DefenceSynergia (DS) was formed by several former directors and policy board members of the United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA) prior to the misnamed 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). The object of DS is to investigate (and expose) the weakness in UK strategy and defence policy by engaging with mainstream players on an apolitical, tri-service basis. DS’s aim is to ensure that all 3 services are properly funded and resourced and best integrated to form a seamless defence package that meets the operational requirement in the context of an articulated Grand Strategy.
Modernising Defence Programme – Thinking the Unthinkable
INTRODUCTION
1. The current structure, capacity and capability of United Kingdom (UK) Armed Forces is not providing adequate protection for the country against rapidly evolving and emerging threats. This is the result of successive savings measures exacerbated by public lack of awareness of operational capability deficiencies facing the country. In spite of this, the Armed Services have employed considerable ingenuity to deliver platforms, systems and people to counter current and future threats. However, despite the UK defence budget being comparatively large, there have been many examples of poor procurement decisions, occasions when the force structure has remained little unchanged for 80 years, and ‘at arms length Joint procurement’ has resulted in much incoherence and significant budget and resource waste. The Middle Eastern (ME) wars provided striking examples but no remedial actions as to the institutional failings of the current Ministry of Defence (MOD) that continues to deliver incoherent combat Capability.
2. The effects of stove-piped decisions on morale, readiness, resilience, responsiveness, regeneration, and critical capability gaps has led to cases of Allies being let down and the UK combat reputation for professionalism tarnished. Whilst politicians boast of the size of UK defence budget, this becomes irrelevant when the emphasis should be laid on provision of war-winning operational capability. UK MOD needs to find, enact and publish a better structure, supported by modern processes to use its resources, manage its procurement and lead its people to be the world-class military Force it aspires to be. Presented with a Security and Defence strategy, realistic assumptions and threat scenarios, structure and equipment plan whose capability goals and limits are clear, the public and the Treasury can be asked to pay any necessary premium.
3. Slow response to rapidly evolving threats are exacerbated by the MOD's inability to take coherent 'System of Systems' adaptable approaches to planning and delivery of military capability. Rather, it can be argued that MOD has erroneously allowed itself to be “technology-seduced” into thinking that a few big, expensive and complex platform programmes can miraculously do everything that has been lost over the last decade, avoid inevitable attrition and losses, and compensate for the lack of people and a proper mass of equipment. There have been too many cases of gold plating when commercial-off-the shelf or military-off-the-shelf “kit” would have sufficed. Real world adversaries evolve and adapt far more quickly than the MOD’s 'observe, orientate, decide, act (OODA) process[1] which can take decades.
4. To answer the House of Commons Defence Committee (HoCDC) Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) consultation questions:
4a. Is the Government correct in its assessment that state-based threats now pose the greatest risk to the United Kingdom?
Not necessarily as threats from various sources wax and wane with time. Whatever the threat, it needs to be met with adaptable, credible and war-winning UK military Capability. There are too many “rogue elements”, such as terrorist organisations, at large to support such an assumption.
4b. What should the MDP mean for the size and shape of the Armed Forces?
The size and shape of the UK Armed Forces need to be configured and funded to meet likely conventional, asymmetric and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats out to 2035. As articulated within a dynamic but published National Defence Strategy document.
4c. What are the implications of examining Defence separately from the wider consideration of national security capabilities?
Running a separate Defence Review could miss opportunities for wider UK security and defence strategies such as: Civilian/Military (CIVMIL) provision of maritime waters, land border and airspace security; coherent CIVMIL cyber security; Multi-agency CBRN responses; wider Military Aid to the Civil Authority/Military Aid to the Civil Power capability development; a comprehensive smart UK security and defence strategy that drives and links a pan-government approach to the wide spectrum of threats UK faces internally and externally.
4d. Should the MoD be seeking further increases in defence spending?
Only where it can be justified and spent more cost effectively than at present. All major projects should be subject to ring-fencing and be required to keep to time, cost and output targets within single Service means and within originally approved budgets and resources.
4e. Which capabilities should the MDP be seeking to retain and augment? Which should it be seeking to restructure or dispose of?
MOD requires a coherent system-of-systems approach to supporting Capabilities not just equipment. It is clear, also, that Cyber Warfare demands considerable, continuing investment and our forces need to be able to operate effectively in a GPS and EW communications denied/degraded environment. Our Maritime Forces require a reassessment of their structure in terms of units and the correct size and mix of manpower to man them, our Army is too tail to tooth heavy, and the RAF has a fatal attraction to a two (single seat) combat aircraft fleet dogma.
4f. How can the MoD reform itself to improve its business, commercial and procurement practices? How can it set realistic efficiency targets?
MOD should review the need for ‘at arms length’ organisations like Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) and the Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO). Returning all Defence Lines Of Development (DLOD) and Concept Assessment Development Manufacturing In-Service Disposal (CADMID) resources and funds to the Front Line Single Service Chiefs would make them personally responsible and accountable Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) for delivering the people, equipment and estates to deploy effective Service combat effect. No more robbing Peter to pay Paul Ponzi schemes to cover up programme failings that might deliver a compromised equipment or platform but not the people, weapons and logistics support to effectively run it. Holding single Service Chiefs to account will also remove the option of blaming others for poor single Service requirement development, procurement, resourcing and stove-piped thinking. Large Capability programmes (Carrier Strike) might still need to be managed as pan-Service Capabilities from the Centre or through Chief of Defence Staff, with single Service Chiefs not able to make single Service based cuts/changes that might undermine a whole Defence Capability.
4g. Who should the MoD be consulting externally?
Big commercial consultancies or large defence sector companies have previously dominated MOD consultation inputs. MOD must consult and embrace fresh perspectives and ideas from a far wider spectrum of national and international stakeholders to bring in innovative commercial and military experience, disruptive new thinking, strategic innovation, rapid procurement, and more cost effective processes and programmes: veterans, Think Tanks, academia, the public, wider UK industry sectors beyond the traditional Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space Sector (ADS). MOD needs 21st Century thinking, innovation and strategies to get it out of a 20th Century mindset and processes.
4h. What lessons can be learned from past defence reviews to inform and improve the outcome of the MDP?
Be honest, don’t situate the appreciation by setting a Trabant car budget and expect to be driving around in a Rolls Royce Phantom. Don’t allow traditional industry approaches too much influence or to constrain change and innovation. Always develop Capabilities using system-of-systems thinking encompassing all DLOD components, ensure all Initial and Main Gate business cases include ALL whole life DLOD and CADMID costs upfront. Stop demanding unrealistic efficiencies. Use simple, transparent, clear and unambiguous accounting methods. Only commit and plan to spend what is in the budget. Hold industry robustly to account to deliver to time, cost and performance – minimal single source contracts and no more pseudo cost plus contracts. No political meddling in long term programmes to tweak annual budgets and procurement decisions. Make the Service Chiefs responsible and accountable for deciding what people, equipment and estate they need to deliver effective combat output. Procure mass of cost and operationally effective ‘good enough and adaptable’ equipment rather than a few overly complex, over-specialised, extortionately expensive trophy platforms. Don’t be too specific in requirement setting, but demand adaptable, flexible, rapidly re-configurable and exportable equipment. Be realistic about future threats and unconventional solutions required, think adaptable doctrine and equipment at all times, have an OODA loop of months, not years and decades. Recognise that reducing the size of the Armed Forces with redundancies and disposing of equipment is quick and relatively uncomplicated. However, should the need arise to re-build, it is a decade or more long task to increase numbers of suitably qualified and experienced people skilled in modern technologies, and procure equipment, most notably in air and naval applications.
MAIN DISCUSSION – UK Defence Deficiencies That Must Be Addressed In MDP
5. Many of the combat support arms and enabling Capabilities required to allow any military formation to have a minimum operational effect in many combat scenarios (open terrain; urban terrain; industrial terrain and littoral terrain) have been emasculated in attempting to fund a few overly expensive procurement programmes. Such reduced or lost Capabilities include:
no effective nor robust Close Air Support (CAS) that can take low and slow flying operations battle damage;
a steadily out-dated SENTRY E3-D Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) capability limited in multinational function and potentially vulnerable to new long-range ‘AWACS-killer’ missiles and limited maritime Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and no Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC);
only a handful of Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) systems that provide symbolic Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) cover of high level formations and critical military locations;
minimal battlefield helicopter and Tactical Air Transport logistics lift;
limited data and voice capacity and highly Electronic Warfare (EW) and cyber vulnerable communications;
limited long range self-propelled artillery heavy armour support and limited littoral assault capability;
limited highly vulnerable theatre-wide Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) support;
with the withdrawal of the Tornado GR4 fleet, just the Typhoon fleet to provide all manned combat air power roles until F-35B becomes operational;
with the planned retirement of the Tornado GR4 fleet by mid 2019, and no plans to integrate Storm Shadow on F-35B (but planned integration of embryonic long-range deep strike Selective Precision Effects At Range (SPEAR Cap 5) weapon at some point in late 2030s) only a limited Typhoon-only Capability remains in the foreseeable future to deliver long-range air launch stand-off cruise missiles strikes – only if planned Typhoon/Storm Shadow Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is achieved prior to Tornado fleet retirement. Not integrating Storm Shadow on F-35B removes any ‘Carrier Strike’ long-range deep strike weapons launch capability for 15 to 20 years once both carrier and F-35B achieve maritime operations IOC some time in the early 2020s. However, it is understood that the SPEAR Cap 3 medium range mini-cruise missile is planned for F-35B, but the IOC date is unknown, as is whether the weapon's integration has been costed and approved. These scenarios indicate deep strike stand off Capability reductions;
limited equipment and weapons stocks, spares and operational training;
no anti access/area denial (A2/AD) reach or defence;
limited tactical and operational level deployable EW and cyber attack and cyber and EW Defence Capability, including no Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) weapons;
minimal arctic warfare Capability;
limited theatre and maritime area AEW and only short-range anti-ship attack capability which limits maritime and carrier strike from Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) carriers with minimal combat ship and submarine fleet protection;
uncertainty over the future of Sentinel R1 - a key airborne capability to support land surveillance complementary to AWACS air surveillance and LRMPA sea surveillance – proven highly effective in air support of land operations;
The need to identify a new class of weapon system and sensors to counter hypersonic missile threats to air and surface assets.
6. Single Service stovepipe thinking has prevailed and prevented a Joint/Combined Arms Strategic approach to provide rapid formation and all-Arms coherent Capability support of deployed Army formations thus undermining their ability to meet the, now Secret, Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA). Too much focus on Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations and focusing on too few big-ticket equipment procurement programmes has skewed and severely neutered MOD’s ability for rapid reinforcement of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
7. The headline deficiencies in the UK's order of battle (OOB) incoherence stand out not just for the Royal Navy, Army and RAF but for UK/NATO defence more widely. There appear to be both Capability Management process and organisational deficiencies that have led to the situation today as follows:
7a. Capability management and defence reviews seem to be undertaken within Single Service and narrower stovepipes with little use of “system-of-systems” thinking or considerations. This has led to the incongruous situation in which the RN acquired the largest and, potentially, most capable aircraft carriers but without catapults and arrester gear (CATOBAR), thus, depriving them of the very flexibility and maximum operational capability that the original design envisaged. Meanwhile, the RAF discarded Harriers and has been forced into accepting the most vulnerable mark of the F35 stable - the B variant. The carriers lack any fixed wing EW aircraft and only have operationally limited uniquely developed AEW helicopter and with no Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) that is essential to provide an information-enabled fleet and exploit and share vital situational ship and aircraft data. Furthermore, with no CATOBAR to launch or cross-operate proper carrier fixed wing (FW) assets, no carrier-based Air-to-Air refuelling (AAR) and little self-protection weaponry, the UK’s so called “Carrier Strike” is highly vulnerable and reduced in combat effect and reach.
7b. Disconnect between Capability managers in Front Line Commands, DE&S has resulted in essential weapons stockpile shortages and even loss of complete weapon families leaving all three Services ‘munition embarrassed’.
7c. A few vast DE&S platform projects are sucking resources out of other platform programmes from sister Services and requiring cuts in non-DE&S resources to keep these programmes afloat ignores the need for pan-Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) of delivering coherent combat effect.
7d. The Army has limited (mainly contractualised), Heavy Equipment Transport (HET) movement capacity, has disbanded its Regular (79 Railway Squadron) and Reserve (275 Railway Squadron RLC (V)) Railway capabilities and has performed limited rail deployment exercise through the Channel Tunnel[2]. The MOD has also out-sourced its Sea Mounting Centre (SMC) maritime deployment base at Marchwood to be operated by a civilian operator[3], and some of the RAF’s strategic air transport aircraft are contractor provided and supported[4].
7e. RAF aircraft are at serious risk from new long-range missile systems such as the ‘AWACS killer’ S-400/S-500 (400km range). Forcing AWACS, other ISTAR and AAR aircraft to operate beyond engagement range would significantly inhibit air support of land forces. New ISTAR survivability capabilities are required. The committee should note that capabilities to counter such a threat were investigated at the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment, Malvern in the 1980s when experimenting with anti-stealth bi-static radar; the proposal being to mount bi-static AWACS radar transmitters in UAVs, so enabling the main aircraft radar to remain ‘silent only’ making it undetectable by anti-radiation missiles. [Refer IEE publication Chapter 11 by MRB Dunsmore: Advanced Radar Techniques and Systems, editor Gaspare Galati; MOD holds the classified data behind this open report. The findings are as valid today as when first published.]
7f. Additionally, the considerable Force-multiplier effect that would result from integrating RN data networking CEC with RAF/RN ISTAR assets, and plans to upgrade the RAF AWACS fleet to US Block 40/45 Open System Architecture (UK Project Eagle), were abandoned by MOD to save money.
CONCLUSION
8. Joint/Combined operations are affected by a lack of cooperation across the three Services that have generated a severely stovepiped and poorly equipped and incoherent UK military Force. We believe the result of a lack of a 'system-of-systems' approach in MOD is to make the deployment and operation of extant Brigades highly problematic for the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) who rightly requires highly mobile and combat effective Brigades in his order of battle (ORBAT). However, to achieve this he will rely upon Capabilities provided by the RN, RAF and Joint Forces, as well as supporting Army assets, many of which are below par or non-existent. In reality the CGS’s fighting capability, mainly UK based in peacetime, will not be highly mobile, safe nor sustainable without MOD recognising the Joint/Combined funding and training requirement required to provide dramatically improved layered air defence and cyber/EW capabilities, counter bombardment, an operational QEC Task Group supported by air and sea escorts with defensive and offensive clout, cyber and EW resilient communications and broader logistic and sustainment support than is currently the case.
9. The MDP (Modernising Defence Programme) must start by being ruthlessly honest and eschew decades of political denial, underfunding, and tinkering, to admit the previously unthinkable and unspeakable – in reality, the UK Armed Forces are an incoherent shadow of what they try extremely hard to aspire to be. Recognise the true cost and detrimental combat effect of a lack of a ‘system-of-systems' approach to Defence capability planning. Question and change the current Capability Management, Defence procurement and infrastructure organisations to review their fitness for purpose or if they are even needed?
10. The ultimate question to be answered is – is MOD, with HMG support, prepared to ruthlessly review, reorganise, re-process, plan and deliver combat-winning Capabilities in a coherent manner, including paying for a mass of adaptable and rapidly re-roleable equipment, or will it once again reshuffle the deck chairs?
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