GIT0005 - Evidence on Global Islamist Terrorism

(GIT0005)

Written evidence submitted by Robert Clark

Is Islamist terrorism the Existential Threat facing the UK?

Report Summary

Islamic terrorism remains a high-level threat to the UK. As of March 2018 the UK threat level from international terrorism remains at SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely [1].

As of March 2018, the threat level from Northern Ireland terrorism was reduced to MODERATE, meaning that an attack is ‘possible, but not likely’[2]. This suggests that the main terrorist threat to the UK comes from international terrorism.

The main threat from international terrorism is from Islamic terrorism, and originates from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its various global affiliates, including Islamic State in Khorasan and Islamic State in Libya. In 2017 there were five terrorist attacks in London, four of which were planned and carried out by Islamic extremists with links to international terrorist organisations.

This is a consequence of the shift in nature in Islamic terrorism witnessed since 2011. Top-down, hierarchical Islamic terrorist organisations including al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabab still remain a high threat to the UK and to UK interests overseas.

The majority of planned Islamic terrorist attacks in this country have been planned by British residents. There are several thousand individuals in the UK who support violent extremism or who are engaged in Islamist extremist activity [3].

A proportion of these individuals have travelled abroad to actively engage in Islamic terrorism and have subsequently returned to the UK. These individuals are often of special concern to UK intelligence agencies, and warrant close supervision and surveillance and, where possible, prosecution under UK law for terrorism offences.

This raises two concerns; firstly, what strategies are the UK intelligence agencies and police forces implementing to counter this threat from UK nationals, and from individuals living within the UK engaging with Islamic terrorism; and secondly, what is the UK response to dealing with these individuals and other foreign nationals who participate in Islamic terrorism overseas, who seek harm to the UK’s national interests?

Report Recommendations

To safeguard counter-terrorism spending with an Act of Parliament, similar to the International Development Act 2015. Despite an increase of 6.6% in the UK counter-terrorism policing budget in the year 2017/2018 from the previous year [4], there is still much uncertainty surrounding counter-terrorism budgets. This consistency will enable UK counter-terrorism police to be even more proactive in countering the threat from Islamic terrorism, rather than be merely reactive once an attack has been successful.

Raising UK defence spending from the NATO mandated 2% of GDP which it is currently meeting to 3% by the year 2022. This will enable the UK to maintain its current military training and advisory capabilities in the fight against Islamic terrorism overseas.

To review the current UK counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, to further safeguard males aged between 21 – 29 who have a higher propensity to engage in Islamic terrorism in the UK. In achieving this, the institutions of family and societal activities are crucial in achieving this.

Introduction

2017 saw the deadliest year in the UK for domestic terrorism offenses since 2005. There were five successful terrorist attacks, four of them Islamic. This resulted in 35 deaths.

There have a further nine foiled attacks since the Westminster attack in March 2017 [5].

Historically, this represents a large rise since the London 2005 attacks which caused 52 deaths and 784 injuries. This was the first successful Islamic terrorism incident in the UK which involved suicide bombing as a means of attack.

The London bombings in 2005 resulted in the Terrorism Act 2006, legislation which increased the power of the Home Office and policing in dealing with terrorist offences. Most notably it increased the period of detention without charge from 14 to 28 days, and made it a custodial offence to incite or glorify terrorism which may directly or indirectly lead to an individual committing a terrorist offence [6].

The UK government is a member of the 74-state international coalition in the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria. The Royal Air Force have been conducting an air campaign in Iraq supporting the Iraqi government since 2014, and in Syria supporting anti-ISIL allies since 2015. A small contingent of personnel have been involved in a limited training and advisory capacity to local allies.

As a direct result of the international coalition, ISIL has lost more than 98% of the territory it once occupied in both Iraq and in Syria, and 7.7 million people have been liberated from their rule [7].

This has resulted in a large group of individuals who have travelled to Iraq, Syria and elsewhere overseas to participate in Islamic terrorism, now on the run from civil authorities in these countries due to the recent military defeats of ISIL and their allies. These individuals are in the process of attempting to transition from civilian combatant, to either law abiding civilians, or criminals and terrorists.

These individuals, often referred to as ‘returning foreign fighters’ have often been trained in terrorist tactics, explosives, small arms and suicide bombing. With the additional further training and indoctrination of extremist Islamic ideology, this has resulted in terrorist attacks carried out in western Europe. In the Paris attacks of November 2015 at least 6 of the 11 attackers were known to have travelled to Syria to fight with ISIL [8].

Terrorist organisations are quick to adapt new technologies to their advantage. This is especially evident in social media and other online terrorist activities, most notably in the use of online propaganda for recruitment.

In assessing the threat posed to the UK from Islamic terrorism, and therefore how best to counter it, the precise nature of the threat itself must first be identified. This is often overlooked or worse still over-simplified. This report seeks to address that concern.

The nature of the threat

Historically the nature of the threat from terrorism to the UK was from Northern Ireland. Between 1970 and 1990 86% of terrorism related deaths in the UK were in Northern Ireland [9]. This decreased considerably with the result of the Belfast Agreement in 1998.

From 2001 – 2017 79% of terrorism related arrests in the UK were classified, according to the Association of Police Chief Officers’ (ACPO) Counter Terrorism Co-ordination Centre, (CTCC) as being international terrorism in nature [10].

The CTCC define international terrorism as; ‘activity linked to or motivated by a terrorist organisation based outside the UK’[11].

Data for the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre (NCTPOC) shows that since September 2013 [12];

 90% of convictions for terrorism have Islamic extremists.

 Of those convicted 91% were male.

 Of those convicted 40% were between the ages of 21 – 29 years old.

 Of those convicted 19% were under the age of 21 years old.

Therefore, based on accurate empirical government data, the nature of the threat is clear. Young male Islamic extremists have been shown to be of a far higher threat to engage in and subsequently be convicted of a terrorist related offence in the UK.

This data serves as a useful tool with which to closer examine current UK counter terrorism legislation.

Since 2013, of those convicted of a terrorism related offence in the UK 49% were under the age of 29 years old. By breaking that figure back into the age categories of under 21 years old and 21 – 29 years old, two possible lines of further enquiry emerge;

How is the UK government’s current counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, and more specifically, PREVENT, handling cases of deterring individuals under the age of 21 in further and higher education centres from engaging in terrorist offences?

How can CONTEST, as a framework for counter-terrorism, be applied more thoroughly to individuals between the ages of 21 – 29? Educational facilities have a legal obligation to actively engage in and participate with CONTEST, whereas many individuals aged between 21 – 29 years old are not subject to such monitoring for signs of radicalisation and potential to carry out terrorism offences. This is a crucial age category whereby the traditional institutions such as family and social practices must be engaged with further.

The UK domestic response

Online terrorist content remains one of the most severe risks to UK national security. In February 2015, ISIL published a 50-page “how-to guide” for aspiring jihadis and potential recruits, circulated online in English [13].

Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 states that an individual is committing an offence if; ‘collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism’ or ‘possesses a document or record containing information of that kind’[14].

The Home Secretary Amber Rudd announced plans in late 2017 to increase jail terms from ten years to fifteen for those who repeatedly download extremist content online, with plans to make repeated viewing of such content also illegal [15]. This will strengthen the Terrorism Act 2000 to take into account the higher frequency with which individuals are streaming, downloading and circulating extremist content for the purposes of Islamic terrorism, and is a positive development in this regard.

Social media platforms were heavily criticised in 2017 for enabling extremist content and terrorist material to be freely distributed with little repercussion.

In 2017 Germany voted into law financial fines for internet companies who do not remove terrorist or extremist content rapidly enough [16]. Whilst some argue that this is in violation of certain freedoms of speech, there is a positive correlation between downloads of terrorist material, and individuals who participate in Islamic terrorism [17].

Since 2011, and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war combined with the emergence of ISIL, large numbers of individuals have travelled from Europe and elsewhere to join and fight alongside proscribed terrorist organisations, predominantly in Iraq, Syria and more recently in Libya and the Maghreb.

Due to heavy battlefield losses in Iraq and more recently in Syria, individuals who have fought with Islamic terrorist organisations in the region have started to return to their countries of origin. This can be termed a process of transition, and is not a singular pattern of movement and behaviour, but rather a process of attempting to transition from group identity, combatant, to another. This results in one of two different behavioural types; either law-abiding citizen, and subsequently of little threat to the UK, or actively engaging in, or a return to, criminality or Islamic terrorism.

MI5 determined that these individuals’ return to the UK poses a security threat [18]. This threat was highlighted by then Prime Minister David Cameron in September 2014 [19], so this is not a recent development, but rather a threat which has publicly existed for three and a half years.

As of July 2017 it is estimated that approximately 850 UK-linked individuals have travelled to engage in the Syrian conflict alone [20]. Of that figure, roughly half are estimated to have returned to the UK. One of the biggest threats that they pose to UK security is the spread of extremist views and further radicalisation of individuals in the UK.

There are two primary issues for concern regarding individuals returning from fighting in this region. First, as they move through the process of transition, how are they detected as past combatants? Second, how are they then treated?
Turkey has been instrumental in providing a buffer between Syria and Iraq, and Europe. Often detecting returning fighters attempting to pass through border crossings and security checkpoints as refugees before they reach Europe, the European Commission paid Turkey €3 billion in 2016 to assist in border security [21]. This policy has proven to be a key development in European security in the light of returning fighters from Iraq and Syria.

As of May 2016, only 54 individuals out of 350 suspected to have returned to the UK by that point from Iraq and Syria, and to have fought with proscribed terrorist organisations, had been successfully charged and prosecuted [22].

Whilst engaging in unlawful activities with a proscribed terrorist organisation is illegal under UK law, many cases have proven difficult to prosecute in a court of law. Despite this, there is both current and new legislation brought in to specifically deal with this threat.

Section 40 of the 1981 British Nationality Act provides authorities with a limited scope for revoking passports from dual-citizens. Under certain conditions, this could leave an individual stateless if doing so was conducive to the public good [23].

Between April 2013 and November 2014 the Royal Prerogative was been used 29 times by then Home Secretary Theresa May to revoke passports from individuals attempting to enter the UK suspected of fighting with international Islamic terrorist organisations [24].

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 seeks to “disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and then return to the U.K.”[25].

The act allows for Temporary Passport Seizures, whereby passports may be seized for 14 days from dual nationals when terrorism related offences are suspected [26].

The act also includes Temporary Exclusion Orders, designed to allow authorities to cancel UK passports and place suspected terrorists immediately onto domestic and international no-fly lists [27].

It has been broadly agreed that these preventative measures adopted by the UK government have been successful in deterring many individuals from attempting to return to the UK. This agreement includes both former combatants themselves [28] and security experts, including the current head of MI5; stating in September 2017 that “those who were still in Syria and Iraq may not now attempt to come back because they knew they might be arrested”[29].

The UK military response

As part of the anti-ISIL coalition the UK has conducted air strikes in Iraq since 2014 and in Syria since 2015.

The RAF have conducted in excess of 1,600 airstrikes against ISIL targets, continuing that the pace this year with air strikes daily [30].

To date over 60,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces have been trained by the British Army in engineering, medical, counter-IED and basic infantry skills [31]. After the US, the UK military contribution is by far the largest.

The training of local allies is a crucial aim in ensuring that ISIL cannot retake territory it has lost. Denying ground leads to a denying of resources and funds, which is crucial in their eventual defeat.

A particular success of the UK contribution to defeating ISIL has been the creation of the Counter-Daesh Communications Cell in 2015. Designed to counter the false narrative ISIL promotes, by highlighting the group’s increased failures, this has led to a 75% drop in ISIL online propaganda from last year [32].

Combined with the domestic efforts made by the UK and other states in deterring individuals wishing to travel to Iraq and Syria, the reduction in ISIL online propaganda has contributed to a 90% reduction in foreign fighters to ISIL [33].

The UK government has not yet set a date for the withdrawal of the UK military commitment to the anti-ISIL campaign, which is the prudent course to choose. By setting a time limit on the mission, rather than the eventual desired end state, risks motivating ISIL to stay in the fight, as witnessed in Afghanistan with the Taliban. At a meeting with counterparts in the anti-ISIL coalition in Rome in February 2018, UK Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson pledged; ‘to continue to fight terrorists until their poisonous global network is totally destroyed’[34].

The British Army and the RAF have been involved in training the Nigerian Armed Forces since 2015 against the threat from Boko Haram. Around 350 personnel deploy in the Short-Term Training Teams (STTT) to train the Nigerian Air Force in airfield protection; and at the Nigerian School of Infantry [35]. The defeat of Boko Haram remains a cornerstone of UK government policy in west Africa, aiming to help bring stability to the region and deny the area to Islamic terrorism.

The British Army have also been involved in training soldiers from the Uganda People’s Defence Force since 2010 [36]. They are assisting the UPDF in their fight against al-Shabab, and in their deployment to Somalia as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)[37]. Denying al-Qaeda affiliated al-Shabab sanctuary in Somalia is a core objective of the UK in east Africa.

Whilst conducting these training and advisory missions to allies overseas in the fight against Islamic terrorism, the question remains whether the UK military has adequate funding to ensure this continued success.

A recent report by the Henry Jackson Society seeks to raise UK defence spending to 3% of GDP by year 2022, in manageable 0.2% annual increments [38]. This would enable the UK to maintain its current operational commitments whilst, crucially, ensuring UK global influence once it leaves the European Union in 2019.

Concluding remarks

Islamic terrorism is not the existential threat facing the UK. However, such is the pace of development of Islamic terrorism since 2011 that it has warranted the changes seen in legislation in order to deal with these threats.

The current UK legislation put in place is adequate to deal with the legality of returning individuals who may radicalise others in the UK. However, in order to ensure that the intelligence services have the resources that they require to undertake the casework necessary in order to secure convictions, then they must have a recognised budget which is protected through an Act of Parliament. It is of little consequence updating and developing UK legislation, if the resources are not matched to ensure that the robust legality put in place can secure convictions due to an already overburdened and under-resourced intelligence community.

7 March 2018