Written evidence from Dr Simon Duke, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration (BSD0001)
Executive Summary
The UK faces a challenging task both with regard to the forthcoming Brexit negotiations on the security and defence aspects, as well as establishing working relations with the EU and key EU partners on post-Brexit CSDP and other related security fields.
The UK government’s September 2017 position paper outlines a series of ambitious objectives, key amongst them being the demand for a ‘deep and special partnership with the EU that goes beyond existing third country arrangements’. The government’s case is based on the past and current contributions made to CSDP and, more generally, EU security.
The detailed responses to the eight questions posed by the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee that follow, suggest a number of key points:
Detailed responses to the questions posed[1]
1.1 A distinction between political support for CSDP missions and actual physical support of missions/operations is perhaps necessary at the outset. Decision-making in CSDP can be divided between the political decision (a CFSP decision) to start a mission and the parallel process of actually contributing to a mission; the latter being a decision made by the EU’s Member States on a case-by-case basis. Hence, a prima facie conclusion could be that at the political level UK support for successive CSDP missions/operations suggests broad alignment with its foreign policy priorities, whereas the decision to physically support a given mission or operation may be subject to a different set of calculations and thus conclusions.
1.2 With the initial distinction outlined above in mind, a more nuanced picture emerges. Based on data from the European University Institute (Florence) and the authors calculations, of the 35 past or current CSDP missions the UK has contributed to 25 with an average of 15.72 personnel per mission. In terms of all of the missions, the UK’s personnel contributions equal 2.3% of the total contributions by the EU’s members (or 4.3% of those operations and missions to which it contributed). The UK’s contributions pale in comparison to France and Italy in particular, who have contributed appreciably more to civilian and military operations overall. On only one occasion, a regional maritime capacity building mission for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP NESTOR), has the UK led the personnel contributions (with 19 personnel). The UK’s contributions of personnel to missions/operations compared to the size of the UK’s population as a ratio of the overall population of the EU (around 15%), suggests to some observers that the UK has not always pulled its weight. The UK has even been portrayed as a ‘laggard in recent years’ by prominent external analyst Professor Richard Whitman.
1.3 It should be borne in mind that contributions of personnel to CSDP missions only provides a rough gauge of strategic interest and it may exclude significant external factors that may go into the calculation of whether and what to contribute. Nevertheless, the UK’s pattern of involvement in CSDP missions suggests some basic alignments with the UK’s foreign policy interests and priorities:
a) The UK is particularly concerned about the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) (ATALANTA, SOPHIA and EUCAO Nestor being examples). Interest in post-Brexit cooperation with the EU in this sphere is likely to increase, given the importance to the UK of SLOCs in the context of the anticipated post-Brexit trade agreements with third parties;
b) The UK has an interest in operations/missions in the candidate countries or neighbourhood (a particular case in point being EULEX Kosovo, while others include EUPAT FyROM, EUPM BiH, PROXIMA, EUFOR ALTHEA/BiH and CONCORDIA FyROM). In some cases, this could be explained by the UK’s prior involvement in NATO operations, but it could also be linked to the UK’s strong support of the candidacy of the Western Balkan countries;
c) The UK has less interest in CSDP missions and operations in Africa, aside from those linked to (a). In those cases where the UK has not contributed all, except one (EUJUST THEMIS), are in Africa (DRC, CAR, Guinea-Bissau and Chad). Care has to be taken to not necessarily interpret this as active strategic disinterest since other variables could explain the UK’s decision in these cases, such as the small size of many of the operations and the willingness on the part of other EU partners to contribute, or the presence of a ‘lead nation’, like France, who provides the backbone of the contributions.
1.4 The advantages and disadvantages of UK (non)involvement will always be an issue of (increasingly) scarce national resources and the opportunity cost of their use for CSDP operations or missions. For military missions the UK has tended to calculate contributions in light of other strategic priorities that may fall outside the EU (the UK’s NATO contributions to Afghanistan being a case in point). For civilian missions the opportunity cost is the loss of expertise that could otherwise serve national objectives and priorities. In terms of the UK’s overall contributions, it has generally contributed proportionately less to civilian missions but this may again be a function of the ready presence of such expertise elsewhere in the EU. On those occasions when the UK has made a conspicuous contribution to civilian missions (EULEX KOSOVO and EUMM Georgia) regional security (or ‘resilience’) considerations may be to the fore.
1.5 In terms of the closeness of the CSDP missions/operations to the UK’s foreign policy goals it is fair to say that in most respects the UK has not been a driver of CSDP in the same way that France has been, with the possible exception of EU-NAVFOR ATALANTA. France has tied CSDP missions/operations closely to its strategic interests in, for example, EUCAP Sahel Mali, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR RCA or EU-SSR Guinea Bissau. But, it is worth noting, that this has often implied a greater commitment in terms of personnel and resources, often as the ‘framework nation’, than the UK has undertaken.
2.1 The UK has deployed personnel to 25 (out of 35) CSDP missions and operations. Statistics from the European University Institute (Florence) show that UK’s overall contributions remained below 100 annually until 2007 and then grew to just over 200 until 2013 when they approached 300. They then peaked in the mid-300s in 2015-2016 and returned to just above 300 in 2017. As was argued earlier, these figures are modest in comparative terms compared to France, Germany, Italy and even Austria. They are comparable with Greece in terms of overall contributions since 2003.
2.2 Such basic quantitative comparisons are open to the objection that they do not measure the UK’s qualitative contributions, nor those of a more general nature. The latter could include the diplomatic and crisis management expertise available to the EU through the official bodies (PSC, EU Military Committee, EU Military Staff, CPCC etc). The operational experience and professionalism that the UK brings to the table is of enormous value. The UK’s track record in leadership positions in many of these bodies (and, beyond that, in other security-related agencies like EUROPOL) is a further significant contribution.
2.3 The less tangible elements underpinning CFSP/CSDP also include UK support to the analysis of intelligence (via the INTCEN and the Military Intelligence Directorate and the resultant Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity). Other forms of general support would include the UK’s role in multilateral fora, such as the UN, to ensure wider support for new (or renewed) CSDP missions and operations.
2.4 The government’s September 2017 position paper gives a detailed summary of the UK’s many contributions to CSDP (as well as to broader EU security). But, it is not always presented in a readily understandable context (what portion of the EU’s total contribution does the UK represent, how much did it pay etc?) nor, for obvious reasons, did the position paper dwell on those instances when the UK did not contribute. The position paper stresses the UK’s leadership role in a number of operations (such as the UK’s command of ATALANTA, its role as a ‘leading contributor’ to SOPHIA and its ‘key leadership role’ in ALTHEA). Other assessments, such as that contained in Angus Lapsley’s oral evidence presented to this committee on 11 January 2018, note that the UK pays 16% of the common costs of military missions and a similar amount for civilian operations. He also noted that UK contributions constitute around 20% of the force catalogue and the UK also provides an over-the-horizon backstop.
2.5 There is the danger that existing assessments may exaggerate the UK’s contributions to CSDP missions and operations and thus the value of this contribution as part of Phase II of the Brexit negotiations. Let me give an example of the way in which assessments can be ‘deconstructed’ using Lapsley’s oral evidence, cited above, as an example. Common costs are allocated on a sliding GNI basis which makes the UK’s contribution a matter of simple maths but, more significantly, common costs only constitute around 10-15% of the overall costs of CSDP missions and operations. When it comes to personnel, the UK’s contributions may well constitute around 20% of the force catalogue, but there is no automatic assumption of their availability for CSDP mission (as a comparison with the UK’s actual contributions shows). The UK may also offer an implicit over-the-horizon backstop, but no such role has appeared explicitly in the mandates of any past or current CSDP mission.
2.6 The overarching point being offered is simply to suggest that the UK undoubtedly puts much on the table, but when viewed from non-UK perspective less generous assessments are possible (and may lead to different perspectives regarding the implied bargaining leverage of the UK’s security role). It cannot be assumed that the forthcoming negotiations will be based on the government’s upbeat assessment of the UK’s contributions to CSDP missions contained in the September 2017 position paper.
2.7 The impact of the UK’s absence on the EU’s ability to deliver CSDP missions is hard to predict with any accuracy. Two general indicators can, however, be offered. First, the government’s September 2017 paper stress the UK’s leadership role in CSDP missions. The UK will be unable to exercise this role as a non-member of the EU, nor will it have a hand in the decision-making and planning of missions. Any future role will therefore be that of a facilitator, rather than a leader. Second, aside from the leadership role and the personnel contributions to CSDP missions, the diplomatic weight and backing of the UK will continue to count. The aspect is not entirely dependent upon the ongoing negotiations and any resultant ‘deal’ since the UK can decide to support the objectives, mandate and execution of CSDP missions from outside the EU, as countries like Canada and Norway do. This would include the UK’s willingness to use its weight in international fora like the UN Security Council, the G7 and regional security organisations.
2.8 There is evidently much about the UK’s CSDP presence and contributions that will be missed in a post-Brexit scenario. But, it should also be borne in mind that to some of the EU27 the absence of the UK has benefits. It was Federica Mogherini who pointedly reminded the assembled EU Heads of Delegation in Brussels on 5 September 2016 that, ‘We have the political space today to do things that were not really do-able in the previous years’.
3.1 The UK government’s September 2017 position paper notes that the UK and the EU share common valued and principles in their external relations as well as shared threats. The UK therefore remains ‘committed to using its assets, capabilities and influence alongside the EU and its European partners’. At a general level it is reasonable to expect that there will be occasions on which the UK may wish to contribute financially and with staff/troops as appropriate.
3.2 The financial costs of contributing will differ slightly for a post-Brexit UK. Most costs of CSDP missions are borne by the Member States, with third parties supporting their own contributions. The EU members pay into the Athena mechanism, for common costs, on a sliding GNI scale. Since the UK will leave the EU, it will not be liable for these costs, although it may still benefit from access to facilities funded through the mechanism. As noted earlier, common costs constitute a relatively small portion of the overall mission costs. It may be that longer-term costs become evident for the UK, and savings for the EU, in the event of greater EU defence industrial, R&D/R&T support, and the use of common procurement, standards and platforms by the EU27.
3.3 Calculations about when and what to contribute will be made on the basis of national interest. Appeals to the common ties noted in the September 2017 position paper may, however, be weakened in light of the post-Brexit absence of the obligations to loyalty and solidarity that exist at the EU level. The UK’s primary interest is likely to remain maritime, especially ensuring that SLOCs are open for trade beyond the EU. It is also more likely that many of the UK’s security interests will remain in the EU’s neighbourhood area, including the EU’s candidates, if only for the simple reason that many of the EU’s members are also NATO members.
3.4 There may also be differences between civilian and military missions. On the former it depends, in part, on whether sufficient police, rule of law and other civil administration skills are available in the EU27. The UK may decide that there are benefits to associating with CSDP civilian missions, especially in those areas where there are ramifications for the EU’s internal security (counterterrorism, organised crime and cybersecurity) where the UK may wish to establish closer connections and access to vital databases.
3.5 On the military dimensions, the issue is partly whether to contribute, but if so in what capacity (especially given the earlier observation that the UK will surrender much of its leadership role in post-Brexit CSDP). There may again be arguments in favour of contributing to CSDP missions in the expectation that there may be trade-offs for European security more generally and NATO’s role (this kind of linkage was suggested during the recent UK-France Summit where the UK pledged logistical support for French forces engaged in Operation Barkhane and French support for the UK-led NATO battlegroup in Estonia in 2019).
4.1 The broad response is that the UK post-Brexit would have the same rights and privileges as any other third-party contributor, unless of course the UK is successful in negotiating some form of unique partnership that is not available to any other third country (as is the government’s apparent ambition). Suggestions for various forms of privileged association, which might include observer status in the PSC for instance, surfaced in the pre-and post-Brexit referendum debates. Such notions suggest a lack of familiarity with how the EU actually works and, it is tempting to suggest, how the UK is perceived in various Brussels quarters.
4.2 The issue of the UK’s continued participation in decision-making on CSDP overlaps somewhat with the next question and will therefore be answered in more detail below.
5.1 Thierry Tardy of the EU Institute for Security Studies estimated in 2014 that approximately 45 non-EU states have participated in CSDP missions and operations since 2003. There are therefore many instances of third party involvement. Broadly speaking, third parties contribute for differing and sometimes overlapping reasons. The EU candidate countries and a number of neighbourhood countries with Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (like Georgia and Ukraine) do so to demonstrate solidarity with the EU. A second group includes non-EU NATO members, like Norway and Turkey, who share the same security challenges with the EU’s members. A third group include important regional actors, like Brazil, Russia and South Africa, who may wish to associate with the EU’s objectives in a specific case and who may wish to be seen as operating at the regional level. A final group includes those who have made primarily symbolic contributions, but who may wish to associate themselves with the broader international values and principles that the EU stands for.
5.2 Association as third parties with CSDP missions is via a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA). FPA’s, as a matter of principle, conform to the notion that third state contributions are without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union. Normally, involvement of third parties in CSDP operations and missions is only approved by the PSC at a relatively late stage and this does not involve their participation in decision-making at the political level, the drafting of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) or the Operation Plan (OPLAN). Once invited by the PSC, they are required to accept the EU’s timeline and procedures. They are, however, normally included in the ‘force generation’ conference for invited third parties (where the decisions on the required assets and personnel are made) which follows a similar conference for the EU contributors. Third parties will also become part of the Committee of Contributors (CoC) which is responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the mission or operation. In some instances, the EU has established general security dialogues with third parties in the context of their overall relations with the EU, or even sector-specific dialogues on, for instance, counter-terrorism or cyber security (this is typically found in the cases of the EU candidates, a number of neighbourhood countries and non-EU NATO members).
5.3 In the absence of any unique agreement between the UK and the EU, we shall have to assume that the UK will be treated as other third parties are. This implies that the UK will not have a voice in the planning of CSDP missions and operations to which it may contribute and a limited voice (via the Committee of Contributors) on the execution of a mission or operation. It is worth reiterating Michel Barnier’s somewhat blunt reminder, delivered at a security conference in Berlin on 29th November 2017, that Brexit implies:
5.4 Perhaps to soften the tone a little with the forthcoming negotiations in mind, the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, referred on 13th December 2017 to developing ‘mechanisms’ for closer and more constant coordination with non-EU countries and international organisations. At the time of writing the nature of these ‘mechanisms’ is not clear, but it is unlikely to be confined solely to the UK and is unlikely to involve getting closer to the decision-making or planning tables – this is what non-membership implies, as Barnier observed.
6.1 The simple answer is that it is likely to depend upon both. The possibility of some form of ‘security bargain’ where the UK links national security concerns, such as continued access to key EU data bases (SIS II, European Arrest Warrants, ECRIS etc.), to some form of guarantee on CSDP contributions/availability is quite possible. In this respect it is clear that the UK and the EU could both stand to gain.
6.2 But, any such bargain will be subject to progress in the wider negotiations on the UK’s post-Brexit relations with the EU. This applies in particular to trade, especially when there are direct connections with security and defence. The UK’s aerospace sector is especially vulnerable (which in 2007-2016 accounted for around 85% of all defence exports and around 128,000 employees in the UK). The ability of this sector to thrive depends less upon European orders (the UK’s largest defence contracts are with the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar) but it is heavily dependent upon the free movement of persons (either for research or skilled labour) and multinational collaboration. The shape of any future agreements in the defence industrial/technology sector will also determine what access the EU has to relevant research funding, the extent to which it will be involved in multinational research and production, its access to critical technical knowledge and association with agencies such as the European Defence Agency. The ability, or inability, to reach agreement in sensitive sectors such as aerospace will, in turn, influence the mood music when it comes to any discussions on CSDP.
6.3 The ability and willingness of the UK to participate in post-Brexit CSDP missions will also depend upon the shape and direction of European defence integration. If, as is the ambition, the EU is successful in moving towards a European Defence Union, complete with greater interoperability, sharing of key assets, specialisation, common platforms and procurement procedures, it may become more difficult for the UK to participate in the longer-term. It is therefore imperative that the initiatives that have been taken in security and defence since the UK’s 2016 referendum result are taken at face value and that active thought about the nature and scope of the UK’s association with a putative European Defence Union, not only CSDP, is taken seriously.
7.1 At a general level the UK will have to invest in staff and financial resources in Brussels and may also have to reinforce its presence in the capitals of the EU27 as well. Brexit will imply that the UK will be cut off from the routine exchange of information that take place within the EU’s institutions and members (at working group, technical, expert, ambassadorial and ministerial levels). It will also be cut off from the various streams of classified exchange, like COREU, that feed the diplomatic and security communities and the EU member’s capitals. In their absence the UK will have to invest more time and energy in informing itself. At a minimum, this will require upgrading the UK’s diplomatic presence in Brussels.
7.2 There may also be generalised knock-on effects for British embassies who stand to lose access to information gleaned through the EU delegations and the routine sharing with other EU members. There may also be effects for the intelligence community. A common impression is that the UK is well provided for in this regard by the Five Eyes Agreement with the US and other allies, and that Brexit will therefore have little impact in this regard. This ignores several factors, such as access to a number of EU early warning systems, the increasing value of synthesized intelligence (i.e. analysis from multiple sources that can be cross-checked) and the exchange of civilian and military intelligence analysis at the EU level. It is therefore conceivable that the UK will have to invest more in these areas as well, subject of course to the details of any forthcoming agreement between the UK and the EU.
7.3 Other forms of less direct costs associated with post-Brexit CFSP/CSDP may emerge in time. For instance, the considerable amount of time spent on coordinating positions in multilateral organisations between the EU Member States (notably in the UN context in Geneva and New York) involved multiple meetings per annum. At first glance this may appear to represent a saving for the UK, but time will still have to be invested in coordination with the UK’s principal European political and security partners. This may be as time consuming, or even more so, outside of the EU’s groups and committees that facilitate discussion and the exchange of information.
7.4 The UK could choose to align more closely with a small group of able EU partners in lieu of CSDP. The emergence of a web of bilateral security agreements and commitments with Poland (December 2017), France (January 2018) and an anticipated one with Germany, suggests this as a possibility. The costs associated with the recent Anglo-French summit at Sandhurst suggest that the potential ‘costs’ of bilateralism, mentioned briefly above, may be unpredictable and involve trade-offs that may not have occurred in the EU environment.
7.5 The full financial and staff consequences of Brexit for the EU are not clear. Brexit will imply less staff and the Union’s overall budget will be reduced by around 12%. The latter will be discussed in more detail in the context of the discussions leading up to the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. The question of whether the EU27 should increase their contributions, as has been suggested by Jean-Claude Juncker, to make up for the Brexit shortfall in contributions has already generated differing opinions and is likely to remain controversial.
7.6 The EU will also lose the presence of UK diplomatic and crisis management staff and expertise in the EU’s institutions. With reference to CFSP/CSDP the UK represented 7% of the EEAS staff at administrative (AD) level in 2015. In terms of AD officials working in the EEAS, the UK represented 39 or 620 at AD level (or 6%). The UK accounted for 28 out of 307 (or 9%) or Member State diplomats on temporary assignment. The majority of UK staff involved in the crisis management bodies in Brussels are seconded national experts (SNEs). At the end of 2015 there were 434 SNES in the EEAS (376 based in Brussels and 58 in delegations). Most of the SNEs worked in the crisis management structures and 151 (or 40%) were seconded ‘cost-free’ to the EEAS HQ (i.e. paid for by the Member State in question) and most of the SNE’s in delegation (80%) were cost free. The exact numbers of UK SNEs is not readily available, but the return of the UK SNEs will not necessarily represent a ‘saving’ if they are merely absorbed back into national functions and greater investment is necessary by the UK in its diplomatic presence in Brussels and other EU Member State capitals.
7.7 Brexit will imply that the EEAS and more generally the EU institutions will suffer from the loss of experience and expertise represented by UK fonctionnaires and Member State diplomats serving in the EU. Since the EU’s broad foreign and security policy objectives will remain unaltered by Brexit, the challenge of meeting these objectives with fewer staff and, quite possibly, a lower overall budget, will be profound.
7.8 Any precise calculations will depend upon the content of any ‘deal’ reached between the UK and the EU, but the general observations sketched above suggest that for the moment caution is merited if the assumption is that Brexit will offer significant savings for UK defence and security if it ceased to participate in CSDP missions. There will be negative qualitative and quantitative consequences for the EU and, in particular, the already overstretched EEAS.
8.1 The short answer would be, not very. Although these ambitions have been nominally attained in the declaratory sense (‘Headline Goals’ have been achieved), CSDP still suffers from unpredictability and shortfalls when it comes to the question of whether the requisite forces, skills and logistical support will be available for CSDP missions, alongside questions about the state of preparedness and planning. The EU remains heavily dependent upon either the willingness of a Member State to become a ‘framework nation’, or the munificence of those participating in the force generation conference. The prospect of potential shortfalls serves to underline the importance of third party support and contributions.
8.2 The EU is well-aware of these shortcomings (nor are they unique to the EU) and is slowly moving towards either shared resources, such as the European Air Transport Command (EATC) at Eindhoven, prospective new common facilities like the EU Medical Command, or to benefit from alignment at the national level as in the integration of the Belgian and Dutch navies since 1996. In addition, the European Commission and the EDA have advocated initiatives that may lead to more common research and development, joint procurement, enhanced interoperability, specialisation and more expenditure on R&D/R&T and less of O&M. The potential savings from developing and deploying common infantry vehicles (estimated at €600 million) or a collective system for the certification of ammunition (€500 million) have been well rehearsed. The underpinning logic that if the EU27 cannot do more with more, they must do more with the same, is scarcely new or confined to defence and security (it applies, for instance, to the overseas diplomatic presence of many EU Member States).
8.3 The future attainment of the ambitions of Article 42(1) will depend upon:
8.4 The EU has defined a ‘new level of ambition’ for CSDP but there remain many challenges. In thinking ahead to a post-Brexit scenario the UK has to make a number of difficult calculations. It could, on the one hand, dismiss the various initiatives as hype since many of the ideas above have been seen before in different forms. Key concepts, like PESCO, that are central to the attainment of others may not work as envisaged. In this case, the UK would presumable reinforce its bilateral ties with key European partners and, wherever possible, strengthen European security through NATO.
8.5 On the other hand, if the initiatives and plans mentioned above are realised, the EU’s security and defence relations with the UK may be complicated by the fact that it is outside the EU and not subject to the common standards practiced in the EU. Greater EU collaboration on R&D, joint procurement and common (EU) platforms may also damage the market access and competitiveness of UK defence industries.
8.6 On balance, it would seem prudent to assume that the EU will make progress towards acquiring or developing the ‘operational capacity’ needed to underpin CSDP. In this scenario, the UK should actively explore the possibilities for engagement (such as associated status of the EDA, access to the EDF and research collaboration which might also include Horizon 2020, coordinate its own defence reviews with the EU’s CARD process, play an active role in any revamped ‘battlegroup’ concept and negotiate access to a revised version of the Athena mechanism).
22 January 2018
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[1] The questions contained a degree of overlap. Some responses are therefore longer and more thorough than others and may offer partial responses to other questions.