Written evidence from Dr Ryan K Beasley, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, University of St Andrews; Prof Juliet Kaarbo, Professor of Foreign Policy, University of Edinburgh and Dr Kai Oppermann, Reader in Politics, University of Sussex (GLO0026)

 

UK Foreign Policy after Brexit: Losing Europe and Finding a Role

Overview

 

Introduction

 

  1. UK foreign policy will inescapably undergo a profound shift as a result of Brexit but how this reorientation will play out is not as yet certain.
  2. At the heart of this change, we argue, is the question of how the UK can simultaneously strengthen its autonomy while also finding foreign policy roles that avoid it becoming isolated in the international system. While sovereign states are free to choose their own course within the limits of their preferences and power, they must also play particular roles within the international system.
  3. The UK’s future roles are dependent both on the decisions taken by domestic UK actors but also on those decisions being acknowledged and understood by other players (Beasley and Kaarbo 2018; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016). Brexit has dramatically altered the roles expected of the UK, or available to it. These efforts to locate new roles in the world take place against a backdrop of considerable international scepticism about Brexit (Oliver, 2016a).
  4. Although there is still great uncertainty about the economic and political outcomes of Brexit, these early efforts to locate a role will significantly affect the boundaries and opportunities of the UK’s subsequent role on the world stage. As the UK is socialised into particular roles by its own actions and those of other states, this will establish a framework for future UK foreign policy. While the roles available to the UK are still fluid as it leaves the EU, they are increasingly circumscribed by its interactions with others and will, ultimately, impact UK foreign policy.
  5. For the most part, the UK's efforts to establish a substantive foreign policy role have not been well received. The roles for which the UK has auditioned can be identified as: global trading state, great power, faithful ally to the US, regional partner to the EU and leader of the Commonwealth. These roles vary from each other in many ways but have one unifying theme; the clear rejection of the role of isolate.
  6. International scepticism about Brexit, both as an event and a process, however, has tended to lead the international community to see the UK as wilfully isolating itself.
  7. We can therefore identify a fundamental discrepancy between those roles most clearly favoured by the UK and those considered acceptable by other actors. Although the UK has professed a desire to ‘audition’ for a number of foreign policy roles, the international responses indicate that the one it is most keen to avoid – that of isolate – may be the one into which it is socialised. It is also worth noting that the other role that looks most viable – faithful ally to the US – is also tinged with the ‘America First’ brand of isolationism adopted by the current administration.

 

Isolate

 

  1. Since the Brexit referendum, the UK government’s main foreign policy goal has been to avoid being socialised into an isolationist role. Being so positioned would see the UK downscaling the resources it spends externally, focussing primarily on domestic considerations and otherwise pulling back from the international stage (Gaskarth, 2014: 566-569). To ward off such an unwanted role, the UK has countered the emerging narrative that it might draw inwards or retrench from overseas commitments (Oliver, 2016b: 694).
  2. This was a response to the view, widespread among international commentators, that the UK was setting out on a “voyage to inglorious isolation” (New York Times, 2017).
  3. The belief that the Brexit referendum could be portrayed as an “isolationist catastrophe” (Los Angeles Times, 2016) was widely seen as the culmination of a pre-existing tendency towards disengagement from the world.
  4. In interviews in June 2017, members of the German Bundestag reiterated the view that this UK act of self-marginalisation was part of an identifiable trend that would diminish the UK’s international voice.[1]
  5. It is this narrative that ministers, including the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Secretary for International Trade, have sought to counter, both domestically and internationally. When Boris Johnson spoke at the UN for the first time he even made a point of distancing the Brexit vote from the ‘America First’ rhetoric of the then Republican candidate in the US:

“I would draw a very, very strong contrast between Brexit and any kind of isolationism.[…] Brexit means us being more outward-looking, more engaged, more enthusiastic and committed on the world stage than ever before”

 

Boris Johnson, 22 July 2016 (Independent, 2016)

 

  1. The Prime Minister struck a similar tone during a visit to India (Theresa May, 2016a) when she said the UK was “determined not to turn our backs on the world”. The UK has thus tried to counter any ‘little Englander’ connotations that some would ascribe to Brexit (Bew and Elefteriu, 2016) and to avoid the role of an isolationist state (Gaskarth, 2014: 566-569).
  2. If not an isolate, then, the question remains, what kind of roles does a post-Brexit UK wish to play?

 

Global Trading State

 

  1. Following the Brexit vote, the UK made a concerted effort to adopt the role of global trading state. Such a role sees the UK as an outward-looking, liberal leader of global free trade. This ‘Global Britain’ has become the prism through which it wishes its post-Brexit foreign policy to be viewed.
  2. Ministers have been as conscientious in their promotion of this role as they have been in the rejection of that of isolate. The Prime Minister has spoken of a country that is “by instinct a great, global, trading nation” (May, 2017a), she and others have sought to portray the UK as “a great champion” (May, 2017b) and a “tireless advocate of global free trade” (Fox, 2017). Towards this end, the UK would “continue to make the case for liberalism and globalisation” and show “calm, determined, global leadership to shape a new era of globalisation” (May, 2016b). Thus, leaving the EU is presented as an opportunity to be “more outward looking than ever” (May, 2017c) and to “step up to a new leadership role as the strongest and most forceful advocate for business, free markets and free trade anywhere in the world” (May, 2017a).
  3. Critically, the referendum and the sovereignty it grants serve as midwife to the global trading state role. Brexit was “a vote to take control and make decisions for ourselves and, crucially, to become even more global and internationalist in action and in spirit” (May, 2017a).
  4. International reaction to these efforts, however, has been largely sceptical. Many of the UK’s partners have stressed the complexities of negotiating free trade agreements and have highlighted the priority they give to their trading relationship with the EU. Moreover, international bodies have echoed this note of caution with, for example, the Director-General of the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, warning that the UK could not “cut and paste” its existing WTO terms and that “tortuous” renegotiations would be required:

“Pretty much all of the UK’s trade would somehow have to be negotiated.[…] It is extremely difficult and complex to negotiate these trade agreements. And slow as well”

(Financial Times, 2016a)

 

  1. Attempts by the UK to solicit commitments from major, non-EU partners about their future trading relationship have been largely rebuffed. This results, in part, from the UK’s lack of sovereignty to negotiate such trade deals but is also caused by a lack of clarity as to its subsequent relationship with the EU. Perhaps the most obvious example is Japan’s response to the UK’s “quite aggressive” (Financial Times, 2017a) attempts to secure a deal during Theresa Mays August 2017 visit to Tokyo. Japanese officials made clear that they prioritised a deal with the EU and would want to know the agreed EU-UK terms of Brexit before discussing the Japanese-UK relationship.
  2. The obvious and notable exception to this rule has been the US, which has responded positively to UK trade overtures with President Trump welcoming the prospect of a “major trade deal”. However, ongoing concerns, such as those expressed by UK consumer groups over food safety, suggest that negotiations may be more protracted than the UK government may wish (Financial Times, 2017b).
  3. Generally, and with the exception of the US, attempts by the UK to cast itself into the role of a global trading state have been challenged on the basis that it lacks the autonomy to do so.

 

Great Power

 

  1. Another role pursued by the UK is that of a great power. Also global in scope, this role emphasises the UK's superior military, economic and institutional resources and highlights the greater responsibilities and rights these confer. Although it has been argued that the UK lacks the capacity to fulfil a great power role (Gaskarth, 2014: 579-580) there has been a post-referendum surge in the popularity of the idea. Such a role complements both the rejection of the isolate role and the promotion of that of global trading state.
  2. In casting for this role, the UK has stressed military aspects; the “outstanding capabilities” of the country with “the biggest defence budget in Europe” (May, 2017e), and one that is “a leading member of NATO” (May, 2017f) with global reach and responsibilities.
  3. The commitment to re-establish the UK's “military presence East of Suez” (Johnson, 2017a) through a large-scale naval support facility in Bahrain is particularly symbolic. This specifically reverses the UK’s policy of disengagement from East of Suez in the 1970s, which came to embody the UK’s withdrawal from a great power role.
  4. This military power is complemented by the UK’s economic status as “the fifth biggest economy on earth” and home to “the greatest financial capital in the world” (Johnson, 2017b). Additional heft is provided through its diplomatic weight as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Prime Minister was at pains to stress to the UN General Assembly in 2017 that the UK takes seriously the “special responsibilities” that come with that role (May, 2017g).
  5. However, there has been no discernible international endorsement of UK claims that Brexit has or will enhance its standing in the world (Oliver, 2016a: 1324-1325) but, rather, there has been a widespread view that the UK has instead diminished itself.
  6. An example was the UK’s inability to gain General Assembly support for its candidate for a judge on the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This result, which leaves the UK without an ICJ judge for the first time in the court’s history, has been described as “a humiliating blow to British international prestige” and a harbinger of a greatly diminished future role (Guardian, 2017).
  7. Far from auditioning successfully for the role of great power, the post-Brexit UK appears instead to be cast as a diminished international actor.

 

Regional Partner to the EU

 

  1. Although less global in scope than the previous two, this role still counters isolation. Speaking in Florence in early 2018, the Prime Minister said that this role would see the UK become the EU’s “strongest friend and partner” (May, 2017e), collaborating on both economic and security matters.
  2. In the same speech, she spoke of a “new alliance” and a “bold new strategic agreement” with the EU in which the UK would combine being “a proud member of the family of European nations” and “a sovereign nation in which the British people are in control” (May, 2017e). From this UK perspective, therefore, the EU has not lost a member but gained a friend.
  3. The availability of this role depends largely on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. To date, the EU-27 have tended to cast the UK in the role of supplicant rather than partner, with the UK seen as both the weaker party and the one that should shoulder the bulk of any costs. To use the words of Federica Mogherini (2017), High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “our British friends will lose more than what we will lose”.
  4. Any aspirations the UK may have to partner with the EU face two apparently insurmountable obstacles. The first is that the outcome of Brexit negotiations must discourage other member-states from following the UK example. Thus, any agreement about the post-Brexit relationship must be worse than the terms of EU membership.
  5. Second, the EU’s main focus is not Brexit at all, but rather the stability of the EU-27 and deepening European integration. For European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, “We will advance, we must advance because Brexit is not everything. Because Brexit is not the future of Europe” (Juncker, 2017).
  6. Given the views on Brexit in the EU and its focus on furthering European integration, there would appear to be limited scope for the UK to act as a regional partner.

 

Leader of the Commonwealth

 

  1. Another role pursued by the UK since the referendum to avoid the isolate role is that of leader of the Commonwealth, which allows it to adopt a position less focussed on Europe.
  2. This has seen an intensification of UK government visits to Commonwealth countries, which, although mainly symbolic, manifest the increased importance these countries hold for a post-Brexit UK.
  3. In visits to countries including Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand, ministers have stressed the importance of the historic and cultural ties with the UK. A clear example was the speech given by the Prime Minister (May 2016c) during her visit to India in November 2016:

“I wanted to come to India on my first bilateral visit outside Europe because this relationship matters more than ever.[…] As the UK leaves the EU and India continues its rise in the world, we should seize the opportunities ahead.”

Theresa May, Delhi, 7 November 2016

 

  1. The UK has based its approach pitch on the values shared by members of the Commonwealth as well as serving mutual self-interests through trade. During a visit to Australia, for example, Boris Johnson spoke of “the Commonwealth’s capacity to strengthen common values among its members”, such as democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary (Johnson 2017b).
  2. When the UK pushes for an early start to trade talks with non-EU nations, those in the Commonwealth top the list, with Theresa May (May 2017a) stressing at the World Economic Forum that talks had already begun “with countries like Australia, New Zealand and India”.
  3. However, during and after the referendum campaign, Commonwealth officials, as well as many of the key states such as Australia, India and Canada (Namusoke, 2016), were openly critical of Brexit, which colours their responses to the leadership ambitions of a post-Brexit UK; these responses have been lukewarm at best. Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull, for example, described having the UK as a close ally in the EU as “an unalloyed plus” (BBC, 2016) and Commonwealth Secretary-General Patricia Scotland provided context for that sentiment, stressing that Commonwealth and EU membership should not be considered mutually exclusive:

“I say the Commonwealth offers a huge amount, but the Commonwealth does not set itself up in competition with Europe – we are partners”

(Reuters, 2016a)

 

  1. The neo-colonial overtones of the leader of the Commonwealth role have been noted (Gopal, 2016; Lis, 2017). Even within Whitehall, reports of sceptical officials branding the project “Empire 2.0” (Politics Home, 2017) suggest that the discordant notes of the Brexit desire for independence and the UK’s imperial past are heard in SW1A.
  2. Commonwealth nations are also concerned about the impact of Brexit on their relationships with the EU (Gruenbaum, 2017). New Zealand, for example, has indicated an intention to prioritise EU links over those with the UK (NZ Herald, 2016) and India has concluded that “Britain needs India more than India needs Britain” (Independent, 2017).
  3. The responses of Commonwealth nations have been sufficiently negative as to suggest that a post-Brexit leader of the Commonwealth role is unlikely to be available.

 

Faithful Ally to the US

 

  1. The final role in which the UK has sought to be cast is that of faithful ally to the US. This would see the UK acting as the US’s most consistent and dependable partner in exchange for being able to magnify its own influence through US support for UK interests.
  2. In pursuit of this role, the UK Government has emphasised the past achievements of the ‘special relationship’ and, in doing so, has suggested that it both predates and transcends the UK’s relationship with the EU. This effort has been expended to counter concerns that at least some of the UK’s value to the US lies in UK influence inside the EU (Oliver and Williams, 2016: 558-565; Wilson, 2017: 551-552).
  3. Speaking to the 2017 Republican Party Conference, Theresa May reminded her listeners of the “unique and special relationship that exists between” the two nations; one that had “made the modern world”. She went on to observe that “you renew your nation just as we renew ours” and in doing so, the US and UK had “the opportunity – indeed the responsibility – to renew the special relationship for this new age. We have the opportunity to lead, together, again” (May, 2017d).
  4. Unlike his predecessor, Donald Trump spoke out supportively of Brexit during the referendum campaign (Reuters, 2016b) and, in a side-swipe at then-President Obama, made clear that under his presidency the UK would “always be at the front of the line” (Telegraph, 2016).
  5. Despite President Obama’s explicit preference for Remain during the referendum campaign, he was quick to stress that, the result notwithstanding: “One thing that will not change is the special relationship that exists between our two nations” (Financial Times, 2016b). This sentiment was reiterated by other US leaders including Chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee Bob Corker, Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and State Department spokesperson John Kirby (Guardian, 2016).
  6. This response from US lawmakers suggests that the role of faithful ally will continue to be available to the UK.
  7. Two important caveats are worth noting, however. First, the ‘America First’ economic nationalism of the Trump administration raises questions about the sustainability of the role and, second, popular unease in the UK with such a role, particularly following the 2003 Iraq War, make it increasingly contested domestically. This second point is further magnified by the unpopularity of President Trump in UK public opinion, with large majorities believing he has made the world a more dangerous place (Washington Post, 2017).

 

Conclusion

 

  1. Brexit has generated a ‘role crisis’ for the UK, with tensions between the UK’s conception of its own roles in the world and the expectations of other actors on the international stage. Two factors in particular will determine how and whether this conflict is resolved: The extent to which the UK’s views of itself and the expectations of others are mutually incompatible, and the nature and range of international partners each role must engage.
  2. There are tensions between the roles for which the UK is auditioning: that of global trading state sits uncomfortably with being a regional partner to the EU, and it is difficult to see the great power role being congruent with being a faithful ally of the US or, as seen in the contest between a UK and an Indian candidate for a seat on the bench of the ICJ, that of leader of the Commonwealth. These conflicts confound the UK’s attempts to plot a clear foreign policy course but, without a determined direction of travel, it will be difficult for the UK to enact any international role. 
  3. These problems are further exacerbated by generally negative international responses. Research suggests that this could give rise to poor relationships between the UK and other states (Thies, 2012; Wehner, 2014; Malici and Walker, 2017). In the case of Brexit, it seems likely that roles engaging with more actors also potentially generate more resistance. This is most clearly the case with the great power role, which would require the collaboration of former EU partners such as France and Germany as well as other great powers such as the US. Similarly, the role of leader of the Commonwealth sits uncomfortably with those, such as India and Australia, it casts in the role of ‘follower’. The roles of regional EU ally or global trading state draw great scepticism from both sets of actors required for the corollary roles. Although the final role – faithful ally to the US – appears available, it comes with well-known strings attached and its long-term viability is currently unclear given both the isolationist tendencies of the ‘America First’ agenda and UK public attitudes to President Trump. The irony, therefore, is that by auditioning for multiple roles to avoid ending up isolated on the world stage, the UK may end up being socialised into the very isolate role it is seeking to escape.
  4. As the UK casts for its post-Brexit foreign policy roles, it must factor in and anticipate international responses, domestic support for roles, and the relationships between its multiple roles.  These constraints on roles suggest that the UK will gravitate toward a narrower role set.

 

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April 2018

 

 

 

 

[1] Interviews were conducted by Kai Oppermann between 19 and 21 June 2017 in Berlin. Interviewees were Bundestag members of the CDU/CSU, SPD and the Left Party who work on European policy.