Written Evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (CIR0018)
Table of Contents
5. The ongoing One Belt One Road project, and what it means for the wider region and for the UK
6. China’s approach to regional organisations, including the ASEAN
9. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………13
As set out in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015, the rules-based international order is founded on relationships between states and through international institutions, with shared rules and agreements on behaviour. It has enabled economic integration and security cooperation to expand, to the benefit of people around the world. It has done much to encourage predictable behaviour by states and the non-violent management of disputes, and has led states to develop political and economic arrangements at home which favour open markets, the rule of law, participation and accountability. The rules-based international order also relies on enforcement of standards and laws covering a wide range of activities and behaviours. The UK has consistently championed this framework.
The context is changing, driven by developments such as the growing role of non-state actors, the impact of technology and longer-term shifts of economic wealth to the south and east of the world. Such changes create new challenges and opportunities. The rules-based international order has always relied for its effectiveness and legitimacy on the active participation and contribution of all states, in particular major states, and on the ability of institutions and relationships to adapt to reflect new opportunities and challenges. It will therefore be important to reflect the contribution of growing powers. We will continue to work with partners to adapt the rules-based international order to meet new challenges.
At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, President Xi Jinping expressed a vision which included the aim of expanding China’s status as a global actor, and increasing China’s reach and influence. The Deng Xiaoping approach of “hiding your light and biding your time” is now over. This new vision inevitably has implications for global institutions, rules and norms. As China embarks on this vision it will face further choices about whether it supports, shapes or works around elements of the existing rules based international order, and whether or not it seeks to establish alternative structures.
Much of China’s foreign policy is aimed at fostering an international environment conducive to its economic development, and securing wider influence commensurate with its growing status as a global power. It is also aimed at bolstering the rule of the Communist Party. China engages with international institutions on issues like internet governance and human rights in order to promote internationally its own authoritarian approach in these areas, and to reduce external criticism. China recognises that it has benefited from the post war international order. But China also wants to see this system adapted to give more weight to its interests as the world’s second largest economy. As illustrated in sections 3, 5 and 6 of this Memorandum, it has shown an increasing willingness in recent years to found new international initiatives.
China emphasises principles of sovereignty, non-interference and consensus. It also stands up firmly for its “core interests”, focussed on its position on territorial integrity. It is prepared to go against international consensus in defence of these (although this is not necessarily unusual state practice in itself). And it has an increasing interest in providing global goods which also benefit Chinese interests, such as on climate change or provision of peacekeepers in countries where Chinese citizens are present.
As a leading architect and supporter of the current system of institutions and relations, the UK also has choices about how to respond to significant global developments such as the rise of China. As the Prime Minister made clear in her speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2017, the UK is committed to maintaining the Golden Era of our relationship with China – not just as a vital trading partner but also as a fellow permanent member of the Security Council whose decisions, together with ours, will shape the world around us. This means that how China engages with the rules based international order, and how the UK works with China in this area, will have an important role in defining the success of the international order in the future. Strengthening this system, with the UN at its heart, is a key priority of British diplomacy. It enables global cooperation through which we seek to address international security and economic challenges, and protects our values.
The Government is engaging with China through the Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership we established in 2015, including a framework of Prime Ministerial summits; annual top-level dialogues covering foreign and security policy, economic and financial issues, and people to people cooperation; and a wide range of Ministerial and expert exchanges, for example on counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, international development, cyber, international law, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
The UK’s policy towards China should also be seen in the context of the whole of Asia. The Prime Minister is clear that the UK is committed to deepening our partnerships with countries across Asia. The UK has many partners in the region, who are in different ways important for our prosperity, security, and values. The UK seeks to work with all our partners on our areas of mutual interest.
In response to the Committee’s terms of reference, this Memorandum sets out examples of China’s support for the existing rules based system (including at the UN); areas where it is seeking to shape emerging international rules (e.g. on climate change and cyber); and examples of where it has been an active participant or instigator of new structures and concepts (e.g. the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road Initiative).
In many areas we are working closely together with China, for example at the UN Security Council to address threats to international security from North Korea, and on global challenges such as health, climate change, and tackling the illegal wildlife trade. There are also issues on which China’s approach towards, and/or interpretation of rules, differs from ours. We are robust in defending our position on such areas of difference, including on issues of human rights and values, on the South China Sea, and on the importance of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy and freedoms. We include commentary within each section on the Committee’s question about the extent to which China shares interests with the UK.
The last forty years have seen a significant and rapid increase in China’s engagement with international organisations. President Xi has committed to respecting the central role of the UN in global governance, including compliance with the ‘purposes and principles’ of the UN Charter. China is now a member of over 150 international organisations or regimes, and is increasingly putting forward more candidates for leadership roles including Under-Secretary-General at the UN, World Bank Vice President, and Chair of the WHO.
Support for the UN has always been a central tenet of UK foreign policy. It is the embodiment of our belief in an international order of peace and security. The UN’s work to uphold universal values also underpins the rules-based international system and is as significant to the world today as when the UN Charter first came into force 72 years ago.
China maintains a strong emphasis on the UN Charter’s principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and on the need to respect territorial sovereignty. These have been central principles of Chinese foreign policy for several years, which often puts them on the other side of the debate from us at the UN. In recent years, as China’s interests and approach to global goods have developed, we have seen more active support from China for UN action on some international challenges, for example on DPRK, climate change and peacekeeping (see below). China is now the third largest contributor to the UN Regular Budget, has become increasingly vocal in advocating for efficiency savings. China is not active in pursuing UN Security Council reform.
Bilaterally, and as permanent members of the UN Security Council, we engage extensively with China on a range of threats to international security. For example, China has supported six robust UN Security Council resolutions in 2016 and 2017 aimed at restricting North Korean nuclear programmes. China’s role in full implementation of these UN sanctions is key to their effectiveness, as trade with China makes up 90% of DPRK’s total trade. The UK regularly urges Beijing to make greater use of its influence to persuade the DPRK regime to change course. We are both signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The Chinese have endorsed the Prime Minister’s Call to Action to End Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, launched at the UN General Assembly in September 2017, and we are committed to working with them on this issue bilaterally and internationally.
We have differing views on some UN Security Council issues, including Syria where China has stuck to its principle of non-interference. Although China’s emphasis on consensus means it has used its veto less often than any other P5 member, eight of its eleven vetoes have come since 2007, and the last six related to Syria. China abstained on the November 2017 draft resolution on chemical weapons use in Syria (which was vetoed by Russia).
China is key to international non-proliferation, as a P5 member, Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, supplier of a range of weapons and technology, and as a member of the Iran deal Joint Commission. China has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but not ratified it. While China is a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member it sits outside all the other export control regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group). This limits China’s interaction with, and accountability to, the international non-proliferation architecture.
The UK and China share interests and engage closely on the international climate agenda. China is the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (27% of global CO₂ emissions), and the largest producer and consumer of coal (50.6% of global consumption). The pace of China’s low carbon transition will therefore be key to meeting the objectives of the Paris Climate Change Agreement. Under President Xi, energy, climate change and pollution issues have become increasingly important. This has been driven partly by efforts to tackle chronic pollution, an increasing issue of domestic concern in China, but also recognition that the transition to a low carbon economy represents opportunities for restructuring China’s economy.
President Xi has been vocal in his support for the Paris Agreement, and China pressed in multilateral fora for early ratification. Following the US announcement to withdraw, China reaffirmed its commitment and willingness to work with all countries to promote low carbon sustainable growth, and China will play an important role in the negotiations to determine how the Paris Agreement will be implemented. It is therefore in the UK’s interests to continue to work with China towards an international regime that encourages all Parties to show the highest possible ambition, whilst providing flexibility to Parties that need it, whilst they need it.
China has been the largest P5 contributor to UN peacekeeping operations since 2009 (2,648 troops and policy staff currently deployed) and is the second largest financial contributor. In 2015, China announced a further 8,000 UN peacekeeping troops and a new $1bn UN development fund. The UK and China hold regular civilian and military dialogues on peacekeeping, most recently in September 2017.
China is less vocal on UN development issues. Its interventions focus on protecting national sovereignty and the ability of host governments to have the ultimate say on what activities are undertaken in-country. The majority of China’s development and humanitarian assistance continues to be disbursed through bilateral channels, rather than through the UN-led multilateral system. This has implications for the overall coherence of the international humanitarian response. The UK is seeking to establish a policy dialogue with China on humanitarian issues.
China is currently one year into a second consecutive (three year) term as a voting member on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). It takes a different position to the UK on a number of human rights issues including freedom of expression, the treatment of human rights defenders, freedom of religion or belief, the role of civil society and the death penalty. China traditionally votes against country-specific resolutions and also tends to support Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) led HRC resolutions on the right to development. In June 2017 the HRC adopted a Chinese-led resolution titled “The Contribution of Development to the Enjoyment of All Human Rights”, which the UK, US, Japan, and a number of EU countries did not support. This is an example of the Chinese promoting their alternative vision of human rights. China’s third Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is in autumn 2018. China did not accept the recommendations submitted by the UK during its first two UPR cycles (2009 & 2013), which covered issues such as arbitrary detention, the death penalty, ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and access for UN Special Procedures mechanisms.
The UK worked closely with China during its G20 Presidency in 2016, advancing UK interests on anti-microbial resistance, green finance, anti-corruption, and the Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China’s G20 priorities include innovative growth; trade and investment; and implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. China also supports the G20’s work to improve standards for international tax transparency, a priority issue for the UK.
We are also working with China on global health and the illegal wildlife trade, on which China signed up to the September 2016 UNGA resolution.
In 2017, President Xi Jinping made speeches at the World Economic Forum in Davos, in Geneva, and at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. He set a vision for global governance in which globalisation and free trade form the basis of global prosperity and security, including through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), complementing existing multilateral frameworks. Nevertheless, China’s domestic policies are not always consistent with free trade principles – for example we continue to encourage policy reforms which would enable international companies to achieve greater market access in China and reduce restrictions on investment.
China recognises it has benefitted from participation in global trade and financial institutions, particularly the WTO, which it joined in 2001. A member of eight formal negotiating blocs, including Article XII Members (which seeks to limit further commitments to liberalisation) and Friends of Anti-dumping Negotiations (which seeks more discipline on the use of anti-dumping measures), China is increasingly active in shaping discussions in the WTO. China’s approach of carefully guarding its status as a developing country has affected efforts to make progress in developing the multilateral framework at the WTO. Compared to other major members, China has a poor record in notifying the WTO on its domestic subsidies, especially in the agricultural sector.
China is yet to join the Government Procurement Agreement (a commitment made during its WTO accession), although it has engaged constructively in some other plurilateral negotiations, including the yet-to-conclude Environmental Goods Agreement. China has defended 39 cases under the Dispute Settlements Mechanism, and initiated 17 cases, most recently against the US and the EU regarding price comparison methodologies in trade defence investigations. Since the provisions of China’s WTO accession protocol expired in December 2016, China has argued that it is legally entitled to be granted market economy status (MES) by the EU. It is currently challenging EU Anti-Dumping regulations at the WTO. The UK will need to update the terms of its WTO membership when it leaves the EU and will work closely with other WTO members, including China, to ensure a simple, fair, and transparent transition.
China is an active and engaged member of the World Bank. It graduated from concessional borrowing in 1999 and became a contributor in 2007. World Bank lending to China is increasingly focused on global public goods and knowledge transfer. China has a 4.65% shareholding and, along with the UK, is one of six members with a single seat on the Board. The UK supports progress towards shareholding reform, and will continue to work with the World Bank and China to ensure the Bank is focussed on delivering life changing development outcomes in the poorest and most fragile countries.
China has supported the IMF’s role in promoting global prosperity, and has strengthened its collaboration with the IMF on capacity development. It is one of eight countries with a single seat at the IMF,[1] and has the third largest quota (6.09% of total votes). It is the third largest contributor to IMF borrowed resources, and contributes to the IMF’s concessional lending window, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. China’s priority is to increase the power of emerging markets at the IMF, predominately through quota and governance reform. It has also sought to enhance the role of the IMF’s special drawing rights (SDRs) reserve asset. In 2016, the IMF included the Renminbi as the fifth currency in the basket used to determine the value of SDRs. Both China and the UK support a strong and adequately-resourced IMF, remaining at the centre of the global financial safety net. The UK remains committed to reaching agreement on the IMF’s 15th General Review of Quotas in the coming years, which is expected to result in increased shares for emerging markets – including China – in line with their relative positions in the world economy.
China garnered widespread international support for the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, although the US and Japan decided not to join citing concerns around governance, standards and additionality. As the first major Western country and first G7 member to announce membership, the UK participated in the negotiations of the AIIB’s founding principles, based on our long experience in similar multilaterals, ensuring the Bank began its operations as a well governed, open, transparent and accountable institution capable of delivering its ambitious mandate to provide more financing and close the infrastructure gap in Asia. The UK currently holds one of the five Vice President positions and a seat on the Board of Directors. The UK continues to work with other members to ensure that the Bank adheres to high global governance standards. The UK, like China, confirmed in December 2017 that it is providing a bilateral $50m contribution to the AIIB’s special fund for technical assistance, which will support ODA eligible countries to prepare infrastructure projects for investment. The AIIB now has 80 members and has invested over $3.3bn in projects across Asia. The AIIB to date is establishing itself as a genuine multilateral lender, and part of the wider international financial system.
China is not a member of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) but it has Key Partner status and contributes actively to the Organisation’s work on tax transparency and compliance, macroeconomic monitoring, science and technology, trade, investment and agriculture policies. The OECD provided input for China’s 2016 Presidency of the G20 and has an on-going bilateral support programme. Among OECD members, the UK has promoted dialogue with China across a range of OECD issues. For example, the UK engaged China proactively to ensure that, as the world’s largest consumer and producer of energy, it plays a transparent and constructive role in the work of the International Energy Agency (IEA). Partly as a result of UK engagement, China became an Associate Member of the IEA in 2015. Mutual exchanges have increased, with senior secondments from the Chinese government into the IEA, and the IEA has established a liaison office in China.
China has declared its support for international law and the UN Charter, and is a serious and constructive contributor to expert discussions on the issues faced by states within the international legal framework.
The UK and China meet regularly for dialogue on international legal issues. The FCO Legal Adviser hosted the Director General for Treaty and Law in the Chinese MFA for an annual international law dialogue in November 2017, the latest in a series of such meetings, which take place alternately in Beijing and London. In addition, there has for several years been an annual maritime law dialogue between UK and Chinese experts. The last round, in November 2017, took place in London. These meetings always provide an important opportunity for candid and open discussion of matters of mutual interest
China’s interpretation of international rules, and approach to international norms and standards can differ from that of the UK in some respects. When differences of view arise they are discussed within the framework of international law and legal principles, including during our regular legal dialogues.
In the South and East China Seas, China puts a high priority on its sovereignty claims. It is a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has made claims relating to ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea. The ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in July 2016 held that UNCLOS supersedes such rights by defining the scope of maritime entitlements and sovereign rights of coastal states. Beijing rejected the ruling, arguing that sovereignty disputes fall outside the jurisdiction of dispute settlement mechanisms provided for under UNCLOS and that, by unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippines had failed to obtain China’s consent to dispute settlement under UNCLOS. The UK regards the Arbitration ruling as binding on both China and the Philippines.
Since the July 2016 ruling, China has increased private dialogue with other claimant states, but has also continued to strengthen military facilities on the features it occupies. In August 2017, China and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed a framework for negotiating a Code of Conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea, and announced the start of negotiations in November. The UK has encouraged China and other states in the region to agree a substantive, binding Code of Conduct that will reinforce and complement the UNCLOS framework.
Construction of military facilities in the South China Sea remains a concern both for regional neighbours and the international community. The UK has expressed concern in recent years over developments in regional maritime security, underlining the need for dialogue and for disputes to be resolved in line with international law. The UK does not support any claimant over another, but calls on all sides to refrain from activity likely to raise tensions. Our commitment is to international law, and to freedom of navigation and over-flight, both commercial and military. Ministers continue to raise our longstanding concerns bilaterally with all parties, alongside allies and partners in international fora, as well as in public. The UK will continue to engage China in frank and open dialogue on regional security issues, including the South and East China Seas.
Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is President Xi’s flagship foreign policy, enshrined in the Party Constitution during the 19th Party Congress. It has become a key feature of China’s economic diplomacy. The Chinese “vision” is of a more inter-connected region with greater trade and connectivity, reduced customs barriers and integrated supply chains. While the initial focus has been on regional trade and infrastructure development, the vision is broader and global, encompassing trade policy and financial integration; shared standards; a ‘digital BRI’; cultural, media and tourism exchanges; a Chinese ‘model’ for developing countries to follow; and new ‘Chinese solutions’ on global goods and global governance. The Asian infrastructure gap is estimated at $1.7 trillion a year.
The first Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 was attended by over 1,000 delegates, 110 countries, and 28 Heads of State. The Chancellor of the Exchequer represented the UK, described the UK as a “natural partner” for the Initiative, and signed up to the ‘Guiding Principles of Financing the Development of the Belt and Road’. The Chinese government has sought support from several international organisations as it develops the Initiative. The AIIB, World Bank and four other multilateral development banks signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese government at the Forum.
The Chinese Government has made clear that it wants to work with the UK on the Initiative. We have regular senior engagement on BRI at government level, most recently at the Economic and Financial Dialogue, which the Chancellor co-chaired. Outcomes on BRI agreed at the Economic and Financial Dialogue included agreements jointly to identify BRI pilot projects, and conduct a research and feasibility study on a mechanism to help attract private capital investment into the BRI; the announcement of Douglas Flint as the Chancellor’s Financial and Professional Services Envoy to the BRI; and the creation of a Financial and Professional Services BRI Expert Board, supported by an Infrastructure Financing Exchange.
The UK has world-leading expertise in a wide range of relevant areas, including sustainable infrastructure, financial and legal services, innovation and technology, and public health and international development. Through the ‘UK-China Infrastructure Alliance’, UK and Chinese firms are already working together both inside and outside China. We have established an Infrastructure Hub which catalyses joint collaboration in third countries along the Belt and Road. We have set up a UK Infrastructure Academy and have delivered training in Public-Private Partnerships. We have commissioned studies to evaluate the opportunities for UK firms, and are scoping opportunities to establish London as the BRI financing hub, and for international development cooperation.
While working with China to maximise mutual and global benefits from the BRI, we believe it is important that the Initiative adheres to international standards and has clear, transparent tendering processes. We are seeking to work with China and third countries to help ensure these are in place, in order to mitigate the risks of indebtedness, adverse social and environmental impacts, and unbalanced development. Such standards should also help meet climate change commitments and promote wider developmental benefits such as increased connectivity, better health security, and disaster resilience that stimulate jobs and growth, in partnership with multilateral institutions.
We also recognise that certain proposals under the Belt and Road Initiative have given rise to a range of concerns. Our intention remains to work with China in ways which support mutual and global benefits, fully in line with the international rules based system.
Separately, the UK is also taking an active interest in other regional initiatives to support connectivity and economic development, such as the Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy launched by Prime Minister Abe of Japan in 2016 and further promoted by President Trump during his visit to the region in November 2017.
China under President Xi has actively promoted Chinese views and interests through regional organisations.
China has deepened cooperation with ASEAN through the ASEAN +1 structure. China has also sought in a range of ways to dissuade these partners from criticising China’s South China Sea policy, despite many expressing concern about China’s assertive behaviour in the region.
China has also been active in multilateral trade negotiations in its region. It is committed to advancing the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP is often seen as a Chinese-led alternative to the formerly US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). RCEP can also be understood as an initiative to consolidate ASEAN’s five FTAs with its six partners, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
China has been an active participant in, or instigator of, new structures, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) promoting security cooperation in Central Asia; and the “BRICS” structure of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. China has also created or hosted new regional concepts, organisations and groupings to extend Chinese influence. In addition to the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative described above, it has set up the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB), and launched new groupings such as the Forum of Ancient Civilisations, co-launched with Greece to build diplomatic and cultural links with other historic civilisations; the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (a ministerial meeting which takes places every three years between China, 51 African countries and the African Union); the ‘China and Central and Eastern Europe’ format (CEEC), also known as ‘16+1’ (facing criticism from some that this is an attempt to weaken EU cohesion); and has actively engaged with the Arctic Council. China has not joined the existing Mekong River Commission for regional water cooperation in the Mekong River Delta but created a new forum, the Lancang-Mekong group, through which it aims to enhance its influence over regional water management issues.
China has also promoted new concepts and structures which help advance its world view and strategic interest. One such example is the “Community of Shared Future”, written in to the Party Constitution at the 19th Party Congress. China has described this as a new approach to international relations based on mutual benefit, stability, development and political inclusiveness, and replacing the zero-sum approach of the past, which it links to the West.
The UK has an interest in the continued dynamic growth of ASEAN nations and effective regional economic and security architecture through the ASEAN institutions and wider region. We currently engage with ASEAN through the EU. After leaving the EU, we will be seeking to strengthen our own national relationship with ASEAN as an institution, as well as strengthening bilateral links with ASEAN members.
The UK attends the biannual ASEM Summit and the annual Asia Europe Foreign Ministers meeting, which are opportunities to meet China, other Asian countries, and regional organisations in a multilateral setting. The UK will remain a member of ASEM after Brexit. We have also engaged through the British Embassy in Beijing with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Secretariat.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed on 19 December 1984 and registered in 1985 with the United Nations ‘treaties and international agreements’ (No. 23391). Concluding this agreement was an historic achievement by the then leaders of China and the UK, Deng Xiaoping and Margaret Thatcher. The Joint Declaration is a legally binding treaty, registered with the UN, which continues to remain in force. It remains as valid today as it did when it was signed over thirty years ago. The handover of Hong Kong in 1997 took place in line with the provisions of the Joint Declaration, reflecting our commitment to the rules based international system. The UK government remains committed to monitoring its implementation closely. In response to challenges from some Chinese officials about the status of the Joint Declaration, we have been unequivocal about our position both publicly and privately with the Chinese Government.
In the Joint Declaration, the Chinese Government made a number of detailed commitments regarding the administration of Hong Kong, including that “the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy” and that it will be “vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power”. There was also the commitment that the capitalist system, lifestyle and rights and freedoms held in Hong Kong would remain unchanged for 50 years under Chinese rule. This arrangement is popularly referred to as ‘One Country, Two Systems’.
The UK government report on the implementation of the Joint Declaration through the six-monthly reports on Hong Kong submitted to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary. In these six-monthly reports, since 1998, we have assessed that there has been one “serious breach” of the Joint Declaration. This relates to the case of British citizen and Hong Kong bookseller, Mr Lee Po who was “involuntarily removed” to mainland China from Hong Kong without any due process under Hong Kong SAR law. Although Mr Lee has now returned to Hong Kong, the issues raised by the case remain of concern. In the most recent report covering the period 1 January to 30 June 2017, the Foreign Secretary reflected that twenty years on from the handover, Hong Kong continues to be a vibrant and dynamic city. The report concluded that ‘One Country, Two Systems’ has “generally functioned well since 1997, however, at the same time, we cannot ignore that important areas of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework are coming under increasing pressure.” Since then, the case of British national Ben Rogers being denied entry to Hong Kong in October 2017 raised further concerns, as reflected in the Foreign Secretary’s public statement at the time and subsequent further evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
The UK Government will continue to defend the Joint Declaration strongly. In public statements and in meetings with the Chinese and Hong Kong authorities, we continue to stress the importance of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy, and that its rights and freedoms should be fully respected. The UK Government believes that ‘One Country, Two Systems’ continues to be the best arrangement for Hong Kong’s long term stability and prosperity and for the city’s reputation as a global financial centre. On independence, the UK’s position is equally clear: we do not consider it to be a realistic option for Hong Kong.
During President Xi’s visit to Hong Kong for the anniversary of the handover, his speeches included commitment to “One Country, Two Systems” as well as further emphasis on principles relating to “one country”. During the visit of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong SAR to the UK on 20-22 September 2017, she stressed her Government’s commitment to upholding the core values and structures that underpin ‘One Country, Two Systems’ including freedoms of the press and of speech, the independent judiciary and rule of law. The Foreign Office Minister for Asia and the Pacific also received assurances from the Chinese Government on their commitment to the faithful implementation of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ when he visited Beijing in August 2017. At the 19th Party Congress in October, President Xi reiterated China’s commitment to ‘One Country, Two Systems’ describing it as a “resounding success” and the “best institutional guarantee” for Hong Kong’s long term prosperity and stability.
The HMG network in mainland China is one of the largest in the world, with nearly 700 UK government staff nationwide and 18 government departments represented. It has been strengthened in recent years, as we have developed the Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China. Operations are based out of the Embassy in Beijing, and supported by Consulates General in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Wuhan. The official British Government offices are supported by numerous offices run by the British Council, Visit Britain, and the Devolved Administrations. There is also close working with a range of external partners, such as the China Britain Business Council, who deliver services on behalf of HMG, and the Great Britain China Centre, who are an FCO Arms-Length Body supporting political engagement and activities in support of objectives on good governance and the rule of law.
HMG has a unique and innovative Regional Cities Network that builds political relationships and soft power in China’s second and third tier cities, operating through officers based in UK diplomatic missions and deployed in seven regional cities. This gives the UK unprecedented access to provinces and cities that receive little attention from other foreign governments. The Regional Cities Network represents all HMG departments, supporting provincial and local governments on reform and innovation with UK know-how, and creating opportunities for British companies.
In recent years the estate has been improved – our Consulates General in Shanghai and Guangzhou moved into new premises in 2015, our most recent Consulate opened in Wuhan in 2016, and 15 Visa Application Centres have been established across China. However, the current Embassy is spread over a number of locations in Beijing including rented accommodation in the Beijing Business District. Other partners (British Council, China Britain Business Council) are also in privately rented accommodation, situated away from the main site. The current Embassy main building was built in 1959. UK/China bilateral relations have grown greatly since then and the building is no longer adequate for the increased number of staff. The FCO’s Spending Review settlement commits us to provide £80m of capital funding towards a redeveloped Embassy in Beijing, to be derived from asset recycling. When in Beijing in January 2016, the previous Foreign Secretary said he believed the Embassy did not reflect the image that Britain wanted to project in China, nor the scale of our ambition, and that HMG planned to redevelop the site. Scoping work is underway, with the aim to produce a true ‘One HMG’ single platform housing staff from the FCO, other Whitehall departments, Devolved Administrations and other British organisations, such as the Great Britain China Centre.
In addition to the mainland China network, the UK also has a Consulate General in Hong Kong that covers our commercial, consular and political interests. There is a British Office
in Taipei covering economic and cultural affairs.
The FCO’s East Asia Department was formed in October 2017, drawing together the FCO’s work on China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and Mongolia. The new Department enables a greater focus not just on the individual bilateral relationships, but also the cross-cutting links between them. On China specifically, there are several parts of the FCO which engage with China on a wide range of priority themes, including on economic diplomacy, security policy, human rights, and many others.
Overseas, the bulk of our resources are in the China network itself, but there are officers in overseas Embassies and High Commissions that engage with China. For example, our Missions to the UN in New York and Geneva, our Representation to the EU and Embassies/High Commissions in Washington, Berlin, Paris and across the Asia Pacific region cover local aspects of China’s international policy. Within Whitehall, the FCO works closely with a number of bodies that have significant interests in China, including but not limited to the British Council; the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; the Cabinet Office; the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; the Department for International Development; the Department for Education; the Department for International Trade; the Department of Health; HM Treasury; the Home Office; and the Ministry of Defence.
China policy, along with policy towards other important countries across Asia, is set by the National Security Council. There are also regular co-ordination meetings for high level processes and dialogues, as well as frequent ad-hoc exchanges between experts in all relevant Whitehall Departments. The breadth and depth of these exchanges has increased in recent years, in line with the development of bilateral relations.
As the UK leaves the EU, as a newly Global Britain, we will be aiming to intensify and renew the Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China to strengthen prosperity, security and links between our peoples. China’s approach to the international order to date has been defined by its policy of sovereignty, non-interference and consensus, as well as defending its core interests. We are now likely to see an increasingly assertive China, seeking to boost its status as a global power, supporting global goods that benefit Chinese citizens, and creating new structures that support Chinese strategic aims. UK work with China on the rules based international system will be a crucial element of our strengthened bilateral relations in the future, and will have significant consequences for the effective functioning of the international order.
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[1] Others are USA (16.52% of quota), Japan (6.15%), Germany (5.32%), France (4.03%), UK (4.03%), Russian Federation (2.59%) and Saudi Arabia (2.02%). Source: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx