Written evidence submitted by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (BSI0070)
Introductory Remarks
1. UKAEA’s mission is to enable the commercial development of fusion power and related technology, and help position the UK as a leader in sustainable nuclear energy. As well as the UK’s own fusion R&D programme (funded mainly by EPSRC but with contributions from Euratom), UKAEA is paid by Euratom to operate JET – the largest fusion facility in the world and the largest EU R&D facility in the UK – on behalf of the coordinated European fusion R&D programme. Through Euratom, UKAEA also has major roles in ITER, the next generation fusion experiment which aims to demonstrate ten times more fusion power out than the power input to heat the fuel. UK industry, often in partnership with UKAEA, has successfully secured contracts from ITER worth over €500M so far and there is scope to more than double this.
2. The UK is genuinely world-leading in fusion R&D as acknowledged by many reviews, most recently by EPSRC: https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/newsevents/pubs/indrevfissionfusion. With the advent of ITER – the global collaboration proof-of-principle project now under construction in France – fusion is entering the delivery era. Through hosting JET on behalf of Euratom, combined with unique capabilities in fusion technologies, the UK is currently positioned to lead the world in delivery of fusion power plants.
3. As well as hosting the world’s premier fusion experiment, UKAEA has also pioneered the spherical tokamak concept, which holds the promise of smaller and cheaper fusion reactors in the future. A novel scheme to significantly reduce exhaust heat from fusion reactors (a major challenge for powerplants) will be tested in a new device, MAST Upgrade at Culham, which is due to begin operation soon. This will be one of the two world’s leading spherical tokamaks, and in collaboration with NSTX-U in the US, will test the physics basis for a spherical tokamak power plant
4. UKAEA has developed, in collaboration with universities and industry, a portfolio of capabilities in all areas needed to deliver fusion. UKAEA has recently opened centres to study nuclear materials (the Materials Research Facility, http://www.ccfe.ac.uk/mrf.aspx) and robotics (Remote Applications in Challenging Environments, http://www.race-ukaea.uk/). Recently £86M from the industrial strategy challenge fund was awarded to UKAEA to host two new facilities, the Hydrogen-3 Advanced Technology (H3AT) centre and Fusion Technology Facilities (FTF) which will develop technology needed for fusion reactors, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/86-million-boost-for-uk-nuclear-fusion-programme. These facilities and related UKAEA expertise will be accessible to industry and research organisations.
5. This portfolio of capabilities also means that UKAEA is well-placed to support a number of aspects of fission development. For instance, both RACE and MRF are undertaking work for the fission community. In addition, UKAEA has leading-edge nuclear data and neutronics codes and significantly, a capability in reactor engineering design, which is expanding in the lead-up to the design of a demonstration fusion reactor. UKAEA, on behalf of STFC, is also using this expertise to design and procure the remote handling ‘hot cell’ part of the UK’s ‘in-kind’ contribution to the European Spallation Source.
Hereafter, the comments relate specifically to the UK fusion programme and our future relationship with the Euratom Research & Training Programme.
Comments on the Government’s Future Partnership Paper 'Collaboration on science and innovation', including any challenges not fully acknowledged and opportunities not fully explored.
6. Firstly, it is worth stating explicitly how the UK benefits in fusion R&D from our membership of the Euratom Research & Training Programme:
7. In the Future Partnership Paper on “Collaboration on science and innovation” (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642542/Science_and_innovation_paper.pdf) the government stated that “The UK hopes to find a way to continue working with the EU on nuclear R&D, including the JET and ITER programmes”.
8. Subsequently, the Secretary of State for BEIS made the following written statement on 11th January 2018: “The UK’s specific objectives in respect of the future relationship are to seek a close association with the Euratom Research and Training Programme, including the Joint European Torus (JET) and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) projects”.
9. Whilst this ministerial statement does not set out the terms of a close association, the fact that there are precedents, such as the agreement Ukraine has with the Euratom Research and Training Programme, provides encouragement to the community that an agreement can be reached for future UK participation in the programme.
10. The terms of each precedent association agreement vary, so there is scope for the UK to seek an agreement that meets it needs. The Ukraine agreement does not have any direct jurisdiction by the CJEU and only provides for “free movement and residence of research workers participating in the activities” covered by the association. The Swiss agreement (which involves participation in the EU as well as the Euratom Framework programme) has similar CJEU and mobility clauses. However, as part of its close relationship with the EU, Switzerland has a much broader agreement on the free movement of people that is linked to the R&T agreement; the EU threatened to suspend the association agreement when a Swiss referendum that would have partially restricted free movement occurred. The ease or difficulty of finding mutually acceptable terms for the UK association with Euratom will only become apparent when detailed negotiations start.
Comments on the issues identified in previous S&T Committee reports (see below) that have since been addressed, and which still require attention.
Reports from four Commons and Lords select committee inquiries have considered the issue of Euratom and the implications for fusion research:
11. BEIS select committee - Brexit and the implications for UK business inquiry (Civil Nuclear sector). 2nd report published Dec 2017 - https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-energy-industrial-strategy/inquiries/parliament-2017/inquiry/
“We recommend that the Government seeks to maintain the existing benefits of EU R&D collaboration, for example through an agreement similar to those held by Switzerland and Ukraine with Euratom.
The Government should also seek clarity and update the House with its assessment of how the Austrian presidency may affect the chances of the timely resolution of JET’s funding. If this does appear to be a material concern, the Government should fast track the funding negotiations, and put in place contingency arrangements, not dependent on a European Commission decision, to allow JET’s continuation until the negotiations are resolved.”
12. BEIS select committee - Leaving the EU: negotiation priorities for energy and climate change policy. Final report published April 2017 -https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmbeis/909/909.pdf
“The Government should explore options to maintain the benefits of our existing research cooperation with Euratom, such as third party membership. Special consideration should be given to funding arrangements that would allow continued operation of, and access to, world-leading research projects including JET and ITER.”
13. House of Lords - Brexit : Energy Security. Final report published January 2018 - https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/63/63.pdf
“We welcome the Government’s commitment to continuing to fund nuclear research in the UK, whether or not EU funding is maintained. We recommend that the Government looks to maintain the post-Brexit viability of the Joint European Torus (JET), and ensures that the UK is able to participate in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) despite its withdrawal from Euratom.
We also note that the United Kingdom’s membership of Euratom is legally distinct from its EU membership, and that in the Prime Minister’s Article 50 notification letter of 29 March 2017 a separate notification was made in respect of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom. This suggests that separate transitional arrangements may also be possible, if they are needed in order to mitigate the risk of a cliff-edge. We therefore call on the Government to review and report to Parliament on the possibility of a Euratom-specific transition period separate from the wider Brexit process.”
14. House of Lords - Nuclear Research and Technology: Breaking the cycle of indecision
“There is a real urgency for Government action on this. The UK’s membership of Euratom must not be allowed to expire without a suitable replacement being in place. Such an eventuality would put the UK at risk of losing its lead in fusion research and in effect throw away decades of research. Furthermore it would put the UK at risk of losing access to the markets and skills it needs to construct new nuclear power plants and may leave existing stations unable to acquire fuel.”
15. A common theme in these inquiries is to recommend seeking an association to Euratom. Some progress has been made in this area : the UK-EU joint report in December 2017 (see paragraph 16) suggests that the UK can continue to participate in all fusion programmes until the end the framework programme in December 2020 (i.e. through most/all of a proposed implementation period) and the written statement from the Secretary of State for BEIS on the 11 January (see paragraph 8), indicates that a bespoke UK association with the Euratom Research & Training Programme will be sought to allow research and training to continue post-2020. What still remains, however, is the implementation of these statements into formal legislation or negotiating positions and subsequently achieving an agreement that is mutually acceptable to the UK and the EU.
The pros, cons and remaining uncertainties for science and research following the recent UK/EU agreement for an ‘Orderly UK withdrawal'.
16. The UK-EU joint report states that: “Following withdrawal from the Union, the UK will continue to participate in the Union programmes financed by the MFF 2014-2020 until their closure. Entities located in the UK will be entitled to participate in such programmes. Participation in Union programmes will require the UK and UK beneficiaries to respect all relevant Union legal provisions including co-financing. Accordingly, the eligibility to apply to participate in Union programmes and Union funding for UK participants and projects will be unaffected by the UK’s withdrawal from the Union for the entire lifetime of such projects”
17. This joint report suggests, assuming it is enacted into legislation in this form, that the UK can continue to participate in all fusion programmes (EUROfusion, JET operation, F4E and ITER) until the end of the Framework programme, i.e. December 2020. This provides reassurance for the community and should provide sufficient time to agree a close association that the UK government have confirmed they intend to seek (see paragraph 8).
18. A key issue that will need to be addressed is reaching an agreement on the mobility of the specialist scientists and engineers. This mobility is needed both to ensure the world-leading impact of the UK and JET programmes are maintained and to ensure UK researchers have access to EU facilities and programmes, including ITER. As far as practicable this needs to be frictionless, flexible and administratively simple.
Comments on the consequences of any short-term uncertainty during the negotiation period, and how these can be addressed.
19. The current Euratom work programme ends in December 2018. An extension to the Euratom programme for 2019-2020 has been proposed to the EU Council for approval. It is expected that the regulation which will allow a continuation of the Euratom R&T programme will be approved in the first semester of 2018.
20. The work plan for 2019-2020 will not be finalised until the end of 2018. It is not yet certain that JET operation will continue in 2019-2020 due to uncertainty surrounding the UK’s future relationship with Euratom. However, the UK government have told the European Commission that it is committed to funding the UK’s fair share for the continued operation of JET until the end of 2020 (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-commits-to-continue-funding-its-share-of-europes-flagship-uk-based-nuclear-fusion-research-facility). This shows a clear intention to extend operation of JET and has provided reassurance to the European Commission.
21. There remains uncertainty about the nature of the close association in the next framework programme period from 2021 onwards. It is important to reach clarity on this future relationship as early as possible to put in place the appropriate plans, notably concerning for the future of JET beyond the end of 2020. The discussions concerning the FP9 programme will take place in the European Commission and EU Council this year, with stakeholder consultations launched in January 2018.
Comments on the UK's future participation in Horizon-2020 and its successor programmes, including any alternative models that should be explored.
22. It is possible to benefit from participation in this Euratom R&T programme by reaching an Association Agreement. Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty allows the Commission to enter into agreements with third states. Two such association agreements have been reached with the Ukraine and Switzerland. In addition, Article 206 of the Euratom Treaty has the provision that “The Community may conclude with one or more States or international organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures.” It appears that this Article has never been used to give a third state associate status under the Treaty, so it is not clear whether this could be an alternative approach in practice and if so whether it would be more beneficial to the UK than an Article 101 agreement. The Treaty also provides for “freedom of employment for specialists within the Community”, though not generic freedom of movement. There is no direct jurisdiction of the CJEU over member states as a result of the Euratom R&T programme, though the CJEU is used for arbitration.
23. Since a member state has never left Euratom and sought an association, the negotiations will need to reach a bespoke agreement to change the regulation for Euratom R&T programme during 2019-2020 to enable this, though this is thought to be achievable.
24. The alternative model for a continued participation with Euratom would be for the UK to become an unassociated “third state” to Euratom, which essentially means a collaborator with no financial contribution or governance role. This could provide a last-resort option for the UK to retain some involvement in the EU programme if an association agreement proves not to be possible. However, it would give the UK little or no influence and risks the UK losing it world-leading position in fusion research. Also this route would not provide access to ITER and hence alternative options would have to be pursued, such as seeking to join the ITER Agreement as a new member state. There is no precedent for this, and it will be extremely complex to negotiate, and it would be difficult for the UK to achieve as good an involvement as it has at present.
Comments concerning whether recent science co-operation deals (eg. the Joint UK-China Strategy for Science and UK-US Science and Technology Agreement) provide a suitable model for collaboration with other countries post-Brexit, including the EU.
25. Fusion is a truly international endeavour. Indeed, the ITER project is the largest collaborative R&D project ever undertaken, with participation from the EU, US, Japan, South Korea, India, Russia and China. Opportunities exist for enhanced collaboration with all of these partners in fusion R&D. It should be noted that the UK already participates in many collaborative endeavours with all of these countries, under the present arrangements.
26. The recent agreements with the US and China do represent suitable frameworks to provide bilateral collaboration. It is essential that clear commitment is shown to provide funding to enable this collaboration, clear expectations for the collaborations are provided to both parties, and commitment from the reciprocal party is delineated through the negotiations. Such bilateral collaborations work when there are clear terms of engagement agreed by both parties and both parties make unequivocal commitment to fund the joint projects that deliver mutual benefits. Anything less usually results in discussion rather than real technical advances through joint working.
February 2018