Written evidence submitted by Commander Nigel MacCartan-Ward

MODERNISING DEFENCE PROGRAMME (MDP) 

This Submission is supported by:

Rear-Admiral ESJ Larken RN DSO

              Captain Colin Hamilton RN

              Commander Graham J Edmonds RN

G H Bennett (Associate Professor, Plymouth University)

SUBJECT:  A Blueprint for Justification and Recovery

Introduction

1. The UK has now reached a troubling watershed between

1. Being able to project cost-effective global political and military power in defence of our Lifeblood and in support of National Policy,
2. Relying on other nations and on some inappropriate UK-based weapon systems to protect those interests.

2. This Submission suggests that:

1. The current constitution of our Armed Forces and the ‘organisation, efficiency management and business and commercial practices in the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’ is flawed and fails to support 1.a., above.
2. Each Armed Service should formally justify its independent existence, constitution and associated weapon systems against HMG’s Military Defence Priorities.
3. Budgetary assignments between each Armed Service should be flexible, on a firm Joint Service basis.

Assumptions

3. The UK’s principal vulnerability to military attack/aggression is globally based and, in large measure, lies on or under the high seas against our Trade Routes, Energy Supply Routes, Undersea Communications Cables and our Overseas Territories, including our Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) – our ‘Lifeblood’.

4. “Deployed boots on the ground” are essential to success in any land-based campaign. “Deployed Navy warships on and under the sea” are essential for deterring those that might harm our Prime National Interest, our Lifeblood.  Such physical presence requires the global capability of supporting air power which cannot be reliably or effectively provided 24/7 by land-based air power especially beyond the NATO geographic area.

5. It is unlikely that Russia (or another major power) would have an interest in provoking a major war in Europe or conduct pre-emptive strikes on the UK.  Any intent for ballistic missile attack on the UK Base by a Rogue Nation is most unlikely actually to occur.  Ultimate shield in both cases is ensured by the nuclear deterrent.

6. There is no foreseeable risk of a military invasion of Britain’s shores.  Should a risk develop in the future, the Naval Service will be required to provide the first line of defence and deterrence – as in World War II.

7. So-called ‘Grey Warfare’, undertaken by for instance cyber resources or public disinformation, will continue to be a vulnerability.

8. It is a Government obligation to fund properly the capabilities referred to at 1.a., above.

What should the MDP mean for the size and shape of the Armed Forces? Which capabilities should the MDP be seeking to retain and augment? Which should it be seeking to restructure or dispose of?

9. With our current limited capability to project effective military power and deterrence beyond the NATO area, MDP should herald a radical and comprehensive Justification Process leading to a new funding balance between the Armed Forces that reflects our Nation’s Prime Military Defence Interest.  In pursuit of this, National Threat Reduction Exercises should be adopted. A basic premise of these exercises must be to understand our limitations as a small maritime island nation with middle-rank developed economy.

10. As part of the NATO Alliance the UK should therefore contribute to the deterrent effect of the Alliance with practical and effective capabilities that are within our means and that also serve our particular global national interests as an island nation. 

11. UK’s military contribution to NATO should be examined critically and revised/reshaped:

1. Leaving the Land-Based Air and Ground Defence of the continental European land-mass mainly to its constituent Nations;
2. Concentrating UK’s military contribution on a robust maritime capability centred on a properly funded and equipped Naval Service, including a Royal Marine led, rapid-reaction Amphibious Brigade Group.

Land-Based Forces - Ground

12. General Sir Nick Carter’s comment in the press that the UK does not have the military wherewithal to challenge the Russian threat is a truism but fails to put into context our Island Nation status.  Heavy tanks and artillery are not needed for the direct defence of the UK Base – see assumption at paragraph 6 above. The retention and quantity of such weapon systems for this purpose needs to be validated. However, UK needs to be able to deploy at decent notice one properly provisioned Division to support NATO within the NATO geographic area, but not beyond.  It should not be stationed permanently abroad (i.e. no re-creation of BAOR). 

13. Further, there is a case for our European NATO partners maintaining an effective establishment of appropriate heavy weapon systems and robust Army infrastructures (including personnel) to deter incremental aggression over their borders. 

Conclusion.

14. The question to be addressed by our Government must be:

‘Can or should Britain continue to invest in and ‘protect the UK Base’ with heavy armour and maintain a large Army when the defence of our principal global national interest, which demands a core maritime capability, is not receiving adequate funding?’

Land-Based Forces – Air

15. The constitution of UK’s military air assets is seriously out of balance in the context of paragraph 1.a., above.  Global Land Force and Naval operations need to have 24/7 Combat Air Support for effective deterrence, offence and defence and this has not been available beyond the immediate NATO area without extreme cost during and as a direct result of the ‘gapping’ of our Carrier Strike capability.

16. A comprehensive Threat Reduction Exercise would validate this observation, leading to a major and essential reallocation of resources particularly with regard to:

1. The size of our land-based Combat Aircraft Fleet, and,
2. The non-cost-effectiveness of independent Expeditionary Air Wing Operations.

Combat Aircraft Defence of the UK Base

17. The Typhoon with an unrefuelled combat radius of action of just 750 nm is unable to defend the UK Base (its raison d’être) against the modern Russian air threat. Each Bear H or Blackjack bomber can launch up to 16 supersonic, conventionally or nuclear armed ground attack cruise missiles[1] at a range of 1300 nm from their targets.  UK does not have nearly enough Air Refuelling resources to extend the combat range of the Typhoon on a 24/7 on-task basis to deter/oppose this threat, so far as it is significant.  Whether judged significant or not, it does call for a realistic deterrent capability.

18. The UK Base does not boast any effective hard kill air defences save for the ship-borne Sea Viper Missile - and there are insufficient T45 Guided Missile Destroyers to support both Fleet and UK Base Ballistic and Cruise Missile defence.

19. Sufficient capability to deter Russia from hazarding or being seen to hazard the UK Base is essential.  This is public and political reality.  But our Red line is that there should be no re-creation of RAF Germany (e.g. RAF Balkans).  Continental Allies must provide such resources/capability.

20. The main currently-available defence against the realisation of an unlikely Russian air offensive against the UK Base would be deployment of the US Navy Strike Carrier Striking Fleet, supported when operational by UK Aircraft Carriers and Guided Missile Warships.

21. The operational effectiveness/cost-effectiveness of the 160-strong Typhoon Fleet is questionable. It should be radically reduced in size.  This would represent a logical and handsome saving in Defence funds without hazarding national security.

Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW) Operations

22. EAW Operations have been re-introduced following the gapping in UK Carrier Strike Capability which has been vital to the success of most Expeditionary Task Force Operations since World War II.

23. This represents a costly departure from historical precedent in terms of funding as well as true global reach.  This cost is not commensurate with the relatively modest achievements by land-based air in or immediately adjacent to the NATO area against undefended targets without any air threat: as in the Libya conflict and now the Iraq/Syria conflict against Daesh/ISIS.

24. 903 EAW deployment to Cyprus for operations in Iraq/Syria has resulted in many pickups, trucks and small buildings being destroyed but at considerable cost in terms of Defence (and Defence Contingency?) Funds. 

25. Various defence analysts have estimated the true Air cost of the Libyan venture as approximately £1.5 billion.  The three-year Iraq/Syria air intervention (about 1600 attack missions) has already cost the taxpayer up to £4 billion – more than the cost of the carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth – whilst contributing less than 5% of the Coalition air effort.

26. Comments in the press by a Typhoon Squadron Commander as well as statistics from a well-known defence commentator, Howard Wheeldon, after his visit to Akrotiri, Cyprus indicate that each 8-hour 903 EAW attack mission cost approximately £2,200,000.

27. If two targets were attacked on each Attack Mission delivering 1 Paveway & 1 Brimstone, the total cost of 800 missions would be £1.76 billion.

28. If 400 additional Attack Missions were flown without weapon release, this would cost £800,000,000: giving a total for 1200 missions of £2.56 billion.

29. This leaves many further missions to be costed, including a large number of Reaper sorties.

30. Further costs have been accrued with the major logistic support train to and from Britain involving Voyager, C-130J Hercules, C-17 and A400M Atlas aircraft. 

31. Personnel support costs, e.g. at RAF Brize Norton and Akrotiri (8,900*) over the three-year period at approximately £35,000 p.a. amount to a further £ 934,500,000 – totalling £3.5 billion.  (*Almost 2,500 personnel greater than that of the invaluable and now threatened Corps of the Royal Marines.)

Conclusion

32. EAWs cannot be considered a cost-effective way of conducting Military Operations against low-value undefended targets.  A return to Maritime-Based Expeditionary Task Force Operations with true global reach is considered essential.

Maritime Forces

Decline of the Naval Service

33. Our Naval Service has been reduced, and drastically so, over the past two decades following successive Defence Reviews.  The root causes of this steady decline in global Maritime capability include:

1. Lack of political, Civil Service and academic recognition of this paper’s Assumptions (3-8 above);
2. Lack of control of Single Service rivalry and in-fighting within MoD – it is notable that the single service with the greater senior-officer availability are those that seem most influential in Academia.  Trenchard’s first view of the proposal to form an independent RAF is pertinent.[2]
3. The excessive influence within Cabinet, MoD, NSC and Parliamentary Academic Adviser teams of some academic cadres steered by unbalanced ‘expert’ briefing;
4. A lack of ‘reliable and robust justification’ when addressing the Operational Requirements for and Procurement of major weapon systems;
5. Deficient MoD contracting with and contract control of UK Defence Contractors, for instance without effective penalty clauses within Contracts to protect the end Customer;
6. The anachronistic and counter-productive arbitrary three-way split in Military Defence Funding.

34. These ‘root causes’ led to the proposal concerning the withdrawal of HMSs Albion and Bulwark from Service and further cuts to Royal Marine personnel.  There was a lack of military justification behind this proposal and it was opportune that the Defence Committee conducted a formal Inquiry into the matter.  The published Report HC 622[3] on the future of the Royal Marines and our Amphibious Warships challenged the proposal strongly and is a fine example of a sensible, if necessarily sectoral, Threat Reduction Exercise – entailing the detailed ‘Justification or Not’ of such proposals.

Increasing Global Challenges

35. Global military threats to our national Lifeblood continue to proliferate.

36. These include:

1. Modern Diesel Submarines which are very difficult to detect and are being procured by Major Powers, Rogue Nations and some Third World countries. The availability of submarines with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems[4] represents a ‘game-changer’ for ASW and ASuW resources, allowing these conventional boats to remain silently submerged for up to 2 or 3 weeks – as opposed to 2 or 3 days – and pose a significant threat to our Lifeblood. MPA aircraft, when available, have little if any capability against this threat.
2. Mobile Land-Based and Sea-based Anti-Ship Missile Systems.
3. The emergence of Asymmetric Warfare including the possibility of Swarm Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and other trade-route chokepoints.

Paras b. and c. above indicate a very strong need for a powerful Defence Suppression capability (as with the F-18 Growler aircraft).

37. These threats cannot be countered effectively by Land-Based Air or Ground Forces.

38. Nor can the threat to our Undersea Communication Cables be so countered. In its Report to the Committee dated Dec 1, 2017, the Policy Exchange Think Tank considered that ‘Undersea Cables were Indispensable, insecure’ and that ‘Britain, as an island nation, was particularly vulnerable.’[5]

Conclusion

39. A major increase in Naval Service equipment and capability is essential - and could, without harm to our National Security and Military Defence, be compensated for by a calibrated reduction in those elements of the Army and Royal Air Force that are not relevant to the prime threats to our Lifeblood.

Should the MoD be seeking further increases in defence spending? 

40. If the Government introduces a program of Armed Forces Justification through the medium of Threat Reduction, it is likely that ‘the Black Hole’ in Defence Funding can be reduced, if not eliminated.  This will in turn allow a return to responsible funding that may need marginal increases.

41. There needs to be equally robust and critical justification of the charges being made by the Defence Industry for new weapon systems and for the maintenance of current weapon systems/platforms.  Immediate examples include:

1. The upkeep of the obsolete Tornado GR4 – more than £7 billion since Harrier withdrawal (NAO figures);
2. The continuing cost of the Typhoon Program (no longer effective in its primary role against the Russian threat) – now estimated to be more than £80 billion;
3. The size of the F-35 Program;
4. The equally extraordinary planned cost of each Type 26 Guided Missile Frigate:

Conclusions.

42. Validation of all Armed Services’ weapon procurement and maintenance plans is necessary.

43. Current MoD Contractual Procedures appear to have failed to protect the interest of the Armed Forces as end-customers.

How can the MoD reform itself to improve its business, commercial and procurement practices? How can it set realistic efficiency targets?

44. A principal root cause of misguided Defence Procurement and excessive Equipment Costs lies within the MoD itself.  While single-service interests and mutual barriers continue to rule without impartial oversight and associated Justification of Priorities, the current defence spending malaise is certain to continue.  MoD cannot efficiently and fairly ‘reform itself’ – but it must be reformed.

What lessons can be learned from past defence reviews to inform and improve the outcome of the MDP? Who should the MoD be consulting externally?

45. Lack of a mandatory Threat Reduction process has led to misguided decisions which have in turn led to the irresponsible demise in UK’s ability to project military power and deterrence on a global basis. The arbitrary three-way split of Defence Funding between the Services continues to be illogical, counter-productive and anachronistic.

46. A principal factor for ensuring UK’s continuing political and military influence in the world, thereby ensuring the sustainment of our island nation Lifeblood, must be a marked diminution in the overwhelming influence of Land-Based Air Academia in Whitehall whose advices have led to the regrettable gap in Carrier Strike and the associated near emasculation of effective Naval Service world-reach.

47. It should be noted and understood that:

1. More than 80% of all effective Air Power Projections/Interventions since World War II have been conducted by the aircraft of British and United States Carrier Battle Groups;
2. Other Nations recognise this and reflect it by utilising the expert advices of Naval Warfare trained Academics (75%) and not Land-Based Air Academics (less than 25%);
3. Retired Officers who are proven experts in their own fields (e.g. Naval Air Warfare a.o.t. Land-Based Air Warfare) and are not gagged by successive Governments are far more able to provide accurate Threat Reduction advice – as demonstrated by the recent Amphibious Warfare/Royal Marine Inquiry.

What are the implications of examining Defence separately from the wider consideration of national security capabilities?

48. Such separation would allow the realistic recognition of the Military measures necessary for the global defence of our Lifeblood – without which our economic and commercial prosperity cannot be guaranteed.

01 April 2018

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