Defence Committee

Commission de la Défense Nationale et des Forces Armées

Oral evidence: Future Anti-ship Missile System – Joint Inquiry, HC 1071

Tuesday 24 July 2018

Members present: Jean-Pierre Cubertafon; Jean-Jacques Ferrara; Mr Mark Francois; Jean-Charles Larsonneur; Mrs Madeleine Moon; Natalia Pouzyreff (Co-rapporteur); Gavin Robinson; John Spellar; Stéphane Trompille; Charles de La Verpillière (Co-rapporteur).

Questions 55-119

Witnesses

I: Joël Barre, Chief Executive, Direction Générale de l’Armement.

II: Admiral Christophe Prazuck, Chief of the French Navy.

III: Antoine Bouvier, Chief Executive Officer, MBDA, and Chris Allam, Managing Director, MBDA.

Examination of witness

Witness: Joël Barre

Q55            Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): Good morning, colleagues. Let us get started. I am delighted to welcome our British counterparts, John Spellar, Mark Francois, Madeleine Moon and Gavin Robinson. We are delighted to see them again today. We have fond recollections of our meeting in London a couple of weeks ago.

On the French side, apart from Natalia Pouzyreff and myself, at different points of the proceedings we will have Jean-Charles Larsonneur and Stéphane Trompille, Jean-Pierre Cubertafon and Jean-Jacques Ferrara. At lunch time, we will have the company of Jean-Jacques Bridey, who chairs our Standing Committee on National Defence and armed forces here at the National Assembly.

To our British counterparts, a hearty welcome and many thanks for your kind hospitality in London a couple of weeks ago. Without further ado, I will give the floor to my colleague, Natalia Pouzyreff, who will address the subject matter at hand.

Q56            Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you, Charles. The work we are conducting is proof of the live co-operation between France and the UK. The stifling atmosphere due to the upcoming departure of the UK from the EU should not hide the fact that there is a clear determination on both sides of the channel to co-operate, particularly in the field of defence. That is what brings us together today. Apart from the values that we have in common, France and Britain are linked because of their status as major military powers in Europe. Through its synergies, defence co-operation is a clear guarantee of security for both countries.

Today, Britain and France face the same context of an increased threat level, due to the new use of power in relations between states, and the resurgence and the dissemination of A2/AD systems—anti-access and area denial systems. More generally speaking, the entire Western bloc is experiencing a challenge to its military supremacy. That observation, which dates back a number of years already, led to our decision to strengthen co-operation in the Lancaster House agreement of 2 November 2010, whose major guidelines have been reiterated since. Among the many joint projects, one MBDA initiative was decided on, which was to give structure to a joint supply chain in the field of missiles, in a spirit of mutual interdependence. The future cruise/anti-ship weapons programme—FC/ASW—whose joint concept phase was launched in March 2017, is an expression of that.

The FC/ASW programme is an opportunity for both countries in several ways. For our Armed Forces, it is an opportunity to enhance a strategic weapon in a context of heightened threat. For industry players, this new generation of missiles is an ambitious project from a technological viewpoint, and it will enable us to get further ahead of our competitors and, indeed, confirm Europe’s industrial excellence. Finally, such a joint programme will be an opportunity for the two countries to share costs and especially to preserve national sovereignty and our full freedom of action.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker, let me remind you briefly of the plan for today’s proceedings. We will have hearings in camera, but there will be public reports. We will hear from the head of the Direction Générale de l’Armement, Mr Joël Barre, and then we will have a working lunch at the Petit Hôtel of the National Assembly at 13.00. We will continue our work this afternoon: we will hear at 14.00 from Admiral Christophe Prazuck, the Chief of Staff of the French Navy, and then at 15.30 from Antoine Bouvier, the CEO of MBDA. The hearings will start with a preliminary statement by the witness for 15 to 20 minutes and then there will be a question and answer session, during which the various French and British MPs will get a chance to speak.

I now give the floor to Mr Barre, whom I thank for being with us today.

Joël Barre (Translation): Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak about the FC/ASW programme, which Ms Pouzyreff has already mentioned. I am delighted to speak before you. This is one of the first information sessions between the two Parliaments. We at the French DGA are very much committed to Franco-British partnership in the field of defence.

The FC/ASW programme is intended to build anti-ship and deep-strike capability to meet our long-term requirements. In France, we decided as part of the military programme Act for the years 2019 to 2025, which was passed on 13 July this year, that this programme should be launched in 2024, because we want to reach the out-of-service date for our deep-strike and anti-ship weapons systems so that by 2030 we can take over the generation of Exocet anti-ship missiles and SCALP missiles for deep-strike. We are looking especially by 2030 to be able to meet the threat of A2/AD—anti-access and area denial—which of course is a challenge to our missiles’ penetration capability.

The programme is, of course, a show of political leadership and determination on both sides. We are showing the same determination as we did with SCALP and Storm Shadow, following which our cooperation was reinforced through the Lancaster House agreement in 2010. The Lancaster House agreement has also enabled deeper industrial co-operation which has led to streamline and generate synergies in the missile field, which is of strategic importance because of its links with the issue of sovereignty that both France and Britain share.

Having said all that, we can only welcome the operating advantage provided by these state-of-the-art missiles and that technology, plus the freedom of action that we enjoyed. Indeed, only a few weeks ago we were able to demonstrate it in joint operations.

France and the UK, for the past few years now, have been thinking about the future capability of these systems. As early as November 2011, which is almost seven years ago, we arrived at a technical arrangement—a technical and operating study—which enabled us to have a better view of the requirements, and indeed identify the concepts that might meet new requirements. Having completed that preliminary study, we have identified the first joint features, both the importance of survivability of missiles, particularly in responding to anti-air defence systems, and as well the need for increased range for these missiles, precisely to ensure the survivability of the platform that carries and fires them. Again, we have on the other side—the threat side—increased range as well.

After the study was conducted in 2011, a new political impulse was given at the Franco-British summit at Amiens in March 2016. There, the idea was to conduct jointly a concept study for cruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. It was decided at Amiens to launch that concept study within a year, and indeed, along with our MoD colleagues, we were able to respect the timetable. As early as March 2017, we set out the technical arrangement that defines the framework for the joint activity, and we at DGA, on behalf of our two nations, laid out the contract for engineering for the MBDA organisation for three years—€100 million to be funded 50:50 by France and the UK.

The concept study proposes to arrive at a better understanding of the possibilities offered by different architectures of missile—they could be supersonic and manoeuvrable, or subsonic but more stealthy—and from there arrive at the solution to meet all the specifications related to anti-ship and deep-strike requirements, either with a single missile meeting all the requirements or, if that is not feasible or simple, by having a whole family of missiles that would offer a high level of modularity, commonality and reusability—the reusability of the various components. For France, what we are trying to do is have the missiles on surface vessels, especially our frigates, and to fit them on our Rafale fighter aircraft, and indeed on maritime patrol aircraft.

As part of that concept study, early in 2018 we reached a first milestone—that milestone is called the initial review. Completing the first stage of that work enabled us to arrive at a first set of possible architectures. The next stage is the key review, which should take place at the beginning of next year—in February 2019. That will be an opportunity for us to arrive at a second shortlist from among those concepts identified in the initial review and to select those that are more promising.

The concepts selected at the key review will be studied more carefully, and the end of the concept phase will be in 2020—I believe that will be the initial gate on the British side. France intends to launch the programme itself in 2024. So that concept phase is under way, and the next stage is the key review in February 2019. That will be an opportunity for us to draw up the roadmaps for ramping up the technologies required for these systems.

It should be pointed out that we will not be in a position to design these future missiles without a huge technological effort, and that effort is already under way, needless to say. Indeed, for the past few years the DGA has been supporting an intense research effort on disruptive technologies and new capabilities. We are doing this through our own programmes, of course, and we are especially looking at survivability and super-velocity—we are talking here about supersonic manoeuvrable missiles.

Now, this performance, associated to a longer range than existing systems, would provide significant advantage and reduce the exposure of the platforms carrying these missiles. That would, of course, provide a decisive advantage in terms of breaking enemy defence systems. As these new technologies are maturing, we are amplifying our efforts—indeed, additional budgets have been granted within our MoD and the DGA. In the military programming law for 2019-2025, we have a significant increase in the budget for this design work and study. Right now, we are spending €750 million a year on S&T at the DGA, and this will be brought to €1 billion by 2022, which is a 30% increase—a significant increase. Indeed, this increase concerns the whole defence investment budget.

In this effort to develop these deep-strike and high-speed missiles, we are looking at improving the different characteristics of survivability, meaning air propulsion, stealth and super-velocity, as well as the technologies enabling terminal guidance of missiles (electromagnetic guidance, optical guidance and bimodal guidance). We have yet to make progress in the navigation for long-range missiles and long flights, especially in hostile areas, in which satellites signals used to guide our missiles are scrambled. We have to make progress in the technologies required to prepare missions and therefore to facilitate the use of such systems and ensure operational capability. We also have to improve the connectivity required for long-distance strike missions.

From an industrial standpoint, let me also add that, having decided on the mid-life upgrade of the SCALP and Storm Shadow systems, and having decided on the launching of the light anti-ship missiles which is a Franco-British project and whose second test in flight was conducted in April this year, the FC/ASW programme is part of our efforts to streamline our industrial efforts under the Lancaster House agreement. The idea is to have an independent and competitive missile industry, which is of course indispensable if we are to meet the sovereignty requirements for freedom of action and operating advantage that these missiles confer.

There is mutual dependence; we have deliberately introduced interdependence under the Lancaster House agreements, and such interdependence is a major base for the cooperation scheme on these programmes. Today, our missile industry is Franco-British—MBDA is a Franco-British company and we have pools of excellence on both sides. That industry meets all the requirements to achieve the ambitious programmes we are discussing today.

Let me also mention the special attention given to Franco-British capability. We are committed to that Franco-British development. Some believe that an off-the-shelf supply could be considered for these missiles; indeed, that could be a less costly operational proposition, because we would save on the R&D. None the less, that should be balanced against what it would mean in terms of loss of the industrial competence necessary to maintain our sovereignty and our strategic autonomy.

As you know, industrial competence is very easily lost and is much more difficult to rebuild, so we must keep that in mind as soon as we have to maintain our industrial competence, not to mention our strategic autonomy. If we were to buy this kind of missiles off the shelf, it would mean giving up on sovereignty, on freedom of action, on freedom of exporting our own missiles or the platforms that carry them.

The FC/ASW programme is one of the accomplishments of this initiative that dates back 20 years or so. The idea is to develop a high-end, competitive, and sovereign missile industry: SCALP and Storm Shadow, the ground to air Aster missile, the air to air Meteor missile, or indeed the light anti-ship missiles Sea Venom/ANL are all examples of achievements coming from that programme. The FC/ASW programme is the one that most defines this Franco-British cooperation in the field of missiles; therefore it is a major and ambitious part of our bilateral defence relationship. Ladies and gentlemen, we at the DGA are very much committed to seeing this programme consolidated and carried out together.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you, Mr Barre. A lot has been said already, but we are here to ask questions. Colleagues, feel free to ask follow-up questions if you believe your questions have not been fully answered. I will now give the floor to our friend Mark Francois.

Q57            Mr Francois: Thank you very much, Madam President. On behalf of the British delegation, may I say how much we enjoyed hosting you in London, and how delighted we are to be with you again today in Paris? To prove that we are humble guests, congratulations on the World cup. Mr Barre, can I begin with a general question: from an equipment and capabilities perspective, how important is the UK-France defence relationship?

              Joël Barre (Translation): Let me just say that in my presentation I emphasised the importance of the Lancaster House agreement, and the implementation of its various parts since 2010. This has given rise, in terms of armaments—because weapons systems are what we are in charge of at the DGA—to significant joint action. Beyond the FC/ASW programme we also have a co-operation programme in mine counter-measures. We know that both the French and the British want to improve mine counter-measures with unmanned vehicles. We have a demonstration project already under way. We also have been pursuing our co-operation efforts in fighter aircraft technology since the Sandhurst summit in January this year. In terms of achievements, as I said, we are also completing the light anti-ship programme. As our learned friend Mrs Pouzyreff said, France and Britain are by far the most powerful armament powers in Europe, and I think it is therefore natural that we seek to work together to address strategic issues that are widely shared.

Q58            Mr Francois: On an industrial level, how important is MBDA as a company for the defence of Europe, as well as for our two countries?

Joël Barre (Translation): MBDA is the European missile builder. It is the only one, really; if you look at the competition in Europe, there is not much of it, is there? Almost none in France—well, there may be some friction here or there, but basically there is no competition in France; and none in Britain either. Maybe in Germany Diehl competes with MBDA, but frankly MBDA is the European missile company. It is a world-class company and it is very successful in exports. The systems it has built for various countries are proof of its excellence.

MBDA is a unique model because, unless I am very much mistaken, this is the only area where two European countries—France and the UK—were able to build up a manufacturing company sharing resources and centres of excellence while deliberately accepting interdependence. Indeed, the only way to arrive at effective European co-operation is to try to arrive at agreements. These are political agreements, because here we are discussing sovereignty and strategic issues. Therefore, the political dimension is very much present, but so too is the industrial dimension, because this is what will guarantee economic effectiveness and ensure good control over costs. In this respect, MBDA is very successful indeed. At the DGA, we certainly recognise that.             

Q59            Mr Francois: What lessons, if any, have you as the DGA learned by working with our Ministry of Defence and our defence equipment and support? Equally, are there any lessons that you believe that you have been able to impart to us?

Joël Barre (Translation): We learn every day from co-operating with our partners. Once again, let me say that the MBDA model is unique. The two countries have built up this unique model and given it an industrial scale. At the DE&S in Britain and the DGA in France, we are following it closely. At a state-to-state level, there is good co-operation. There is a high-level working group between the defence procurement department and the DGA that works and meets regularly. We share similar perceptions on many issues, including strategic goals as well as the search for economic and industrial effectiveness.

Your way of doing things and your perceptions are useful to us. We, the French, tend to give preference to strategic rather than economic considerations, and maybe the British are more pragmatic and remind us of the harsh realities of economic considerations.

Q60            Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): Thank you, Mr Barre, for the presentation. You have given us an outline of the political framework and the timetable. We can see that it is a long-term road map with strong political commitment on either side.

I have two questions. First, regarding the platforms, where do you propose to integrate that new type of missile? What are the challenges, when you are looking at aircraft or ships, of carrying those missiles, and how do you propose to address them on the French and British sides? Secondly, could the recent announcement of the combat air strategy and Tempest have any impact on the FC/ASW programme, and if so, what would that be?

Joël Barre (Translation): On platforms, as far as France is concerned, the FC/ASW programme is looking at surface platforms, multi-mission frigates and intermediate-sized platforms—that is the programme that was launched in 2017—and the horizon frigates. So it is about various types of frigates that we have in our Navy. Regarding aircraft, it is Rafale, which is the continuation of SCALP, and the future maritime patrol aircraft for the antiship capability.

On the British side, they are focusing on frigates—the T-26 frigates. I am not an expert on British frigates, but I believe it is the T-26 that they had in mind for those missiles.

Q61            Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I would like to pick up on what you have just said and add a little colour to your vision of the architecture of these future systems, especially what we call the open architecture and the importance of connectivity in all cases, be it for SCALP, FCAS, Tempest or whatever.

There is an important issue at stake here. These platforms, which are part of these systems, must be interoperable and must be able to communicate with one another without any faults—if we want to be able to use them jointly, that is. So that requires open systems. On the French side, we tend to perceive the F-35 system as a closed system. I would like to have your view on that.

Joël Barre (Translation): You are right. You flag up a very important issue. In fact, the operations that we conducted jointly in Syria with the US and the UK pointed precisely to that point: interoperability and communication between systems is crucial. That is something that we are trying to reach in our new building of military capacity. We want a system that can be interoperable and open—must be open, and must be able to connect with different kinds of systems—but also that must be compatible with all the systems that our allies could have, especially our American allies.

That ties in with the earlier question. Our British counterparts are probably in a better position than we are to guarantee to bring to the table this interoperability and compatibility with our American allies. They certainly have better knowledge of the American systems than we have—so the F-35 system and the next generation of American systems must be compatible with what we do. They need to be open. We must none the less keep our sovereignty. Our technologies must be under our control—when I say “our control”, I mean European control—so that we have no restrictions when it comes to using or exporting them. That is very much part of what we are looking into against the backdrop of the future of combat air systems.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Madeleine Moon has the floor.

Q62            Mrs Moon: I wonder if we can move forward to look at possible future problems and issues that it would be good to get aired. In particular, you will be aware that the UK Harpoon system comes out of use in 2023 and that we will have an anti-ship missile capability gap. What discussions, if any, have you had with the MoD regarding the possibility of the UK procuring an off-the-shelf missile to plug the gap? How comfortable would you be if the MoD told you that it might explore that option? Has that been discussed? Is it something there is tension over? Would you view such a decision as being incompatible with the FC/ASW programme?

Joël Barre (Translation): I cannot remember discussing this capability gap issue for Harpoon with my British counterparts in our official meetings. Was it mentioned in the working meetings? Yes, it was. Okay, so our teams did discuss it.

I can sum things up quite quickly: first, our British counterparts have a capability gap problem by 2023, given the out-of-service date of the Harpoon. We fully understand that the capability gap must be closed—the issue must be addressed—but the decision you make in that regard must not jeopardise our co-operation on the FC/ASW. That is the first choice criterion that we would like you to take into account.

I believe that you should not take a decision to replace the Harpoon with a missile that would still be available by 2030, with a performance that meets your requirements. In fact, I do not think that exists. In other words, in 2023 you will not have accessto a missile with the requirements that we are looking for in terms of 2030. It means that you will have to make a decision for the relatively short term—let us say 10 years—with performance that is not what we are aiming for by 2030. That is the first part of my answer. You should not jeopardise our shared objectives. Secondly, we have a missile called the Exocet. We are more than happy to offer it to bridge that capability gap, instead of the Harpoon.

Q63            Mrs Moon: I have listened to all your answers, Mr Barre, and I wonder whether your initial training was in the diplomatic service, rather than in industry, because you gave very diplomatic answers. Can I ask you to say a little more about the issue of jeopardising that co-operation? You have talked about ensuring that whatever is purchased to fill that gap, whether it is the Exocet or something else, does not jeopardise the co-operation on the joint capability we are working on. What else would you be looking at? Is there anything else that could jeopardise it? If we went for something that was not from MBDA, would that jeopardise the co-operation?

Joël Barre (Translation): The concern we have is that the substitute for the Harpoon—your decision in 2023—will lead you to choose a missile that will postpone our objectives for the FC/ASW. We have a timeline with 2030 as an objective. Were you to choose a substitute for the Harpoon in 2023, it might push back the horizon of our programme. It might mean that our timelines would become out of sync. The first baseline priority for any cooperation project is to have a joint timeline for it. That is, in my opinion, the main risk.

Q64            Mrs Moon: Thank you, that is most helpful. I do not think any decisions are being made or even contemplated in the UK yet. I always believe that we should explore future possible difficulties before we get there. In evidence to the joint inquiry in London, the MoD spoke of strategic autonomy and red lines, particularly in regard to the exchange of sensitive information. What red lines do you see? What difficulties, if any, have there been in the two Governments’ co-operation during this FC/ASW concept phase? Is anything proving problematic at the moment?

Joël Barre (Translation): We have looked into the matter. My British counterpart and myself have monitored it closely to ensure that the concept phase can be as efficient as possible. In this concept phase, we need to compare a whole range of solutions in terms of penetration capacity with air defence systems. To sum up, we are looking at two kinds of high-performance penetration missiles: supersonic manoeuvrable missiles, which are faster; and subsonic stealth missiles, which are slower. Until now, France has worked a great deal on the former, while the British have worked quite a lot on the latter. This works have generated sensitive data both sides.

The difficultly we face is that we need to do this concept phase as comprehensively as possible, while having on both sides very sensitive information that we need to protect, but that we need to exchange in an effective manner. That is what we call the red lines, and we have agreed with my British counterpart to keep an eye on the red lines as we progress, but so far it has not stopped us working together. as the more we go into detail when we compare the systems, the more difficulties we face, the more work we will have to put in on both sides to solve them. Those are the red lines. 

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you for those questions, Madeleine. I now give the floor to Mr Ferrara.

Q65            Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Mr Barre, thank you for answering the questions and concerns of our British counterparts, which is a good thing. There are a number of constraints that we need to take into account when choosing the missiles, whether we use them with the F-35 system, the Tempest or the Rafale fighter aircraft. It is quite likely that our British counterparts will continue with the F-35 system. Will we be able to find an agreement, despite these constraints?

I have another question—you might not be able to answer it right now, but it is important to ask it none the less. It is related to the question of stealth missiles versus manoeuvrable missiles. In your opening speech you talked about a category of missiles that would meet our concerns regarding timeline, expertise and so on. That could be the solution, but it seems to me that choosing between stealth and hyper-velocity remains a little tricky. You have answered a lot of questions, and it was all very interesting, but what is your opinion on that?

              Joël Barre (Translation): First, you are talking about the aircraft more than anything else—the carrier. Whether it is the F-35 for the UK, the Rafale fighter aircraft for us, or the Tempest, it does not really matter. It is not a problem; it is a constraint. It means that we will have to work on the interfaces so that all these aircraft can carry the same missile. However, it is a constraint that we can work around. Right now, it is not too much of a problem, and it won’t be a problem when we come to choosing the missile.

You flag up something that is the key to this concept phase, which is whether we will converge—or not—on a supersonic, manoeuvrable solution or subsonic, stealthy solution. At this juncture, I cannot answer that question. I hope that we will converge. Our industrial colleagues are working on this. There is not an easy solution, because both options are very different, but we need to work together and try to find the best possible solution, taking into account the constraints on both sides.

The key review in February 2019 is the next step for the development of this programme, and it is an important one, because it will allow us to assess the situation and to have a shortlist of the concepts. We currently have seven on the shortlist, and the key review will allow us to have a shorter shortlist of concepts to review, and then we will continue with our analysis in the most objective possible manner. The possibility to have a family of missiles that can bring together different advantages is also part of the question.

I cannot give you a more detailed answer at this juncture. We have only been working for the last year and a half. You said it was a tricky question that I might not be able to answer, and you were right. I can’t give you a fully satisfactory answer right now.

Q66            Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): None the less, I would like to go back to my colleague’s question.. We see that the mission platform relationship is important. If I understand correctly, you are saying that, on the Rafale fighter aircraft, for example, it is more that we are trying to implement the SCALP substitute or deep-strike capacity.

As you have said, in terms of airborne platforms, the anti-ship capacity would be carried out by a PATMAR-type aircraft. Ships are already equipped on both sides—French and British—with long range, deep-strike missiles. For the British it is the Tomahawk, and for the French it is the MdCN. This may be a simplistic understanding from me, but we already see that you have two kinds of missile that could be developed simultaneously and could be coherent, consistent and compatible with some subsections, if they are modular enough. From the platform point of view, the mission could be different.

              Joël Barre (Translation): I haven’t been clear enough. The FMAN capacity is also to be used on the Rafale fighter aircraft. Currently, the Rafale fighter aircraft is equipped with the SCALP missile and Exocet missile in its air-to-sea version. We want to renew that capacity on the Rafale fighter aircraft. The anti-ship capacity must be adapted on the Rafale fighter aircraft. We will also set an anti-ship capacity on the PATMAR-type aircraft, but not a long-range, deep-strike missile on this one.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you for that answer. I think that Mr Ferrara has another question.

Q67            Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Is the best solution not to adapt things, so that we have a family with the supersonic for anti-ship and the more stealthy solution for deep strikes? Is that not something that we can all agree on? I state this before you on purpose.

Joël Barre (Translation): I think we need to complete our analysis work. I can’t give you a forecast right now; I don’t even have a hunch in that particular area. I think that we need to continue our work. I would just like to remind you that we are looking at operational needs also, trying to understand what they are, because that will really draw out what we do in the future.

That’s our starting point—the operational need. We have some preliminary documents right now. In the concept phase we need to compare concepts; that’s one thing. However, we must also have a clearer definition of our operational needs. So, currently I cannot answer your question and I can’t go down the avenue that you’re suggesting. I’m sorry I can’t answer this question right now.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you very much, Mr Robinson, for your patience. You have the floor.

Q68            Gavin Robinson: Thank you, Sir, for all that you have indicated thus far in the engagement that we’ve had. If I can take you back to your presentation, you outlined a timetable from the February 2019 review to the 2020 conclusion of the conceptual phase, and to 2024 for the launch of the programme itself. Could you fill in the space between 2020 and 2024? What do you imagine will occur during that period of time? Could you give us some of your thoughts about a memorandum of understanding between our country and yours, including what you would like to see in it and whether that memorandum of understanding will continue to develop during that four-year period, or do you imagine it will be a document written in stone?

Joël Barre (Translation): We have a procurement process in France that is governed by an ministry document that sets out a number of steps and a number of phases within these steps. So, currently we are conducting the feasibility phase—the concept phase, or the joint concept phase. That runs until 2020. After this concept phase, in our French internal system, we move on to the choice milestone, in which we submit the options to our Minister of one or several systems that will enter the design phase, and that is what we will be putting to our Minister in 2020.

Then we will move on to the design phase, which will run for approximately four years, and in 2024, at the end of the design phase, we will suggest the launch for development and manufacturing of the product, so that we can meet the deadline of 2030. So that’s our organisation; this is how our process is broken down.

Now, in Great Britain you have an initial gate, if I understand correctly, which is equivalent to our choice milestone. So, in 2020 you will be doing the same as us. At the end of 2020, or the beginning of 2021 in the worst-case scenario, we should have a similar calendar. Then we will sign the necessary agreements so it can move on to the design phase and then in 2024 we will be implementing the project.

Q69            Gavin Robinson: Sir, you have indicated that that is the procurement process and we are getting to a design phase. You also spoke earlier in glowing terms of MBDA. I wanted to probe just how open you are to an open competition before we enter design phase, to see whether there is an appetite for open competition, or whether you truly believe that MBDA, no matter how unique it is, is the only company that could fulfil such a requirement. Or do you believe that there is merit in seeking alternative solutions and designs from alternative companies such as Raytheon or Thales?

Joël Barre (Translation): The answer is no. I don’t think that we will put MBDA in competition with anybody else at the end of the concept phase. First, as I mentioned earlier, MBDA is the single missile manufacturer in Europe as I see it. We have built it together. It is an important strategic asset for both our countries, so I think that it must manufacture the missiles. There is no alternative in Europe. If we were to open up the market to other players, we would have to open it to the US, and I am not in favour of that as French délégué général pour l’armement Secondly, in a programme of such magnitude, as we move forward we gain experience, share technology and share know-how. We also share sensitive information, so we cannot jeopardise our initial choice after we have gone through all these steps.

Those are the two main reasons why we do not think that it is relevant to have competition for MBDA.              

Q70            Gavin Robinson: I commend you, Sir, for the most brutally honest and frank response that I think we will get today. Have you had any discussions with your London-based counterparts and do they have exactly the same certainty on procurement possibilities?

Joël Barre (Translation): No, we haven’t discussed this yet. I have been délégué général pour l’armement for the last year, and at the end of August I will meet my third British counterpart in one year. 

              John Spellar: Touché.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I encourage you, director general, and your new counterpart to look into that question and to be as brutally honest as you were today. Thank you Gavin. Unless you have another question, I will give the floor to Stéphane.

Q71            Stéphane Trompille (Translation): Thank you. Director General, I have two questions for you. First, what are the main economic, financial, strategic and industrial advantages to conducing this armament programme in a bilateral manner? How important is it to France’s defence industrial and technological sector? Secondly, what are the consequences of Brexit on this bilateral programme and on the One MBDA initiative, and will a new inter-governmental agreement be necessary for the Lancaster House agreement to be implemented? I am thinking here of all the customs issues that could arise.

Joël Barre (Translation): With regard to the use of co-operation, I have been pretty clear about this but, in general terms, you know as well as I do that weapons co-operation will enable us to meet a number of objectives. Firstly, there is a political objective in terms of building European defence. For that to happen, you need to co-operate on weapons systems, and that is one of the strong dimensions of this. The french military programming law for 2019-2025encourages that. Secondly, there is an operating advantage. When you build such sophisticated and complex systems jointly, they will be more readily interoperable. The French, British and Americans struck in Syria recently and that was made possibly because our connection systems were interoperable.

Of course, there is also an economic advantage, because in the joint concept phase we share expenses. We have €100 million for MBDA, and as I said, that was 50:50—€50 million was paid by the British side, and €50 million by the French. We will also share research and development costs, and lower the costs of the missiles themselves. If we use the same technology for the missiles, the unit cost per missile will be lower, so that is another economic advantage. The other obvious advantage of co-operation is that we are supporting the industry, MBDA, which is part of our industrial structure, and it is gaining ground and weight thanks to our joint efforts.

All the joint British and French programmes are conducted as part of bilateral agreements, so within the context of national sovereignty. If we are to continue our adventure with FC/ASW, we will need additional agreements, because at this stage we are only looking forward to the concept phase.

Brexit seen from my standpoint is a political issue. The French Government have already made their views known. Co-operation should continue with the UK regardless of Brexit, and there is nothing else to add. I can only welcome that position because we already work on many joint projects. Will customs regulations and the post-Brexit legal framework make any difference? We do not know, but should there be an issue, again it will be addressed bilaterally. I think that any issue can be addressed.

Q72            John Spellar: Thank you for that positive response. In many cases this is a matter of will and basic intention to focus on the main issues. We can sympathise with you in trying to keep up with the changes that take place in the Ministry of Defence, but within that construct, how frequent are those discussions between DE&S and the MoD, and how often do UK-French bilateral meetings to review progress take place?

Joël Barre (Translation): Well, for each programme there is a joint organisation. For the FC/ASW programme we have a joint office where the programme is conducted, and that brings our teams together on a regular basis and whenever necessary. We also have contacts on a general basis between DGA and the Ministry of Defence procurement, and there is regular contact between DGA and DE&S. We meet on a regular basis. I see my British counterpart for procurement in the Ministry of Defence, and the CEO of DE&S, roughly every three months.

Q73            John Spellar: Finally, on exportability, how important will that be in the final decision, and to what extent are we trying to align not just the technical specifications, but the criteria that will determine exports?

Joël Barre (Translation): You are right to bring that up. There can be no effective co-operation between France and Britain on any weapons system, including the one that we are discussing today, unless we agree on common rules for exportability. That means that we need to agree on the terms and conditions for possible exports. You have rules governing that, and we have our own rules as well. Of course, as part of any co-operation agreement, we have to agree on the issue of exports to be able to have a joint policy.

Q74            Mrs Moon: I have to leap in there. I want to know about the systems that we are looking at. We are looking at airborne and surface-launched, but are we talking about a single system or are you looking at two systems? Are you looking at submarine-launch? I would like some clarification on those areas, if I may.

Joël Barre (Translation): As things stand on FC/ASW, we are only looking at surface and aircraft platforms. We are not considering submarine launches. In France, the SM39 is the submarine version of the Exocet, and we will have to replace it someday. We will see whether we can also have a similar application for FC/ASW, but at this stage we have not started any studies on submarine-launch. 

Q75            Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I would like to ask a question. In the short or the long run, will this joint Franco-British programme be open to other nations?

Joël Barre (Translation): No one else, at least in Europe, owns deep-strike capacity right now apart from the French and the British. Of course, other countries may decide to become involved, but as things stand the FC/ASW programme is a Franco-British programme that is really at the heart of Franco-British co-operation. I believe it is essential to conduct the joint concept phase successfully and then we have to successfully complete the key review. Then, by 2020, we should make the decision to continue, with MBDA, for the rest of the programme.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): This shows that, at least on the French side in the DGA, there is clear determination and commitment to Franco-British co-operation. I suggest that we adjourn now, and we will resume this afternoon with other speakers. I thank the witness.

              Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

Examination of witness

Witness: Admiral Christophe Prazuck.

Q76            Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I should like to thank Admiral Prazuck, the Chief of the French Navy, for coming, as well as the naval officers he has brought with him. I will not repeat this morning’s introduction, but let me remind you that although this is a closed door session, we will none the less be publishing the report. Once you have finished speaking, Admiral, the British and French MPs who have joined us today will pose alternate questions. But first, Admiral, perhaps you could say a few words about the issue we are addressing: France’s assessment of the threat and the need to maintain offensive capability at sea. You have the floor.

Admiral Prazuck: Thank you, Mme Pouzyreff. I have been in post for two years. I have been a submariner, a surface officer and the head of the Naval Special Forces. Prior to being chief of the Navy, I was head of the HR department of the French Navy. I have both very direct and very frequent discussions with my English counterpart, Admiral Sir Philip Jones. We recently ran a joint exercise, Catamaran, and the Royal Navy is really our twin Navy. We co-operate on many issues, and this is something of primary importance to me.

(Admiral Prazuck continued in French (Translation))

With your permission, I will switch to French to talk about missiles and other more complex issues. So what are we discussing today? We entered the missile era in 1967, when an Egyptian Styx missile was launched against the Eilat, a corvette. Then, in 1982, during the Falklands War, an Exocet hit the British ship HMS Sheffield, while in 1987, another Exocet missile hit the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf. In 1991, British Sea Skuas hit a number of Iraqi fast patrol boats, and in 2003 HMS Gloucester intercepted a Silkworm missile that was launched off the Iraqi coast. This run of events, which started in 1967, reached a turning point in 2006, when a non-state actor - more than likely Hezbollah - launched a huge anti-ship missile against the Hanit, an Israeli corvette. Indeed, a similar situation was recently seen in the south of the Red sea, where, apparently, a Turkish cargo vessel was hit by the same type of missile.

In parallel with the creation of anti-ship missiles, defensive systems were also developed— both anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. In France we developed the Masurca while the Americans brought into being a whole family of missiles, the SM-1, SM-2 and SM-3. Equally, France designed the Crotale, a short-range missile, as well as the Aster, developed by MBDA. In summary, there are today 2 distinct families of defensive missile system: long-range missiles, such as the Aster and SM-3, and short-range missiles, such as Crotale.

As Mme Pouzyreff indicated earlier, anti-ship missiles are above all offensive weapons, much as anti-missile systems are broadly defensive in character. However, going beyond this very basic distinction, try to imagine you are on a ship at sea and you are being attacked by a vessel that has just fired an anti-ship missile - Such a situation is entirely plausible today, especially in the eastern Mediterranean - You will have to destroy the ship that fired at you, and you will be using an anti-ship missile to do it; in other words you will be selecting an offensive type of missile as a means of defence. This type of situation is not just plausible, but in my opinion more than likely to occur.

In the French navy, we have always had our own national capability for offensive missiles—the Exocet—but we have also used American defensive missiles like the SM-1, before it was replaced by MBDA’s Aster. However, beyond just anti-ship and anti-missile systems, we must also talk about cruise missiles, whose background is a little different. The Tomahawk, which was introduced in the 1970s, has been on board British submarines since 1995, with the Royal Navy’s first operational launch in Kosovo. The Storm Shadow / SCALP programme — where France and Britain worked together—began in 2002, with its first operational strike in 2003 in Iraq. France has the naval version of this missile, the MdCN, operated from our surface platforms, and given a baptism of fire last April against chemical weapons targets in Syria. This missile can also be launched from the Barracuda class submarine, which will enter service with the French Navy in 2020.

You may know that about a year ago, the French President ordered a strategic review, which emphasised the resurgence of state strategic competitors or adversaries. It underlined the new outbreak of aggressive posturing, especially in the maritime domain where the threat is as high in coastal or littoral zones as it is on the high seas —the South China Sea is the obvious example. These disruptive influences have invested hugely in long range hyper-velocity missiles and highly effective (and increasingly widespread) surface-to-air missiles, which have completely upset the strategic landscape.

The rise in the number of A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) zones is coupled with competition across the electromagnetic spectrum through the jamming of radar, communications and other similar systems. As highlighted in the strategic review, there is a clear requirement to maintain our ability to be the first into contested areas - there are many lessons for us to learn from the operation in Syria last April - just as it is necessary to maintain air superiority in the maritime environment, through sufficient aircraft range and penetration capability. Finally, it is of course essential to maintain a level of industrial autonomy in our missile manufacturing. Such are the findings of the strategic review.

As far as I am concerned, I believe the Exocet missile, which has been highly successful over a long lifecycle, will be an out of date weapon in terms of speed, range and agility in the next ten to fifteen years. We have reached the limit of what we achieve through incremental improvements. The MM40 Block 3C will never be a hyper-velocity, supersonic missile.

We have now reached certain limits, and this is where the new FMAN/FMC programme comes into play.

In July while speaking at the French Ministry of Defence, our President talked about the exceptionally close Defence relationship between France and the UK, with or without Brexit. To him, this is a strategic, deep relationship, and it will only deepen. He said that with our two allies Britain and the US, we conducted the operation in April against Syria with an unprecedented level of integration and technical prowess. In the end, the military showed that, despite the doubts and the rumours that surface from time to time, the operational reality on the ground was solid; together, we acted with unprecedented speed and an unusually high level of interoperability.

Franco-British co-operation, regardless of the outcome of Brexit, has been reinforced through the Lancaster House treaties and the summit at Amiens in 2016. Now the issue is to strengthen our operational coordination, as much with the Americans as with the British, and particularly in the North Atlantic and Western Mediterranean. We have often had British escort ships for our Carrier Strike Group and, very soon, we hope to have put in place an escort exchange programme for our respective aircraft carriers in order to further strengthen our integration.

We have a common strategic culture. We have similar decision-making processes. We have a common history. Anti-ship and cruise missiles are typically expeditionary weapons or supremacy weapons—those that enable us to be the first to enter contested environments and destroy enemy defence. Interoperability is therefore one of our main challenges, much more so than if we were to put together this type of project with any other country. That sums up the major military and operational challenges. But there are also other significant issues, principle among them industrial partnerships such as the support to the missile manufacturer shared by both of our countries: MBDA. There is, of course, the problem of sovereignty and the maintenance of our industrial expertise. There is also a financial issue associated with this programme; We want to be able to share the costs of development and ownership, but also to reinforce our export capabilities.

What am I, as head of the French Navy, expecting from the FC/ASW programme?

First of all, a direct response to the operational requirement: once the missiles are brought into service, French and British sailors ought to be able to use the improved missile range and penetrative effect to counter a high quality enemy force whose capability is increasing day by day. We want to have replaced the AM39 by 2030 at the latest, initially on the wings of the Rafale and subsequently on the FCAS and the future maritime patrol aircraft (PATMAR). We will replace the MM40 once we have brought in the final improvements because it will still be a subsonic missile. Equally I am expecting the missile to be integrated on our 15 front line frigates by. By 2032, I am expecting the replacement for SCALP on the Rafale, especially for those deployed on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. These are the deadlines and the objectives that we are currently pursuing.

Secondly, we want to provide support to MBDA, our missile manufacturer.

Thirdly, we want to develop mutual dependence between France and Britain in this field. The deliberate development of mutual dependence has been identified by our own Minister of the Armed Forces as a critical basis for our co-operation in Europe. On that subject, I note that the UK has joined the European intervention initiative.

In conclusion, I would say that this level of co-operation comes as the result of an alliance between two countries with unique attributes: France – who pioneered the development of anti-ship missiles with the Exocet, broadly copied, for instance, by China, with the C-801 and C-802 – and the UK – which has extensive experience in the operational use of anti-ship missiles both as a defensive and offensive weapon, such as in the Falklands, Iraq I and Iraq II. Moreover, it is an alliance between two countries that have already achieved technical and operational success through the deployment of the Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missile.

Our timelines are converging, in particular since our cruise missiles will come to the end of their life cycle at approximately the same time. We have already successfully co-operated once. In the second generation, we want to build decisive capability which will carry weight within alliances and coalitions. Today, the capacity to be first into a contested environment, and the fact that we carry maritime cruise missiles sets us apart from other navies. The new generation of anti-ship missiles with deep-strike capability could become a decisive weapons system for Europe. The FC/ASW programme, therefore, carries the dual challenge of upholding both national sovereignty and European sovereignty.

So, there we are, in a few words, I have set out why I believe this ambitious and necessary programme is so important.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you, Admiral. We will now move to questions from the joint panel.

77.          Gavin Robinson: Admiral, congratulations on your sterling efforts to speak English at the start of your presentation. Much better than my attempts at French, I can assure you—and sometimes at English as well.

Q77       We enjoyed your presentation. You mentioned the Royal Navy as being almost a twinned Navy with you and your men. How much involvement have you had in the concept phase of this programme? Do you follow it closely? Are you closely involved in the conceptual process that our two countries are engaged in?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): The concept phase is starting only now. This is a strategic programme, so for me it is essential. I monitor it closely and will follow developments equally closely. One thing I can tell you is that after the operations conducted in Syria, which I have mentioned a number of times already, we are reviewing the conditions in April, together with Sir Philip Jones and John Richardson, our US counterpart. It is useful for us to analyse the efforts in a first-entry context. What do we do when we have a missile threat? What should you do to get rid of that threat? That is the whole purpose of the anti-ship missile programme. How can we be more effective in terms of deep-strike? As I said, I will be monitoring the programme very closely. I will note its developments and the various possibilities. I have followed this on the French side and I will work with my British counterpart on the strategic context, as well as the tactical context.

I note that there may be differences where one approach—especially in Britain—favours stealth as being a better guarantee of deep-strike capability, whereas the French approach looks at high speed, or hyper-velocity. I would advocate comparing the two to see which is likely to be more effective.

78.          Gavin Robinson: Thank you for that answer. That being the case, do you believe that, ultimately, we will be able to agree on one single weapon, or will the outcome of this be a number of weapons systems that allow for those varying requirements and varying operational needs? Can you indicate whether you or your British counterparts have had any discussions about a submarine-based weapons system, and whether that is forming part of the conceptual process?

              Admiral Prazuck (Translation): To my mind, there is no doubt that if you look at a deep-strike or anti-ship missile, we may end up with missiles that have either very similar or very different features. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a range of final versions coming from the same initial design brief. As for choosing between stealth and speed, operational, forward-looking studies on potential threats for the next 10 to 15 years will have to be conducted. When it comes to a submarine launching platform, on French submarines, we have the SM39 missile, the Exocet class, which needs to be modified, but not immediately: it is not a burning, pressing issue. The main challenge today is to replace our airborne and anti-ship surface capabilities, as well as SCALP/Stormshadow..

79.          Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): Thank you, Admiral for being here and for your presentation. Along the same lines as our colleague Gavin Robinson, I would like to ask additional questions about the convergence of French and British requirements in operational terms, and more specifically, A2/AD. What kind of systems should these missiles be able to destroy? In what sort of conflicts do you expect these weapons to be used? In particular, you have the dual use of  anti-ship missiles. Could anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft missiles be considered as part of a joint concept?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): First of all, you asked about the context in which these defence requirements might arise. With our own Aster 15 and Aster 30 and the Russian systems that are being sold across the world—the S-300 and S-400 systems—the need is more and more pressing for a capability that is able avoid interceptor missiles. Our weapons must be able to avoid these anti-missile systems, and that is the driving force behind the new programme. Those systems are the real threat, and I believe that industrialists and researchers should look further, beyond the existing anti-missile systems.

In response to the question about what kind of theatre or context the anti-ship missiles will be used in today> You cite specifically the suppression of air defences and why one might use an anti-ship missile? A few months ago, the Americans in the south of the Red sea said that they were attacked by an anti-ship missile. They responded and fired cruise missiles aimed at all radar sites along the Yemeni coastline, or those that they believed were incriminated in firing at the initial target. In addition, there are mobile systems—mobile anti-ship and anti-air missiles—that move along the coast with radar that looks for and identifies targets. If you want to be able to fire a missile and make sure that it hits this kind of radar , this is also SEAD—suppression of enemy air defences—which we expect to have on the anti-ship missiles. One of the primary tasks of FC/ASW,  if it is to be used in a ‘first in’ scenario against a land-based enemy, is to destroy defences on the coastline with a SEAD-type missile. You would then be free to use deep-strike missiles, like FMC or MdCN.

But there is also another type of conflict where these missiles come into play, which was highlighted in the strategic review—competition on the high seas. Since the end of the cold war we have lost track of the possibility of two major naval forces confronting each other on the high seas. During the cold war a third ‘battle of the Atlantic’ was a distinct possibility, and now we have significant new maritime powers capable of building the equivalent of the French Navy every four years, with very powerful offensive capabilities to challenge the sovereignty of maritime space or the security of supply lines to Europe.

I am not saying that we are likely to find ourselves in this kind of conflict tomorrow. However, if you look at the growing capability of worldwide naval forces, the tactical possibility of a high seas confrontation becomes more likely now than it has been since 1989.

80.          Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): To follow up on this, one can imagine that France, having the world’s second largest EEZ, needs a maritime presence around the world. If we have new generation weapons with a significant deep-strike capability, could that act as a deterrent, namely to keep the enemy at bay?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Very much so. That deterrent role is, after all, one of its primary benefits—to keep at bay any enemy or adversary that we may have. Today, you see the C-801 and C-802 everywhere, which are copies of our Exocet, made in China. You find them in the hand of non-state actors, You see them on board ships, even on small boats. These missiles are capable of inflicting serious damage and we need to be in a position to counter the threat.

81.          John Spellar: Admiral, you talked warmly about the relationship between our two Navies and significantly talked about similar decision-making processes. How closely do the two command structures now work together? As a subset of that, has that increased since the Lancaster House agreement?

              Admiral Prazuck (Translation): I see my British counterpart at least four times a year, within the construct of formal chiefs of  navy meetings. We also have regular staff talks between our staffs. How many officers do I have in the UK? There are 12 officers now embedded in various positions within the Royal Navy. That is the highest level of exchange we have with any other country in the world. As a follow-up to the Lancaster House agreement I can tell you that we are now working on the CJEF joint capability. This summer we had a joint amphibious exercise called Catamaran, off the coast of Brittany, and we are on track so that by the end of 2019 the command and control elements of an inter-Service force should be fully operational. As far as I can see, the operational exchanges —escort of the Charles de Gaulle by British frigates or the Queen Elizabeth by French frigates—I believe will become the new normal. So there you have it—a whole host of constant exchange programmes between the two Navies. I see no other navy in the world with whom there could be such deep interoperability.             

82.          John Spellar: That is very helpful. In that context, therefore, what work are the two Navies doing operationally to exploit the new and emerging technologies that you have described and are in the development phase?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Our procurement agencies, the DGA and DE&S, have exchanges on technological developments and on the way in which those can be put to joint use. From an operational point of view, I can tell you that if you look at anti-submarine warfare, we use the same sonars—on different frigates of course- but we use the same sonar and the same anti-aircraft missiles and we are working jointly on an prototype for mine countermeasures. It is not 100% in all fields, but in areas of strategic priority, we work in close co-operation.

83.          Jean-Pierre Cubertafon (Translation): The risk of a capability gap in anti-ship missile systems for the Royal Navy is sometimes mentioned. What would be the longest acceptable capability gap for the French Navy?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Zero days would be the answer. But let’s not forget, the Royal Navy has moderated a capability gap with Harpoon because it has its Sea Skuas that are carried by helicopters. They were very much used in the Persian Gulf back in 2003. So it found a back-up solution. We do not have the same capability until such time as the Sea Venom arrives in service. However the French see no capability gap in anti-ship missiles, but we do need to provide upgrade maintenance and refitting. We now have a budget plan that enables us to do that refitting, after a transitional period during we have had to run a very tight ship. But in replacing Exocet and SCALP with FC/ASW that potential capability gap will disappear

84.          Mr Francois: Admiral, we are meant to be talking about a joint missile programme, but as I am here may I ask you a bit about carrier operations? We now have the Queen Elizabeth in service and the Prince of Wales is following well behind. You have Charles de Gaulle. You are talking in your Loi de programmation militaire about a follow-on carrier, but some years in the future. How do you see combining our carrier programmes and working collaboratively on carrier operations in the future?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): I am not sure that the British taxpayer would be happy to take part in the development of the future French carrier. Back in the 2000s, when you were developing your own aircraft carriers, France considered becoming part of the Juliette programmes, and that would have enabled you to have two aircraft carriers in the UK and a similar one in France. Unfortunately, it did not work out that way, and the decision that was then made in the UK—not to have a catapult-equipped carrier—meant that you have vertical landing and take-off aircraft on the carriers. That means that French Rafales will not be able to land on the Queen Elizabeth or the Prince of Wales. Conversely, I certainly hope that the F-35s will be able to use the Charles de Gaulle as a platform.

Having said that, significant areas of co-operation remain alive, if only because, while the British carriers are being built, the French fleet has embedded British naval officers in their teams so that landing skills or flight over water are maintained. We know that American fleets, likewise, also receive British naval officers. We have worked with our British counterparts on the concept of aircraft carrier operations. It seems pretty theoretical, but the big question is, what do you want to do with these ships? In escort operations, we will work jointly. We have to remember that an aircraft carrier is a fundamental tactical tool—a military tool—but it is also a political tool, because it assures the co-operation of allies and coalitions. When the Charles de Gaulle was engaged in Syria after the attacks in Paris, it had European escorts from Belgium, Germany, UK and Italy. The idea is that you provide a central platform around other allied capabilities rally. Therefore, escorts by British frigates of the Charles de Gaulle will be met with a French escort for the Prince of Wales and the Queen Elizabeth in years to come. This will be a matter, of course, of co-operation, but it will certainly highlight the close proximity between the two Navies regarding command and control.

I mentioned CJEF—the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. This should very much involve our joint aircraft carrier capability. It can employ the carriers; in the same way it can employ our amphibious forces. We are building that capability as we speak. Nonetheless, co-operation around aircraft carriers will take place very much in an operational context, rather than an industrial one.              

85.          Mr Francois: Thank you, Admiral. To follow on from that, I believe we also collaborate on amphibious forces, and you mentioned an exercise that took place very recently. As part of our Modernising Defence programme, there have been rumours that our Ministry was considering cutting back on some of our amphibious capability. That is something that has greatly concerned us as a Committee. As the head of the French Navy, do you have any concerns about the possibility of the Royal Navy retrenching in terms of its amphibious capability? I say that without wishing to draw you into politics in any way.

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): I heard the same rumour—it was extensively covered by the British press—regarding amphibious capability, but also human capacities and resources in the Royal Marines.  You will know that, in France, we have a different organisation: most of our amphibious capability depends on the land army, so we are not exactly in the same situation.

Every time that I hear those things about the Royal Navy, it concerns me—it’s a concern for the French Navy. We are twins in many ways, as we noticed with the maritime patrol issue a few years ago with Nimrod. At the time, we wondered whether the British would ever use those aircraft again. We thought, “If you can do without them, everyone can do without them”, but in fact, they are extremely important for protecting our submarines.

For France, as is enshrined in our military programme, the amphibious capacity of the military forces is exceptionally important for carrying out operations, as we did off the coast of Libya with helicopters that took off from our BPC platforms (Landing Helicopter Dock), and in humanitarian operations such as the one that was conducted in the French Antilles islands after Hurricane Irma. It all boils down to joint training programmes—to training adequately our young officers who spend a lot of time on these types of ship.

86.          Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Admiral, I know it is a tricky question, but I would like your opinion: are you going to opt for a whole family of missiles? Does that fit in with your requirement for a supersonic solution for anti-ship missiles and a subsonic, stealthy option for deep strikes? We also know that decoupling would allow us to adjust our timelines, to share the industrial work and to distribute it according to the expertise of both our countries. What is your perspective on that?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Personally, I would opt for the cheapest option. I want us to manufacture as many missiles as possible for the lowest cost. We need to analyse the value of each option. We should not have a pea shooter—in other words, a weapon that could be easily intercepted by any defence system. Instead, we should have a weapon that can beat the coastal protection systems—all the defence systems. We need to have that capability within the next 10 years.

It could be so expensive that only one such weapon could be developed, so I am waiting for the findings of the studies that are being carried out as we speak, so we can find the best offensive and defensive capacity against ships and in deep strike, which I believe is really crucial for the kind of operations that we are likely to undertake.

87.          Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Just to follow up, will the cheapest option none the less mean that we are free to act as we like?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): No, the cheapest option that allows us to strike—to beat defence systems as they are today and will be in the next decade. We are at a very early stage of our studies and analysis. In the end, when we receive the key findings, I will be able to answer your question in more detail. At this juncture, I cannot say much more.

88.          Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I am going to ask the question that no one else wants to ask. Are you ready to consider an off-the-shelf option from further afield?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): I think I answered that question in my introduction. When it comes to weapons to defend ourselves, we can look into options from a broad range of partners. However, when it comes to the weapons we use to attack, we need to retain our sovereignty.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Food for thought.

89.          Mrs Moon: Admiral, you have talked about us almost having twin Navies. Do you see French and British operational requirements being so close at any point that we could actually have common development and procurement? Is that somewhere we may head in the long term? I have to tell you that we seem to waste an awful lot of money on development and procurement. Perhaps we would start making some savings if we did it together.

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): If I understand correctly, you are asking me whether we could have a joint procurement agency. Currently, there are a number of issues on which we work together—on procurement and our requirements for anti-aircraft missiles - we tried to cooperate for Horizon frigates. There are also some areas where we differ. Submarines, for example—especially nuclear deterrent submarines—should belong to each country; we should remain independent in that area.

It is good when our industries, our chains of command and our engineers can come together for joint programmes. It allows us to draw down costs, especially for development, and to pool skills. For example, you have greater skills and knowledge in stealth missiles, and we are better at high-velocity missiles. But having a shared chain of command would be too complicated. It is already difficult for us to cooperate between our Armed  Services in France; I am afraid adding the British system on top would be a bit too much.

90.          Mrs Moon: With regard to risk, what is your assessment of where we are at the moment in terms of the anti-access/area denial capability of our adversaries? Could you give me an idea of the range of the risk? If 1 is a very small risk that we are ready for and capable of dealing with and 10 is a high risk, where would you say we are now, and where do we need to get to?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): It all depends on where you stand. I believe right now, in the eastern Mediterranean, we are at 8 or 9 on a scale of 1 to 10. Off the coast of Brittany we are close to zero. The most striking example that we have today is in the eastern Mediterranean. There is another risk that arises here—the proliferation risk, especially of anti-ship missiles. With everything that is going on in the south of the Red sea, I would say the risk level is close to 3 or 4 in Bab-el-Mandeb strait. That is to answer your question while remaining not too far from the boundaries of our continent.

91.          Mrs Moon: With regard to range, there has been a lot of talk about whether or not we go for medium range or deep strike. Which would be your priority?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): In our recent operations I would have opted for the longer range—range over anything else, really—so as to strike as far as possible at the defence systems of our adversaries. With A2/AD systems, we need to be either thousands of kilometres away or be very close, using submarine capacities. They allow us to attack a defence system before it has time to react.

92.          Mrs Moon: Finally, have you spoken with the Ministry of Defence at all about the possibility of replacing Harpoon with Exocet? Has that been part of your discussions with the Royal Navy?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Yes, absolutely. I am not here to sell the Exocet to anyone, of course; I am not the DGA—the equivalent of DE&S—but I know it is one of the options that the Royal Navy is looking into.

93.          Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I want to return to what Madeleine was saying about bringing the teams closer together. At the end of the concept phase, when we start the development phase, could we then have a joint programme office?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Yes, I think that is what normally happens in joint programmes. We always have bilateral and binational teams coming together.

94.          Stéphane Trompille (Translation): You have told us all about this future missile. There is, however, one question that remains: what should we expect from our enemies in the future, and to what extent will the future missiles meet the capabilities of our enemies? I know we are not completely in agreement about velocity or stealth, but what should we expect as an end product?

              Admiral Prazuck (Translation): What we want is to be able to strike the defences of our opponents, or to go beyond them. Some say we need to be stealthy; others believe that even if you are stealthy, someone will see you, so you need to be very quick. The whole aim, or the shared goal, is to be able to strike the defensive system of your enemies—for example, a chemical plant on land that is within another country’s borders, with long-range anti-missile systems and short-range anti-missile systems.

To strike that particular target, you can strike with SEAD—suppression of enemy air defences—weapons, so you can strike the radar systems first and then you can strike the final target. That’s if you want to strike a target that is on land. So you start by taking out the radar systems and by being stealthy, using missiles that fly very low or that fly extremely quickly. They are able to hit their target. That is the first option, or first scenario.

The second option is if you are at sea. Let’s imagine a scenario where we are in deep waters—a scenario that we’ve completely forgotten about since the Cold War. In the Cold War, people thought there would be a third Battle of the Atlantic, whereby the Russians would stop any American ships coming into Europe. So we’ve completely forgotten about this scenario, but it’s coming back to the fore and it is likely in a certain regard, given the efforts undertaken by emerging countries that are investing in their naval forces, so that they can be competitive with the French, other European and American naval forces.

In this particular context, we will need to have weapons that can neutralise enemy ships and I think that the mix between the two scenarios is if you are off the coast, for example, and you are in a stand-off. You are far enough from the coast that missiles launched from the coast cannot hit you. So the enemy country will send boats out with missiles on board that will be fired to strike our ships. You need to be able to destroy those small ships, and neutralise the missiles aboard them.

Those are the two main scenarios and then there is a sort of pick and mix scenario, which includes a bit of both.

95.          Stéphane Trompille (Translation): Thank you very much for your answer. There was a battle of the Atlantic in the Cuban crisis. None the less, what I really wanted to know is this: regarding what our potential enemies will have, how much research have we put into knowing what China is doing, Russia is doing or what others are doing? And what about proliferation, which you touched upon earlier? What should we expect in terms of missiles on the other side? Have you made any progress in that particular area?  I know that you won’t have an easy answer to give to us right now, but have you looked into it? Do you aim at looking into it? What are we going to be faced with? Essentially, that is what I am asking.

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): If you are asking me what is on the other side—the enemy side—you are asking about the systems that will counter or try to counter our missiles. Right now, there is the S-400, manufactured by the Russians, which has very good radar systems and missiles with impressive interception capacity and ability. So that is the type of system that we will most likely come up against. These are precisely the kind of defence systems that we must be able to strike with our joint programme. Currently, the only way to strike them is to do so from very close up.

Another development is being trialled by Russia, China and India with missiles that are like the FMC, to strike at sea. They are anti-ship missiles—Yakhont for Russia, and the Bastion missiles. The Chinese also have a lot of publicity about their DF-21, which is a ballistic missile with a self-directing device. They are all a bit shrouded in mystery, because having an auto-director and being ballistic seems to be a contradiction in terms. It is a concept that I believe is not mature or completed yet, but these are attacking, offensive weapons.

96.          Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Just to pick up on that, what about your knowledge of extremely fast, high-velocity missiles that are developed by China or Russia?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): I believe that supersonic missiles already exist in both those countries, and a lot of concepts are also showcased. For example, missiles that have a ballistic trajectory achieve a high speed, but at high speed heat is produced. Having a guidance system seems quite complicated at that speed, because to guide a missile to a moving target such as a boat would be extremely difficult—I don’t really believe that the technology exists yet. They do have supersonic missiles. That is a fact and a matter of public record. Other concepts belong more to their dreams or future objectives, such as high-velocity guided missiles with ballistics, and I have not yet seen any proof. For me, it means that when we develop our FTI programme, our frégates de taille intermédiaire, we need to invest in radar that allows us to see at 360° constantly. When you have a radar that revolves, you cannot see what is happening at 360°. When a missile comes at high velocity, you need to know what is going on and what is coming from all angles all the time.

97.          Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): We are at the concept phase of a weapon, or two weapons, that will meet the operational needs of both countries by 2030. Do you think that Western countries already have weapons that could meet our operational needs? Do those weapons already exist, or are they currently under development?

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): To my knowledge, there are none. To my knowledge, weapons that in 10 years’ time will be able to beat defence systems such as A2/AD do not yet exist—the only solution now is to shoot from all angles. Over the past 20 years we have benefited from a situation in which we were a step ahead technologically. Things have changed over the last five to six years, and the situation is now quite the opposite. I do not see in any Western arsenal a weapon that would meet our operational needs. I think this is a great opportunity for France and Great Britain to be leaders in that particular area.

98.          Mr Francois: Admiral, you mentioned the DF-21 ballistic missile. As I understand it, ever since the Americans sailed their carriers into the Taiwan Strait in 1996, the Chinese have been somewhat obsessed with American carrier power and the ability to kill an American carrier battlegroup. I think they now have a thing called the DF-31D, which is a ballistic missile optimised for attacking aircraft carriers. Are you saying that you believe that this technology is not yet mature, and that you do not think that these systems are operationally viable yet? You have one good reason for answering this question, and we have two.

Admiral Prazuck (Translation): Yes it’s true. First, the Chinese build aircraft carriers, and if they were sure that they could strike an aircraft carrier, they would not make them. That is my first argument. Secondly, a ballistic missile is designed to strike a target that does not move. Imagine that there was a missile that could go to Mach 6 and could be fired 1,000 km away from the aircraft carrier. It would take six minutes to reach its target. Let us imagine that the carrier moves at 20 knots or 10 metres per second. In six minutes, the carrier will have moved 3.6 km, so shooting a ballistic missile without the ability to manoeuvre, even at a very high speed, does not make sense. The only way to adjust the terminal trajectory is to have a number of devices on board, but then you cannot have the speed. To have all the devices that allow you to guide a missile, you need to slow the missile down significantly, which means that it is not longer a high-velocity weapon. It would be at Mach 1 or Mach 2, which is like the kind of weapons that are out there right now.

Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): That brings our exchanges to a close. Admiral, thank you for shedding light on the state of the threat and on the needs of military forces that want not only to remain sovereign, but to be second to none.

Examination of witnesses

Witnesses: Antoine Bouvier and Chris Allam.

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99.           Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): We are now on the home stretch, with the final panel of witnesses. We will hear from Antoine Bouvier, who is none other than the CEO of MBDA, Admiral Xavier Païtard, who is his defence adviser, Patricia Chollet, who is in charge of relations with Parliament, and Chris Allam, the managing director of MBDA UK. It will be best to give you the floor, so that you can give us a brief presentation. This is an in-camera session. There will be a report, and the proceedings will be submitted to you before they are published.

              Antoine Bouvier: This seems a bit of a paradox, as there is a majority of Brits in the room. I don’t know whether to express myself in French or in English. Since English is the working language of this company, I will combine the two. By the way, Chris is not only the MD and in charge of our activities in the UK within the organization but also the executive vice-president of engineering. He has responsibility for all our engineering activities across the four countries—France-UK, Germany, Italy and Spain.

MBDA is organized as a sort of matrix with double hats. Chris has two responsibilities: engineering across the group and being the MD of UK. That is how we ensure that the objectives of MBDA across the countries it operates in are well understood and well respected, and they are discussed and agreed at executive committee level. I understand that I now have to speak French.

(Mr Bouvier continued in French (Translation))

Back in 1996, France and Britain decided to develop jointly a deep-strike programme known as SCALP Storm Shadow. That programme was launched as an alternative to an American version. The US brought significant pressure to bear in France and in the UK to dissuade the countries from developing this programme. In any case, Matra in France and BAe Dynamics in the UK decided to join forces and merge their missile activities. The programme was so large that France and Britain decided to embark on the new vision and draw up a road map for both countries for missiles through this new company called MBD.

In 2018—22 years after 1996—taking stock of all the activities conducted since that time, we have a very positive results to show. In France, Germany, Britain and Italy, as well as in some export-countries, there is the SCALP Storm Shadow, which is an excellent missile and operates to the satisfaction of our two countries. Our company had its scope broadened to include GEC-Marconi in Britain and Aérospatiale in France, and we also have a presence in Germany, Italy and Spain. Today, MBDA stand on the same footing as our American friends. Our industrial base is very robust  in France, Britain and Europe.

The FC/ASW programme is the chance to breathe new life into this project, which started 20 years ago, and to bring a new impulse to Franco-British co-operation while maintaining the three fundamental directions. The first is political understanding. The significance of the agreement signed at Lancaster House in 2010 has been highlighted and renewed at the Franco-British summits that have taken place since then. In respect of a more challenging political context because of the Brexit—in fact, in spite or because of that context—Franco-British co-operation has become even more important than it was in 2010.

The second dimension is manufacturing and industrial consolidation. We created MBDA in 2016, and we had one MBDA with centres of excellence. The third dimension is programme co-operation. In 1996 we started SCALP and Storm Shadow, and we will extend that in 2018. On top of deep-strike, we have anti-ship strike capability.

For the past 20 years, we have developed one of the few industrial sectors where, in terms of capability, France and Britain have developed the same roadmap, with the same ambition and determination. We are about to bring an additional impulse to this positive momentum.

Where do we stand today? We have a timetable. You may remember that the Lancaster House summit started the programme in 2010. The new programme was confirmed at each Franco-British summit. In 2011, a technical and operational study began. At the Amiens summit in 2016, France and Britain decided to start a concept phase, which began in 2017. The purpose of that concept phase is to look in greater detail at the various possibilities of anti-ship strike capability and deep-strike capability in terms of structure, architecture and the best way to respond to operational requirements while ensuring that they converge as much as possible. This work will be conducted over the next three years. The first stage was completed in 2018. The next is in 2019. The idea is that by 2020 we will have full convergence details that are as comprehensive as possible, but of course it will be for the two countries to arrive at—hopefully—similar solutions.

There are many areas of convergence. The Chief of Staff of the French Navy, the Air Force and the French DGA—likewise, the DE&S and MoD in Britain—have the challenge of penetration survivability. We have to remember that we are facing A2/AD challenges that occur more and more often and are seen to be threats to us: issues of radius of action, terminal guidance, military preparation—I am going through the list of major operational challenges. We can look into each of these challenges in detail because each has a technological dimension, and many of the technological challenges have been addressed as part of the Franco-British R&D framework. The eight major projects have been driving research co-operation. We have technological challenges, as I said. They were examined in France and Britain. In France we looked at propulsion, especially supersonic propulsion. Britain looked at stealth. In both countries, in a very balanced way, we have been looking at self-guiding missiles, artificial intelligence and the like. This is where we stand today.

I believe it is important to give you a recap on the background. The momentum started 20 years ago, but it is our collective responsibility to see it through, because that momentum will not ensure the success of a European company, MBDA. Also, in this context we can respond in terms of where the challenges are to maintain supremacy, sovereignty and technological capability. We want to maintain our Armed Forces at the best possible level.

I should like now to thank you for giving me this opportunity to talk. This is, to my knowledge, the first time France and Britain have had a Joint Committee—a Franco-British Committee—and I am delighted, and indeed very proud, to see that this unique event, which is a first, should be so close to the concerns of this company.

Of course, we have military programmes in France and Britain, but we also have a Franco-British company. We are delighted to be involved in this discussion here in Paris. This is a world premiere, as it were, although there have been talks at parliamentary level.

I should like to thank you for this co-operative effort, although there will be more specific issues on technology, on SCALP and on Tempest. I am sure you will have issues on extending this to other partners and looking forward to exports, but we will have plenty of time for questions to address all these points.             

              Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): Thank you, Mr Bouvier. MBDA is indeed the iconic company to represent Franco-British co-operation. I will now give the floor to our guests, starting with Mr John Spellar.

100.        John Spellar: Could you tell us what progress has been made so far in the concept phase and do you expect that still to be on track to conclude in 2020?

Chris Allam: The concept study has made huge progress so far. What we have done, as in any concept study, is open up the range of possible solutions and look at the requirements. That is what we are doing at the moment: imagining what the solutions might be, working with the two MoDs on the requirements and looking at what they need to do—not just in specifics, but also in a general sense of what they are trying to achieve. We have filled that space with potential solutions.

Going forward, we will start to converge on some answers. That process starts early next year, when we take a wide range of concepts and probably start to narrow that down to what look like the best choices—best militarily, best economically, most cost-effective, best range of technologies and best commonality across a range of products. To answer simply, the study is going very well. It is on track and the teams are working really well together.

101.        John Spellar: Can I be a little more specific? You have talked about starting to bring that together next year, so at what stage do we get to, if not conclusion, then at least a milestone in the concept phase, and then start to outline a road map for moving beyond concept into development and, indeed, manufacture?

Chris Allam: The next milestone is March next year. At that point, we will be mid-way on the concept study and we would start to see convergence down to a smaller number of concepts, but we don’t have to decide how many. The important thing is to keep our minds open to how many solutions.

A year later, the plan there is to start the assessment phase. That is the point where, if you like, convergence starts to happen and that says we are clear what we want to do and can start to design and develop it. That was the plan when we started; it still is the plan now. Our job as industry is to find those solutions and make them attractive. It looks good so far, but we need to get through those key milestones.

102.        John Spellar: Mr Bouvier rightly drew attention to the unique and successful nature of the company, but obviously there are different skills within the company, so what roles have your centres of excellence in the UK and France played in the concept phase up to now, and how do you see them taking that forward?

Antoine Bouvier: May I come back to your first question, to complement what Chris has just explained? You enjoyed the presentation by the Chief of Navy, because he was very blunt; I will take it as an invitation to be blunt myself. I will speak in French—it is easier to be blunt in French.

(Mr Bouvier continued in French (Translation))

The speed at which we can arrive at convergence is one of the critical criteria for the success of this programme. We have several options on the table as things stand, and the various stages that Chris has just described—the initial review at the beginning of 2019, the key review in 2020—are the milestones where we can assess convergence among different options. But it will not be for MBDA to decide on the pace of convergence, and indeed it is not for MBDA to decide on the final programme.

Our job is to provide the two MoDs—the French and British Armed Forces—with all the elements upon which they can arrive at a decision. The close dialogue between the French and British Armed Forces, and indeed between DE&S and DGA, is what will ensure a rapid convergence toward a single solution, or possibly two solutions, because if the French working assumption is confirmed—that we will launch production in 2024—then by 2020 we need to have a risk reduction programme, which I believe is called the assessment phase in the UK. For that to happen, you need to have achieved a certain level of maturity in the documentation and technical specifications. Then you can consider two solutions in parallel, but no more, and ideally you should be working on the basis of a single solution.

So you are quite right to underline the need to arrive promptly at convergence, but how quickly we arrive at convergence will depend on a critical element, namely the ability of the French and British sides of MBDA and the French and British MoDs to exchange sensitive information on the type of product, propulsion, stealth, operational use and what we believe enemy aircraft defence will be moving towards in the next few years.

But we have restrictions on either side—we have our red lines—and the one message I would like to send loud and clear is that speedy convergence is critical for success and will depend on each country’s capacity, both at Armed Forces and Ministry level, to work jointly, arrive at technical solutions and draw up a timetable that, if the hypothesis is confirmed, will lead to roll-out in 2024. That is essential, and it is essential that we should be able to exchange sensitive information between France and Britain in a more flexible and full way. Regarding centres of excellence and who does what, I will hand over to Chris.

Chris Allam: The centres of excellence are the inspiration behind the technology in the programme at the moment. They are fully involved—they are a part of MBDA, so it is just the way we work. We work with those centres of excellence, and they are a core part of the solution on both sides. They are totally embedded in what we have done so far.

103.        Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): May I return to John’s question to make things perfectly clear? The head of the DGA, Joël Barre, spelled out the ambition on the French side this morning. We have this concept phase that takes us to 2020. In France, we would like to decide by 2020. I am not saying that it is going to be one system or two systems, but we want to start with the design phase after the concept phase, and that will take us to 2024. Without prejudging the issue, we do not know at this stage whether we will opt for a single weapons system or two systems.

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): You are right to bring this issue up. We have different decision timetables in France and in Britain. The operational requirements may also be different, which may then lead to different technical solutions. The MBDA’s role in bringing about convergence is important, not decisive but important. Our job is to provide our respective Governments, the two Ministries of Defence and our Armed Forces—the decision-making bodies—with all the elements so that they can arrive at a decision, looking at operational requirements and technological solutions. The more freedom we have to exchange even highly sensitive information, the better a position we will be in to document reliably and accurately the elements upon which sound decisions can be made.

In France, the vote of the military programming law means we have a tighter timetable, but similar debates will be conducted in the UK. Initially the timetables are not identical, but both countries have a higher interest in ensuring that the two timetables converge. It is for the MBDA to document and inform the choices as best we can.

104.        Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): Before we move on to the technical details, what is your take on OneMBDA and the challenges that that can bring about? Does Brexit stand in the way? Is the structure Brexit-proof? Will it be a challenge to keep the structure going? That is one question I have. This is absurd reasoning, but looking at employment and economic development in both countries, what would the consequences be for industrial development and employment on either side of the channel should the programme be aborted or not come about?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): When France and Britain decided, back in November 2010 with the Lancaster House agreement, to launch the OneMBDA initiative, the idea was to permanently consolidate in France a prime contractor for missiles in France and Britain. The decision to have the centres of excellence was based on the fact that neither France nor Britain, no matter how big they were, could go it alone. Neither of them could achieve the critical mass required to achieve success in the defence industry. To arrive at critical mass, we had to specialize. That was an initial objective, but to arrive at critical mass, we had to accept a certain level of interdependence. You have to accept mutual dependence to come together. The whole purpose of the Lancaster House agreement was to organize mutual dependence, rather than being subjected to it as a collateral. The objectives that were listed in 2010 are all the more valid today. As a result, MBDA is the only European company that can rival its American counterparts. Other European companies have high-performing products, but none—other than MBDA—is of a size approaching that of its American rivals. That is what ensures MBDA’s growth and performance outlook.

If you keep that in mind, and keep in mind the major political objectives, you find that, although the specific consequences of Brexit—customs duties and non-tariff barriers such as standards and new requirements for staff secondment, for example—will of course be challenges, they are secondary issues and will be handled in the wake of the primary objectives that were set out back in 2010. What is a source of concern today is not so much the negative consequences for bilateral or indeed multilateral relations between countries—I believe we can certainly arrive at reasonable arrangements—but MBDA UK’s ability to access development funds in Brussels when the UK is outside the EU as a third-party country. On a short-term basis, this may sound marginal, but in the longer term—over a five or 10-year period—these will be decisive aspects. I therefore believe that, as of now, a solution should somehow be found in the field of defence so that the UK is not seen as a third country.

While Britain may not be a member of the EU, its strategic and security interests are so close to those of all the other 27 member states that this common fate and destiny should be enshrined and recognized as part of a well-defined association so as to enable Britain to take part in major defence programmes. That is what we are hoping for, and I believe it is a reasonable enough objective, which, beyond political issues, should be recognized as an objective that will serve not just British interests but the interests of Europe at large. That is the only way we can keep our critical size vis-à-vis our non-European competitors. It took us years of hard work and consolidation to achieve that, and it would be tragic if the Brexit deal disrupted our momentum and challenged that critical mass. We can always arrive at pragmatic solutions, but from a political standpoint, Britain’s strategic interests are very much the same as ours.

105.        Mr Francois: Gentlemen, you have made much of centres of excellence within MBDA. Could you explain to us briefly what the centres of excellence are, what is excellent where, and to what extent either nation has given up some elements of capability and is now dependent on the other?

Chris Allam: There are two types of centres of excellence. In one, the countries have decided that one will be reliant on the other for a certain capability. In the other, we have decided to share everything but keep capabilities in both countries. All that was done by a measured, conscious process in which the countries said, “We have decided to be reliant on our partner.”
 

For example, actuators are embedded in the UK. That is a UK-based centre of excellence, on which the French side of the business relies. It all runs in an integrated way, as Antoine said at the start—we run it as a European business—but there are absolute built-in reliances across it. We then make sure there is enough skill in the other country so that they can do interpretation. It is the most efficient piece of design that I have seen in an industrial context, but it all lives in that political will that says, “That’s the way we want our missile business to run.”
 

To pick up the other question, if this programme did not happen, we would put at risk the skill we have developed in European missile design. This is one of the core programmes. It is not the only one—MBDA has a number of programmes—but it is absolutely at the core. In the same way that Storm Shadow and SCALP were at the core of MBDA to start, this is at the core of MBDA as we go forward. It is the heartland that drives the design, the skill and therefore the value in export. The sovereignty also comes from that design process; it does not come through just buying the equipment, but through what you learn when you design it. To answer the question on centres of excellence, there are two types: one where we are dependent on each other, and one where we have decided to literally share everything in that domain.

106.        Mr Francois: If the crown jewels in that arrangement are the really high-end R and D, where is that now?

Chris Allam: In the context of centres of excellence, the R and D lives in the respective centres of excellence, and obviously in the shared ones. Not everything we do is a centre of excellence, though. Outside of that we have core integration and core missile design, both of which are alive and well through the scale of MBDA in both countries. R and D lives both in centres of excellence, for those we have chosen, and outside them for areas that are not put in. I am trying not to make that sound too complicated, but there is a whole design that sits behind this.

107.        Mr Francois: Could you provide the Committee with a note that gives greater detail on how this works specifically, just so it is easier to conceptualize exactly what lies where? Do you see what I am reaching toward?

Chris Allam: Absolutely. That is no problem. This is well documented, so we will provide a note on how the centres of excellence work, what they are and how they are staffed. Indeed, a joint report between the UK and France is produced every year that covers some of that ground. It is a slightly long read, though, so I will not suggest that; I will summarize.

108.        Mr Francois: At the risk of touching on the heretical, you obviously compete very successfully with the American majors around the world. In a sense, what you have achieved is quite remarkable. What thought, if any, has been given to transatlantic co-operation? Do you see a future where you are not just competing with the Boeings, the Lockheeds and the Raytheons of this world, but are perhaps increasingly co-operating with them in order to gain access to the US market and, subject to certain strategic red lines, potentially on some black technology as well? Can you see your business evolving in that way over the next 10 to 20 years, or do you see that it is likely still to be overwhelmingly European with very few links with the United States?

Chris Allam: I am sure that my CEO will want to comment, but I will first. The context of the programme you are inquiring upon started as, and is fundamentally part of, a UK-French agreement, so I don’t see that programme direction changing. Certainly, in our view, it is on the right track. On the second point, you would have to consider both markets to be open markets to progress that, and that is not particularly the way I see it in this particular domain. I don’t see both those markets as being totally open. To be blunter—as we are being blunt—the US feels like a closed market, however you approach it. We have had many attempts at that and none have been very successful, so you would have to consider that balance before you stepped into that mode of US collaboration.

109.        John Spellar: Isn’t the outstanding example of that the failure of the US to buy Brimstone, even though the United States air force consider it to be the best product?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): If I may comment, Brimstone has been one of my greatest frustrations as the CEO of MBDA. For those not familiar with the product, Brimstone is an excellent British product. When I say British, I mean British. It means that when we have tried to promote Brimstone in the US we have promoted it out of the UK without any French, German, Italian or Spanish face—just with UK citizens in the framework of the British-US defence relationship.

This programme was an excellent programme, highly appreciated by the US air force. The US at this time had no equivalent to Brimstone in terms of operational capability and performance. We made a number of excellent and very aggressive commercial proposals to the US customer. The British PM sent two letters saying, more or less—obviously in much more diplomatic terms, but the substance was exactly this—“This programme is for me a test of the US-British relationship in the field of defence”. All of this for a proposal that was less than $100 million. So how is it possible that the US President did not deliver the right level of consideration, respect and, I would say, even politeness, to a letter sent by the British PM saying “this programme is a test of British-US co-operation in defence”?

In the end, after a number of years of effort, we have not been able to get a positive decision on Brimstone in the US. It is an excellent, if unfortunate example—another example—of the difficulty we have not only in penetrating the US market but in setting up any balanced co-operation between the US and Europe in the field of defence. The US are more than pleased to have us contributing to programmes—contributing our technology, funding and market—but much less willing to accept that we are partners. The term “partner” is not something acceptable—this is the track record we have had—from a US perspective.

There is another example, which is not in any way related to the UK. It is a bad experience we had in Italy and Germany on an extended air defence programme called MEADS, which you may remember.  Italy and Germany invested a significant amount of money—billions of euros—in MEADS and the US in 2012 took the unilateral decision to stop the programme, without any consideration of the investment made in Germany and Italy. Finally, we were able, with Lockheed Martin, which is our partner on MEADS, now renamed TLVS in Germany—there was also some co-operation with the US—to develop a new version for the German customer, but that is another example of a difficulty we have.

Why do we have these difficulties? Because the US have the budget they need, so there is no need for co-operation. They have exactly the same type of objective—of sovereignty, of freedom of action, of operational advantage—that we have in the UK and France. The terms of the 2015 SDSR—freedom of action, security of supply, and operational advantage—are exactly the same terms used in France, but also in the US. So there is no surprise when in the US they are not willing to enter into this type of co-operation, because they don’t want to have anything that limits in any way the ability ever to produce, develop or field any programme.

So this is where we are, whether we like it or not. I do not disregard some good examples of co-operation with the US in other sectors; but in a sector like the missile sector, which is very sensitive—probably more sensitive than any other sector—I don’t see anything that would lead us to think, to consider, whether there is significant potential for developing co-operation with the US in the foreseeable future.

110.        Mr Francois: You could have added ASRAAM to that list of things where we got close and never quite made it. One other question, if I may: there is a slight glitch in the programme in that Harpoon comes out of service with the Royal Navy in 2023. We then potentially have a missile gap out to 2030, and operationally that is not a desirable place in which to be. The MoD will have to decide on replacing it, although at the moment it has no money for it—we established that in our hearing in London. But even if the MoD could find the money for it, it would have to decide whether or not to make an interim buy, probably of an off-the-shelf-option, at least to take it through to 2030.

Q78       So there is a risk, in the end, that the programme could become decoupled and you could end up with a deep-strike programme but lose the anti-ship element of that, because you’re kind of overtaken by events and the Royal Navy cannot stomach the seven-year gap. What thought have you given to that and what potential solutions do you have?

Chris Allam: You stated that as a risk, which I think is put perfectly; we see it as a risk. It is something that has always been there, so it has not suddenly appeared; it has not appeared out of nowhere. I am fairly sure Sir Simon Bollom and Sir Mark Poffley would have answered the question well from a military perspective, as to what they intend to do about it, and it is certainly not my job to tell them about their military capability gap.

However, recognizing the risk from an MBDA perspective, we would say our intent has always been to offer the best possible solutions to both the French and the UK at the end of the next decade. Therefore, we would say that an interim gap-filler, if they choose it, would be the best way forward—in other words, something that continues the capability they have.

There are other ways of doing that kind of job, so they would also look at those. What can they do from a helicopter-based solution, and so on? But if they literally want to fill the gap, they can do it with something that feels similar and that can be taken out of service. The design intent is that when our solution comes in, it will have all the attributes that you want—indigenous design, sovereign control, it leads to export and it leads to prosperity—all the things that you want from that solution. Looking at that, you would say that extending Harpoon would be a very obvious thing to look at. Without going too far in advising, I’d say that would be an obvious thing to look at. But I’d say there are lots of other ways to do that as well.

111.        Charles de La Verpillière (Translation): I have some questions on the current activity of MBDA. How is your business doing? What is the share of exports? In what way is your business distributed between Great Britain, France and Italy? What are the short and medium-term opportunities for you between now and 2030? And the final question: with the project that we are currently working on, and if we move on to the development phase, how would the development of the project be shared out between MBDA UK and MBDA France?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): Currently we have a very robust working plan. We have great opportunities to grow the company, both in the UK and in France, and these plans have been successful for quite some years already. These opportunities for growth are based on a very close relationship that is based on trust between France and the UK. In the UK, for example, we have the portfolio management agreement, which is an agreement that runs for 10 years. That gives us a great deal of visibility and is a really great framework for our dialogue with our British customers.

In 2011, we had a similar agreement that allows us to share long-term technological and product-based objectives with France and to safeguard jobs in France for MBDA. It is a robust plan.

Given the budget constraints in both countries, even though both have undertaken significant efforts in the field of missiles, we have developed export activities in France and the UK over the past few years that make up more than 50% of our turnover and 50% of our workload. We export over and beyond the UK to the Middle East and Asia, and that is how we are able to reach critical mass, which is the only way to succeed for a company such as ours.

What about the next decade—2020 to 2030? We currently have a range of products that are at the top level of innovation, efficiency and affordability. MBDA’s objective as a company is to serve its clients—Germany, Italy, Spain, France, England—and to prepare for the new national and European programmes for the 2020 to 2030 period. We want to meet the demands and requirements of all those countries, to be competitive and to offer the best performance for our export countries that are the military allies of European countries. Our cruise missile and anti-ship missile programme is precisely about renewing our range of products. We will also be working in other areas with all those countries, but that programme is the cornerstone of what we do.

As I said earlier by way of introduction, the DNA of MDBA is the SCALP and Storm Shadow programme that France and the UK agreed on. This decision has given structure to our company’s activities. Today, France and the UK make up 75%—35% and 40%—of our business, and things are quite similar in terms of turnover and jobs created on either side of the channel. Germany and Italy are also extremely important to us in the European context, but let us not forget about the level of technology and business that we have in both your countries—the UK and France. We should think about developing those technologies and consider the export opportunities in Germany and Italy, which is in the common interest of our company, France and Great Britain. Missile activity in Germany, Spain and Italy must not be nationalized like it is in Germany with Diehl, for example. They must not purchase equipment from the US; they need to buy from MDBA. Our objective as a company is to extend our business to other countries, and the deep-strike and anti-ship programme is a good example, because we are starting from a Franco-British scope but the objective further down the line, when we reach the right level of maturity, is to extend that programme to six other European countries that have cruise missiles.

112.        Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): I would like to make a quick comment. The ability to export your products is good, and it is also good to sell platforms. Export clients are interested in well-equipped platforms. Is that correct?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): Well yes, that is absolutely the case. Performance is really about the performance of the whole weapons system and the platform—it is the two together that can really deliver a satisfactory performance. With new technologies, with this new generation of products, we are thinking not only about exports—that is why I mentioned earlier that those products will be exported to allies of European countries. MBDA is not developing business activities with countries that are not allies of European countries.

When I look at the prosperity agenda and global influence, I see that they are the objectives of France, the UK and Europe, in countries where we can sell weapons to reinforce our foreign policy and our defence policy. That is also relevant for Germany, Spain and Italy, but it is really relevant for France and Great Britain. We know that we are the industrial power behind both your countries.

113.        Mrs Moon: I wonder whether you could say a bit about the industrial and economic benefits for both countries—France and the UK—of that sort of joint working? Could you also comment on whether both countries are doing enough to develop the skills base, in particular the technical skills base and technical education, to ensure that the creativity and the capacity to stay ahead of the market will be there in future generations?

Chris Allam: The answer to the first question is that it is this type of programme that keeps MBDA at the leading edge of missile design. Put simply, there is almost nothing else—there are a few other programmes—so it is the absolute core of what we do as engineers.

To take the second question, I can probably answer more easily from a UK perspective. I also sit on the Royal Academy of Engineering’s education and skills panel, where one of the things we work on is generating engineering skills for the future. Put simply, is the UK doing enough? No, is the answer to that. Are we brigaded around doing more? Are we determined to do more? Yes.

MBDA are in a fantastic position whereby we offer wonderful careers to people across a broad range of engineering. We sit at the top of that food chain, so we are not the one that gets starved first, but our supply chain does. We are still affected by the ability to generate creative engineers with the right profile and background, and with a variety of skills, and that is an endeavor that we should continue.

I cannot answer for France—I have not seen it quite so closely—but I am pretty sure that it operates in a very similar way and will suffer from some of the same characteristics. I would say that this is the type of programme that helps to defeat that problem because it creates a pool for engineering and great engineering jobs to do.

114.        Mrs Moon: If I may, I have a slight obsession with the fact that we are aiming too old. I had the RAF presentation team come to my constituency a couple of weeks ago, and I said that I was inviting 100 10-year-olds. They said, “Oh no, Mrs Moon, it is full of bangs and things being blown up”—exactly the sort of things your products do—“so it’s not suitable for children.” I said, “It’s suitable for my children, I promise you, and they will kill you with their questions.” They were really nervous. The children came and they floored them with their questions. The first question was, “Is Russia a real threat?” The second question was about what the RAF is like as an employer of women, and the third was a technical question about some of the equipment. It was amazing. Afterwards, the RAF took them into a room and they designed radar systems—at age 10! What is a company like yours doing in France and Britain to encourage those youngsters that we need for the future? Are you engaged in any way in combating what I fear is a disaffection among our young people, and not only about engineering, but about seeing defence as a legitimate career for them?

Antoine Bouvier: Thank you for the question, because for a couple of years now this topic has been a top priority for MBDA.

(Mr Bouvier continued in French (Translation))

I will now switch to French because I will be more comfortable. Every year for the last four years—2014 to 2018— we have employed 1,000 people in all our countries, with a total headcount of 10,000 people. That means that currently approximately 30% of those with permanent contracts have been with us for fewer than five years. The majority of those newcomers are young people who have recently come out of university or an apprenticeship, or those who have only a few years of experience. That is because a lot of pensioners have now left the company, and there has been a significant growth in our business in the UK and in France, and to a lesser extent in Germany and Italy. We employ most people mainly in France and Great Britain.

About five or six years ago we put some thought into the question that you have just raised. A defence company such as ours cannot just employ the best engineers out there, or people who come to MBDA because they like the technology. We are an international company and a good employer, but that is not enough; if we just stop there, every year we will create a gap between our corporate culture, and our responsibility and mandate as a company to serve the British and French defence sectors. In-house we have developed workshops and held discussions. We have organized debates, and challenged people who have been there for 20 or 30 years: “Why do you work for MBDA; why do you make missiles? Are you happy that your skills are used to improve the kill probability of products?” We really pushed people to give us answers.

The answer is that MBDA is a company that guarantees access for European countries to critical defence products. We are not here to kill; we are here to safeguard our countries and our values. That is what we started to develop in-house. Then, when we started employing these young people a few years back, they knew what our mandate was and what we stood for. We never set aside the aggressive nature of what we do. We never said that MBDA is working towards world peace; we just said that MBDA is here to protect European countries. So it was very clear for the people who joined our ranks, and in interviews, we always ask the question: “Do you understand what kinds of products you are going to help manufacture, and do you know what they are going to be used for?”  I think we need to be very clear on all of that. We need to bear in mind what the end use of our product is and be very clear about this.

115.        Mrs Moon: I also say that you have to find a way to sell that to 10-year-olds, because once you’re getting to the 16 and 18 year-olds, you have lost it—they don’t have the vision, creativity and excitement of a 10-year-old.  If you could bottle that and keep it running through people’s veins, my god, we’d be world beaters.

Q79       Can I ask you about the Perseus concept, and whether that has been part of what you have used to move the current programme forward? We have heard talk about it, but I am not quite clear where it sits within the current design stage.

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): Do you mean the two different concepts?

Q80       Mrs Moon: Yes.

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): The first thing is the military requirements. Penetrating enemy defence lines and survivability requirements are the two basic types of requirements to counter access-denial strategies—A2/AD, as we call it. In France and Britain we have different operational cultures and ways of doing things.  We have different operational and technological cultures. To keep it simple, in France the technological and operational culture is based more on speed and hyper-velocity, whereas in Britain stealth and maneuverability are more in favor. 

I am not deciding anything now, but what I advocate is that France and Britain should come together and put on the table all the pros and cons of both techniques, in order to arrive at an answer. Since I believe that the laws of physics will remain the same on either side of the channel regardless of Brexit, I think that when all the chips are down we can arrive at a very clear and informed dialogue, enabling us to arrive at an informed solution.

What I advocate is that each country should present the merits and limitations of both technical solutions, so as to arrive at the best solution. I am not pre-judging the issue at all. We want to arrive at the best possible technical solution, so that France and Britain can agree on a technological solution that will enable us to achieve the same operational objectives. If we have the same operational objectives, surely the solutions will be identical as well.

116.        Jean-Jacques Ferrara (Translation): Let us consider the exportability of it all. This is part of the business model, as it were. We want to be able to export your technological solutions. What of the ITAR directive, however, which will create impediments, as we saw in Egypt about the SCALP ? 

Chris Allam: If we look at export generally, the whole point of the programme is to design a system that can be exported, either by using technology that is available for export, that we know about, or by positioning technology so that it can easily be modified so that it can be exported. That is not particularly saying that we would design ITAR-free absolutely everything that we do, but in our minds it is a fundamental point about who has control over this technology. One of the reasons we are working in co-operation between the UK and France is to ensure that. It is therefore very obvious to say that we will make sure we manage that so we can exploit it in the way we want. So that is the principle and the fundamental that you get, and that is why you can get the output that you can.

If we look at history, Storm Shadow and SCALP and Meteor have taught us how to do this. History does not always tell us what will happen in the future, but I would say there is a very good marker there that says we have fine examples of where we have brought together technology. It has been very exportable and yes, there have been some issues along the way, but issues that we are in a good position to deal with.

On this particular programme, we have still got work to do to work out exactly where it goes. What we do know now is that this is a very exportable capability. Other countries will want this. They will want to join the programme, and maybe that is an option. They will want the product at the end, and maybe that is an option. The countries that are using the capabilities that Europe has already worked with them on are the natural ones to start with.

I can only be excited that there is a great prospect there. Your words are well thought-through; we just need to be careful about what we do as we select technology and companies to work with. We should be mindful of saying that there is an export endeavour and a control of technology at the end of this, and it should be held to task to do that, I believe.

117.        Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): If I may, I would like to ask a follow-up question— and I hope that it is not a killer question. MBDA is not taking a position now—indeed, when the concept phase comes to a close, it will not be for MBDA to make a final decision—but, in an ideal world, where all the budgets were available, we could see that our operational people would very much like to have both types of technologies and both versions within the same family, with full modularity, so you could have components that could fit a supersonic version and others for a subsonic version, yet arrive in the same family.

Q81       Of course, it makes sense to compare effectiveness and reliability, but at the end of the day surely it would be nice to benefit from both types of capacity? In an ideal world, assuming that we can afford both and can fund this two-pronged development, from an industrial and manufacturing standpoint, does it make any sense at all? Is it doable? Is it realistic to conduct this sort of dual development?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): We are not being overly cautious in comparing the respective merits of the two solutions, but we stick to our principles, and the principles state that it is not for industry to decide or to give direction on budget lines. Our job is to provide reliable, documented evidence to inform the debate. That is our role and we will not step outside it.

From an industrial and technological viewpoint—not deciding on which option to go for—if we were to develop both capacities, needless to say it would be for us to re-use as much as possible generic technology in our operable sub-systems. We want to be moderate; in fact, that is the way we operate already. Indeed, one of our objectives in Britain on what is now PMA (Portfolio Management Agreement)—or rather the whole point—was to arrive at re-use, both at system level and component level. Needless to say, if there are different versions being developed simultaneously, of course we will be doing that.

Is it doable? The capacity is indeed there. As we said, we hired a massive amount of new talent, who arrived at MBDA with youth and enthusiasm, and we are building experience. We are looking at the long term, and we have that major human asset in both France and Britain. Headcount in engineering—at Chris’s place, as it were—has been developed considerably. We have a significant base of technical people and engineers, and they are getting stronger and younger every day.

118.        Mr Francois: You had a concept called Perseus at one time. What was it, and how does it play into the programme, if at all?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): That was before Chris joined MBDA. That actually might address a point you made on another issue. A couple of years back, we engaged in these “concept visions”, which are like concept cars in the automotive industry. You have a call for ideas and papers, so you have young international teams competing and they suggest their ideas. Those ideas go through a selection process, we shortlist them and we arrive at one. We provide a budget and, say, a dozen people to develop the concept that is selected. That is what we do at MBDA. That gives these young people a chance to work together, to get to know one another and to develop these concept projects.

Perseus was one such example, three or four years ago. It was presented at Euronaval back in 2014, I believe. It was a concept study, so there were 10 young engineers working on it for six months. Of course, we are not talking at all about the same engineering budget or ambition, but the idea was to motivate these young people to communicate and create a team spirit, especially in the engineering department.

119.        Jean-Charles Larsonneur (Translation): I have one more specific point on the question of the timetable, which was addressed early on. We know that Harpoon will go out of service shortly before Exocet does. Is it at all possible to move the timetable forward for the entry into service of the future missile to 2026 or 2027, so that filling the gap is not so much of an issue? Can one consider having that capability delivered earlier?

Antoine Bouvier (Translation): That was of course considered. We arrived at a negative answer, for two reasons. The first is that the strategy to fill the gap is not to do with MBDA; it is the exclusive decision of the British Government and the Royal Navy. Can we live with two, four or six years? That is not for me to decide—the answer was given by the British Government. Aspect No. 2 is purely technological. We saw that some of the objectives in some of the initial programmes were unrealistic.

Of course, it is always tempting to launch programmes with unrealistic objectives, but you pay dearly for that, so objectives should be ambitious but realistic. Programmes should be launched only when you have done enough work on reducing the technological risk, on the convergence of operational requirements and on the commonality of architectures, so that we can define a system’s specs for our customers in the best possible way. That is exactly what we have on our road map.

              Natalia Pouzyreff (Translation): It is now time for me to thank all the participants. This brings this series of joint hearings to a close, and we will hopefully agree on the terms of a report. We of course arrived at a clear understanding after the session in London, and will do the same after this session. We found many issues that bring us together. It is now for us to draw up a report, which will reflect our range of skills, our concerns about technological sovereignty and our common objectives. We have mentioned the need to maintain skills while attracting new talent, and we have addressed all the major issues of the co-operation programme. Thank you all very much.

              John Spellar: On behalf of the British delegation, thank you for your excellent chairmanship during the course of today’s hearing, Madam Pouzyreff.