Written evidence submitted by Dr Andrew Watt
Inquiry: “Fake News”
Concerns re reliability of digital counting of votes in the June 2016 Referendum
This document is intended as Written Evidence to the Select Committee’s Inquiry entitled “Fake News”.
It seems to me that it falls within the broadly drawn Terms of Reference of that Inquiry.
Should the Committee consider that the matters which I draw to its attention might more appropriately be considered under a separate Inquiry I suggest a title of “Digital counting of votes in a democracy” for such an Inquiry.
Executive Summary
The area of concern
Recently it came to my attention that many millions of votes in the Brexit Referendum on 23rd June 2016 were counted by means of scanning of voting papers.
That information came to my attention in the context of seeming numerical discrepancies in the supposed voting results in individual voting areas.
The existence of seemingly minor numerical discrepancies in a context where digital counting of votes seemed to be at least a significant component of the total number of votes allegedly cast led me to ask the question as to whether it was possible to create a scanning system that would distort or otherwise falsify the aggregate of votes seemingly cast.
If, hypothetically, the scanning software was rigged would it be easy to construct Quality Assurance measures which would detect rogue software and ensure a reliable vote count in the Referendum.
Terminology
I use the term “cast vote” to refer to a vote cast by a registered voter.
I use the term “counted votes” to refer to the seeming number of votes cast, whether such “counted votes” are assigned by means of manual counting or by means of counting by scanning or other computer software.
Conventional interpretation assumes that the number of cast votes corresponds exactly to the number of counted votes, when making appropriate allowance for spoiled ballot papers etc.
The June 2016 Referendum
Of the order of 33.5 million counted votes were reported.
Some 17.4 million counted votes were assigned to Leave and some 16.1 million counted votes were assigned to Remain.
Of the 33.5 million total counted votes, at least 13 million (but perhaps many more) were, so I am informed, counted by scanning of voting papers.
I understand that a company called Idox produced or used scanning software that counted of the order of 13 million counted votes.
I have been unable to ascertain how the approximately 20 million other counted votes were counted.
It seems plausible that all or the vast majority of votes were counted electronically given the time on 24th June 2016 that final numbers of “counted votes” was officially announced.
In drawing attention to the possibility of tampering with vote counting in the June 2016 Referendum I am making no specific allegation regarding Idox, its suppliers or any other company which may have been involved in supplying scanners and associated software used to count Referendum votes.
The Select Committee is in a position to gather evidence regarding the methodology of counting of votes in the June 2016 Referendum and examine whether the possibility of tampering with vote counting can be safely excluded.
Is it possible to falsify the counting of votes?
In the manual system of counting votes, as I understand it, any individual falsifying the counting of votes in a referendum would have a tiny, and in all likelihood insignificant effect, on the total number of counted votes.
The situation is very different when votes are counted electronically.
One programmer could, hypothetically, significantly distort the total number of counted votes so that they did not fairly represent the number of cast votes.
In the context of the June 2016 Referendum it was hypothetically possible for the number of counted votes in favour of either Leave or Remain to differ significantly from the number of valid cast votes.
How electronically counted votes could be falsified
In this section I will demonstrate that when using scanning software it, in principle, would be straightforward to falsify the total number of votes when the counted votes are electronically counted.
I will demonstrate how such hypothetical false counting of votes could be achieved using Pseudocode.
Pseudocode is a quasi-English means of expressing what computer code is intended to achieve.
A very simple approach to scanning software intended to count votes in the June 2016 Referendum would look something like the following.
If VoteContent = Remain then RemainTotal = RemainTotal + 1;
If VoteContent = Leave then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
At the end of the scanning process the scanning software would output both the RemainTotal and LeaveTotal figures for counted votes.
In principle, votes for either side could be exaggerated by any arbitrarily chosen percentage. I illustrate the scenario where the desired exaggeration of counted votes is 5%.
To improperly exaggerate the number of Leave votes by approximately 5% the Pseudocode could be simply modified as follows:
If VoteContent = Remain then RemainTotal = RemainTotal + 1;
If VoteContent = Leave then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
If LeaveTotal mod 20 = 0 then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
The final line of the preceding Pseudocode examines whether the number of Leave votes is exactly divisible by 20 and if the LeaveTotal is a multiple of 20 it adds a (false) vote to the LeaveTotal.
In principle, an exaggeration of Leave votes by more or less than 5% could straightforwardly be produced by using a number other than 20 in the third line of the preceding Pseudocode.
The code to introduce false votes need not be immediately adjacent to the code counting a scanned vote.
For example, the first step in counting a vote might be to check if a vote is to be counted might look like the following:
CheckVoteContent;
If VoteContent = Remain then RemainTotal = RemainTotal + 1;
If VoteContent = Leave then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
The PseudoCode “CheckVoteContent” represents a module which establishes if a valid vote has been cast or note. Its proper purpose would be to reject blank or spoiled voting papers.
The CheckVoteContent module could include, in addition to code to establish whether the ballot paper was blank or spoiled, the following PseudoCode:
If LeaveTotal mod 20 = 0 then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
in order to exaggerate the LeaveTotal by 5%.
Quality Assurance
I have been unable to locate any information which describes the Quality Assurance processes carried out to ensure that the “counted votes” corresponded exactly with the “cast votes”.
In other words it is an open question whether adequate Quality Assurance was in place for the counting of the June 2016 Referendum votes.
The following describes some basic Quality Assurance steps which may or may not have been carried out.
To establish basic accuracy of scanning software to be used in the June 2016 Referendum one or more electoral authorities might have tested the scanning software on, for example, 200 ballot papers some weeks or months before the June 2016 Referendum.
Such Quality Assurance procedures are inadequate to test the behaviour of scanning software in the live Referendum Count.
It would, for example, be possible to provide an “update” to the software between the date on which any Quality Assurance tests were carried out and the date of the Referendum.
The initial tests would provide assurance of accurate counting but would not detect any irregularities in update versions of the software.
It would also be straightforward to write scanning code which exaggerated, for example, the Leave vote which would perform accurately in all Quality Assurance tests carried out before or after the time of the Referendum Count.
Again, I use Pseudocode to demonstrate how this could be done.
If VoteContent = Remain then RemainTotal = RemainTotal + 1;
If VoteContent = Leave then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
If LiveTime then LeaveTotal mod 20 = 0 then LeaveTotal = LeaveTotal + 1;
The Pseudocode “LiveTime” checks whether the time is 22.00 on 23rd June 2016 or later and earlier than, say 06.00 on 24th June 2016 (or whatever alternative time is chosen as indicative of the anticipated completion of counting of votes).
If such code were included it would be impossible to detect vote tampering in any reasonably likely Quality Assurance tests carried out on dates before or after the times exemplified in the previous paragraph.
If LiveTime were not true the software would produce a true vote count.
However, during live counting of Referendum votes the number of Leave votes would be falsely exaggerated by 5%.
It seems to me to be highly unlikely that Quality Assurance tests would have been carried out on sample voting papers during the time just specified.
The need for the Counting Software source code to be publicly disclosed
It seems to me that when matters as important as the June 2016 Referendum may generate enormous political and/or financial advantages for those correctly anticipating the result it is imperative that in any credible democracy that the counting of votes be free from any suspicion.
As I have demonstrated earlier in this document it is, in principle, straightforward to create scanning software that would both distort the number of counted votes and yet pass any reasonably likely Quality Assurance test of its accuracy carried out before or after the date of the Referendum.
In my view the only basis on which the United Kingdom public may have confidence in the supposed result of the June 2016 Referendum is that both the source code and the compiled code used to count votes cast on 23rd June 2016 is put into the public domain.
Questions to be asked by the Select Committee
In order to establish whether the number of “counted votes” in the June 2016 Referendum accurately represents the number of “cast votes” it seems to me that the Select Committee would require to ask a series of questions which would include the following:
In the absence of satisfactory and complete answers to such questions together with public release of verified source code and compiled code the possibility exists that the number of “counted votes” in the June 2016 Referendum does not correspond to the number of legitimate “cast votes”.
The existence of such a possibility is, in my view, of grave concern to the democratic credibility of the United Kingdom.
Annex: Concerns regarding the franchise of the June 2016 Referendum
Annex 1 to this Written Evidence presents an analysis of the franchise of the June 2016 Referendum which leads me to the conclusion that the Referendum franchise was unfair and unlawful.
Consequently, I draw the conclusion that the June 2016 Referendum result should be rejected.
November 2018
ANNEX 1
Brexit Briefing Paper No.3
The June 2016 Referendum franchise was rigged.
The Referendum result should be rejected
A Briefing Paper
For
The Prime Minister, Ministers, Parliamentarians and Citizens
Of
The United Kingdom
© Dr. Andrew Watt
12th August 2018
© This Briefing Paper may be freely copied and distributed provided that any such copies are complete and that no charge is made for any copies so distributed.
The franchise for the June 2016 Referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union was rigged.
Its result should be rejected.
Executive Summary:
Background
The June 2016 Referendum result indicated a small majority in favour of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union.
The total votes cast were as follows:
The majority in favour of Leave was 1,269,501.
Parliamentarians, including the Prime Minister, have on countless occasions expressed a perceived need to “respect the Referendum result” on the supposed basis that it expressed the democratic will of the British people.
Such assertions that the Referendum result should be respected rest on the assumption that the Referendum was valid and lawful.
In this Briefing Paper I set out arguments that demonstrate that the Referendum franchise was visibly unfair and was unlawful.
If, as I argue, the Referendum was unlawful it follows that its result should be rejected, not respected.
I am, of course, aware of mounting evidence that there was unlawful activity with respect to the conduct of the Leave campaigns in the June 2016 Referendum. In arguing in this Brexit Briefing Paper that the June 2016 Referendum was unlawful I do not include consideration of those potentially very important issues.
The Referendum Franchise – the legal framework
The Referendum franchise was set out in the European Union Referendum Act 2015.
Section 2 of the 2015 Act states the following:
2 Entitlement to vote in the referendum
(1) Those entitled to vote in the referendum are—
(a) the persons who, on the date of the referendum, would be entitled to vote as electors at a parliamentary election in any constituency,
(b) the persons who, on that date, are disqualified by reason of being peers from voting as electors at parliamentary elections but—
(I) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local government election in any electoral area in Great Britain,
(ii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a local election in any district electoral area in Northern Ireland, or
(iii) would be entitled to vote as electors at a European Parliamentary election in any electoral region by virtue of section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1985 (peers resident outside the United Kingdom), and
(c) the persons who, on the date of the referendum—
(i) would be entitled to vote in Gibraltar as electors at a European Parliamentary election in the combined electoral region in which Gibraltar is comprised, and
(ii) fall within subsection (2).
(2)A person falls within this subsection if the person is either—
(a) a Commonwealth citizen, or
(b) a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.
(3) In subsection (1)(b)(i) “local government election” includes a municipal election in the City of London (that is, an election to the office of mayor, alderman, common councilman or sheriff and also the election of any officer elected by the mayor, aldermen and liverymen in common hall).
Source:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/36/section/2
In order to understand who was entitled to vote in the 2016 Referendum we need to look at who is entitled to vote in a UK parliamentary election.
We find the answer in the Representation of the People Act 1983.
Section 1 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (as amended by the Representation of the People Act 2000) states the following:
1 Parliamentary electors.
(1) A person is entitled to vote as an elector at a parliamentary election in any constituency if on the date of the poll he—
(a) is registered in the register of parliamentary electors for that constituency;
(b) is not subject to any legal incapacity to vote (age apart);
(c) is either a Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland; and
(d) is of voting age (that is, 18 years or over).
(2) A person is not entitled to vote as an elector—
(a) more than once in the same constituency at any parliamentary election; or
(b) in more than one constituency at a general election.
In order more fully to understand who is entitled to vote we need to look at the definition of a “Commonwealth Citizen”.
That definition is found in Section 37 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (as amended).
Section 37 of the 1981 Act states:
37 Commonwealth citizenship.
(1) Every person who—
(a) under the British Nationality Acts 1981 and 1983 or the British Overseas Territories Act 2002 is a British citizen, a British overseas territories citizen, British National (Overseas),] a British Overseas citizen or a British subject; or
(b) under any enactment for the time being in force in any country mentioned in Schedule 3 is a citizen of that country,
shall have the status of a Commonwealth citizen.
(2) Her Majesty may by Order in Council amend Schedule 3 by the alteration of any entry, the removal of any entry, or the insertion of any additional entry.
(3) Any Order in Council made under this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(4) After commencement no person shall have the status of a Commonwealth citizen or the status of a British subject otherwise than under this Act.
Source:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/37
To complete the picture of who was eligible to vote in the Referendum we need to look at Schedule 3 of the British Nationality Act 1981.
The countries listed there are:
SCHEDULE 3 Countries Whose Citizens are Commonwealth Citizens
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
The Bahamas
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belize
Botswana
Brunei
Cameroon
Canada
Republic of Cyprus
Dominica
Fiji
The Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guyana
India
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mozambique
Nauru
New Zealand
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
Saint Christopher and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tanzania
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Western Samoa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Source:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/schedule/3
The Referendum franchise: interpreting the Law
Putting all that together the franchise for the June 2016 Referendum was as follows:
The Referendum franchise: the legal problems
There are three major legal problems with the Referendum franchise:
These issues need to be properly considered by the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Up to 5 million UK citizens resident outside the UK were illegitimately denied a vote
There are up to 5 million UK citizens resident outside the UK.
As indicated by their place of residence those 5 million are amongst the most internationally minded UK citizens.
I cannot locate a fully reliable estimate of how many of those 5 million are registered to vote in the UK. Perhaps the information could only be collated from multiple freedom of information requests to the relevant electoral authorities.
If any reader has more reliable figures for the above I would be happy to include updated figures in a future version of this Briefing Paper.
About 1 million Commonwealth citizens inappropriately eligible to vote
Can anyone justify the fact that, for example, Canadian or Australian citizens were allowed to vote in the Referendum?
Neither Canadians nor Australians are UK citizens.
Nor do they derive rights from European Union citizenship, since neither Canada nor Australia are Member States of the European Union.
What possible legitimate basis is there for Canadians and Australians being granted a vote in the Referendum?
I can identify none.
I had significant difficulty in finding a fully reliable figure on the number of Commonwealth citizens eligible to vote under the Representation of the People Act 1983 and therefore under the European Union Referendum Act 2015.
Media estimates seem to indicate 1 million such Commonwealth citizens or a little more:
If anyone is aware of a more reliable or up to date source of an estimate of the number of Commonwealth citizens eligible to vote in the 2016 Referendum, please email me at killbrexitnow@gmail.com with the information and a link to its source.
Some EU27 citizens were allowed to vote while others were denied a vote
The franchise was visibly discriminatory with respect to the eligibility of EU27 citizens to vote in the 2016 Referendum.
Citizens of Ireland were allowed to vote.
Citizens of Cyprus and Malta were allowed to vote, on the basis of their Commonwealth citizenship.
Citizens of the other 24 Member States of the EU27 were not allowed to vote.
This is visibly discriminatory on grounds of nationality which is unlawful in European Union Law.
Political implications of an unlawful referendum
The Westminster Parliament has assumed that the Referendum result was valid.
That assumption has resulted in many assertions by Members of Parliament that the Referendum result should be respected.
When up to 5 million UK citizens were improperly denied a vote and around 1 million Commonwealth citizens (who have no legitimate interest in the European Union citizenship and other EU-derived rights of UK citizens) were improperly granted a vote it is evident that the Referendum franchise was not fair.
The Referendum franchise was rigged to exclude millions of UK citizens who were the most likely to be internationally minded.
The Referendum franchise was rigged to include a million Commonwealth citizens who have no legitimate right to determine or influence the rights of UK citizens granted to them directly or indirectly by virtue of their European Union citizenship.
Members of Parliament should recognise that the Referendum franchise was rigged.
Members or Parliament should recognise that the result of the Referendum of 23rd June 2016 should be rejected.
Legal implications of an unlawful referendum
The June 2016 Referendum was the basis for the letter of 29th March 2017 sent by the Prime Minister to President Tusk.
In her letter of 29th March 2017, Mrs. May stated:
On 23 June last year, the people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.”
and later in the letter went on to state
“Today, therefore, I am writing to give effect to the democratic decision of the people of the United Kingdom.”
There can be no reasonable doubt that the Prime Minister’s letter of 29th March 2017 which purported to be a notification compliant with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union was based on the result of the Referendum.
As demonstrated in this Briefing Paper, that Referendum result was illegitimate and unlawful.
In my view any supposed lawful Article 50(1) decision was absent.
In consequence, the Article 50 TEU negotiations which have enthralled (or horrified) the UK public and media since March 2017 lack a lawful basis in Law.
I expect that a legal challenge will be launched to any concluded version of the Withdrawal Agreement on grounds including the illegality of the 2016 Referendum and the absence of a lawful Article 50(1) TEU decision.
I anticipate that only when the Court of Justice of the European Union carefully considers the flagrant breaches of the principle of fairness, the departures from the principle of proportionality and the visibly discriminatory aspects of the Referendum franchise will this outrage against democracy be corrected.
Feedback on this Brexit Briefing Paper
Feedback on this Brexit Briefing Paper may, as usual, be sent by email to killbrexitnow@gmail.com.
If any reader has identified reliable sources for estimates of Commonwealth citizens in the UK and UK citizens resident outside the UK I would like to firm up those estimates in this Briefing Paper if such estimates exist.
Other Brexit Briefing Papers
Two other Brexit Briefing Papers are currently publicly available.
Further information on each may be found at the following locations online:
Further Brexit Briefing Papers are in preparation. When available I anticipate announcing their availability via my Twitter account, @KillBrexitNow.