Written evidence submitted by Patrick Hopper
(Royal Marines 1958 - 1981)
I must first say that as I was discharged to pension from the Royal Marines 36 years ago, I am hardly in a good position to discuss the details, not being 100% up to date on the subject. However, as an active member of the Royal Marines Association, I follow the Corps’ activities closely and know a lot more than most other civilians.
Why do we need an amphibious military capability?
In the event that the government decides it must land troops in another country to rescue British nationals, restore order or act in support of NATO or the UN, then the troops must land from the sea with all the necessary vehicles, equipment, artillery, armoured and air support, and logistic supplies to carry out their task effectively, especially if the landing is opposed by a military force. The Royal Navy is already severely out of balance. Two enormous aircraft carriers, with insufficient sailors to man them, no fixed-wing aircraft to put on them for some years, and insufficient funds to operate them both, inadequately supported by a fleet of less than two dozen warships (half of which are usually stuck on dockyards, being mended, because their engines don’t work in seas that are warmer than the English Channel), do not constitute a viable naval force to engage in military operations. The Royal Navy fleet of surface ships today is pathetically small and if confronted by a couple of Russian squadrons, would be sunk to the last ship in minutes. Removing the 100% working and reliable amphibious ships makes everything even worse.
What could the UK Armed Forces do to match the capabilities that might be lost? Are the alternatives good enough?
Just because Afghanistan is landlocked, it does not mean that we no longer need an amphibious capability. With the drastic shortage of military troop carrying aircraft, landing by air is a non-starter. With the Parachute Regiment able to field only one battalion of parachute trained soldiers, the alternative of an airborne assault against a defended area is unthinkable. Albion class ships however do have the capability to carry vehicles, equipment etc., enough anyway to allow the troops to hold ground against armed resistance until further supplies can be brought in by sea and air. If, instead of purpose built Albion Class ships, we have to rely on STUFT vessels (Merchant Navy), then like in the Falklands conflict and the Atlantic Conveyor, they are highly vulnerable to air attack (aircraft and missiles), having neither armour plating nor adequate means to defend themselves. How is it that we are so slow to learn from our mistakes? As far as matching the capabilities of the discarded Royal Marines, there is nothing within the UK infantry forces that could meet requirements unless a lot of time and money is spent finding and training up soldiers to the required standard. Time, men and money which may not be available.
What effect will the cutting of 1,000 Royal Marines (15%) have?
The Royal Marines are the most highly trained, versatile, efficient and cost effective infantry that the United Kingdom possesses. The Corps is based primarily around 3rd Commando Brigade, consisting of three battalion sized Commando units, permanently supported by regiments of artillery, engineers and logistics, all trained to commando standards and with a long history of excellent cooperation and effectiveness. To lose 1,000 Royal Marines effectively means losing one of the commando units. This would reduce the Commando Brigade to a level whereby it cannot effectively carry out its primary role as a specialist infantry brigade strike force. A brigade always works with three battalions in combat – “two up, one in reserve”. In a combat situation, the brigade could be brought up to strength by assigning to them an army infantry battalion, but that battalion will have no amphibious training or experience and with the best will in the world, will be unable to perform to the same high standards as the Royal Marines. The two remaining Commando units will have to “nurse” the army battalion, thereby reducing their own effectiveness. One should remember that basic training in the Royal Marines lasts 32 weeks. The army training for the infantry is 12 weeks. It brings to mind the saying “you can’t make a silk purse from a pig’s ear”. In any case, the army is being so drastically reduced that it will only be a matter of time before it becomes referred to as the Walmington-on-Sea Home Guard and be about as effective.
What do you think will happen to unit morale and satisfaction with Service life if the reported changes and reductions happen?
The serving Corps will have confirmed to them the inability of the Government to understand that pulling out the teeth of its guard dog, to save on veterinary costs, is not the answer. They will feel undervalued and under-appreciated and this will badly affect recruitment and retention. Yes, the present Government has been trying for years to restore the country’s finances after the Labour government bankrupted us, but the Conservatives have shown the same disregard for Defence. The Ministry of Defence has a gloriously incompetent procurement organisation and is staffed by civilians with no military knowledge or experience, outnumbering those in uniform and headed by a minister barely out of short trousers.
What do you think will happen to the communities where these capabilities are based if the reported changes and reductions happen?
Apart from the people who work to support the amphibious ships when they are in their home port, I don’t think that the reduction in the Royal Marines will have any major deleterious effect. Communities in and around infantry units do not require large or technically skilled workforces, who would lose their livelihood caused by the reductions.
If the Ministry of Defence really wants to save money, perhaps they should look at the current officer levels and their salary bill. The Royal Navy has about two dozen ships, but has 260 four ring Captains and 40 Admirals. It has long been the custom that most warships are commended by officers below the rank of Captain. Captains usually commanded cruisers and battleships, which we no longer have. One Admiral would normally command a flotilla of not less than half a dozen ships. The RN did it on the cheap in the Falklands, using a Commodore instead of an Admiral to command the whole fleet deployed there. The Royal Navy could perfectly well manage with about 10 Captains and 3 Admirals, a saving of about 95%. Not relevant to this subject, but the army is no better. Current strength (dropping fast) is about 72,000 but has 269 Brigadiers and Generals. A more justifiable figure should be 40, or 85% less. I don’t suppose the RAF is any better. I am sure that Wing Commanders, Group Captains, Air Commodores and Air Marshals considerably outnumber their aircraft.
3 January 2018