(MDP0020)

Written evidence submitted by the Human Security Centre

Background

The Human Security Centre (HSC) is an international, independent, not-for-profit foreign policy think-tank based in London. The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

Dr Rowan Allport is an HSC Senior Fellow who leads the organisation’s Security and Defence team. He has written extensively on UK defence matters and was the lead author of the HSC’s 2015 The Two Per Cent Solution: An Alternative SDSR.[1]

Executive Summary

This submission will answer a number of the key questions within the inquiry’s terms of reference and make additional supporting points.

• The Government is fundamentally correct in assessing that state-based threats now pose the greatest overall challenge to UK security, and this has been reflected in developments since the drafting of the most recent NSS & SDSR.
• Looking to the future, the capabilities of the Armed Forces in need of enhancement include air and missile defence systems, anti-submarine systems, and ground-based anti-armour & indirect fire systems.
• The MoD should be seeking additional resources: increasing defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP – or around £7.7 billion extra a year – is a viable policy.

The increasing challenge of state-based threats

1. Since the 2015 publication of the most recent NSS & SDSR, the Government appears to have further shifted in the direction of prioritising state-based threats. When questioned by the defence committee on the UK’s current threat assessment in February 2018, Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson MP said that “We would highlight state-based threats and the speed at which they were escalating as the top priority, but, within a hair, that is followed by the terrorism threat, which comes straight after that.”[2] This statement reflects similar developments in the US as expressed in the country’s most recent National Defence Strategy.
2. A number of post-NSS & SDSR 2015 developments support the Government’s new position on state-based threats.

1. The potential of the Islamic State to conduct sophisticated attacks in the UK has proven limited. This can be credited to a number of factors, including the proficiency of the UK security services. It is objectively the case that – with the partial exception of the Manchester bombing of May 2017 – all recent terrorist attacks have been crude in nature.
2. The operation to destroy the Islamic State as a territorial entity in Syria and Iraq has largely been completed. Although the organisation will continue to function as a terrorist and insurgent group, and there remains the risk of former fighters returning to the UK to carry out attacks, their freedom of operation has been significantly compromised.
3. Future terrorist threats cannot be known for certain. The recently published National Security Capability Review (NSCR) states that: “We expect the threat from Islamist terrorism to remain at its current heightened level for at least the next two years and it might increase further.”[3] However, it seems unlikely that there will be a substantial qualitative increase in terrorist capabilities in the near future that would justify further defence resources.
4. The publication of the most recent NSS & SDSR occurred after both the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and wider operations in eastern Ukraine; and following the commencement of Moscow’s major operations in Syria in September 2015. However, it is likely that the November 2015 release of the NSS & SDSR failed to allow for the implications of the latter action to be fully factored into its findings. It is important to note that whilst the attack on Ukraine is perceived to be the leading example of the Kremlin’s aggressive tendencies, the intervention in Syria also demonstrated – often needlessly[4] – a significant number of the capabilities of threat to the UK and its allies.
5. The poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal is further evidence that the UK and its allies will likely be facing a Russia willing to run a high-risk strategy that goes beyond rhetoric for the immediate future.
6. Away from Russia, the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programme has recently become far more urgent in nature. While the UK is not a priority target for Pyongyang, a potential nuclear war in East Asia could have catastrophic implications for both Britain’s allies in the region and the global economy. The UK does not have a legal obligation to come to the defence of South Korea in the event of renewed hostilities. However, it remains an active member of the United Nations Command, and in 1953 was one of 16 nations which signed a Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice, which stated that the United Nations Command would be “united and prompt to resist” if another attack on South Korea took place.[5] It seems inconceivable that the UK could avoid involvement in fresh fighting on some level.

The MDP and the future size, shape and capabilities of the Armed Forces

3. The 2015 NSS & SDSR states that by 2025, it is expected that – in addition to peacetime taskings such as delivery of the nuclear deterrent – the UK will be able to field an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel, which would include:

• a land division with three brigades
• a maritime task group centred on an aircraft carrier
• an air group with combat, transport and surveillance aircraft
• a Special Forces Task Group

It appears probable that a scenario involving a major conventional conflict with Russia centred on (though not necessarily limited to) Eastern Europe represents the most extreme circumstances under which the above force would be fielded. If we are to assume that Russian forces represent the benchmark threat, a number of shortfalls are immediately evident. This section lists a selection, rather than the totality, of these deficits.

Air and missile defence

4. The British military is currently lacking in systems capable of mounting a defence against a major air and missile threat, which in the Russian context would include:

• modern multi-role combat aircraft such as the Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’
• attack helicopters such as the Ka-52 ‘Alligator’
• subsonic land-attack cruise missiles including the ship and submarine-launched 3M14-Kalibr and the air-launched Kh-101
• hypersonic conventional weapons such as the ship and submarine-launched 3M22 Zircon anti-ship missile, and the air-launched anti-ship/air-to-surface Kh-47M2 Kinzhal
• short-range ballistic missiles such as the 9K720 Iskander-M system

5. By 2025, the projected air defence assets available to the UK will be:

• RAF: 7 x Typhoon and 1 x F-35B squadrons[6]
• Royal Navy: 1 x F-35 squadron; up to 13 x Type 23/26 frigates with the Sea Ceptor missile system; 6 x Type 45 with the Sea Viper missile system; 1 x air defence troop (Royal Marines) with the Starstreak missile system
• British Army: 1 x regular regiment with Sky Sabre missile system; 1 x regular and 1 x reserve regiment with the Starstreak missile system

6. RAF and Royal Navy combat aircraft are tasked not only with air defence, but also other missions such as deep strike, close air support and surveillance. Furthermore, those aircraft that are available for air defence will have to cover the British Army in the field and its lines of support, key allied strategic locations in the theatre of operations, Royal Navy ships, as well as the defence of the UK and its territories.
7. Royal Navy ships are comparatively well equipped for air defence, but questions remain over the performance of Sea Viper and Sea Ceptor against the latest generation of anti-ship missiles. Minimal progress has been made towards the acquisition of a sea-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capability.
8. The British Army’s ground-based air defence assets are the weakest link in the chain. The three air defence regiments (of which one is a reserve unit) that represent almost all of the UK’s ground-based air defence assets would struggle to cover even the deployed division and its key support sites. This would leave other targets in allied territory and the UK itself highly exposed. It is not currently planned to field a land-based ABM system.
9. Recommendations

a.     procure an additional 30 F-35B fighters by 2028, to add to the 48 that will be in service by 2025: this would allow for the formation of two additional squadrons

b.     form two additional Army regiments equipped with Sky Sabre

c.      move forward with the procurement of Aster 30 Block 1NT missiles to provide the Sea Viper system with a limited ABM capability

d.     explore the option of developing a NATO joint ABM force – potentially based upon the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system

e.     begin an urgent review into the potential wartime air defence requirements of the UK mainland

f.        study returning an air defence capability to the RAF Regiment

g.     increase personnel strength of the relevant forces branches to accommodate enacting these recommendations

h.     ensure adequate stockpiling of spare parts and munitions

Anti-submarine warfare

10. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is an area of historic British speciality that has been significantly downgraded since the end of the Cold War. The Royal Navy has lost all of its diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), and now operates only six nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).[7] Just 13 ASW frigates remain in service, and only eight of these are fitted with modern towed sonar. Planned orders of the Type 26 frigate have been cut from 13 to eight, and it seems likely that the Type 31e frigate will lack ASW capability entirely.
11. The reintroduction of an aircraft carrier capability will soon allow ASW helicopters to be taken to sea in large numbers, although the Royal Navy will only have 30 Merlin HM2 helicopters for all ASW and Airborne Surveillance and Control (ASaC) tasks. The purchase of nine P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft for the RAF will go some way to mitigate the loss of the Nimrod aircraft in 2010, but will fall far short of the 21 Nimrod MRA4 originally ordered in 1996.
12. In 2025, it is conceivable that the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet will possess an attack submarine force comprised of around 18 SSN, SSK and cruise missile (SSGN) submarines. Not all of the above would be available for operations at once, and Russian doctrine would dictate that several vessels were kept back in Russian home waters to defend the Northern Fleet’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs – of which there would be perhaps eight). Nevertheless, the remaining submarines would pose a threat through their ability to interdict shipping in the North Atlantic region, and could attempt to harass the UK’s SSBNs.
13. A number of the above submarines could also fire Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in the UK from launch positions in the Norwegian Sea. Russia’s 2017 Naval Doctrine places a particular emphasis on what it refers to as ‘strategic conventional strike’, including the ability to ensure the “destruction of [the] enemy's military and economic potential by striking its vital facilities from the sea”.[8]
14. While the US Navy would ultimately provide the majority of ASW assets in a major conflict, they too have run down their capabilities, and as part of the ongoing ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy, most of their submarines are being deployed in the Pacific. As such, the Royal Navy would have to provide most of the immediately available ASW capability early on in a crisis, and take a major supporting role throughout any conflict.
15. Recommendations

a.     procure an additional five P-8 Poseidon aircraft to add to the nine on order

b.     ensure that the planned Type 31e frigate has at least a basic hull-mounted sonar

c.      fit half of the Navy’s 28 Wildcat helicopters with a dipping sonar for ASW tasking[9]

d.     end the practice of confining one frigate and one destroyer to harbour due to personnel shortages

e.     explore the option of extending the Type 26 programme from eight to ten ships, all fitted with towed sonar.

f.        increase personnel strength of the relevant forces branches to accommodate enacting these recommendations

g.     ensure adequate stockpiling of spare parts and munitions

Ground-based anti-armour and indirect fire support

16. Russia’s investment in advanced armoured systems looks set to increase in the coming years as it moves away from procuring upgraded models of Cold War-era equipment and towards newly developed systems such as the Armata Universal Combat Platform, a family of vehicles which includes the T-14 tank.
17. In recent years, NATO forces have become increasingly reliant on airborne platforms to destroy hostile armour. The UK currently depends on the Apache attack helicopter with Hellfire missiles and the Typhoon and Tornado aircraft with Brimstone missiles for much of its ability to engage tanks and similar vehicles. This has allowed for a reduction in Britain’s own armoured vehicle holdings.
18. However, it is unlikely that a conflict with Russia would take place within a permissive air environment, making the availability of airpower less ubiquitous than has been the case in recent conflicts. There is also reason to believe that the current generation of anti-tank missiles – be they air or ground-launched – may be rendered less effective by the active protection systems (APS) that Russia is fielding on its vehicles.[10] However, APS tend to be less able to defeat gun-fired kinetic energy rounds, meaning that tanks firing such munitions may once again become the most reliable means to defeat other tanks.
19. Despite this, the UK is continuing to reduce the size of its Challenger 2 tank force, with one of three remaining regular Army regiments scheduled to lose its vehicles. While the Army notionally has 227 tanks in service, each regiment is only allocated 56 vehicles. In a force of two regiments, it seems highly likely that the overall number of tanks will fall significantly in the coming years. The MoD has stated that it is seeking to study options to provide a third regiment through the regular and reserve force, but nothing has been confirmed.
20. To give context to these numbers, it is estimated that a Russian Land Force motor-rifle brigade will typically have 40 tanks on strength, and a tank brigade 94 tanks. A motor-rifle division would have 214 tanks, and a tank division 322 tanks.[11]
21. Despite developments in APS technology, anti-tank missiles will still have a role to play. However, the British Army retired its only armoured vehicle mounted anti-tank missile system, Swingfire, without replacement in 2005.[12] Norway is currently researching options to procure an anti-tank missile capable of overcoming APS.
22. In the context of a lack of guaranteed air support, the British Army also has deficiencies in its indirect fire systems. At present, the most capable system available is the GMLRS munition, capable of striking targets at a range of over 70 km. However, Russian’s Tornado-S system can fire rockets to a range of 120 km. These are supported by the Iskander-M ballistic missile system with a range of 400-500 km.
23. The US Army currently fields the ATACMS missile with a range of up to 300 km. Having identified its own excessive dependency on air power to provide support, the force has now prioritised the fielding of long-range indirect fire systems, including the up to 500 km range Precision Strike Missile (PSM). Importantly, the PSM will be compatible with the launcher that fires the British Army’s GMLRS rocket.
24. Recommendations:

a.     study the feasibility of providing each of the two armoured infantry brigades with two Challenger 2-based armoured regiments, as opposed to one

b.     speed the fielding of an APS suitable for British armoured vehicles

c.      partner with Norway in the procurement of an APS-resistant anti-tank missile, with a view to mounting it on an armoured vehicle

d.     consider working with the US Army in a joint programme to expand the availability of long-range precision fire systems

e.     redeploy personnel and restructure the Army to accommodate enacting these recommendations

f.        ensure adequate stockpiling of spare parts and munitions

Future defence spending levels

25. Present government policy is to enforce a ‘floor’ in defence spending of 2 per cent of GDP. Recent data indicates that in 2017/18, the figure reported to NATO was actually 2.14 per cent of GDP, or £43 billion.[13] However, as the committee is aware, this figure has been significantly ‘padded’ by the inclusion of costs such as Civil Service pensions payments.
26. A number of high profile figures in the defence sector have called for defence spending to be raised as a portion of GDP, with 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent being the most popular targets. 3 per cent, whilst desirable, is unrealistic due to wider demands on the Treasury. However, the current political and security environment makes 2.5 per cent a viable – if challenging – goal. In January 2018, former Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon called for a spending target of 2.5 per cent of GDP, or around an extra £7.7 billion per year, by 2022/23. The 2.5 per cent call was later echoed by recently retired Rear Admiral Alex Burton.
27. A significant percentage of this extra money would be required to compensate for the shortfall in funding for current programmes, which has been estimated to be around £20 billion over the next decade.[14] There is also the need to end the current 1 per cent armed forces pay cap, which amongst other things has contributed toward continuing shortfalls in personnel numbers. Nevertheless, the funding increase would still provide for the implementation of a number of new initiatives that would allow for the current threat environment to be better managed.
28. Recommendation

1. Increase defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the current parliament

16 April 2018