GIT0003

                              Written evidence submitted by The Henry Jackson Society                                              

About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is a London-based think-tank founded on the global promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy, and civil rights. HJS specialises in the study of international terrorism, counter-terrorism, and radicalisation.

About the Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT)

CRT is unique in addressing violent and non-violent extremism. By coupling high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, we aim to combat the threat of extremism in our society.

About the Author

Nikita Malik is Director of the Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism (CRT) at the Henry Jackson Society, where Dr Najah Al-Otaibi, Dr Julia Rushchenko, Emma Webb, and Tom Wilson are fellows. This submission is co-authored by all of the above. CRT couples high-quality, in-depth research with targeted and impactful policy recommendations, in order to combat the threat of violent and non-violent extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism in our society.

The Henry Jackson Society is a think-tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances that keep societies free, working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

Summary of this submission

• The Government’s strategy to combat Islamist Terrorism must incorporate new threats, caused by an international Islamist ideology that has put down national roots.
• The submission outlines the efforts taken by the UK to combat Islamist terrorism at home, stressing the need to tackle its ideology. Success is benchmarked in relation to defeating Islamist terrorist organisations.
• While projects like CONTEST and Operation Temperer continue to protect critical infrastructure, more must be done to prevent returning British jihadists by:
• Increasing the use of temporary exclusion orders and TPIMs,
• Strengthening vigilance of our nation’s borders against the smuggling of returning fighters into the UK, and,
• Monitoring criminality that leads to terrorism.

1. Efforts taken by the UK to combat the threat of Islamist terrorism

1. The Government’s approach to combatting domestic Islamist terrorism is contained within the UK counter-terrorism (CONTEST) strategy. Launched in 2006, this multi-pronged strategy incorporates four core streams: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare.[1]

1. Protect and Prepare aim to reduce harm done in the event of a terrorist attack. Though there is evidence this aspect of the UK’s approach has been very effective, there is always more to be done.
2. Pursue and Prevent deal with combatting terrorism, focusing on the disruption of attacks and the prevention of individuals being drawn into terrorism.

2. Existing resources help authorities disrupt individuals from committing Islamist-related terrorism offences. These include:

1. Proscribing an organisation (there are 71 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. Five additional organisations were proscribed in 2016).[2]
2. Asset-freezing.
3. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs).[3] TPIMs can be imposed for one year but can be extended, based on new evidence.[4] In August 2017, six TPIM notices were in force, and all six had been relocated.[5]
4. Intelligence-led stop and search.
5. Seizure of travel documents.
6. The deportation of individuals under a system of bilateral agreements known as deportations with assurances (DWAs).

These measures go some way in disrupting association and prosecuting those in terrorist groups, and we would encourage their continued use in monitoring and gathering evidence on those individuals who cannot be prosecuted or deported.[6] There is, however, concern that the ability of law enforcement to obtain intelligence about terrorist-related activity is being eroded by technology.[7] We would encourage the Government to focus on greater fostering of human intelligence and capacity building in this area by working with technology companies to police against security threats.

3. The Government’s approach to the ideological underpinnings of Islamist extremism in the UK has evolved with time. However, it remains an area requiring improvement.

1. Following a review of Prevent in 2011, the need to tackle extremist ideology was put at the centre of the Government’s efforts to prevent individuals from being radicalised.[8] This was further emphasised in the following years:
• The establishment of the Prime Minister’s (PM) Taskforce on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism following the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013.
• The establishment of the Extremism Analysis Unit in 2015.
• The publication of the government’s Counter Extremism Strategy in 2015.[9]

2. Successive PMs have sought to emphasise the importance of tackling the problem at its ideological source.[10] Significantly, the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act made the Prevent duty statutory for all public bodies, including schools, prisons, local authorities, universities and the National Health Service (NHS).

3. The Prevent duty has gained ground and widespread acceptance in UK institutions at national and at local levels, particularly since being framed as a safeguarding duty.[11] The establishment of innovative practices has aided in the acceptance of Prevent by local communities in particular. However:

• Islamist extremist speakers continue to address students uncontested at universities.[12]

• Ofsted continue to discover extreme and intolerant material in schools.[13]

• Politicians, local government and public services continue to engage with extremist groups and individuals.[14]

• The charitable sector remains a key arena for funding the spread of this divisive ideology.[15]

On a national level, the Government must tackle the ideological underpinnings of extremism to stop attacks in the UK, and to prevent British nationals from going abroad to fight with extremist groups.

4. The Commission to Counter Extremism and the Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill (2016) are a move in the right direction to comprehensively tackle the extremism that produces an environment conducive to radicalisation. The Bill includes broader issues, including consideration of measures needed to address Dame Louise Casey’s review on integration. Subsequently, social cohesion,[16] prison radicalisation[17] and extremist abuse of the charitable sector and online and broadcast media require urgent attention.[18]

2. Success in relation to defeating the threat of Islamist terrorism

1. Crucial to success is a reduction in the number of Islamist terrorist attacks in the UK. 2017 saw a dramatic spike in the number of attacks, injuries and fatalities resulting from Islamist terrorism.[19] An important indicator of success will be when there are successive years where no terrorist attacks are carried out in the UK.

2. There are a number of indicators to measure our success in achieving this objective:

1. In the short-term, success means being able to stop the terrorist attacks that arise. Longer-term, success will mean a dramatic reduction in the number of terrorist plots.
2. Our intelligence agencies set high standards for stopping attacks. However, the increasing number of plots in recent years makes future failure more likely as it becomes impossible to stop every planned attack. A counter-terror police report in October 2016 found that ten attempts had been stopped over the past two years;[20] in December 2017, MI5 reported stopping nine planned attacks during the course of that year alone.[21] This increase is also an indicator of failure to prevent radicalisation and recruitment at earlier stages.
3. While former head of MI5 Jonathan Evans has stated this threat is likely to last for a generation,[22] success must involve reversing this trend and creating an environment where the number of planned attacks is dramatically reduced.

3. Returning foreign fighters (FF) represent a hard threat to domestic security[23] and success must include considerably reducing this phenomenon. Between 1998 and 2015, of the 58 Islamist-related terror offenders with known or suspected terrorist training, 45 (77%) had received training abroad.[24] Approximately 850 British fighters have travelled to fight in jihadist organisations in Iraq and Syria, with roughly half of this population returning to the United Kingdom.[25] Only 54 of the 400 British fighters who have returned to the United Kingdom have been successfully prosecuted, with many faking their own deaths and returning to Britain under new identities.[26]

i.        More Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs) should be used to target British jihadists who have travelled to Iraq or Syria and want to return to the UK.[27] It is clear that determining an individual’s membership of a terrorist organisation or their involvement with atrocities or terrorist activities will take time. This will require greater use of legislation and mechanisms like TEOs to ensure evidence for prosecution is gathered prior to re-entry. Success will include preventing FF from re-entering the UK, or ensuring their prosecution if they do.

ii.      The Immigration Act 2014 enables the Home Secretary to deprive someone of their British citizenship if this is deemed to be in the public good, an alternative and harsher measure to a TEO. These measures tend to be issued when British citizens are abroad, reducing avenue for legal recourse.[28]

iii.   Ultimately, the Government should aim to greatly reduce the number of Britons travelling to join jihadist groups in the first place. Success must therefore involve reducing the desire to take up terrorist activity, partially by defeating the ideology that drives Islamist terrorism. While it may be beyond the remit of the Government to reform political and theological belief systems, it can and should take initiatives to hinder the spread of extremism, especially in ways that lead to incitement and radicalisation. This should include stopping funding to non-violent extremist groups, including in civil society, the domestic charitable sector and foreign funding for extremism in the UK.[29]

4. Success will involve the continued protection of our critical national infrastructure (CNI). Islamist terrorist groups have, in the past, released propaganda targeting critical infrastructure in the UK. While Operation Temperer has proved effective in response to critical threat levels, the following should be considered:

i.        The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) should include the threat from domestic extremism, as well as international extremism, when it determines the national threat level to the UK.

ii.      A greater understanding of the networks involved in the domestic extremism threat would be critical in increasing the success of preventing attacks.

iii.   Strands from CONTEST should not be treated separately, and Prevent training should be given to those who work in CNI – including airports and other transportation networks, such as Transport for London – to prevent the ability of terrorists to access critical infrastructure.

5. The Government must take responsibility for combatting extremist propaganda both online – by providing tech companies with the legal framework[30] they need to remove problematic content – and offline, by ensuring the counter-radicalisation Prevent strategy is properly implemented in the public sector.

3. How the UK works with allies and partners to combat Islamist Terrorism

1. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 recommended working with international partners to protect the UK’s interests at home and abroad.[31] The UK has partnered with states from the Middle East and Africa to fight terrorism. Strengthening engagements with the region is essential to protect the UK from terrorism; working closely with allies is an effective way to combat terrorism, ensuring a joint fight against a common enemy in the form of al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al-Shabaab, among others.

2. Recent bilateral activities with allies has created stronger relationships. Early in 2018, the UK joined the French-led operation (the G5 Sahel) against Islamic State militants in West Africa.[32] The forces come from five African states – Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania – and extensive military and defence mechanisms are used to combat radical armed forces in Mali and neighbouring states. The British mission focuses on conducting counter-terrorism military operations.

3. The UK is also allied with the Gulf States. In 2016, the Government opened a permanent military base in Manama, Bahrain, allowing Britain to participate more broadly in regional operations. The Royal Navy facility hosts around 6,000 British military personnel and is used to fight extremists in the region and facilitate attacks for operations against IS.

4. Efforts by the UK to enhance relationships with partners can be improved by an increase in bilateral activities, particularly following Britain leaving the EU. The UK can benefit from Gulf State projects. Saudi Arabia, for example, has developed a state-of-the-art centre (ETIDAL) in Riyadh dedicated to fighting IS online terrorism propaganda.[33] The UK should consider creating international centres of excellence to counter extremism[34] in order to enhance existing anti-terrorism programmes.

5. There is a very hazy intelligence picture on the smuggling networks entering Europe and the UK, and more data must be collected to solidify this for any action plan or vulnerability framework.

i.        It is likely that the families of many children exiting Islamic State will employ the help of smugglers to assist children in entering Europe. We have seen instances of Islamic State child fighters being smuggled into Europe.[35] These individuals are unknown to the authorities and nothing is being done to assist or monitor them. 50% of children entering migrant routes, for example, disappear in the first week of registering.[36] The British Government must therefore be attentive to these individuals:

• Radicalising other vulnerable migrants, because the child or individual has not been identified as being trained by Islamic State, and/or
• Disappearing and being instructed to join other, national terrorist cells in Europe who are anticipating the arrival of the child. Given the levels of their on-site training in Iraq and Syria, they could then pass on this training to cells in Europe directly.

ii.      Therefore, British intelligence must work with its partners in countries of conflict, as well as migrant routes, to ensure that individuals entering the UK have appropriate documentation and have been vetted to ensure they do not present a security threat to other members of the population.

4. Geographical regions where it would be in the UK’s national interest to monitor the threat of Islamist Terrorism

1. A major concern of the international community, particularly post-9/11, is the realisation that ineffective governance can provide shelter for terrorists. Governance fragility has given rise to failed/failing states worldwide, exacerbated by armed non-state actors. Despite some militant groups being brutal, they may be perceived as legitimate by many in the populations under their control, as happened with the Taliban or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).[37]

2. In recent years, every insurgent group that has made gains in the Middle East and South Asia has claimed to be “Islamic” in orientation.[38] This religious frame is particularly useful for propaganda when the central government is seen as secular, as well as corrupt and incompetent. Such groups rely on local popular support for recruits and resources, enhancing their resilience. While the UK has certainly been focusing on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the following regions should be monitored as possible areas of future concern:

1. The Philippines: One of the groups that could potentially offer shelter to IS is Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines. One of its goals includes an Islamic State for Muslim Mindanao. Over the years they have been engaging in kidnap-for-ransom activities and welcome foreign terrorists seeking refuge.[39]

2. Afghanistan: Not all FF are returning to their country of previous residence or citizenship. There is growing evidence of FF from Syria and Iraq regrouping in Afghanistan (particularly FF from Pakistan and Uzbekistan). One area of particular concern is Jowzjan province, where IS has been relocating fighters and their families.[40] While the security experts remain sceptical about the potential rise of IS in Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan,[41] it is important to monitor the following developments:

• The emergence of strong leadership among the ISKP fighters;
• The security measures at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan;
• ISKP’s ability to engage in organised crime to fund their campaigns (currently their financial capabilities are very limited).

3. Central Asia: While Central Asia is not a concern per se, considering the surveillance and punitive policies of the authoritarian governments, it still remains a possible recruitment pool for extremist groups, as exemplified by recent radicalisation trends and attacks perpetrated by Central Asian nationals, particularly Uzbeks.

3. The British government must seriously consider the challenge of state building in areas that could possibly provide shelter for Islamist extremists, craft a comprehensive response to the challenges of armed non-state actors in collaboration with local stakeholders and engage in anti-corruption efforts, strengthening trust towards secular regimes in areas considered vulnerable in terms of the spread of Islamism.

By Nikita Malik

Director, Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, The Henry Jackson Society

2 March 2018