Written evidence submitted by the Defence Police Federation

Introduction

The Defence Police Federation is pleased to make this submission of written evidence to the Defence Select Committee’s inquiry into the Modernising Defence Programme (MDP).

The Defence Police Federation (DPF) is the staff association representing officers in the civilian Ministry of Defence Police.

About the Ministry of Defence Police

The Ministry of Defence Police is the MoD’s dedicated civilian police force. Its officers are deployed at key MoD and Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) establishments across the UK and are responsible for providing armed and unarmed security for critical assets and infrastructure. This includes the protection of the Atomic Weapons Establishments (AWE), Chemical Research facilities at Porton Down, strategic buildings in London and the HM Royal Navy’s continuous at-sea deterrent (CASD), including submarines and the new HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier.

MoD Police officers are also deployed to protect Ministry of Defence munitions sites and armouries, along with key naval bases including HMNB Clyde (incorporating Coulport), HMNB Devonport, and HMNB Portsmouth. The Force retains the largest police marine contingent in the UK and the second largest armed policing capacity in the UK behind the Metropolitan Police.

The MoD Police holds full constabulary authority across the UK, enabling officers to operate both within and outside the perimeter of Ministry of Defence establishments; with the Force being accountable to the Independent Office of Police Complaints and Police Investigation and Review Commissioner in Scotland. MoD Police officers are also used to provide additional policing and armed policing capacity to augment Home Office resources in the event of a critical incident under Operation Temperer.

Summary

The Defence Police Federation wishes to highlight the following for the Defence Select Committee’s consideration.

• The MoD’s UK-based establishments represent high-value targets to both state-based and terrorist threats to the United Kingdom

• The UK’s Armed Forces are rightly recognised as among the best, if not the best, in the world. However, their full capability is contingent on having the necessary assets and materiel (ranging from the Trident nuclear deterrent and HMS Queen Elizabeth carriers to arms and munitions) and this is a primary responsibility of Ministry of Defence Police officers at the sites they protect.
• Ensuring the full capability of the Armed Forces requires continued and robust security of critical assets and infrastructure. A domestic attack on critical assets (e.g. HMS Queen Elizabeth while in port) or establishments such as munitions sites or Chemical Research facilities risks undermining UK military capability and public confidence; while also significantly impacting on Ministry of Defence financial planning and budgets at a time when the Department faces a funding gap of c.£21 billion over the next decade[1] according to a National Audit Office report published in January 2018.

• The security of domestic MoD establishments and critical assets should be fully considered as part of the Modernising Defence Programme to ensure the maximum capability of the UK’s world-class Armed Forces and to provide the public reassurance of their personal safety and freedom.

Evidence submission

The following sets out the DPF’s responses to the questions posed by the Defence Select Committee in its inquiry’s Terms of Reference

• Is the Government correct in its assessment that state-based threats now pose the greatest risk to the United Kingdom?

The DPF would challenge the assessment that state-based threats now pose the greatest risk to the United Kingdom.

The past 12 months have seen terrorist attacks in Westminster, London Bridge and Manchester that have resulted in significant loss of life and required the deployment of both armed police (including the Ministry of Defence Police as part of Operation Temperer) and the Armed Forces. The DPF would argue that these attacks, alongside those foiled by the security services, demonstrate an appetite amongst terrorist groups to attack the UK. While to date attacks have been on public targets, the attack on the Palace of Westminster demonstrates that extremists are willing to target heavily protected sites. It is therefore feasible that MoD establishments could be targeted in future.

While state-based threats must be seriously considered, particularly in terms of cyber-attacks, cyber-warfare, and chemical attacks, the DPF would contend that the capability of the UK’s Armed Forces would be seriously impaired by a successful terrorist attack on a domestic establishment or high-value asset, such as HMS Queen Elizabeth when in port at HMNB Portsmouth.

By way of example, an attack on HMNB Portsmouth that compromised the ability of HM Royal Navy vessels to put to sea would immediately compromise the capability of the Armed Forces. Similarly, an attack on MoD munitions sites could deprive personnel in theatre of essential equipment and weaponry, putting their lives in jeopardy. Consequently, it is essential these establishments and assets are effectively and robustly protected to minimise potential risk.

In securing MoD establishments, the MoD Police operate both within and outside the perimeter of sites, providing both a robust on-site armed deterrent and the development of local intelligence that minimises the potential for a terrorist attack. The DPF contends that such capability is fundamental to protecting and maximising the capabilities of the Armed Forces; demonstrating the importance of reviewing security and its funding as part of the Modernising Defence Programme.

• What should the Modernising Defence Programme mean for the size and shape of the Armed Forces?

The Defence Police Federation recognises the importance of arresting the decline in personnel numbers across the Armed Forces.

While the Federation would not make recommendations on the size and shape of the Armed Forces, we would note the importance of safeguarding whatever assets, personnel and materiel is held by the Armed Forces now and in the future.

Pressures on the defence budget in recent years, alongside delays to procurement projects, have increased the strategic importance and financial value of many assets. To take the new aircraft carriers as one example, the UK was without such capacity until HMS Queen Elizabeth came into service. However, this remains the only such asset until HMS Prince of Wales is ready for deployment, which ultimately increases the value of the one strategic asset that can be used in theatre. An attack on the serving aircraft carrier when potentially vulnerable in port would significantly impair Royal Navy operations.

This example demonstrates the importance of robustly protecting existing and future Armed Forces assets to maximise capability and help ensure the safety and wellbeing of personnel. For this reason, the Defence Police Federation contends it is essential the MDP considers not just the size and shape of the Armed Forces, but how these structures can be best protected from disruptive and potentially calamitous domestic threats – including through the armed and flexible security that is provided by the MoD Police.

• What are the implications of examining Defence separately from the wider consideration of national security capabilities?

The DPF welcomes the separate consideration of Defence from wider national security capabilities, believing this to provide the MoD with the opportunity to fully assess, pending the next Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the needs of the Armed Forces specifically given fundamental geo-political changes and the rise of new threats since the 2015 SDSR.

The DPF believes this should include the domestic security of establishments, personnel, materials and assets as potential targets for both terrorist and state-based threats; also recognising that such security of MoD establishments domestically has historically not formed a significant part of the SDSR process.

According to the 2016-17 Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence Police Committee, the MoD Police had a budget of £129.5m for the 2016-17 financial year[2] – equating to less than 0.01 percent of the total Ministry of Defence budget of £35.3bn in the same financial year[3]. This is despite the MoD Police acting as a vital component for high value assets such as the new aircraft carriers and CASD, which have been publicly reported to cost circa £6 billion.

The DPF believes that separating defence from wider national security capabilities provides the opportunity for detailed consideration and action to meet the needs of the Armed Forces. We would contend that examination of defence must include the domestic security of critical assets to maximise the capability of the Armed Forces in theatre. This should include the funding and budget allocation for policing and security, recognising the extreme disruption an attack on critical assets, materials or establishments such as munitions sites would have on the Armed Forces’ capability.

The DPF would additionally note that recent increases in counter terrorism funding have not resulting in additional financial resources being made available to the MoD Police. While the DPF, as noted above, supports the separation of the national security and defence capability reviews, it would caution that this separation must not have any impact on interoperability, budgets and funding of security resources.

• Should the MoD be seeking further increases in defence spending?

The Defence Police Federation welcomes comments from the Secretary of State for Defence and Ministers of State at the MoD that the NATO target of spending two percent of GDP on defence should be a floor for UK defence spending.

We would advocate for further increases in defence spending, including additional spend/funding for the Policing and security of MoD establishments in the UK.

As noted above, the MoD Police budget equated to less than 0.01 percent of the total department budget for 2016-17, based on the 2016-17 MoD Police Committee Annual Report and the MoD’s accounts for the same financial year. While the MoD Police is one of a number of security options available to the Department, it is the only one capable of both providing armed capacity and policing powers operating outside the perimeter of MoD establishments – reducing the potential for attack.

We would additionally note that the 2016-17 MoD Police Committee Annual Report cited issues of capacity within the MoD Police workforce, noting the need to engage with customers (individual MoD establishments) to temporarily adjust targets for Policing and security. The Committee noted there to be a “significant challenge to customers in managing this risk at some establishments.[4]”

These challenges are a consequence of continued reductions to the MoD Police budget over the past decade, most recently requiring a reset (i.e. lowering) of the Force’s complement – resulting in a reduction of circa 200 firearms posts (according to the MoD Police Committee Annual Report) between the size of the Force’s workforce and established customer requirements for security.

The DPF fully supports arguments for increases in defence spending to reflect current needs of the MoD. However, we believe it essential that, as part of any funding settlement agreement agreed with HM Treasury, additional funding is allocated to the security of departmental establishments and assets – including funding for the MoD Police. We contend this will better protect assets and materiel domestically, maximising the capabilities of the Armed Forces.

• Which capabilities should the Modernising Defence Programme be seeking to retain and augment? Which should it be seeking to restructure or dispose of?

As noted above, the DPF believes it essential that security of MoD establishments and assets within the UK is fully considered as part of the Modernising Defence Programme to safeguard investment in critical assets and minimise the risk of an attack.

Noting the MoD Police Committee’s comments about the challenges in managing policing and security risk at some establishments, we would advocate for, at minimum, the retention of existing funding and personnel for establishment security (specifically the MoD Police), but believe there is a strong case to augment existing resources through the allocation of additional funding.

The DPF would contend that less than 0.01 percent of the MoD Budget is insufficient to ensure the security of assets in critical infrastructure that have both strategic importance and represent significant financial expenditure. We believe the Modernising Defence Programme provides the opportunity to address issues in maintaining current security levels and better supporting MoD Police officers facing growing demands on their capacity and resources.

• How can the MoD reform itself to improve its business, commercial and procurement practices? How can it set realistic efficiency targets?

The Defence Police Federation does not set out proposals for improvements in the MoD’s procurement practices. However, as outlined above, we would note the importance of ensuring that high-value assets that have been procured at significant expense are fully and robustly protected. We would note that the MoD Police has significantly reduced its criminal investigative capacities over the past decade, and that this has limited opportunities to ensure financial recovery and fraud avoidance with the procurement process. While the MoD Police remains a world-leader in issues such as contract fraud investigations, the limits of its resources have reduced opportunities to contribute to effective MoD procurement practices.

We would additionally note the importance, within the MoD’s business practices, of aligning risk and security considerations with financial allocations and budget planning. There is currently a disconnect between these functions within the MoD, as budget allocations are not made by officials determining the risk/level of threat to domestic establishments. The DPF contends this process creates an effective silo mentality, in which the requirement for financial efficiencies is divorced from strategic considerations and the risk to establishments and assets.

A more joined-up approach, in which the threat to individual MoD sites and assets is the foremost consideration – with funding allocated to meet a defined risk appetite and threat level – would best ensure the protection of domestic establishments, critical assets and infrastructure.

• Who should the MoD be consulting externally?

The Defence Police Federation does not make any recommendations as to organisations with which the MoD should be consulting externally.

• What lessons can be learned from past defence reviews to inform and improve the outcome of the Modernising Defence Programme?

The Defence Police Federation would not seek to apply past reviews and their lessons to the MDP; but would reiterate comments above about the importance of maximising and effectively resourcing policing and security to protect assets and maximise capability. We would additionally reiterate that funding and resourcing for policing and security must be based, first and foremost, on the risk to individual assets and establishments, not on the financial envelope allocated to meet this requirement.

13 April 2018