Written evidence from Dr Jamie Gaskarth, Deputy Head and Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, POLSIS, University of Birmingham. (The author’s views are his own and not that of the University) (GLO0016)

*Global Britain faces three key challenges:

• international order is fragmenting;
• international society is “deliberalising”, with a rise in authoritarianism; and
• domestic public opinion seems to be more insular.

*To counteract these problems, Britain needs to:

• Be far more active in its diplomacy.
• Remind domestic and international audiences about the contribution it makes to international institutions.
• Recognise that it must deal with states that don’t share its values but make sure that these relationships are functional and not used to legitimise authoritarian regimes.
• Reduce the hostile rhetoric around immigration and have a more nuanced policy when it comes to overseas professionals and future elites.
• Restructure its economy and open up its regions to global opportunities, not just London.

At first glance, the label “Global Britain” fits closely with longstanding assumptions about British foreign policy. It can be taken to mean that Britain is uniquely open to people, trade, and culture from across the world because of its liberal economy and politics – recalling David Miliband’s idea of Britain as a global hub; or that Britain can exert influence because of its membership of international institutions and multiple global connections – echoing Winston Churchill’s Three Circles (Europe, the Commonwealth and the English-speaking world) and William Hague’s networked foreign policy; or it can resonate with Britain’s history of global engagement, via its imperial past, identity as a global trading nation, contribution to global public goods in the UN, and record of intervention abroad, with Britain “punching above its weight”.

But, these ideas assume domestic support for economic liberalization and military intervention, as well as an international environment that is globalizing and liberalizing.

In reality, the world is changing and all three of these assumptions face a series of challenges. Specifically, international order is reforming in ways that will challenge Britain’s ability to exert influence; international society is “deliberalising”, making it hard for Britain to uphold and promote its values; and domestic opinion is more insular – meaning that immigration and military action are increasingly unpopular. I will look at each of these in turn before suggesting possible responses to these challenges.

International order is fragmenting. The era of globalization has faltered and given way to a more regionalized pattern of interactions. Global institutions designed to manage political and economic disputes, such as the United Nations Security Council and the World Trade Organization are losing support. Russia and China have issued a series of double vetoes on action over Syria, allowing the conflict to continue. Rising powers such as Brazil, India and China have a post-colonial mindset which is deeply resistant to Western intervention.[i] As with Kosovo in 1999, France, the UK and the US have had to act outside the UNSC framework in Syria in April 2018 to uphold humanitarian norms – in this case, against chemical weapons use. Meanwhile, the WTO has failed to conclude the Doha round and efforts to further liberalise trade have stalled. [ii]  Indeed, the United States is actively hampering its work by blocking the appointment of members of the WTO’s appellate body, who are there to hear and resolve disputes. At the same time, cross regional trade negotiations like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have been side lined by President Trump.

Facing this impasse, regional institutions are becoming more salient. The integrative logic of the Euro is driving Eurozone members closer together and increasing costs, financial and political, on those outside. China’s One Belt One Road initiative is integrating Central and East Asia and increasing Chinese dominance of its region. In East Asia, TPP has been superseded by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership signed on 8 March 2018, (made up of eleven former signatories of the TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreed between ten ASEAN members and six of their FTA partners (including China, India, Japan and South Korea). Even Africa, where trade between countries has only made up 10% of commerce, saw a continental free trade area agreed in March 2018.[iii]

The UK has intimated that it might try and join arrangements such as CPTPP but their founding logic is regional not global. There is a risk the UK could find itself squeezed out of an international order based on increasingly integrated regional blocs.

International society is “deliberalising”. The end of the Cold War saw a wave of democratization across the globe and the assumption that liberal economic and political reforms would follow. Whilst the number of electoral democracies globally increased to a high of 64% in 2006, subsequent years have seen an annual decline in political rights and civil liberties.[iv] According to Freedom House, in 2017 “Seventy-one countries suffered net declines in political rights and civil liberties, with only 35 registering gains. This marked the 12th consecutive year of decline in global freedom”. Since 2006, 113 countries have seen a net decline, only 62 have experienced a net improvement and only 39% of people globally live in free societies.[v] Freedom House’s President, Michael Abramowitz, argues in their 2018 report “Democracy is in crisis. The values it embodies…are under assault and in retreat globally”.[vi] As such, the world is becoming more authoritarian.

This is important as Britain is looking to increase trade with other regions to offset the economic costs of Brexit. In doing so, it will have to deal with countries that are increasingly illiberal. Key strategic partners such as China, Russia and Turkey are run by autocrats who are consolidating their hold on power at the expense of liberal values. Recent announcements about closer links with Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and India are tempered by the fact that the first ranks joint bottom sixth in the world for freedom and the latter two are described by Transparency International as “among the worst regional offenders” in terms of corruption, with “fewer press freedoms and higher numbers of journalist deaths”.[vii]

Domestic opinion is increasingly insular.

British residents remain engaged with the world, undertaking 70.8 million visits overseas in 2016, 8% more than in 2015.[viii] However, their attitudes to two key aspects of UK interaction with the wider world have hardened in recent years in ways that challenge the “Global Britain” moniker. One is over immigration. According to IPSOS Mori “although the proportion rating the impact of immigration on Britain as positive increased (to 46%)” in 2015-16, the majority of people (60%) want immigration levels to be reduced.[ix] This is problematic as freer movement of people is often an important feature of free trade agreements. Efforts to engage with India and Australia have been hampered by Britain’s reluctance to loosen immigration controls.[x] The number of international students in the UK from India saw a decline of 26% between 2012-13 and 2016-17[xi] and the Indian High Commissioner has called for freer movement of professionals as a condition of a future deal.[xii]

In this respect, the government may be out of step with the public as 73% of people surveyed in 2017 would like to see the same number or more international students coming to study in the UK;[xiii] meanwhile 52% of people would accept more immigrants coming to do highly skilled jobs in the UK, compared to 12% who preferred fewer.[xiv] Efforts to reduce immigration through tighter controls have resulted in a number of deportation controversies souring relations with EU and Commonwealth countries.[xv] This is counterproductive and threatens to cement in the mind of European partners a view of Britain as more insular, as well as squandering the net gains in impressions of Britain’s attractiveness among Commonwealth and non-EU G20 countries after Brexit.[xvi] Immigration may have been a key driver of Brexit but the evidence of polling is that it is unskilled migration that is of particular concern to British citizens and efforts to reduce net migration to under the arbitrary figure of 100,000 do not reflect these nuances. Nevertheless, there may be public opposition to the kind of liberal immigration policy one might expect from the “Global Britain” label.

The second aspect of domestic opinion affecting British engagement with the world is scepticism over military intervention abroad. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were highly controversial and saw significant domestic opposition. In 2012, 58% of people thought the UK were wrong to go to war with Iraq in 2003, and only 24% supported the action; 48% thought the UK was wrong to send its Armed Forces to Afghanistan, compared to 29% who expressed support.[xvii] When military action was launched against Libya in March 2011, only 30% of British people surveyed approved, compared to 44% who disapproved, a figure that went down to 23% approving and 50% disapproving by April 2011.[xviii] In the aftermath of the government’s parliamentary defeat over air strikes on Syria in 2013, a poll showed only 19% supporting military action with the United States.[xix] In a YouGov poll published prior to the air strikes against Syria on 14 April 2018, 22% supported a cruise missile strike against the country, compared to 43% who opposed it.[xx] These kinds of figures represent a serious challenge to Britain’s status as a global military power. If the UK is to continue to play a great power role and act as a security provider internationally, policymakers need to grapple with the catastrophic fall in public support for military action. It is a real failing that the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 does not even acknowledge this as a problem.

Possible solutions:

*The fragmentation of international order is a significant challenge to “Global Britain”. The UK should be making a concerted effort to support international institutions, emphasizing the constructive role it has played for decades behind the scenes in the United Nations and in the development of the WTO, World Bank and IMF. Indeed, the government could identify itself as a “responsible global power” as part of its “Global Britain” rebranding. This might mean a renewed commitment to participate in diplomatic initiatives, particularly regionally. The recent effort to coordinate an international response to the Skripal poisoning was a masterful effort of diplomacy and demonstrates what the UK can achieve with the requisite political will. It was also a welcome reversal of Britain’s retreat from global influence over the last decade.

*Brexit is likely to mean that the UK will have to increase its trade with states that do not share Britain’s values – especially in the event of a harsh deal or no deal with the EU.  Whilst economic realities have to be accepted, it should be made clear that these would be purely functional arrangements. The government needs to avoid repetition of confusing expressions of “shared values” with governments that abuse human rights, as in Liam Fox’s article on the Philippines in 2017.[xxi] It is enough to state that the UK has shared interests. Indeed, more practical language is likely to be more effective in some cases.

*Britain will have to revisit its immigration policy and make efforts to reduce its aggressiveness. Increased restrictions on immigration across the board create a negative impression of the UK globally, hamper the recruitment of skilled professionals, and, in the case of student visas, alienate the very elites Britain should be reaching out to in order to foster  international political and economic links in the future.

*An important driver of immigration concerns, as well as unease at costly military interventions, is a sense that some parts of the UK have been forgotten, politically and economically. Long term, a fundamental restructuring of the economy is required to ensure it is not as reliant on foreign investment, has greater levels of domestic investment, and has a stronger manufacturing and technology base. As a result, Britain needs to open up its regions to global interaction, not just London.

April 2018