Dear Sirs

Thameslink Programme inquiry
Written evidence submitted by APTU (The Association of Public Transport Users)

1. APTU (The Association of Public Transport Users) is the rail user group for passengers between West Hampstead Thameslink and Harlington inclusive on the TSGN franchise operated by Govia Thameslink Railway (“GTR”) (Thameslink brand).  We are recognised by GTR as a stakeholder. Our response has been informed by prior feedback from our members on the issues that matter to them.
2. Additionally, I have been a member of the Thameslink Programme Stakeholder Reference Group, which consists of representatives from Rail User Groups and Local Authorities on the Thameslink route which has provided a user perspective to the Programme’s management.
3. We welcome the opportunity to comment.

Executive Summary

4. Our key comments are:
• The decision to phase roll out of services is welcomed.  A review should be carried out in early 2019 to see if the December 2019 improvements can be introduced earlier.
• There are two key remaining challenges:
• The difficulties of ensuring on-time presentation of services at the edge of the Central London ‘Core’[1].  That £900m of necessary spend has been identified and only £300m will have been spent by the start of the third phase of service increases is a significant concern.
• The need to ensure the Siemens Class 700 trains are sufficiently reliable.
• Because insufficient attention was paid to passenger’s wants, additional cost is being incurred to fit Wifi and Seat Back Tables.

Phased delivery of services

5. We believe the decision to engage in a phased rollout of through services to be sensible; indeed the primary question is why this was not identified at the start of the programme; we have been aware of the likelihood of this happening for around a year.  The main benefit will be that as the service frequency increases, lessons can be learnt and further improvements in processes made in advance of the next service increase.
6. Our experience of unloading and loading from Siemens Class 700s in the Central London Core suggests that this portion of the network can be made to work effectively during ‘normal’ times – we have been briefed by Thameslink on the measures they plan to improve operating effectiveness and believe them essential.  Some of the change will be cultural for passengers – for instance at the moment, I can leap straight on to a northbound train and the worst that will happen is that my train will stop more than I hoped; in the new world, I can end up on the Great Northern, where getting home will be a real nuisance.  I will need to train myself to always look where trains are going.
7. We believe the main barriers will be:
• Difficulties in running trains so that they arrive on time at the edge of the core.  We comment further below on this.
• The possibility that the Class 700s will not prove sufficiently reliable; again we comment further below.
8. We do have to declare a slight conflict – users on the Midland Mainline, for stations represented by APTU, will receive most of the service increase benefits in May 2018 and all benefits by December 2018, with the benefits in May 2019 and December 2019 limited to additional destinations served with a single change.
9. Nevertheless, when taking a whole of network view and given the importance to travellers of a reliable service, we believe that this is a sensible move.
10. We note that increments to the service are aligned with UK national timetable changes and are led to understand that some increments may also have a pre-requisite of changes by other train operators, and in the case of Cambridge, non-Thameslink engineering works.   We believe that once there is no reliance on changes by other operators, the possibility of accelerating the service increases should be considered as rollout progresses.  Particularly, this should be considered in February 2019 as regards an acceleration of benefits currently due in December 2019.

Risk of further delays

11. We believe that the main risks of further delays are as follows:
• The possibility that works this Christmas and New Year will not be successful.  We note that engineering blockades to date have not caused delay to the programme and know of no reason why these will not be successful (although we are not specialist engineers and so are not in a position to make a credible evaluation).
• Unreliable operation of the rail network outside the Thameslink Core (see below).
• Class 700 reliability and the ability of the joint Siemens / Thameslink team to overcome problems promptly (see below).

Problems with the rail network

12. We believe that problems with the rail network away from the central London core remain a very significant issue.  We cannot comment on Great Northern reliability, but our perspective is that problems south of the Thames on the Brighton Mainline are a particular issue.  In good part this is because significant portions of it are a two track railway, making most incidents have a greater impact as there is no option to use the ‘other’ track.  In addition, our impression is that the Midland Main Line is maintained more effectively – I particularly recall an occasion that reliability suffered from rodents chewing signalling cables – the response being to put cable in armoured ducts.  South of the river, there seem to be many repeat incidents, suggesting that not enough is being learnt (or available to invest) to prevent reoccurrence.
13. The NAO Audit report notes that £900m needed to be spent on the Region’s railways to improve reliability, further noting that £300m would be spent before April 2019 – being the maximum amount that could be spent practically.  It is of considerable concern that £600m remains to be spent and (a) there is no definitive commitment to spend; and (b) a significant proportion will be unlikely to have been spent before the most intense timetable is due (from December 2019).
14. In addition to track and signalling reliability, failures in day to day management by Network Rail Control Staff and Signallers remain an issue for attention.  As an example, I recollect waiting around 6 minutes on a Siemens Class 700 at Harpenden for a late running East Midlands Trains[2] (EMT) service.  This was for a train to London.  During that 6 minutes my train could have accelerated to line speed, stopped at St Albans and still got to London ahead of the EMT service. 
15. It is most essential that goals and measures for Network Rail and the Thameslink operator (and future Franchisees) are fully aligned – A common issue is that Network Rail can achieve its goals but the Train Operator does not. The example I quote above is a classic example of this occurring in our area – A regulation decision is made to prioritise an EMT service over a Thameslink service travelling south.  Network Rail Derby can claim ‘success’ as both trains are within PPM (Public Performance Measure) at the edge of their Network Rail area (as the EMT Train terminates and the Thameslink train transfers to the Kent Region).  However, the late running Thameslink train then loses more time travelling through south London and also causes delay to other trains, finally arriving beyond the PPM limit.  In this example, it is essential that Network Rail East Midlands bears the full ‘consequence’ of the late running outside their region.
16. Moves away from PPM as a headline performance measure are also to be welcomed – it is the passenger journey that matters, so impacting 1,200[3] passengers for 20 minutes should have significantly greater impact than delaying 100 passengers for 6 minutes – under PPM the score for both is the same despite the former having 20 times greater passenger impact (on a simple, mechanistic, basis).

Siemens Class 700 trains

17. Reliability on the Class 700 trains has improved considerably from the earliest days, but remains considerably below that of the best Siemens fleets, even after allowing for the greater unit length.  As service intensity increases, it will be important that:
• Reliability continues to improve; fortunately many faults are software centric, so are relatively easy to address.
• Time to recover is kept to an absolute minimum.  There are still occasions when it takes a very long time (1 hour plus) to get stalled units on the move again.  It will be essential that such occasions are kept to an absolute minimum – through a combination of avoiding faults; software changes to allow faster recovery; and good practices by Siemens and Route Control to explain to drivers the steps they need to take to overcome the problem and get moving again.
18. It is clear to us that insufficient allowance was made for testing for these trains – we suspect that the training regime was largely designed for an old style train, largely mechanical in nature, rather than one where software plays such a central role, manging everything together, rather than many semi-autonomous components where a failure in one part would not have wider impacts.
19. Design decisions on the units have also lead to cost increases, from the user perspective, specific examples are the omission of Wifi and seat back tables in Standard class.  Despite lobbying by Rail User Groups, including APTU (and we believe the Franchisee at the time, FCC), at the time there was a refusal to include these in the original build order, a decision that has subsequently been reversed, through a combination of national initiatives and a recognition that these features are important to the traveller.  As of today, later trains in the order are being fitted with Wifi and seat back tables before they leave the factory, but, whilst there is a commitment to retro fit to other units, as yet no timescales are available. It is not clear to us if the cost of this is allowed for in the current published totals.
20. Other design decisions are likely to incur costs that will not be the responsibility of the Thameslink Programme, as the first credible opportunity to address will be the first major refurbishment.  These are the lack of power sockets in Standard class and the particularly uncomfortable design of the Standard class seats.
21. At the time we lobbied for these changes, we pointed out their importance in attracting revenue at the off-peak for optional travellers (eg leisure and business travellers).  In addition to increasing cost for the rail industry, there is a loss of revenue, with a direct impact on the Tax Payer as revenue risk on the TSGN franchise is taken by the Department for Transport.

Conclusion

We are happy to update the Public Accounts Committee in person if wanted - or to speak to / engage in further dialogue with your Researchers.

Yours faithfully

Neil Middleton

Neil Middleton
Chairman
APTU