Written evidence from Mr Grant Evans (TRH0098)
Serious Further Offences and the Division of Responsibilities
1 Preface
1.1 On 12 10 2017 the Justice Committee launched an inquiry into the Government's Transforming Rehabilitation Programme.
Among the terms of reference to which it called evidence were two where I considered I could help the Committee –
- What impact have the reforms had on…:
- serious further offences? – and –
- How effective have Government measures been in addressing issues arising from the division of responsibility between the NPS and CRCs in the delivery of probation services?’
1.2 I write in my personal capacity as a former senior probation officer with 43 years of experience in diverse communities. Relevant to this enquiry are the responsibilities I have held across most sectors of probation work, including a prison, community supervision teams, intensive supervision, a hostel, courts, and also panels for child protection and public protection.
I was joint chair of the Reading Multi Agency Public Protection Panel [MAPPP].
I have led, developed and supported probation staff, some with no training at all and others with the highest degree of training, thereby managing every level of risk. I have led a Serious Case Review into the death of a child.
I retired in March 2012 and in writing this paper I have appreciated that it is time to stop thinking about probation.
2 Summary
2.1 This note draws together my evidence that is on the Committee file from April 2014, July 2014, and November 2017.
2.2 Both topics of serious further offending and division of responsibility were critical to reformers of rehabilitation, and together underpin the protection of the public. They were also matters where lessons of history were available to those who were willing or able to regard them.
2.3 Firstly, there is evidence behind the Transforming Rehabilitation programme of muddled and misleading thinking by the Lord Chancellor in his statements about offending/reoffending data. This is shown to be relevant to a view on reducing Serious Further Offences.
2.4 Secondly, there is relevant and independent evidence about Serious Further Offences which was available to the Lord Chancellor but seems to have been missed. Three of the most painful but instructive SFOs are reviewed here for the lessons that were drawn out by HMI of Probation at the time.
2.5 Thirdly, independent academic review of the kind of offenders who commit Serious Further Offences found that the majority of SFOs come from offenders in the medium risk group, today managed in the Community Rehabilitation Companies. The ‘joined up’ management of both medium and high risk offenders across the new divisions of the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms is thus revealed as essential.
2.6 Muddled thinking and the omission of hard evidence together have meant that staff and managers face a greater challenge to catch up and manage the division of responsibility than should have been the case. There are questions of accountability for these problems.
3 Muddled Data – ‘Reoffending is Rising’ – Relevance to Serious Further Offending
3.1 Apologetic Note on Reoffending Terminology:
In the context of a discussion about probation and criminal statistics, several terms need to be understood in order to avoid ambiguity -
1 ‘Offending’ is the usual term for offences across the board, regardless of previous record, or who may be supervising.
2 ‘Reoffending’ usually means repeat offending by any previous offender, and thus it is important to distinguish it from the following term, in the context of a discussion about services for rehabilitation.
3 ‘Reoffending under supervision’ is a specific reference to repeat offending whilst under supervision, normally in the community, and including episodes of supervision/licence after custody.
4 ‘Serious Further Offences’ is a very specific term for the most serious sexual or violent further offences or attempted offences committed under supervision or immediately afterwards. Examples are -
Murder, aggravated burglary or death by dangerous driving;
Rape, sexual assault of a child under 13, or incest.
The intention of a serious further offence review is to learn lessons and to disseminate good practice. Instructions were revised in 2014 and the list has been reduced.
With apologies to the Committee but the language has been confused elsewhere.
3.2 Three important occasions stand out, as listed below, in the path to Transforming Rehabilitation when facts about reoffending could have been corrected or improved.
3.3 On 27 02 13, in his Corrected Oral Evidence to the Committee[i] of the need for change within probation services, at questions 10, 13 and 24, Chris Grayling as the then Lord Chancellor asserted three times on the same date that there was evidence that offending was rising.
3.4 This was not true. In the same year the Office of National Statistics reported that crime in England and Wales was down by 10% over the year to September 2013, and down by 15% for the whole of 2013[ii] – the biggest annual fall in crime for 33 years. Those are big changes to miss.
3.5 He further asserted that there was ‘hard evidence’ that ‘reoffending is going up’.
This was not true either. (reference next page)
3.6 I did not read that the Committee had been able to challenge him about his mistakes. I am not clear whether the Committee had a briefing that would have enabled it to do so.
3.7 In May 2013, the paper ‘Transforming Rehabilitation’ [TR] argued for the division of responsibility between public and private sectors, meaning a radical change programme. In arguing the need for change, this paper said that
‘In recent years, reoffending rates have barely changed, and the most recent figures show a rise…’
3.8 Neither assertion was true. As mentioned already, the data in Transforming Rehabilitation did not show a rise in reoffending although published just the previous month, as the following table
shows –
3.9 Quotation from Transforming Rehabilitation[iii] – Annex C – ‘Case for Change Analysis’ – page 41 [page 44 on screen]:
In recent years, reoffending rates have barely changed, and the most recent figures show
a rise. In 2000 the proven reoffending rate for all adult offenders (i.e. those cautioned,
given a non-custodial sentence – including fines – or released from prison) was 26.2%
and in 2010 was 25.3%.
The table below sets out reoffending rates for different groups of offenders from 2000 to
2011.
Fig 1.1.2:Reoffending 2000-2011
| 2000 | 2002 | 2005 | 2010 | Year to June 2011 |
Court Orders | 37.9% | 39.8% | 36.2% | 34.1% | 34.2% |
Custody (under 12 months) | 54.3% | 60.1% | 57.0% | 57.6% | 58.2% |
Custody (12 months or over, excl. IPP and life) | 42.2% | 41.7% | 34.6% | 35.9% | 35% |
All adult offenders[1] | 26.2% | 27.6% | 24.9% | 25.3% | 25.5% |
In this original version the Analysis seems superficially compatible with the data.
Notes to table:
1 The first three columns in this table are reproduced exactly from the Ministry’s Fig 1.1.2 as above, but omitting the [redundant] columns for 2002 and 2005, and adding the next two columns which simply calculate the differences in the figures across the 10.5 years, and the percentage improvements that they represent from the 2000 percentage base.
2 The words in italics are my own, written to clarify the distinction between ‘reoffending’ and ‘reoffending under supervision’, the absence of which is confusing.
3.11 Through a comparison of these two tables, for which I invite scrutiny, it seems that the conclusion must be that ‘reoffending’ fell in 3 out of the 4 given sentencing types. The phrase –
‘most recent figures show a rise’ is therefore simply wrong.
Moreover, the figures rose least in the categories where probation services are providing supervision, which may have been worth comment.
The idea that the ‘reoffending rates have barely changed’ is also wrong without qualification, as it only applies to the ‘ALL adult offenders’ line which includes vast numbers of disposals or sentences which are outside the remit of probation reforms.
The ‘Case for Change Analysis’ is therefore wrong.
3.12 Lastly in the sequence, in June 2013 the Impact Assessment for the Offender Rehabilitation Bill[iv] published a range of data amongst which was, once again, the data for reoffending by offenders who served less than 12 months, and by offenders who served 12 – 24 months.
3.13 As with Transforming Rehabilitation, the substantial difference of 20% between the two groups’ rate of reoffending was not explicit.
3.14 My argument today is that accurate facts about ‘reoffending under supervision’ are highly relevant to analysis of ‘Serious Further Offending’, because when there is an overall fall in reoffending under supervision there is also likely to be a fall in Serious Further Offending.
3.15 This is apparently justified by the following data from the Ministry of Justice:[v]
| 2009/10 | 2013/14 |
All SFO convictions | 273 | 233 |
One assumes that a Lord Chancellor would be aware of this 15% improvement, and one also assumes that the role carries a duty to present the facts openly and correctly.
[Note - Data up to 2008 is not comparable due to a reduction in the criteria that year, made in order to concentrate on the most serious schedule 15a cases.]
3.16 This argument should elevate the importance of getting the facts about ‘reoffending’ right in order to allow scrutiny of the plans that prevent serious risk of harm to the public.
3.17 I anticipate that the Committee will now be concerned by various public reports of increases in Serious Further Offences by up to 26% when comparing data for 2012 with 2016. [vi] Due to the reforms, the volume and character of the caseload has changed in a way to make this difficult to analyse, but suggestions are made in the conclusion.
4.1 On 27 02 13 the Lord Chancellor told the Committee[vii] about the importance of HMI of Probation. In his ‘not satisfactory’ evidence he said that he valued ‘the really powerful role’ that they played, and casually added that they had ‘one or two very useful thoughts’.
Subsequently, in a press interview in September 2014, he said -
"I have asked the Probation Inspectorate if they discover anything in the reforms or how they are being implemented which would put the public at risk.
"They have not come back to me and said this.”[viii]
4.2 This is very strange since there are many warnings (cited below) about public protection within the work of HMI on Serious Further Offences, which are cited below.
It is therefore unclear whether he either took evidence from HMI on SFOs and ignored it, or failed to take the evidence.
I believe that the Committee should be able to scrutinise this evidence.
This is a question of public interest.
[Note: His evidence was deemed ‘not satisfactory’ by the Committee in the Interim Report of 22 01 14.] [ix]
4.3 Useful and Powerful Evidence from HMI of Probation
HM Inspectorate reviewed three very significant and relevant Serious Further Offence cases between 2006 and 2009.
Each was a murder committed while the offender was under supervision.
In the majority of Serious Further Offence reviews there is no criticism of the standard of offender management, but in these three cases there were significant problems or errors which were instructive to almost everyone in probation at the time. It seems improbable that HM Inspectorate were unware of these findings a few years later, if asked to report to the Lord Chancellor.
4.4 [redacted]
4.5 In summary, the critical findings relevant to SFOs were that –
- arrangements for separate specialist public protection teams are liable to lead to losses of continuity of offender management and of shared understandings of risk of harm; [source – Case A - ‘Principle Finding 4’] [see ref 9]
- continuity, consistency, and clarity of lead management of a case throughout sentence is a critical component in public safety whose loss, notably through transfers, is a key contribution to ‘cumulative’ failure; [sources – principle findings in cases of offenders A and B [see refs 10 and 9]
- an organisation which is under stress can contribute to failures of communication, judgement, and good practice; this is the case in particular when there are features such as caseloads which are too high; staff sickness rates that are too high; difficulties in high staff turnover caused by problems in recruitment and retention of staff; lack of experience not only in staff but also in managers – thus leading to a lack of supervision and support of the front-line staff – leading in turn to the staff feeling overwhelmed; IT failures; and behind most of this the impact of budgetary cuts. [ref 13]. These were the organisational features found by HMI after it was called to investigate a major internal report on a Serious Further Offence of particular gravity in Case C. [see ref 13]
- ‘questions’ about operational accountability for failures of practice up to Board/Trust level had arisen. To this might be added Ministry of Justice level.
4.6 In other words –
Do not split offender managers into higher/lower risk teams.
Do not arrange staff in a way that diminishes single lead responsibility throughout the sentence.
Do not be surprised if stressing the service will lead to failures.
Do not fail to maintain accountability at the top.
4.7 It is extremely difficult to see how these lessons, learnt at such cost to victims, were built in to Transforming Rehabilitation.
5 ‘A Key Contribution to Cumulative Failure’ – Loss Through Transfers across Divisions
5.1 The difficulty of case transfers, relevant in Cases A, B, and C above, is of special relevance to this discussion for two reasons.
- Firstly, it has long been known that the breakdown of a case is most likely to arise at the point of transfer; a Home Office Research study [which I clearly recall but have been unable to relocate] came to this conclusion over 20 years ago in its study of parole cases. This may be common sense to the Committee. Most of us have a doctor at some time in our lives. How well do we think a doctor knows our case when it is transferred at frequent and irregular intervals?
- Secondly, the new fracture in services adds a fresh layer of transfer issues through transfer to another service. When risk is rising, a case is more likely to require a transfer across the private/public boundary. This is precisely the moment when there is the need for most clarity of leadership, consistency, commitment and continuity in the relationship with the offender. The sensitive balance of support and direction may be about to change.
5.2 The case of offender C illustrates painfully well the practice problem of transfers of cases and communications; there were issues when transferring information and assessments -
- across sectors within the same service [as between probation staff in different functions such as courts, unpaid work, or offender management, perhaps in different geographical locations], and
- between professionals from different services [as from a Youth Offending Team, a prison doctor, or a prison officer to Probation Services and onwards to courts and police] who are likely to have different systems and language, as well as varying policies on confidentiality; and
- across and between different services in different sectors such as Courts staff in one area, police staff in another, and probation staff in others - which in the last resort contributed to the final breakdown of the critical understandings about breach/recall arrangements that should have worked to take control of offender CA.
5.3 Evidence such as this suggests that structural changes which increase in the need to transfer cases, such as across new divisions, will increase the risks of lost understandings and expertise between staff, and also the risk of reoffending.
5.4 However, the Lord Chancellor told the Committee it would be a ‘simple process’[x] of a ‘call up the corridor’.[xi]
6 High Risk Offenders are less likely to commit Serious Further Offences
6.1 The problem of understanding Serious Further Offences is underlined by another source. An independent research study by Craissati and Sindall[xii] of 94 Serious Further Offences in Inner London from 2004 to 2006, found evidence from sources including HMI Probation[xiii] that -
‘The SFO characteristics – in keeping with previous studies – were wide ranging, as were risk profiles of the offenders, the majority of whom fell into the medium risk range.’ and
‘There are a number of learning points from this study, the overarching one being that there is nothing obviously indicating that these offenders stand out as particularly unusual or worrying. This finding is in line with a number of other documents which suggest that SFOs within the probation service tend to be committed by a heterogeneous group including a number of low to medium risk offenders, many of who[m], are on community sentences, and most of whom are not considered high enough risk to be discussed by the MAPPP.’
6.2 The Committee may be surprised to find that this Serious Further Offence ‘majority’ of low to medium risk offenders is managed by the Community Rehabilitation Companies under the new contracts.
6.3 Moreover, if one assumes that the majority of short sentence prisoners are not high risk [which seems reasonable], it also means that the majority of the increase in SFOs is likely to be in the private sector – which may not be what they expected.
6.4 The finding is important because it suggest that offenders in both medium and high risk categories should be managed with exactly the same understandings of their risks and needs.
7 Conclusions
7.1 Muddled thinking and missing information – ‘a Time to Tear…’[xiv]
Otherwise ‘excellent’ probation services were broken up on the basis of these very wobbly foundations of data and information. These findings from yesterday can make a contribution to the Committee achieving a fresh perspective about the problems today because they may show that the foundations are wrong for both sectors of this programme, and that they need either rebuilding or remedying. Before decisions what needs to be done, the preliminary step to any remedy would surely be an acknowledgment of the consequences of this issue. However, the Committee may also feel that there is a more serious case for enquiry.
7.2 Stressful conditions
The Committee may be able to judge whether the above issues were so serious as to be responsible for many of the stresses that have followed the break-up of the services, and the increases and other problems with workloads and resources, already been made known to the Committee; these are important not simply for their impact on staff but for their foreseeable impact on the conditions that raise the risk of errors that contribute to Serious Further Offences. It appears that the analysis of the fundamental issues was bad enough to create a predisposition for the future problems.
7.3 Divided Responsibility with Serious Offences – the two issues together
Whilst it is already acknowledged in previous hearings that divided responsibility can lead to many problems – and conspicuously getting the right staff resources in the right place at the right time – the independent evidence is that even within an undivided service an artificial split in responsibility for offenders raises the likelihood of risk of serious further offences. It must follow that this raised risk will be aggravated by the additional complexity of the public/private division.
7.4 Lessons from Previous Serious Further Offences
It needs to be understood why the useful lessons outlined in section 4 were not heeded, and not built into the reforms.
7.5 Scrutiny of Serious Further Offences
Firstly, It should be possible to obtain an analysis based on a single strata of offenders – such as 12 to 24 months custody – or a particular community sentence - and then to ask for information about the proportion of cases where staff mistakes contributed to the likelihood of the offence. These proportions can be compared for the years following 2009, but before and after the reforms.
Secondly, it should be possible to request data that shows whether the previous rate of reduction in the occurrence of Serious Further Offences (section 3.11 above) has been maintained after the reforms but discounting the new responsibilities.
7.6 Accountability
A Home Secretary could once be called to the House to make a statement with a Serious Further Offence as serious as Case C. It is suggested that a lack of clear accountability raises risk, and the question arises of who would report today to the House in a case that fell on the boundary of the public/private sectors. It needs to be confirmed that the Lord Chancellor of the future would be responsible for explaining, if possible, why the divided responsibility for a Serious Further Offence of gravity was not wholly his/her ministerial responsibility.
7.7 Shared Understandings – ‘and a Time to Mend’[xv]
If one assumes that there is only limited scope for any ‘fixing’ of the current system, the need for developing shared understandings seems to be a top priority from the evidence of the Serious Further Offences. There is still a need to work as a team across the divide, which must mean shared training and experience, with integrated systems and standards that help people to talk to each other without inhibition.
7.8 Shared Responsibility for Reform
It should never be forgotten that in a scrutiny of the need for Transforming Rehabilitation, a focus on the probation services is almost irrelevant without remembering their more expensive sister, the Prison Service, whose responsibility for the reform of prisoners goes back to the Prison Act of 1898[xvi]; also the courts who pass the sentences. A serious effort at reforming rehabilitation might take this into account with a look at the reforms in Scotland.
7.9 The Lord Chancellor’s Gold Standard
It is impossible to underestimate the contribution of the former Lord Chancellor in his remarks about the fracture of probation supervision being managed with by a ‘simple process’ and ‘a call up the corridor to the public protection guy’. If this visionary aspiration for the future is to be realized it requires huge forces to make sure that shared understandings and teamwork across the public/private sector division are so strong that an officer ‘up the corridor’ is available, willing and able to quickly get to grips, and that the people either side of the line work together without fear of criticism. There will be no sense of passing the buck, no fear about workloads, or jealousy about targets, or doubt that assessments are incomplete. This nirvana of instinctive cooperation should be the gold standard of the future, by which the Committee can test the working of the reforms.
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