the UK’s Doomsday Machine (Nuclear Deterrent) back on with an approved target list with the blessing of Parliament is highly problematic. None of these matters were discussed during the July 18th 2016 debate on the replacement of the platform element (submarines) of the UK Doomsday Machine.

This is an initial analysis of the Parliamentary debate on Trident (submarine replacement) held on 18th July 2016. Submarines are the platform element of the UK’s Doomsday Machine.

Column 1 outlines who in Parliament spoke in support of replacing the Trident- submarine platform element of the UK’s Doomsday machine. Column 2 paraphrases the argument. Column 3 is seeking to identify what is true, what is more truthful and provides some direction in terms of whether CASD can be relaxed or the UK Doomsday Machine put on a certain strategic and legal footing.

The July 2016 debate occurred just after Theresa May became PM. The debate was used to bring the Tory party together on something it could agree on, while using it to highlight the divergence of opinion in the Labour Party. The debate only occasionally touched upon the threat in the next 30 years (unknown) and how to define or build and manage a Doomsday Machine (nuclear deterrent) in a post cost war period where there is no Hitler-like or Stalin-esque threat.

Current UK policy separates the UK’s independent Doomsday Machine (Deterrent) from is obligations under Art VI, NPT. The former trumps the latter, rather than seeking an alignment to it. The UK Doomsday Machine (nuclear deterrent) replacement is a high-end survivable second -strike capability tuned around a 30-minute launch on warning process to begin a thermonuclear war to end civilisation as we understand it. This is as opposed to a cheaper ‘launch on(after) attack system (for example), which is consistent with the current ‘several days to launch’.

While there appears no legal means to use Nuclear Warheads designed to destroy civilian populations, no effort was made to examine or define ‘minimum’ or minimal in a post-cold war era. Minimum is assumed to be a direct replacement of what already exists. It should be appropriate in the post-cold war era to seek out a minimal deterrent in route to meeting commitment under NPR article VI. The Trident Commission for some reason took as it starting point a CASD as the minimum. This is most odd when the current Tridents have not carried a live mission trajectory throughout their operating lives.

This analysis suggests the UK MOD should be permitted to propose alternatives and released from the burden of CASD where for 24 years there has been no NATO operational plan (agreed target list) for the UK’s independent Doomsday machine. All missiles have been de-targeted and system if a means exists to approve ‘excess incidentals deaths’ is ‘several days from launch’.

A decision on submarine building carried with it a decision on nuclear posture for next 60 years, while avoiding the obligations of article VI of NPT, the ending of the cold war in 1991, and no supporting NATO operational plan for the UK’s Doomsday Machine.

The UK Government and Parliament seems to be going to great lengths to rebuild elements of a Doomsday Machine while presenting it in the form of an icon. The submarines are the UK’s ‘space shuttle’. Aldermaston is not a nuclear bomb factory but largely a research centre. Presenting a Doomsday Machine as a union jack wrapped industrial icon is highly problematic. It prevents scrutiny and prudent decision making. A Doomsday Machine presented as an icon blocks the understanding that the iconic Vanguard submarines have not had a live target in their twenty-four years of existence. The iconic status prevents us from questioning the manufacture of 100 W76 warheads between 1994 and 1999 when the Doomsday Machine no longer had an approved NATO operational plan and has not had one since. The iconic status prevents us from questioning why Aldermaston costs at least £1bn a year where its principal contribution is the manufacture of 1 replacement warhead a year, the destruction of 2 existing warheads a year and maintenance of the c200 warheads, half of which were produced after the UK Doomsday Machine was de-targeted in 1994. The latter removed the need for half the stockpile built.

If we are to address Fake News, then the re-building of the UK Doomsday machine(nuclear deterrent) is a good place to start.

Mike Kiely, Battersea

November 2018

Proponents July 2016 Ministers and MPs	Arguments relied upon July 18th - 2016	Relevance to UK Nuclear Deterrent and UK Defence Industrial Base.
PM, Woodcock (B in F) Paisley (N. Antrim) Jones (N Durham) Morris (More & Luns) Metcalfe (S. Bas and TH), Dakin (Skun) Angela Smith (Sheff) Perkins (Chfield) Flello (S. Stoke-oT) Mercer (Plymth) Chalk (Chelt) Jenrick (Nwrk) Foster (Tbay) Smeeth (S-o-T N) Jim Shannon (DUP) Benyon (Nbury) Howlett (Bath) L-Buck (S. Shds) Kinnock (Abrvn	Importance to UK Defence industrial Base – skilled engineering jobs 30,000 jobs in 350 constituencies 275 local companies, 1,500 nationally Steel? Catchelco Devonport 800 companies 20 companies in NE 26k jobs, 13k in advanced manuf., 1000 businesses in 450 towns across UK	Jobs do not of themselves justify replacing a Doomsday Machine. 85% UK supply chain but 60% (referenced but no verification by value) components could be non-UK including the steel for the hulls. Command and control (Draper Labs, US) Guidance systems (Draper), AF&T MC2912 (Sandia), missile (Lockheed-US), components pf the warheads (neutron generator-Sandia) and much of the design will be US, steel for missiles tubes will be French –(Industeel -Arcelor/Mittel). US can supply parts for Nuclear Propulsion, replacement cores – I assume Rolls Royce has freedom to source US components and design for PWR3 if not copy and build from US. The design and source of the missile silos should be specified. The proportion of the proposed £180-£200bn spent on UK industry should be specified. Cathelco (Chstfiedl) 176 employees owned by EVA (Finland) Pipework for ships, Ballast and water treatment. Ultra Electronics –( Rugeley, Hybrid -£37m electric propulsion system subcontract to BAE) Royal Navy 2,000 Babcock HMNB Clyde (Faslane) – 3,500, 8,200 by 2022; BAE Barrow 7,000; AWE, Aldermaston, Burghfield, 6,000 (Lockheed) - Missile Warhead costs =£1.4bn pa, c£26m pa per missile and 3 warheads. Apart from warhead mixture EDC3753 – possibly switching to PBX9501 variant it is not clear what AWE adds. Babcock HMNB Devonport, 2,500. Rolls Royce (Raynesway PWR3) 1,300 Doomsday machine as a job creation exercise does not appear the most effective use of skilled engineering resource.
PM, Cartlidge (S. Suff) Reed (Copeland) Lewis	our ultimate insurance against nuclear attack	Operationally the Doomsday Machine can only be used in a graduated response following US/NATO lead. Ignores article VI of the NPT Ignores the enormous over capacity of 14 SLBMs versus 6 in the North Atlantic. The ’insurance’ assumes signing up to mass suicide pact and the planning of that outcome, none of which is under Parliamentary oversight. ..assumes a Hitler-like or Stalin-esque type threat. No current Tier 1 threat.
May, Gapes, Moon (Car)	Nuclear threat has increased	Russian no longer considered a Tier 1 threat. Missiles and warheads de-targeted since 1994 triggered by Major/Clinton. Russia has to replace out of date equipment so some upgrade will occur. Ignores the lack of an existential threat historically represented by a Stalin-esque or Hitler-like figures. Putin may wish to make Russia great again, but this is not Communist dictatorship seeking global domination.
May, Mercer (Plymth)	Unknown threats in the next 30 years	Suggests an opportunity to relax CASD until threat emerges. This is more compatible with ‘several days to launch’ posture. May provide time to design less expensive real-time system, not reliant on such a flaky construct as deterrence. Vanguards if posture relaxed, propulsion system will last longer providing extra time for renewal if needed.
May	Obligation to provide NATO allies with an umbrella of a nuclear deterrent	There is no NATO operational plan for the UK Doomsday Machine (nuclear deterrent) since 1994. Room to seek options, no UK umbrella needed since 1994. NATO Article V guarantee has not been defined. This does not address the 14 v 5/6 submarine (SLBM) imbalance in the North Atlantic.
May	Cannot ask French /US to put their cities at risk if asked to defend UK.	This assumes there is threat of the UK becoming a standalone target for Russia and Russia will advance on the UK while not first going to France – for example. It also assumes there is no existing overlap or imbalance in resources. E.g 14 SLBM subs versus 6 in the North Atlantic. A similar imbalance exists on missiles and warheads. All exist because of an 1970’s threat. There is significant overlap in US, French and UK capacity. 1 missile/warhead may be considered 1 too many and 50 warheads could incapacitate Russian economy.
May	Separate centre of decision making	The US SIOP (single integrated operational plan) and its variants are all US/NATO controlled. UK Deterrent is a subset of the total plan. Launch on warning has a maximum of 30 minutes decision making time. EWS and initial response under US/NATO control, therefore there is unlikely to be little time for UK to be consulted. There has been no agreed NATO nuclear operation plan since 1994 so any current Launch on Warning activity is exclusively US. It is accepted this argument is in need of ‘refurbishment’ (Nicholas Withey) L Freedman, stated (separate centre of decision making) argument based on diplomatic convenience rather than strategic rigour’. It also fails operationally where the decision time is reduced to 30 minutes.
May, PM Lewis (N.Forest E.)	..Enemies need to know we are prepared to use it… ..Cost to attacker greater than anything it might gain.. Inflict punishment no one can contemplate ..every moment of everyday day..	In a US/NATO graduated response this argument is not relevant or does not need to be made. But more relevant is how is the UK threat relevant when there no NATO nuclear operational plan? Russia is not considered a tier 1 enemy. The threats or enemies ought to be verified and ND designed accordingly. Threat of mutual destruction may not need a CASD, as missiles are de-targeted and no supporting NATO operational plan exists. Yarynich – mathematically this is could be just one warhead. Cuban crisis showed no weapons were needed, the inhuman consequences were enough for both parties to stop. This includes the US which then had a strategic advantage in terms of capability to deliver a first strike. Every moment of every day deterrent argument is not true as the Doomsday Machine has not been on ‘launch on warning’ posture for 24 years.
May Tugendhat (Tb & Mall)	Insurance policy, ultimate safeguard	If the insurance policy is a capacity to issue a threat, then a CASD may be over specified and it is possible to define a minimal deterrent. Guaranteed suicide if the threat is carried out is not much of an insurance policy. Any firing of a missile would be in breach of causing ‘excessive incidental death’ by definition – a war crime. A UK Doomsday Machine fulfilling a deterrent function is only the ultimate safeguard if we accept mutually assured destruction as a possible outcome. Safeguard against whom? Russia?
Lewis (N. Forrest. E) Murrison (SW Wiltshire) Mrs Moon Mercer (Plymth) Smeeth (S-o-T N) Howlett (Bath) Leigh (Gainbgh) Tugendhat (Tb&Mall)	Seat at the big table, status	Seat on security council is not dependent on retaining nuclear weapons or a CASD or a CAS without a ready to use ..D..It is questionable how much status can be attributed to a 1970’s warhead, for a war/threat that ended in 1991, missiles de-targeted in 1994 which cancelled the associated NATO operational plan. There has been no approved NATO nuclear operational plan for the UK nuclear deterrent since 1994. UK’s forceful arguments for why nuclear weapons are necessary implicitly legitimise nuclear deterrence for other mid-ranking liberal NATO states, not to mention the rest of the world. Status may be lost if the replacement programme is not designed for lower threat status or contributes to delay in compliance with NPT.
Costa (Leic)	Cannot be un-invented (dis-invented)	Posture can change, and Doomsday Machine re-defined to meet threat. All bombs with mega-ton yields have been dis-assembled. De-targeted and de-alerting is a change in posture which has not been used to flex CASD, even though CASD serves little purpose without a NATO approved operational plan. UK could halve it’s missile stockpile without reducing it level of readiness, and this half was manufactured after the UK had de-targeted its missiles in 1994.
Foster (Tbay) Kinnock (Abrvn)	Russian Re-vamping	North Atlantic ‘Nato’ 14 subs versus 5-6 Russian subs. 4 at sea versus 1 at sea or 1 tied up at dock. Maximum of 50 warheads needed to destroy all of Russian cities and industrial base. US French UK boats in North Atlantic alone have at least 3 times this number. Massive over capacity at every level. Any re-vamping claims needs to be quantified.
Perkins (Chfield) Davies (Swan Esr)	Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania	Such an aspiration needs a NATO operational plan, not a standalone UK independent CASD. No operational nuclear plan currently active, not since 1994. US has excess capacity. Interesting to request such a NATO scenario to understand UK role. Such a scenario should be planned, it does not need an imbalance of 14 SLBM subs v 5-6 subs in North Atlantic.
Jenkins (Har&N.Ess)	Ends large scale conflict WW III	This does not require a CASD. Deterrent could be re-defined. UK no longer launch on warning(LOW) but ‘several days to launch’. Several days to launch could be several weeks or months to launch if we design the ND that way.
Coaker (Gedling)	NATO membership demands use of US nuclear weapons	Not currently. No NATO operational plan using UK SLBM nukes since 1994. Hypothetical US/NATO SIOP would point to joint command and balanced minimal capability, 14 US French/UK subs in North Atlantic versus 5/6 Russian subs. But is 14 NATO subs versus 6 Russian subs superiority needed? 3 or 4 at sea versus 1 sometimes at sea is imbalanced. There will also be a large overlapping in targets used by US/UK/French.
Lewis (N.Forrest E.) Smeeth (S-o-T N)	Lesser of two evils, unpleasant necessity	Not relevant to a CASD, could be managed as a just in case ND, one missile could meet this objective in theory. The assumed existential threats should be spelt out as part of a business case.
Lewis (N. Forrest E.)	Cheaper than conventional forces	Khrushchev justification to stop NATO attack. Is it UK policy to substitute conventional forces with a Nuclear threat?
Howlett (Bath) Davies (Swan Est)	Nuclear Blackmail	The CASD posture and the 200 warheads are not needed for nuclear blackmail. It could be 1 missile. As former British Army General Hugh Beach notes wryly, Japan and Germany do not seem ‘unduly worried’ about the prospects of nuclear blackmail.
May	Counter-terrorism	Doomsday machine not relevant to CT, but funding diversion may reduce ability to support quick reaction forces.
Selous (SW Beds) Murrison	Ukraine	The removal of nuclear weapons (1,900 ICBMs) and dis-assembly was conducted by Russia under the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine never had operational control of these missiles. There is much to be grateful for this move given leakages of conventional weapons from Ukraine post 1991. Britain was a signature to the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine is now a non-nuclear state. US paid Russia to remove and destroy these missile and paid Ukraine its costs. Ukrainians complain about the Budapest Memorandum as Russia has breached the terms (Donetsk and Crimea) and US has not intervened to stop Russia. Immaterial as the Ukraine had no means to maintain or build ND. Control of missiles never left Moscow.
Howlett (Bath) Fallon (SOS)	North Korea	Is the intention for the UK to launch a pacific fleet to defend New Zealand or Australia? Mentions of North Korea seem irrelevant if there is no pacific fleet. US likely response would be use of cruise missiles to target specific facilities.
May	Fully armed and fully ready	Weapons have been de-targeted since 1994 and no NATO operational plan since then. Some local UK unspecified planning of targets but this is not yet open to scrutiny by the UK Parliament. Status of ‘Several Days to Launch’ means the Deterrent is no longer ‘ready to launch’ and not available to ‘launch on warning’. It is not clear what CAS achieves as it the deterrent is not targeted as their no existential threat. Armed but not ready to fire as there are no targets and unlikely to be until the next Stalin or Hitler emerges.
May, Fallon	48 to 40 warheads and operational warheads down to 120, stockpile down to 180 by 2025	This is not describing a minimum but the 1998-199 production run of 250 warheads in Aldermaston. Other MOD briefing’s states 8 missiles and maximum of 3 warheads per missile which is 24 warheads per Trident. This would allow operational warheads to be reduced to 72 from the c200. It would also permit DII missiles contracts to be reduced from 58 to 24. At sea but not targeted. Missile and Warhead was identified as £1.4bn pa cost by the NAO in 2018. Opportunity for substantial saving if reviewed. One missile and 3 warheads cost, c £26m a year, versus cruise missile costs at £1.5m. A combined NATO warhead count of 50 would be more than that needed to destroy Russia cities and command posts. Aldermaston built 100 W76 of the 250 built after UK de-targeted missiles in 1994.
May	…Our independent Deterrent..	This is not wholly credible. UK Doomsday Machine (Nuclear Deterrent) functions as part of a US/NATO resource for which there is no operational plan since 1994. EWS, weather systems, targeting systems and firing procedures are a function of the current US/NATO SIOP. UK Trident would feature in US/NATO graduated response if ever required but it overlaps with US and French North Atlantic deterrents in terms of targets.
May	Committed to Dis-armament in a multilateral process	A plan is needed as part of NEW Start from 2021 but there is no evidence of such a diplomatic effort. A new deterrent could be aligned directly with NPT Art VI, consistent with current modified posture as opposed to being designed to be possibly in breach of Art VI or undermining its provisions. UK would not be re-building its manufacturing capability in Aldermaston/Burghfield (Mensa) if UK was committed to meeting its NPT VI obligations. AWE could maintain assembly and dis-assembly capacity of NEPD while conducting manufacturing in US. AWE Aldermaston already focused on the science – Orion.
May	Committed to retaining the minimum amount of destructive power to deter any aggressor	‘Minimum’ could mathematically be 1 missile and 1 W76 warhead. Circa 200 Warheads is not minimum, it is a quantity from a production run in 1988-1999. In North Atlantic there are 3 NATO CASDs (two untargeted and 1 minimally targeted) 14 SLBM versus one relaxed Russian CASD – 6 SLBMs. Current minimum is defined by what the UK has been sold and the batch of manufactured waterheads built at Aldermaston. Note little effort has been made to define a ‘minimal’ deterrent. Trident Commission did not analyse the impact of de-targeting and civilian control of any re-targeting exercise following the Chilcott report.
May, Fallon	UK holds 1% of 17,000 warheads	Others in the debate state 17,000 include tactical nuclear weapons. New Start limits USA and Russia to 1,750 operational strategic warheads each. UK c200/3500 = 5.71% UK’s – 200 in the North Atlantic represents c200/1750 =11.42% The Warhead is of 1978 design vintage and is not suited to hardened and deep bunkers. Given no more than 50 warheads are needed to destroy Russia, the UK Doomsday Machine could be re-defined and reduced as part of a NATO defined deterrent aligned with foreseeable threats.

End. 23/Nov/2018