Written evidence from Sarah Ayres[1] (DEU 31)
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Devolution and Exiting the EU Inquiry
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 This invited written submission focusses specifically on the implications that arise from European Union (EU) exit for the governance of England. It concentrates on a specific set of issues outlined in the Committee’s call for evidence that are pertinent to English devolution. More specifically, it examines (i) how the momentum behind English devolution might be affected by Brexit (ii) how an English voice might be represented in Brexit negotiations (iii) potential opportunities emanating from European withdrawal and (iv) the possible threats to English devolution posed by exiting Europe. My views are based on my own academic research that has examined English devolution for the past 20 years. Six central claims are made.
1.2 First, EU withdrawal has the potential to further marginalise or, by contrast, appease an increasingly disenfranchised ‘English political community’. Maintaining the momentum behind English devolution and ensuring that the English voice is heard in Brexit negotiations could offer an important opportunity to pacify perceptions of alienation and exclusion in parts of England.
1.3 Second, there are opportunities for the newly elected metro mayors to work with Government to ascertain what EU funds and programmes might be effectively managed by the combined authorities. Metro mayors would benefit from working together to speak with one voice to Government on the issue.
1.4 Third, spatial sensitivity and place-based policy solutions offer a fruitful way to accommodate the social and geographical divisions identified during the EU referendum. However, engaging the English tier is challenging due to significant variations in institutional arrangements and local governance capacity. Metro mayors are a good place to start, although a more comprehensive approach will be needed if all parts of England - including its ‘left behind areas’ - are to have a voice.
1.5 Fourth, Brexit offers an opportunity to reframe the English devolution debate in constructive ways and build upon some of the positive relations post the recent devolution deals. Where devolution deals have faltered, trust needs to be rebuilt. The Network of Local Enterprise Partnerships, that represents the 39 Local Enterprise Partnerships in England, might be employed to represent rural and coastal areas in Brexit discussions.
1.5 Fifth, despite a global trend towards decentralisation, evidence of its success remains inconclusive. Data suggests that the success of local initiatives are often hampered by an uncoordinated approach at the Centre. Whitehall’s propensity for centralisation and the differentiated approach to devolution that characterises individual government departments will need careful management.
1.6 Finally, Brexit is likely to make regional disparities worse and could lead to greater conflict between England’s territories for scarce resources. Robust inter-governmental relations that cover the whole of England will be required to ensure an equitable distribution of funds post EU withdrawal.
2. THE MOMENTUM BEHIND ENGLISH DEVOLUTION NEEDS TO BE MAINTAINED POST BREXIT
2.1 There is a danger that the momentum behind English devolution is lost amidst the Government’s focus on Brexit. Influential figures pivotal to driving forward English devolution in the last Government, such as the former Chancellor, George Osborne, and former Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Greg Clark, have been lost to the debate. Recent research suggests that central and local actors viewed the energy and commitment of these ‘devolution champions’ as pivotal in driving forward English devolution (Political Studies Association, 2016). The repatriation of EU powers provides a potential platform for a new set of Brexit related devolution champions to emerge but these roles have yet to be filled.
2.1 In previous oral evidence to the Committee, Professor James Mitchell (2018) described the ‘position of England in the constitution as the elephant in the room that is not spoken about’. Indeed, the English Question - how England should be governed post devolution in the UK (and now post Brexit) - remains pertinent. Past research on the governance of England (Wyn Jones et al, 2012) and post Brexit reflections (Jennings et al, 2017) identify a growing sense of dissatisfaction with current forms of local representation in Westminster amongst English voters. Fuelled by concerns about a lack of spatial equity and a sense that English people lack an independent voice on issues that matter to them, an ‘English political community’ has emerged. EU withdrawal offers an opportunity to both exacerbate and resolve this issue. In light of this, it might seem prudent for Government to make clear that the views of localities in England are important in EU withdrawal negotiations and that final decisions on the repatriation of powers will be sensitive to the views of this increasingly mobilised English political community.
3. ENGLAND’S METRO MAYORS SHOULD HAVE A ROLE IN BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS
3.1 Since EU laws and regulations affect so many local areas and services, there is a strong case to be made that localities in England need a seat at the negotiating table. However, as the Committee (2017, 17) has previously noted, the main source of disquiet and disagreement between the Centre and sub-national tiers ‘derives from the lack of communication and established mechanisms for both proper consultation and shared decision making’. There is, nonetheless, still time for the UK Government to engender a spirit of goodwill by setting out procedures for how localities might be consulted in the future.
3.2 The Government, however, faces a particular challenge in consulting the English tier due to the huge variations in institutional arrangements and local governance capacity (Ayres and Pearce, 2013). There is a perception amongst local leaders that Government has its preferred areas and local leaders to work with. In negotiations surrounding the recent devolution deals, for example, Greater Manchester is often referred to as the ‘best practice model’ and a lot of political energy and time have been devoted within Whitehall to develop devolution here (Political Studies Association, 2016). However, other localities in England do not have the same history of local partnership or the positive relationships with the Centre to cultivate devolution in the same way. Moreover, the Centre does not have the human resources to invest equally in other local areas as it has done in the Manchester conurbation. This has resulted in a high degree of differentiation in both the process governing central-local relations and the outcomes in term of devolution agreements. This raises questions about spatial equity and social justice. As one senior local government leader stated recently, ‘We want parity of opportunity, if not outcome’ (Political Studies Association, 2016, 8).
3.3. A hung parliament could provide opportunities for local leaders to offer support to a weakened government post Brexit. Arguably, the Government will be reliant on partners to successfully manage Brexit and this could open up opportunities for the newly elected metro mayors and London mayor to play a prominent role. Metro mayors have powers and responsibilities to make strategic decisions across whole city regions, in contrast to existing city mayors (which are also directly elected) or local council leaders that only make decisions for, and on behalf of their local authority. Six democratically elected metro mayors were elected in May 2017 in Cambridge and Peterborough, Greater Manchester, Liverpool, Tees Valley, West Midlands and West of England. Sheffield City Region has a devolution deal in place, but will elect its metro mayor in May 2018.
3.4. The six mayors represent almost 10 million people and economies worth more than £200bn. They have powers over transport, housing, job creation and skills. While Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have been promised access to the Brexit Secretary, David Davis, and a role in negotiations, the role of England’s metro mayors remains unclear. One argument is that they need to work more closely to lobby Government collectively (IPPR, 2017). A Political Studies Association (2016, 7) report recently suggested, ‘collective local lobbying and discussions with central government could prove more strategically advantageous in the future if localities can overcome the propensity for individualism and desire for first mover advantage’.
3.5 Giving metro mayors a role in Brexit negotiations may also prove critical for successful policy implementation in the future. The Government’s current position of negotiating the repatriation of powers ‘back stage’ or behind closed doors might be advantageous in the short term in terms of managing complexity and uncertainty. Nonetheless, accusations of elitist and exclusionary decision making could undermine successful policy delivery down the line. For example, the recent round of English devolution deals shows that some local leaders and councils have been reluctant to rubber stamp or support decisions that they were not party to, leading to the collapse of deals in some areas (Ayres et al, 2017a).
4. BREXIT OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD ON THE POSITIVE CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONSHIPS CULTIVATED BY THE RECENT DEVOLUTION DEALS AND FOR LOCAL LEADERS TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
4.1 Given the scale and complexity of Brexit, Whitehall is unlikely to want to manage all aspects of repatriated EU powers and resources. This presents opportunities for metro mayors and local areas to make the case for what areas they would like to control locally. Recent discussions with colleagues in Whitehall suggest that the Cabinet Office has been doing some work to explore options for what powers might be devolved post Brexit, although this information is not yet publicly available. Drawing on Bulpitt’s (1983) analysis of ‘high politics’ and ‘low politics’, one might envisage a situation whereby Westminster retains control over matters that are regarded as primarily the responsibility of the Centre, for example, macro-economic policy and tax raising powers (high politics) while devolving competencies in other areas it does not want or cannot manage (low politics). Brexit potentially allows for a reframing of high and low politics in the territorial management of the UK - a reframing that local leaders, including metro mayors, should seek to influence.
4.2 There is the potential to build on the trust and goodwill generated between the Centre and some localities from negotiating the recent devolution deals. Procedures for negotiating the deals have been described as low on formal guidance and procedure, leading some to raise concerns about accountability and transparency in the process (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2016). It is also true that this informal way of working has been more successful in some areas than others. In those areas where devolution deals have faltered, attempts need to be made to rebuild trust and cooperation. Nonetheless, a high degree of informality and the Government’s purposeful strategy to locate decision making ‘back stage’ was viewed as useful in overcoming political or institutional barriers and breaking deadlocks (Ayres, 2017). Whitehall officials felt that informal working had been largely positive, an observation supported by Localis and Grant Thornton (2015, 16) who suggested that ‘72% of local actors had found the discussions with central government constructive and positive’.
4.3 Jennings et al (2017) also argue for a reframing of the way that devolution in England is managed. They suggest that sensitive place-based policy offers a fruitful way to manage the problem of a divided country post Brexit. They contend that citizens’ expectations ‘in different locations may not be polar opposite but they are sufficiently different to require a sensitive political and policy response’ (p. 3). Their research looks specifically at political attitudes in the ‘left behind areas’ - England’s rural areas and coastal towns - and how they compare to public attitudes in the conurbations. Findings reveal that geographical context really matters and that post Brexit spatial policy needs to be sensitive to the social, cultural and institutional aspects of place. Government has a difficult task in engaging these areas, due to the sheer number and considerable diversity in local institutional arrangements.
4.4 Local Enterprise Partnerships and the Network that collectively represents them might be employed here. There are 39 Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) across England. They are local business led partnerships between local authorities and businesses and play a central role in determining local economic priorities and undertaking activities to drive economic growth and the creation of local jobs. Some LEPs are included in the recent devolution deals, while other peripheral, rural and coastal areas are not. It may prove difficult for Government to develop meaningful relationships with all LEP areas but the LEP network might act as a conduit. The Network helps LEPs come together on areas of shared importance, engage with Government and share knowledge and good practice.
4.5 International research recognises the virtues of local place-based policy and leadership. Barber (2013), for example, asserts that in the face of considerable global challenges, the nation states of the world are paralysed. He claims that cities, and the mayors that run them, offer the best new forces for good governance. Cities are home to more than half of the world’s population, a proportion which will continue to grow. Moreover, they are unburdened with the issues of borders and sovereignty which hobble the capacity of nation-states to work with one another. Barber demonstrates that regardless of city size or political affiliation, local leaders exhibit a non-partisan and pragmatic style of governance that is lacking in national and international halls of power.
4.6 Drawing on this narrative, the newly elected metro mayors are well placed to cultivate the trust of citizens in their office, help cities become beacons of good governance, and spearhead city-to-city collaborations in order to better address shared problems. Barber’s boldest proposal is a ‘World Parliament of Mayors’, established on a voluntary basis to enable cities to have a stronger voice in global affairs, provide a world-wide platform for the sharing and transfer of urban best practices, and establish a more democratic basis for addressing global priorities. Brexit presents new opportunities for local leaders to reach out to Europe and beyond to establish their own relationships with global leaders.
5. EXTENSIVE DEVOLUTION POST BREXIT COULD PROVE RISKY IN THE ABSENSE OF EVIDENCE OF SUCCESS AND A COHERENT RESPONSE ACROSS WHITEHALL
5.1 Academic research has revealed a global trend towards decentralisation over recent years. For example, of the 52 countries Hooghe et al (2016) examined, two-thirds have witnessed an increase in their levels of regional authority. Decentralisation is purported to foster the growth of local economies and improve the efficiency of public services and accountability of political institutions. However, global data on the effectiveness of decentralisation is inconclusive. Indeed, Bucek and Ryder (2015, 2) suggest that ‘the reorganisation of administrative regions and the reallocation of power, driven by economic and administrative necessity, may be one of the greatest public administration experiments ever undertaken’. In this context, the significant devolution of power to England’s territories post Brexit could be viewed as risky.
5.2 This issue is compounded by stark variations in local governance capacity and the fact that Whitehall departments have variable levels of enthusiasm for decentralisation and often interpret the ‘local’ in different ways (Ayres and Stafford, 2014). This means that different scalar maps and spatial objectives have emerged that can undermine policy coordination and delivery locally. For example, there is a perception in Whitehall that the big delivery departments - health, education and welfare - remain quietly cautious about decentralising budgets and functions locally (Ayres and Pearce, 2013). This perspective echoes research by Ayres and Pearce (2005) conducted nearly 20 years ago which identified departments as (i) leaders (ii) ‘in transition’ and (iii) laggards with respect to their enthusiasm and willingness to devolve to the subnational tier. At the time, the Departments of Health, Education and Skills and Work and Pensions were viewed as ‘laggards’ and it would seem that this view has a degree of contemporary relevance.
5.3 For example, while Greater Manchester has been granted control over health and social care as part of its recent devolution deal one remains sceptical about how far this offer might extend to other localities ‘less trusted’ in Whitehall. Indeed, Greater Manchester is viewed by many Whitehall officials as a bit of an anomaly - the benchmark yes but a tough act to follow (Political Studies Association, 2016). Moreover, combined authorities have been granted control over the Adult Education Budget but not 16-19 skills policy or schools. This ‘patchwork of powers’ (Sandford, 2018) could become more complex and acute post Brexit and might undermine local efforts to coordinate policies in a meaningful way.
5.4 In reality arrangements are even more complex than the typology of ‘leaders, in transition, laggards’ would suggest because, even within departments, individual teams have distinct working practices and objectives that can vary with regard to their focus on decentralisation. Wong et al (2012, p. 5), for example, have identified over ‘100 major maps for England relating to policies and programmes on the economy, transport, communications and the environment’.
How or whether the patchwork of sectoral policies expressed in these documents might be coordinated across Whitehall or locally remains uncertain. One solution could be to engage the support of the cross-departmental Cities and Local Growth Unit in Whitehall. In recent research, local leaders praised the Unit as an effective conduit for central-local discussions and for coordinating devolution efforts in Whitehall (Ayres et al, 2017b). The Unit might have a role in coordinating post Brexit devolution initiatives by acting as a conduit between departmental Ministers and metro mayors.
6. BREXIT WILL MAKE REGIONAL DISPARTIES WORSE AND COULD LEAD TO GREATER CONFLICT BETWEEN ENGLAND’S TERRITORIES
6.1 A popular narrative at the time of the EU referendum in 2016 was that the ‘metropolitan elites’ of London were the main beneficiaries of EU membership, while the majority of the population did not benefit. McCann (2018, 1) claims that this argument is empirically wrong. His conclusion is that:
‘the wealthier remain-voting regions of the UK in and around the London economy as well as in Scotland, are both less dependent on EU markets for their prosperity and are also less exposed to wider Brexit trade-related risks, than the economically weaker leave-voting regions’.
In short, all parts of the UK economy are likely to be adversely affected by Brexit, but the adverse effects are expected to be much harsher in economically weaker regions (Chen et al, 2018). This situation has the potential to widen regional disparities and heighten conflict between territories as they compete for scarce resources and inward investment.
6.2 Moreover, the withdrawal of EU Cohesion Policy in 2020 is likely to compound this issue further. Cohesion Policy promotes policy instruments that explicitly target weaker regions with long term investment commitments largely independent of the politics of the UK national government. The loss of EU support will significantly undermine the autonomous action of England’s less favoured areas (Sykes and O’Brien, 2017). Post Brexit, England’s territories will be entirely dependent on the political and territorial calculations of the UK government. Brussels and London have radically different attitudes towards regional policy. The former seeking to redress regional disparities while the latter promoting (uneven) economic growth, which has resulted in winners and losers across the country. The UK Government intends to create a UK Shared Prosperity Fund to replace the EU Structural Funds. However, questions remain about whether the fund will be as generous as current levels of EU support.
6.3 Widening regional disparities and a lack of national consistency can be seen to undermine social justice and spatial equity in the public policy system. This has the potential to heighten inter-regional divisions and will do little to quash the anti-political sentiments of the English political community. Robust inter-governmental relations will be required to manage the complexity and uncertainty posed by Brexit. Constant dispute or conflict resolution, either between localities or between the Centre and local areas, is not a feasible form of statecraft. Whitehall will need to manage the distribution of funds and powers to local areas with sensitivity and careful planning. This need not necessarily mean extensive formal structures, procedures and guidelines. The challenge for policy makers moving forward, is to strike the right balance between the flexibility afforded by informality and demands for greater transparency and democratic accountability. To date Whitehall’s attention has been on England’s core cities (and Cornwall’s devolution deal). However, relationships may need to be extended to the ‘forgotten areas’ (Jennings et al, 2017) if the potential for disparities is to be managed. This is likely to require some investment in financial and human capital resources in Whitehall’s devolution teams and Units if local concerns about ‘parity of opportunity’ are to be allayed.
March 2018
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[1] Sarah Ayres, Reader in Public Policy and Governance, University of Bristol, UK