(MDP0011)

Written evidence submitted by Air Vice-Marshal Andrew L Roberts (Retd)

Executive Summary

The planned force of only nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft would be insufficient to guarantee concurrent continuous cover for both the UK deterrent and other vital tasks, including CVA protection, in tension and hostilities.

To remedy this situation, seven additional P-8s should be acquired, bringing the total fleet to 16 aircraft, noting that any additional aircraft would need to be ordered before Q2, 2019.

Flying booms should be fitted to the RAF’s A330 Voyager tankers.

Consideration should be given to establishing aircrew above the planned 2:1 crew-to-aircraft ratio, if necessary by making use of Reserve/Auxiliary aircrew.

Were the P-8 force's responsibilities to be extended to include responsibility for overland surveillance, additional P-8s should be acquired as necessary.

Introduction

1. In calling for evidence in support of its Modernising Defence Programme inquiry, the Committee asks, inter alia, which capabilities the MDP should be seeking to retain and augment.  This submission concerns the number of aircraft planned for the re-established Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) force.

2. SDSR 15 proposed that nine P-8 Poseidon MPA be acquired.  At the time, the P-8 was the only MPA on the market capable of meeting the UK’s needs in a reasonable timescale.  Given the urgency of filling this acknowledged gap in the Defence Programme, the Government was undoubtedly justified in selecting that aircraft without going out to competition.  However, capable though the P-8 may be, the number of aircraft planned is undoubtedly inadequate to fulfil even the highest priority tasks likely to be assigned to the force in tension and hostilities.

Historical Background

3. A total of 46 Nimrod MR1s were built for the RAF but, by 1985, the MPA force had been reduced to 33 Nimrod MR2s.  For various reasons (mainly financial), the force was further reduced by stages so that, by 1999, it stood at only 21 aircraft.  Had the Nimrod MRA4 programme not been delayed, it would have remained at that level.  However, delays to the MRA4 resulted in the MR2 having to be retained beyond its normal fatigue life so that, by 2010 when the Nimrod was grounded for in-year defence budgetary reasons, only 16 aircraft were available to the front line.

4. Meanwhile, in 1996, a contract had been let to convert 21 MR2 airframes to become the Nimrod 2000 (later renamed Nimrod MRA4).  However, following a series of defence budget savings measures, the size of the planned force was progressively reduced; immediately prior to cancellation in SDSR 10, it had been reduced to only nine aircraft. 

5. Following withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 from service and the cancellation of the MRA4, the UK was left without any MPA capability.  The decision in SDSR 15 to reinstate the MPA role by acquiring nine P-8 aircraft will be reflected in these aircraft being delivered to the RAF between 2019 and 2021.

Relative Performance

6. The Nimrod MR2 had an operational flight time of approximately 8½ hours in temperate climates, allowing it to remain on patrol for about 3½ hours at 1,000 nm from its operating base.  It was capable of being refuelled in the air.

7. Trials of the Nimrod MRA 4 had confirmed that it could fly for over 14 hours unrefuelled.  With its air-to-air refuelling system, flight time could have been extended to 27 hours (being limited by engine lubrication), resulting in a significant improvement in long range capability over the MR2.

8. In terms of sensors and weapons, the overall capability of the P-8, as an MPA, is not dissimilar to that of the Nimrod MRA4, both representing a very considerable increase in ASW capability over the Nimrod MR2.  However, the maximum flight time of the P-8 is only about 10 hours, allowing it to remain on station for slightly less than five hours at 1,000 nm from base. Although the P-8 is fitted with an air-to-air refuelling system, this is incompatible with the probe-and-drogue system used in the UK’s A330 Voyager tankers.

MPA Tasks

9. The ten primary tasks for which MPA are likely to be required in peacetime, tension and hostilities are:

1. Protection of the UK’s national strategic deterrent.

2. Protection of naval forces - in particular, the new aircraft carriers.

3. Protection against threats to commercial and other shipping, including counter-piracy.

4. Surveillance of, and action against, threats to trans-continental under-sea communications cables.

5. Protection of the UK EEZ (including oil rigs and shore facilities) against potential threats, assistance in counter-terrorism operations and, possibly, fishery protection post BREXIT.

6. Protection of overseas territories, including the Falklands.

7. Operations in such areas as the Caribbean in support of counter drug-running operations.

8. Support to Special Forces.

9. Gathering electronic, acoustic and photographic intelligence.

10. Fulfilling the UK’s international obligations for Search and Rescue in aid of shipping and aircraft in distress out to longitude 30 degrees west, in accordance with the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979.

The two highest priority tasks in tension and hostilities are likely to be a. and b. above.

10. It will be necessary to be able to maintain at least one MPA patrol continuously airborne in tension and hostilities for protection of the strategic deterrent.

11. SDSR 10 reduced the number of frigates to only 13.  Although the current Type-23 frigates will eventually be replaced by fully anti-submarine capable Type-26 Global Combat Ships, only eight are now planned for the Fleet, the balance being made up of Type 31 frigates which will have only a limited anti-submarine capability.  Even allowing for embarked helicopters, without MPA the geographical coverage of anti-submarine defence likely to be available to a UK aircraft carrier (CVA) group will be less than adequate.  In the absence of sufficient numbers of surface and sub-surface escorts, the Committee will appreciate that this makes the need for full MPA support that much more vital.  To provide adequate defence in the deep field against submarines equipped with long-range cruise missiles, continuous cover by at least two MPA per CVA group will be required.

12. However, additional important tasks, such as general surface and sub-surface surveillance, protection of the supply train for major naval deployments and operations, and other tasks specified in paragraph 9 above, are also likely to be required in both tension and hostilities.  These tasks will fully occupy resources equivalent to those required to support at least one additional MPA patrol.

13. Thus, when the need to protect the UK’s strategic deterrent is included, the irreducible number of patrols by UK MPA needing to be maintained concurrently in tension and hostilities, even if only one CVA is deployed at a time, would be four.

MPA Force Capability

14. The number of continuous patrols an MPA force is able to maintain concurrently depends on the distance from its operating bases[1] at which operations are taking place.  Table 1 below shows the operational coverage which was possible with the original Nimrod MR2 force of 21 aircraft and compares this with that possible with nine P-8 Poseidon MPA.  The table also shows what established fleets of 12 or 15 P-8s could achieve.

Table 1 – Comparison of the Sustained Patrol Capability Possible with Varying Numbers of Nimrod MR2 and P-8 Poseidon Aircraft in the Front Line

Notes:

1. The figures in this table are taken from the detailed, computer-based, study, The Sustained Patrol Potential of a Royal Air Force Fleet of Nine P8A Poseidon for Maritime Patrol, recently undertaken by Group Captain Derek Empson, an officer with many years of experience in planning and controlling MPA operations.

2. The Nimrod MR2 figures assume only 70% aircraft availability (as was experienced in the latter days of that aircraft).  Those for the more modern P-8 aircraft assume 85% availability. 

3. The minimum number of hours on patrol for effective ASW cover is about three hours.  Asterisks are shown against the number of patrols possible at ranges where less than 3 hours on patrol would be achieved.

4. The figures in square brackets for established fleets of 9, 12 and 15 P-8s show the number of concurrent patrols possible with only the planned two crews per aircraft instead of optimal crew establishments, effectively halving the RAF P-8’s fleet potential productivity in times of tension and hostilities. 

5. For the purposes of this assessment, the Sustained Monthly Flying Rate assumed for periods of political tension and during hostilities for MPA crews is assumed to be 130 flight hours per mean calendar month. This is 30% higher than the generally accepted maximum peacetime rate of 100 flying hours.

15. Clearly, not all patrols would necessarily be taking place at the same distance from base.  However, even assuming the force were to be manned to the optimum level[2] with crews flying at the assumed wartime rate, it can be seen from this illustrative table that, to achieve four continuous patrols at anything greater than 600 nm from base, an additional three P-8s would need to be acquired.  To enable 4 patrols to be sustained out to 1,200 nm from base to provide, say, sustained ASW cover for distant deterrent and naval operations, 15 aircraft would need to be established.

16. On the other hand, as illustrated by the figures in square brackets in Table 1, were the crew-to-aircraft ratio to be held at 2:1 without the maximum tension/wartime flying rate being increased above the assumed 130 hours per month, 15 aircraft would need to be available to maintain 4 patrols continuously; even then, such coverage could not be maintained beyond about 400 nm from base. 

In-Use Reserves

17. A feature of MPA operations is that, in monitoring potential enemy deployments and other activity as tension develops, flying and patrol coverage needs to be increased to wartime rates well in advance of hostilities actually breaking out.  This will be especially true of sea areas to the north of and around the UK, where it will be necessary to monitor the inevitable Russian submarine activity heading towards or already in our home waters or in the South-Western and Western Approaches. Once a hostile submarine reaches its patrol area and is able to reduce speed, and therefore noise levels, it becomes more difficult to detect and track.

17. Continuity of patrol cover is of crucial importance in ASW.  A break of only an hour can easily result in loss of contact with a target.  To cater for those occasions when aircraft need to be removed temporarily from the front line for scheduled maintenance, or for some particularly complex or difficult modification or technical problem to be dealt with, it is usually the practice to maintain availability by making use of ‘in-use reserves’ to augment the established front line, although even this does not provide a satisfactory cushion for attrition through accidents or enemy action.  One in-use reserve should be provided, even for a front line establishment of only nine-aircraft.

Command and Control

18. If the most effective and economical use is to be made of scarce and expensive platforms such as MPA operating over vast areas of ocean, it is vital that the activities of all assets be closely coordinated.  With the increase in threats at sea, especially that of the Russian submarine fleet, it is to be hoped that an ‘Atlantic Command’ structure will be re-established within NATO before too long. MODUK should consider pressing for this.

19. In the meantime, ASW operations tend to be highly classified, to the extent that it will often be necessary for UK MPA operations to be controlled under strictly US-UK auspices from JHQ Northwood.  In this context, it will be important for RAF officers with sufficient MPA experience and rank to be represented in the operational tasking and control structure within JHQ.

Overland Surveillance

20. In order to cover both maritime and overland surveillance requirements once the Sentinel is withdrawn from service[3], it might be judged cost-effective in the long-term to use the P-8 as a multi-mission aircraft (MMA), rather than purely as an MPA.  Given a large enough fleet, this could increase operational flexibility in both roles. 

21. It may, of course, be possible to cater for overland surveillance by using platforms other than manned aircraft.  However, were the option of using the P-8 as an MMA to be pursued, it will be important that P-8s additional to those necessary for the MPA role be acquired if assumption of the overland role is not to prejudice maritime operations – taking account of any effect structural modifications necessary for an MMA capability may have on aircraft range and endurance.

AAR Support

22. Should maritime operations take place in very distant waters (say, in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean or South China Sea), air-to-air refuelling (AAR) is likely to be required to extend MPA range and endurance – as was the case with the Falklands war, for which an AAR capability was added to the Nimrod.

23. The UK’s P-8s will be delivered with the standard AAR system fitted, as used by the United States Navy’s P-8s but capable of receiving fuel only from tankers fitted with ‘flying booms’.  Converting the P-8 to a probe-and-drogue system, as is used by both RAF and USN fast-jets, would involve significant expense and, because of much lower fuel transfer rates, AAR using this system could be a significant tactical disadvantage during anti-submarine operations.

24. Unlike the French, Spanish and Australian A-330 tankers, the UK’s A-330 Voyager tankers are fitted only with drogues and will thus not be capable of refuelling our P-8s.  Like the P-8, both the RAF’s C-17 and Rivet Joint aircraft already have receptacles for AAR booms and, were the UK to purchase F35A’s once our CVA requirements have been met with the F35B (involving 48 out of a planned 138 buy), so would that aircraft. 

25. AAR can be a useful force-multiplier for operations at long range.  As was shown in the late 1980s and early 90s, the AAR capability added to the Nimrod for the Falklands war also proved to be extraordinarily useful in peacetime (eg, for intelligence-collecting in the Barents Sea) and was used extensively in Afghanistan.  Conversion of the UK’s P-8s to a probe-and drogue system would probably not be worth the considerable expense and disruption resulting from an alteration to the contract with Boeing, especially as this would involve further dollar expenditure. However, adding a flying boom (such as the automatic booms so successfully fitted to the Australian tankers) to the UK’s Voyagers might be a very different matter.

Boeing P-8 Production

26. As can be seen above, at least six additional P-8 aircraft plus an in-use reserve would be required to fulfil the minimum maritime coverage likely to be required of the UK’s MPA force in tension and hostilities.  Were overland surveillance to be added to the P-8 force’s responsibilities, further aircraft would be required.  However, it should be borne in mind that Boeing’s P-8 production line will close at the end of 2022 (for conversion to production of the latest version of the civil Boeing 737) so that orders for any additional P-8s would need to be placed by the end of Q2, 2019.

Conclusions

27. The planned force of only nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft would be insufficient to guarantee concurrent continuous cover for both the UK deterrent and other vital tasks, including CVA protection, in tension and hostilities.

28. To remedy this situation, seven additional P-8s should be acquired, bringing the total fleet to 16 aircraft, noting that any additional aircraft would need to be ordered before Q2, 2019.

29. Flying booms should be fitted to the RAF’s A330 Voyager tankers,

30. Consideration should be given to establishing aircrew above the planned 2:1 crew-to-aircraft ratio, if necessary by making use of Reserve/Auxiliary aircrew.

31. Were the P-8 force's responsibilities to be extended to include responsibility for overland surveillance, additional P-8s should be acquired as necessary.

13 April 2018

Appendix A

AIR VICE-MARSHAL ANDREW LYLE ROBERTS CB CBE AFC FRAES RAF(Rtd)

Andrew Roberts entered the Royal Air Force through the RAF College, Cranwell, as a flight cadet in 1956.

Although, as a pilot, he has flown over 30 different types of aircraft, his operational experience has been largely in the maritime field, in which most of his flying has been on the Shackleton and Nimrod, although he has also flown the Buccaneer and the Sea King/Wessex helicopters.  Also relevant to this submission is the fact that over the years he has flown in, and exercised operational coordination of, maritime patrol aircraft of other NATO and Commonwealth nations.

His staff and command appointments in the maritime field included:

• responsibility for all MPA operations and development of NATO AWACS concepts of operation at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), a post which included responsibility for overseeing all Maritime Surveillance Coordination Centres throughout the NATO area [1975-77];
• command of RAF Kinloss (Nimrod MR1 and 2) [1977-79]; and
• Chief of Staff at HQ No 18 [maritime] Group, at the same time acting as Chief of Staff (Air) to CINCHAN/CINCEASTLANT at the Northwood Headquarters [1987-89].

Appointments within the Ministry of Defence include:

• Personal Air Secretary to USofS (RAF), serving both Labour and Conservative ministers [1970-71];
• Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes [1984-87], responsible for the development and 'Long-Term Costing' of the RAF programme and for its submission to form part of the overall Defence Programme;
• Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff Concepts [1989-91], responsible for developing concepts on which the allocation of funding between the three Services and the centrally-funded equipment programmes over the following 25 years could be based,
• Leader of the RAF Manpower Strategic Studies Team [1992-94], responsible for developing new RAF manpower structures and supporting policies for the following 25 years.

He retired from the Royal Air Force in April 1994, to join the Lord Chancellor's Panel of Independent Inspectors.