Written evidence from The Rights Practice (HMR0017)

1. Key Points
1. The FCO’s human rights work is taking place in a new context of emboldened authoritarian governments seeking to undermine ideas of universal values and international standards. Brexit will only complicate policy making.
2. The Magna Carta Fund lacks a clear strategy for working in difficult environments.
3. Discussion of human rights is marginalised in human rights dialogues.
4. There are many missed opportunities for the FCO to consult with and support the work of British and overseas civil society.

2. Recommendations
1. The FCO should develop a strategy to address the risks posed by China and other powerful authoritarian governments to international human rights standards and practice.
2. The FCO needs to dedicate more resources to support a reinvigorated strategy on human rights.
3. The Magna Carta Fund should be responsive to the concerns of local civil society and human rights defenders and it should not help legitimise a restricted discourse and practice on human rights.
4. There should be more consistent and coherent messages on human rights from across government.

Introduction

3. The Rights Practice welcomes the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights Work. The government states that it is committed to standing up for human rights, not only as the “right thing to do”, but also because the protection of human rights contributes to security and prosperity, which is in the UK interest. The Rights Practice is concerned that the FCO’s policies, resources and tools to stand up for human rights are not fully fit for purpose in a world in which human rights are increasingly being challenged.

4. Our particular concern lies with the human rights situation in China. These concerns include wide-ranging human rights violations within China (e.g. arbitrary detention, torture and ill treatment, and restrictions on freedom of expression and association) as well as the influence of China’s state-centric approach to human rights on the protection of human rights in Asia and beyond. A particular concern to the UK must be the erosion of many civil and political rights in Hong Kong. The challenge posed by China to human rights around the world is emblematic of the new context in which the FCO, the United Nations and NGOs, such as ours, must now operate.  

5. The Rights Practice was founded in 2002 to support those working towards improved human rights in China. Our work has focused on building the capacity of lawyers, local NGOs, human rights defenders and scholars to promote and defend human rights.  The organisation is a registered charity and receives funding from the European Union, bilateral donors and private foundations.  Among our areas of concern are criminal justice, particularly the use of torture and the death penalty, and participation in public life, notably the role of civil society. In recent years, we have received funding from the FCO to support visits to the UK by Chinese lawyers. We received Human Rights and Democracy Programme funding in earlier years and we have a current application to the Magna Carta Fund for Democracy and Human Rights. The Rights Practice was founded by Nicola Macbean, a former Director of the Great Britain-China Centre (1988-95). Nicola is currently a member of a research project, funded by the Ford Foundation, to look at the impact of China’s Overseas NGO Management Law on Europe-China civil society relations.

A New Context

6. Human rights are under pressure across the globe.  Human rights workers in Asia are under growing threat[i] as authoritarian governments in the region, emboldened by a newly assertive China, seek to silence calls for government accountability. The last few years have seen a more challenging environment for the promotion and defence of human rights.

7. Human rights discourse at the United Nations is being undermined as countries, such as China, increasingly use a ‘people-focused’ language at the expense of concern for individuals and victims. At the March 2018 Human Rights Council China pushed for a so-called ‘win-win resolution’ that privileged cooperation between states over state obligations to protect individuals. Eventually, by 28 votes to 1 the Council passed a revised resolution, promoting “mutually beneficial cooperation in the field of human rights”[ii]. The UK was one of 17 countries that abstained rather than oppose the resolution. Observers at the United Nations are seeing a gradual erosion of language in support of individual human rights as China promotes a vision of collective rights across the UN system.

8. The environment for promoting human rights has become more difficult as the space for civil society to operate is being shrunk by governments adopting legislation to register and restrict the work of domestic and overseas NGOs. In many countries civil society also faces more repressive policing and surveillance. The most vulnerable organisations are advocacy groups and organisations working to promote human rights or using an inclusive and rights-based approach to development.  China’s Overseas NGO Management Law, which came into effect in January 2017, is illustrative of the new reality. Research reveals how the space for debate and frank exchange of views within European and Chinese civil society has almost vanished. Overseas organisations self-censor to secure and retain registration, while local civil society is increasingly starved of funding.

9. The CCP set out its opposition to civil society and universal values in Document No. 9[iii]. Chinese policy drew on Russia’s response to so-called ‘colour revolutions’ in eastern Europe and central Asia. China has long championed providing support to GONGOs and other loyal NGOs. We now see countries in the Asian region adopting a similar approach. Research from a southeast Asian country shows how NGOs promoting a ‘big development’ approach are prospering at the expense of those encouraging inclusive development models. China has also established its own funds to support NGOs in other countries and is directing these funds towards the kind of groups with which it is comfortable. China’s new aid programme is a challenge to established donors and international NGOs that have been promoting a more participatory and rights-based approach among local NGOs.

10. The challenge to human rights from authoritarian actors, particularly China, coincides with an apparent loss of confidence, within liberal democracies, in the values of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The global financial crisis and austerity have taken the gloss off the liberal political model. Brexit provides the UK with an additional set of challenges. There are widespread concerns that in the pursuit of trade deals, in a life outside the European Union, the UK will become increasingly reliant upon states that commit gross human rights violations[iv]. The UK will lose influence on human rights if it pursues a trade policy grossly at odds with its stated values.

FCO work overseas

11. In its work overseas the FCO is one of many actors providing support for human rights. For example, in China the FCO is a mid-range donor with multi-lateral and several bilateral donors providing significantly more funds for human rights initiatives. DFID’s decision in 2010 to end funding for China programmes included the Civil Society Challenge Fund, and this gap in UK funding for rights-based work by civil society has not been replaced. With the UK leaving the EU and the EU introducing a new Multiannual Financial Framework and funding instruments, there is considerable uncertainty about the scale of funding that can be accessed in future by UK NGOs working overseas on human rights.

12. The Magna Carta Fund for Human Rights and Democracy (MCF) was launched in 2016, but there was no call for proposals with respect to new work on China in 2017. We understand that this was due to a lack of funds which also applied to work in other countries and on thematic issues. This year we received an invitation in mid-April to submit concept notes for new projects by the end of the month. In mid-May we were invited to submit a full proposal and were given two weeks to complete the application. This is a very tight timetable for small organisations that may have senior staff travelling and who need to consult and check details with local partners. 

13. The Rights Practice supports the list of project objectives set out in the 2017-18 ODA spend objectives[v]. We note, however, the exclusion of a specific objective to protect women’s rights despite the appointment of an FCO envoy on gender equality. It is also not clear how these project objectives relate to the 2016-17 MCF Strategy document which focused on three interconnected themes and rejected the idea of a list of thematic priorities which, it was argued, implied a hierarchy of rights.

14. It is unclear how the MCF approaches funding work in countries with restrictive laws on the role of domestic and international NGOs. We recognise the need to manage risk, but, limiting support to organisations that are able to work within a repressive regulatory environment risks undermining the Fund’s objectives. Registration usually means that NGOs have to compromise on the people they work with and the topics they address.  Registration tends to favour those organisations that address human rights using a top down and technical approach. It will generally exclude human rights defenders and organisations working with an explicit human rights mandate. The benefits of a top-down and technical approach are generally limited to those situations where policy makers are already minded to support reform. This approach is not effective where the need is to raise awareness of human rights concerns and/or support the work of activists within local civil society.

15. A top-down, technical approach to human rights work overseas directs scarce resources to organisations that are close to the government and limits funding available to independent groups. Moreover, access to overseas funding and experts boosts the ability of registered organisations to monopolise the framing of human rights challenges and solutions and marginalises independent voices. Registered organisations and those close to government are more likely to adopt technical explanations than failings of accountability or unequal power.

16. It is unclear how the MCF assesses the impact of their financial support. There seems to be a preference for projects that have an impact at the policy level. In the short timeframe for most MCF projects, policy level impact will only take place where policies are already in the pipeline. However, privileging projects that ‘work with the grain’ of government priorities can be highly problematic in countries where human rights are most at risk. More support should be given to projects that boost the capacity of civil society, and not just in those countries where civil society remains relatively welcome.

Human rights dialogues and statements

17. Despite the plethora of bilateral meetings that take place with countries, such as China, consideration of human rights is largely relegated to human rights dialogues. The misnamed High Level People to People Dialogue with China is a particularly striking example of how an opportunity to address the pressure on civil society and open up dialogue on difficult issues is neglected, seemingly at the expense of commercial interests. As far as we know, there has been no consultation with civil society organisations engaging with China as part of planning the People to People meetings.  

18. The annual human rights dialogue with China is a disappointment. The dialogue provides an opportunity for the FCO to raise human rights with Chinese counterparts, linking areas of concern with examples of specific cases of rights violations. British NGOs appreciate the opportunity to brief the FCO on our concerns before the dialogue and to hear about the meeting afterwards. There is, however, a lot of frustration on the part of civil society that the meetings bring no tangible results. Although case lists are handed over to the Chinese side, they provide little or no information on these cases. Meetings in the UK normally include a short visit programme for the Chinese delegation. These visits potentially contribute to better understanding of the UK’s approach to human rights – both on issues of substance as well as process.  The contribution of civil society to human rights progress must be forefront in the dialogue meetings and study trips if these activities are to have value.

19. It is unclear how the FCO assesses the success of the dialogues. There is an impression that holding the dialogues has become the key objective for the FCO.  Dialogues have become the place for discussing the most challenging aspects of the UK-China relationship. Without the promise of these meetings, tensions in the relationship risk spilling over into other areas. In light of the deteriorating human rights situation in China, are there circumstances in which the FCO might cancel or postpone the dialogue? UK civil society believes there is scope to demand more meaningful meetings and there would be support if the FCO decided to cancel the dialogue due to lack of satisfactory progress in planning the meeting.

20. Statements of concern by the British government are an important element of the FCO’s human rights work. We know from within China that statements by overseas governments are very much welcomed by the embattled human rights community. These statements are also important in reinforcing the message that the UK prioritises human rights. The value of such statements in today’s climate should not be underestimated[vi].

21. The UK rarely makes a statement on human rights in China, except as part of the EU or a group of like-minded countries. Once the UK leaves the EU, the British government will need to be bolder. If the UK is to show leadership on human rights the government not only needs to continue demonstrating support for statements by the EU, but also issue its own statements. The German government provides a good example. The Chinese authorities have been successful in stoking anxiety among business leaders and politicians that critical statements or, for example, meetings with the Dalai Lama, will have negative consequences for trade. As a result, politicians self-censor. Yet, there is little evidence to support such fear. Investment from China into the UK increased substantially in 2012, the same year that ministerial-level contacts were frozen following a meeting between the prime minister, deputy prime minister and the Dalai Lama[vii].

22. The British government recognises that human rights violations can be a source of instability that effects our prosperity and security. Failing to stand up to violations of international standards risks permitting a ‘new normal’ to creep into international practice. It is not just the most egregious violations that should be publicly challenged, but also the drip-drip erosion of international human rights principles regarding the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice.  

FCO and the United Nations

23. China’s provision of funding to cash-strapped U.N. agencies is a new source of influence.  Many of these organisations are unprepared for the erosion of human rights norms that may come with new funding. The FCO could leverage other funds and, through monitoring, help to ensure that money from authoritarian governments is not being used to undermine the human rights work of U.N. agencies.

24. It is essential that the FCO works to ensure that British experts are represented on relevant committees at the United Nations. In light of moves by China and other authoritarian countries to restrict accreditation of NGOs at the U.N., UK representation on the Committee on NGOs to ECOSOC (Economic and Social Committee) should be a priority.  Governments, including China’s, have delayed many NGO applications for consultative status for years.

Coherence and cross-cutting issues

25. The FCO must show stronger leadership across Whitehall on human rights. For too long politicians have relegated human rights concerns to the margins. If human rights values are central to the UK these need to inform policy making across government. The FCO research department has high levels of expertise on country-related human rights concerns, but it is difficult to see how this knowledge shapes policy making at higher levels, especially on trade issues. The Cross-Government Prosperity Fund is a troubling example of significant new funding which will have no human rights content, at least with respect to China, despite its stated link to the Sustainable Development Goals. 

26. Finally, language is important and the FCO should be vigilant. Countries like China seek to insert their own terminology into statements at the bilateral and multilateral level thereby gradually shaping new norms and understandings. A ‘Golden Era’ and People to People are redolent of Chinese propaganda and should be dropped. The regular turnover of staff within the FCO, particularly in relation to ‘difficult’ countries, is disruptive as new staff have to master a complex agenda.

June 2018

Endnotes