(MDP0021)
Written evidence submitted by Plymouth City Council
1.1. Plymouth, ‘Britain’s Ocean City’, is one of the largest cities on the south coast and the 15th largest city in England with a population of approximately 264,200, an economic output of £5.2 billion and 108,000 jobs.
1.2. HMNB Devonport and Dockyard’s identity and history is fundamental to Plymouth and the city is immensely proud of its links with the Royal Marines, Royal Navy and wider military community. This is demonstrated by the 50,000 (approx.) strong attendance each year at Armed Forces Day celebrations. The relationship between the city and its military personnel is emphasised in the commitment to the Armed Forces Covenant and the city continues to support its veterans through mental health support, housing projects and opportunities to retrain with valuable job-based skills.
1.3. HMNB Devonport and Dockyard is the largest naval base in Western Europe and home to the amphibious fleet, Hydrographic vessels and all of the Royal Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigates (ASWs) in addition to being the operational training hub of the front line fleet and the Royal Navy’s Amphibious Centre of Excellence at Royal Marine Tamar.
1.4. In light of the increased Russian Naval activity in the North Atlantic, and the likely NATO activity to match, Plymouth’s role will become increasingly vital given its excellent training grounds and Flag Officer Sea Training (F.O.S.T.). This extends beyond the Royal Navy, offering tailored training to allied Navies founded upon NATO operating procedures.
1.5. The Naval Base and Dockyard covers 650 acres, with 15 dry docks, four miles of waterfront, 25 tidal berths and five basins. It is a huge economic asset to the city, directly accounting for 14.1% of the city’s economic value in terms of Gross Value Added (GVA) and 10.1% of Plymouth’s total employment. When indirect effects are taken into account including those employees who travel from outside the city and the effects upon the supply chain (of which there are over 250 across the South West region) the impact of the Naval Base and Dockyard is valued at approximately £839m in GVA and 16,185 full time equivalents. Therefore, any changes that reduce the size and shape of the Armed Forces and strategic assets in Plymouth will have a significant economic impact.
1.6. Strategically the Naval Base and Dockyard represent the only facilities in the UK authorised and licensed to carry out deep maintenance on Royal Navy submarines. This specialist maintenance of nuclear capabilities has been carried out in Devonport since the 1970s, nurturing a rich culture of highly skilled expertise in this field.
1.7. This culture of expertise forms part of the critical mass that has built up over the years and has contributed to the agglomeration of expertise, facilities and capabilities in nuclear submarines, ASWs, hydrography and amphibiosity, thus presenting an opportunity for a significant return on any investment by building upon this critical mass.
1.8. Plymouth urges the Government to recognise the importance of HMNB Devonport and Dockyard as a key UK strategic asset, and commits to the preservation of those facilities and activities that are of such strategic importance to the UK. Specifically we ask the government to:
1.9. The City Council would also welcome providing oral evidence to the Defence Committee where appropriate.
2.1. Is the Government correct in its assessment that state-based threats now pose the greatest risk to the United Kingdom?
2.2. We accept the findings of the National Security and Capability Review (NSCR) and agree with their conclusion that the resurgence of state-based threats, intensifying state competition and erosion of the rules-based international order are making it harder to build consensus and tackle global threats. The recent use of a nerve-agent on British soil has shown how state-based threats are now a major risk to our country. This is set against a backdrop of well-established Russian Naval activity in the North Sea and North Atlantic.
2.2.1. The City Council supports the view that the UK must have the versatility and means to respond to any growing risks and threats to our security now and in the future. This means ensuring that the UK has the full spectrum of capabilities. This therefore includes the UK’s ability to respond to the increasing risk posed by state-based threats.
2.2.2. Having the ability to project force and deter aggression is an essential component of our future capability. HMNB Devonport and Dockyard has a critical support role to play in ensuring that the country has a modern, available, effective and adaptable naval capability. In addition to acting as the base port for the UK’s ASW capability, and the amphibious capability provided by HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK (and previously HMS OCEAN) the UK has the ability to counter threats from another state through the fast and effective deployment of the Royal Marines. This capability needs to be maintained at pace according to the level of threat.
2.2.3. The Naval Base and Dockyard also act as a gateway to the North Atlantic, at a time when there is increased Russian Naval activity in this area. Unlike other UK ports, Plymouth can offer direct access to open ocean, avoiding busy shipping lanes and can provide a large, sheltered anchorage. Strategically the Naval Base and Dockyard are the only facilities in the UK licensed to carry out nuclear submarine deep maintenance, this specialist capability has been carried out in Devonport since the 1970s, nurturing a rich culture of expertise in this field. With such a rich culture of specialism Devonport Naval Base and Dockyard is a critical strategic defence asset that can continue to make a significant contribution to these intensified threats.
2.2.4. On top of the strategic assets that Plymouth has to offer, it also boasts a growing and thriving digital industry. The City Council also acknowledges the risk of Cyber Crime and was quick to recognise the risks and opportunities posed in the National Cyber Security Strategy. Plymouth’s superfast broadband connectivity and commitment to developing wireless technology leaves it well placed as a SMART city.
2.2.5. Partners across Plymouth have joined forces to bid to become a pilot area for Digital skills and Cyber security, working with the national Digital Policy Alliance (DPA) to ensure we generate a pipeline to meet the future needs of our cyber security industry. This builds upon the expertise of GCHQ accredited BluescreenIT, Cybercon and multiple undergraduate and master level degrees in cyber security with military specialisms, making Plymouth a key centre for both traditional Armed Forces activities and future developments.
2.3. What should the MDP mean for the size and shape of the Armed Forces?
2.3.1. Given the documented rise of the number of state-based threats, it is important that the UK retains a diversified Armed Forces that reflects the diverse nature of current risks whilst also having the foresight to prepare for any future developments in the nature of conflict. Careful consideration should therefore be given to protecting our existing capabilities and building upon those areas of specialism that can give the best return on investment to match the intensified state-based threats identified in the NSCR.
2.3.2. A key area of specialism within HMNB Devonport and Dockyard is the amphibious capability. Retaining the Royal Navy’s Landing Platform Docks (LPDs), currently HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK, particularly given the recent decommissioning of HMS OCEAN, is vital in the event of landing and supporting ground forces such as the Royal Marines. This contribution should be recognised within the context of increasing state-based threats. Their unique flexibility gives the Marines the ability to project power without requiring an airfield, allied port or road network. In addition, they also provide invaluable humanitarian aid and rapid response to British citizens overseas and others affected by humanitarian emergency.
2.3.3. The MoD has previously recognised the significant role and value of the amphibious capability with a £30m investment in 2014 to build the Amphibious Centre of Excellence at RM Tamar and the recent regeneration of HMS ALBION costing £85m in 2017. The effective use of this investment is therefore reliant on the retention of these ships and their associated maintenance in Plymouth, in addition to retaining the specialist skills and jobs in the local economy.
2.3.4. In December 2016 it was clear that the MoD’s intention was to consolidate Royal Marine units from Chivenor, North Devon and Norton Manor Camp in the Plymouth / Devonport area. It is hoped that this is still the intention. Furthermore it is hoped that with the estimated disposal date of 2023 for Stonehouse Barracks, home to 42 Commando, that these units are also reprovided for in the Devonport area.
2.3.5. In light of the increased Russian Naval presence and in particular, submarine activity off the coast of Scotland and in the North Atlantic, the capabilities of the ASW Type 23 and 26 Frigates will be of increasing importance. Plymouth, as home to all the Anti-Submarine Warfare Type 23 Frigates, with the facilities and expertise to support them, is well placed to welcome all the ASW Type 26s. In addition to the expertise and agglomeration of other Naval activities in the city, Plymouth also boasts huge geographical benefits to base-porting the Type 26s.
2.3.6. Devonport with its excellent training grounds and large sheltered anchorage in the Sound is also home to F.O.S.T– the training hub for the front line fleet. This organisation provides Operational Sea Training for all surface ships, submarines and the Royal Fleet Auxiliaries together with land and air units. With increasing numbers of NATO and foreign participants, F.O.S.T. has established a worldwide reputation for excellence. Choosing to locate in Plymouth is testament to the city and the facility should be capitalised on as a key asset to train NATO and foreign participants to the highest standards.
2.4. What are the implications of examining Defence separately from the wider consideration of national security capabilities?
2.4.1. In terms of GDP, the UK has always fallen firmly within the NATO 2% guidelines, however a Defence Committee report[1] expresses concern that the criteria has been amended to include elements that were not previously included, creating the need for a genuine 2% of GDP on defence to fulfill those NATO commitments. In order to meet the identified emerging threats whilst also honouring our commitments to our allies through Joint Force 2025, the UK must increase the defence budget. Despite being cited as the fifth largest defence budget in the world, huge proportions of this budget are diverted to the renewal of the Trident nuclear programme and on the two new aircraft carriers, leaving little for other conventional forces.
2.4.2. The NSCR continues to remain committed to meeting the 2% NATO target, yet as we leave the European Union it will become more important to maintain our close relations with our allies, particularly through NATO. By separating the defence strand from the rest of the NSCR the funding gap in terms of our commitments to our allies can be properly addressed.
2.5. Should the MoD be seeking further increases in defence spending?
2.5.1. Yes, defence spending should be achieving a more genuine 2% of GDP rather than failing to meet this target.
2.5.2. While the recent budget uplift of £800m is welcome, in light of the increase in state-based threats to the UK and NATO nations, consideration should be given to revising the proportion of GDP spent on defence to more genuinely reflect at least the 2% commitment to NATO. If we are to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent and conventional forces to meet these increasing threats then spending on defence will need to increase proportionately.
2.5.3. The facilities at HMNB Devonport and Dockyard include the UK’s sole licensed site for the specialist deep maintenance and refuel / defuel of nuclear powered submarines, in addition to maintaining de-commissioned submarines. Looking to the future, Devonport will require investment to support future generations of nuclear submarines.
2.5.4. With the new Type 26 Frigates coming into service in the mid 2020s Devonport has excellent facilities, a highly skilled workforce and is positioned at the gateway to the Atlantic making it the ideal baseport for the new Type 26 Frigates. Further investment will be needed to ensure that Devonport has the facilities to match both local skills and expertise with the future capabilities of the Royal Navy. We call on Government for confirmation that the eight planned Type 26s will be base-ported in Devonport.
2.5.5. Continued efficiencies will also help to ensure that budgets go further. For example the Government has previously made substantial investment in the amphibious assault capability in Plymouth on which it could consolidate and build. £85m was spent on the regeneration of HMS ALBION in 2017 and £30m in 2014 on the facilities at RM Tamar as an Amphibious Centre of Excellence. In order to ensure the effective use of this investment, retention of these ships, their associated maintenance and proximity to the amphibious related facilities in Plymouth is vital.
2.5.6. Previously the MoD has stated its intention to consolidate Royal Marine units in Plymouth, though no site has been confirmed. It also announced that Stonehouse Barracks, home to 42 Commando, is to close. We call for confirmation of plans to consolidate the Royal Marines in Plymouth and identification of the new site.
2.6. Which capabilities should the MDP be seeking to retain and augment? Which should it be seeking to restructure or dispose of?
2.6.1. HMNB Devonport and Dockyard is currently home to Britain’s amphibious ships and also hosts the Royal Navy's Amphibious Centre of Excellence at RM Tamar. RM Tamar at Devonport provides vital support for the Royal Marines preparing for operations worldwide and for amphibious training, locating the units next to their headquarters unit 1 Assault Group Royal Marines and alongside the berths for the amphibious ships HMS BULWARK and HMS ALBION. The facility includes maintenance facilities and berthing facilities capable of supporting and operating Landing Craft, Raiding Craft and other small boats.
2.6.2. Not only has this capability proved itself of immense value militarily, but also in humanitarian activities, with HMS BULWARK rescuing almost 3,000 migrants from the Mediterranean Sea during Operation Weald. These vessels have been specially designed as a Command & Control platform and to accommodate the Royal Marines. The expertise and training that has subsequently been built up over the years make them an irreplaceable asset and one that Plymouth is truly proud to host.
2.6.3. Plymouth is also home to all the ASW Type 23 Frigates, with the facilities and the expertise in these areas of specialism already in Devonport Naval Base and Dockyard, Plymouth is well placed to make the case for all the ASW Type 26s, in addition to the expertise and agglomeration of other naval activities in the city.
2.7. How can the MoD reform itself to improve its business, commercial and procurement practices? How can it set realistic efficiency targets?
2.7.1. No response provided.
2.8. Who should the MoD be consulting externally?
2.8.1. No response provided.
2.9. What lessons can be learned from past defence reviews to inform and improve the outcome of the MDP?
2.9.1. The 1981 Defence White Paper proposed the early retirement of the Navy’s amphibious capability, HMS FEARLESS and HMS INTREPID. Following a visit to HMS FEARLESS in Portsmouth, the then Secretary of State for Defence John Nott, revoked his decision to scrap the amphibious ships. Soon after, the Falklands War broke out and the two ships played a crucial role in the war. This shows that not only were the function of the ships underestimated, but also that there is no predictability in global political affairs. Recent global events from Russia’s heightened aggression, and changes to the world order make our world even more unpredictable. With this in mind the UK Armed Forces need the full spectrum of capabilities to respond to any threat to our national or allied interests.
2.9.2. Yet this lesson was not properly learnt, with the amphibious vessels being targeted again when previous SDSRs tied up one of the Albion-class ships alongside at extended readiness. The recent sale of HMS OCEAN, Devonport’s largest warship, and a third of the nation’s amphibious ships, has meant a smaller Royal Navy presence at Devonport with corresponding changes in activity. It is our view that the Bay-class RFA fleet is not a comparable alternative to the Albion-class, and only by maintaining the Albion-class ships can the UK fulfill its obligations to the pledged amphibious capability.
2.9.3. Furthermore the announcement of this SDSR, ahead of the typical schedule, is a welcome development. The last review had such strong emphasises on defence accounting and maintaining UK nuclear capabilities through Trident and the new Dreadnought class. As a result there was little chance for genuine debate around the future of our Armed Forces, and which capabilities may be required to respond to any future threats.
2.9.4. The publication of the NSCR, and MDP allows for such debate, to identify those capabilities that are most fit for purpose in the Armed Forces of the future, and where they should be located in order to secure the best return on investment for the MoD.
2.9.5. This is why we propose that all Type 26 ASW Submarines are based within Plymouth to best make use of the facilities, expertise, training grounds and supply chains that currently support the ASW Type 23 Frigates. Secondly, the amphibious capability must be maintained in its current form, and HMS ALBION and BULWARK retained until their scheduled decommissioning date to build upon the critical mass already established. Finally, a significant footprint of the Royal Marines needs to be maintained within the city.
16 April 2018
[1]Defence Committee, ‘Shifting the goalposts? Defence expenditure and the 2% pledge’, 12 April 2016.