Written evidence submitted by BMW Group (BMW0001)

  1. Thank you for inviting the BMW Group to make a written submission to the Transport Select Committee’s inquiry into the two current UK safety recalls on BMW vehicles.

 

INTRODUCTION

  1. The BMW Group takes its responsibilities as a vehicle manufacturer extremely seriously, especially where the safety of its customers and products is concerned. BMW Group products are developed and manufactured under the strict governance of our quality management systems. We continuously monitor the safety performance of our products in the market place and follow up on observations relating to safety.  We work closely with the relevant authorities to ensure our customers’ safety, and that of other road users.
  2. We also work hard to provide important safety information to customers and put in place an effective fix for all vehicles affected by a recall, at our expense.
  3. In the UK, we work closely with the DVSA in reporting safety issues and implementing recalls, responding to reports made to the DVSA by members of the public and agreeing the actions the BMW Group will take in accordance with our obligations under the General Product Safety Regulation 2005 (“GPSR”) and the DVSA Vehicle Safety Defects and Recalls: Code of Practice (“DVSA Code of Practice”).

 

PRODUCT SAFETY PROCEDURES

  1. It may be helpful to outline our product safety procedures.
  2. BMW UK is a subsidiary company of BMW AG and is responsible for sales, marketing, advertising and aftersales within the United Kingdom. BMW UK works closely with its parent company, BMW AG, on a number of issues including safety and information provided to BMW owners.  Decisions regarding product safety, technical campaigns and product recalls are taken by experts at BMW AG. Potential safety issues and faults are monitored and identified in a number of ways. Reports are made via subsidiaries, regulators, suppliers, plants, the development teams, retailers and others. These reports are sent within the BMW Group to the BMW AG Quality department, which evaluates and assesses the potential fault.  This process may involve investigation and forensic testing, as well as conducting simulations and field tests.
  3. One important aspect of the evaluation process involves conducting RAPEX assessments to determine the level of risk attributable to a safety issue and the appropriate response. The Committee will know that the RAPEX system is prescribed by the European Commission and sets out the methodology to be used for assessing the risks posed by a product.
  4. The two assessments are combined to provide an overall risk level which then informs decisions on the appropriate level of corrective action. Certain risks may require a recall, whereas lower levels of risk may be addressed by other measures.
  5. Once a potential safety issue has been thoroughly evaluated, a report is presented to the BMW AG decision board, which consists of representatives from BMW Group’s Quality, Legal, Aftersales Business Management departments and the relevant Development department(s).
  6. The decision board decides how the potential safety issue should be managed, taking into account the information presented by the Quality department, BMW AG’s legal obligations under the GPSR and other equivalent legislation, as well as our responsibility to BMW owners and the wider public.
  7. The decision taken by the decision board is implemented in affected markets by local subsidiaries working closely with local regulators and enforcement authorities, as appropriate.
  8. Product safety decisions continue to be monitored by BMW AG and are regularly reviewed if new evidence or information comes to light including information from the different markets around the world.

 

 

THE TWO UK RECALLS SUBJECT TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE INQUIRY

B+ battery connector

  1. This issue affects certain BMW 1 Series, 3 Series, Z4 and X1 models from the production period March 2007 to September 2011 inclusive.  This affects 312,000 vehicles in the UK.
  2. Under certain conditions, affected vehicles could suffer from a loss of connection between the B+ cable and the junction box. The plug-in contact of the B+ cable can become damaged due to vehicle vibrations and frictional corrosion, caused by a high current load running through the cable. This can lead to the connector overheating and losing connection with the power distribution junction box.
  3. The issue is resolved by replacing the connection with a modified plug-in connector, which clamps to the terminal of the power distribution connector.
  4. The loss of connection manifests itself when the car is not in use, when a previously hot component cools and contracts. Where a fault occurs, this typically results in the customer experiencing problems unlocking the vehicle and/or starting the vehicle. It is also possible that the alarm may malfunction.
  5. Following these pre-warning signals, if the car continues to be used, in some cases customers have reported that the vehicle has come to a halt during travel.
  6. In 2013, the BMW Group announced a recall for this issue relating to ‘hot climate package’ vehicles which affected only a small number of UK vehicles. BMW UK broadened the scope of that recall in April 2017 and again in May 2018 (See para. 25-40 below).

Blower regulator

  1. This issue affects BMW 3 Series models built between December 2004 and July 2011. This recall affects 279,104 cars in the UK.
  2. The blower regulator controls the blower motor’s fan speed within the heating and air conditioning system.  Over time, frictional corrosion can occur at the contacts of the blower regulator due to vibrational stress. When combined with high current flow at maximum blower speed, an increase in temperature can occur, resulting in damage to the regulator connection and wiring.  In extremely rare cases this can lead to a fire.
  3. As of today’s date, we are aware of six vehicle fires in the UK caused as a result of this issue, with two further cases currently under investigation.  
  4. BMW UK announced the recall relating to the blower regulator on 18 May 2018.
  5. The majority of vehicles recalled are affected by both of these issues. Of the total 279,104 vehicles potentially affected by the blower regulator recall, approximately 181,000 are already included within the B+ battery connector recall.
  6. It is important to note that the B+ cable issue is entirely separate from the blower regulator issue.

 

DIALOGUE WITH THE DVSA CONCERNING THE B+ BATTERY CONNECTOR

  1. We set out below a detailed timeline of events.
  2. BMW AG first became aware of a possible issue with the connection between the power distribution box/junction box (which is mounted behind the glove compartment) and the battery positive (B+) connector (which is located in the boot of the vehicle) in July 2010. The issue potentially affected BMW 3 Series, 1 series, Z4 and X1 vehicles manufactured between March 2007 and September 2011.
  3. This issue was first highlighted in vehicles which were equipped with the ‘hot climate package’, which includes all vehicles supplied to the US and Canadian markets. Such vehicles are fitted with a larger cooling fan, which means a significantly higher current load (+50%) runs through the B+ cable, increasing the risk of the failure of the connection.
  4. BMW AG initially addressed the issue by the release of a ‘PuMA measure’ in May 2011. PuMA is a German acronym for “Problem and Measures Management Aftersales” which is a worldwide BMW Group database of reported issues and advises retailers on how to repair them.
  5. Subsequently, in 2013, BMW AG decided to issue a worldwide product recall in respect of the B+ cable issue, for vehicles which were equipped with the ‘hot climate package’ only. All vehicles supplied for the US and Canadian markets are equipped with the hot climate package as standard. The DVSA was advised and 78 vehicles within the UK were subject to the recall.
  6. In November 2014, the DVSA drew to the attention of BMW UK a vehicle safety defect report made by a member of the public. From that time onwards, BMW UK was in regular contact with the DVSA on this issue.
  7. A RAPEX assessment was carried out in February 2016 by BMW AG in respect of the issue, and the RAPEX degree of risk was assessed to be low.
  8. If no action is taken to rectify the B+ connection in response to instances of the vehicle failing to unlock and/or start, it is possible (but rare) for the connection to deteriorate further, with the result that the customer may experience the engine cutting out whilst the vehicle is in motion. The BMW AG decision board concluded that it is not possible for a vehicle to cut out in motion due to this issue without the customer first experiencing prior indications of the problem as described in paragraph 16.
  9. The DVSA Code of Practice provides that a safety defect is “a failure due to design and/or construction, which is likely to affect the safe operation of the product without prior warning to the user and may pose a significant risk to the driver, occupants and others.” The decision board of BMW AG considered the issue, and determined that it was not a safety issue in respect of which a product recall should be instigated, because (i) the customer would experience prior warnings such as failing to unlock and/or start while the vehicle was stationary, and (ii) the RAPEX degree of risk was low.
  10. In February 2016, BMW UK met with the DVSA and provided information regarding 20 cases relating to the B+ battery connector issue.
  11. In November 2016, following further discussions with the DVSA, BMW AG issued a technical campaign (involving customer notification) regarding the B+ cable issue for all affected petrol vehicles in the UK produced between December 2009 and September 2011. These vehicles were fitted with a plastic rather than metal cable holder, which was found to have increased the risk of failure of the B+ cable connection. Under a technical campaign, BMW retailers contact customers by letter, with a subsequent inspection and repair being carried out free of charge when convenient for the customer, or at the next occasion on which the vehicle is taken to the retailer for servicing.
  12. On 25 December 2016, Mr Narayan Gurung, who was driving a Ford Fiesta, was killed in an accident involving a BMW 3 Series vehicle which had suffered electrical failure due to this issue. An inquest into Mr Gurung’s death, in which BMW UK is an Interested Party, is ongoing and is due to be concluded on 8 June 2018. The BMW vehicle involved in this accident was produced in February 2011, and would therefore have been subject to the technical campaign launched in November 2016.
  13. In February 2017, a meeting was held between BMW UK and the DVSA. The DVSA indicated that they now considered the issue to be a safety defect for the purpose of the DVSA Code of Practice, and that the BMW Group should implement a recall in respect of those vehicles which were at that time subject to the technical campaign. The BMW AG decision board determined that, in light of the DVSA’s request, the technical campaign would be converted to a recall within the UK. This recall was announced in April 2017 and affected approximately 36,000 vehicles.
  14. BMW UK continued to maintain dialogue with the DVSA throughout 2017 and 2018 on this issue. As part of this dialogue, the DVSA indicated that it wished to understand why the April 2017 recall affected petrol vehicles produced between December 2009 and September 2011 only, and did not include petrol vehicles manufactured outside this date range, or diesel vehicles. The BMW Group produced documents to explain why the risk of failure was significantly lower in diesel vehicles and petrol vehicles outside this date range. Notwithstanding this, in May 2018, the DVSA advised BMW Group that it considered a recall of all potentially affected vehicles was required.
  15. The BMW AG decision board therefore met and initiated a recall of all potentially affected vehicles. The recall (affecting approximately 312,000 vehicles, in addition to those vehicles already recalled in April 2017) was announced in May 2018.
  16. On 18 May 2018, BMW informed the DVSA of its intention to expand on the battery connector recall by also replacing the blower regulator wiring harness on affected 3 Series models. This involved carrying out a second repair on the cars already affected by the B+ battery connector and recalling up to an additional 88,000 cars in the UK.

 

ALLEGED PROVISION OF INCORRECT INFORMATION TO THE DVSA

  1. Following the conclusion of the evidence in the inquest into Mr Gurung’s death, the BMW Group understands that the DVSA gave a statement or statements to the media which alleged that the BMW Group had “provided the DVSA with incorrect information, so [the DVSA] was not able to make an informed decision”. At the time of making this written submission, no details have been provided by the DVSA as to what the allegedly incorrect information was, although such details have been requested.
  2. The BMW Group categorically denies providing the DVSA with incorrect information at any time. The DVSA’s allegation is not supported by the oral evidence given at the inquest by two representatives of the DVSA, neither of whom alleged that incorrect information had been supplied. Both witnesses described the BMW Group as “co-operative”.

 

COMMUNICATION WITH BMW OWNERS

  1. The safety of BMW owners, and all other road users is of paramount importance to the BMW Group and we understand the concern that BMW drivers might have at this time. When issues arise, we respond swiftly to rectify them in the best interests of customers and the wider public.
  2. In order to effectively implement the B+ battery connector recall, BMW UK is informing and contacting affected owners using a range of measures.
  3. All affected owners have been or will be contacted by letter, using details obtained from the DVLA owner database.
  4. A dedicated owner helpline has been established to enable customers to make enquiries and arrange the repair of their vehicles.
  5. Information is being provided on how to determine if a customer’s car is subject to the recall and what to do as a result via the BMW.co.uk website and associated social media channels.
  6. If an owner has been charged for having a B+ cable replaced in the past, BMW UK will fully reimburse them for that expense.  However, we are stressing to those customers that it is important that they still respond to the recall letter by booking their car in for the work to be checked by an authorised BMW service technician.

 

VEHICLE FIRES

  1. Vehicle fires are extremely rare and are known to be caused by a wide variety of factors. A manufacturing defect is one cause but others include arson, faulty repair or the fitting of non-approved accessories.
  2. Historically, if BMW UK received a report of an incident involving fire in one of its vehicles, the customer would be advised to immediately contact their insurance company, in accordance with standard industry practices. The insurance company would carry out an independent vehicle inspection to identify the root cause of the fire, and would advise the BMW Group as the manufacturer if they found any evidence of a manufacturing defect.
  3. However, we took note of the Committee’s inquiry into fires in Vauxhall Zafira vehicles in 2016/17 and as a result have made changes to the BMW processes and procedures for investigating vehicle fires. Since August 2017, BMW UK now actively seeks the permission of the affected customer’s insurer to carry out our own inspection of the vehicle, in addition to the insurer’s independent investigations.

 

BLOWER REGULATOR RECALL

  1. BMW UK became aware of three cases in the UK involving heat related damage to the wiring at the blower regulator (with no evidence of fire) up to December 2015. Reports of these cases were then passed to BMW AG.
  2. Damage is most likely to occur when a higher current flow passes through the connector, which happens when the air conditioning system is set to its maximum setting for frequent or prolonged periods. For this reason, damage is more likely to occur in vehicles driven in warmer climates.
  3. The connection pins between the blower regulator and the wiring harness were both tin-coated, which was found to increase the risk of damage. The design of affected vehicles was modified in two stages. In June 2011, the wiring harness contacts were changed from tin to silver and the same modification was made to the blower regulator contacts in March 2012.
  4. Following the design change, BMW continued to monitor the situation through ongoing in-market research.
  5. In November 2017, the decision board of BMW AG resolved to carry out a product recall in North America in respect of this issue. BMW UK notified the DVSA of this recall.
  6. In May 2018, following further investigation of the issue, the decision board of BMW AG determined that a recall would also be carried out in the UK.

 

CONCLUSION

  1. The BMW Group always acts in a responsible manner, has comprehensive and robust product safety procedures and works closely with regulators and enforcement authorities, including the DVSA.
  2. We have at all times maintained open communication with the DVSA and have acted promptly upon requests made by the DVSA to carry out product recalls. However, we would welcome the opportunity to participate in any review of the current regulatory approach to ensure regulation for the industry is sufficiently robust, responsibilities are clear and to maintain the highest possible safety standards for our customers and the wider public.

June 2018