Written evidence submitted by Commodore (Rtd) Michael Clapp CB RN and Rear Admiral (Rtd) Jeremy Larken DSO RN

 

Commodore Michael Clapp joined the Royal Navy in 1950. Commands during his career included HMSs Puncheston, Jaguar and Leander and 801 Squadron, Fleet Air Arm.  He also completed two tours in the Naval Staff of the MOD and later served as Naval Director of the Joint Maritime Operational Training Staff. In 1981 he was appointed Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW) and commanded the landings and inshore operations in the Falklands conflict in 1982. He retired from the Royal Navy in 1983.

 

Rear Admiral Jeremy Larken joined the Royal Navy in 1957. Commands during his career included HMSs Osiris, Glamorgan and Valiant and the Third Submarine Squadron. During the Falklands Campaign, Larken commanded the LPD HMS Fearless. He completed two tours in the Naval Staff, and formed the new Naval Staff Duties Division as Director, implementing the Heseltine reforms of 1984.  He subsequently served as COMAW and then as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Overseas) until his retirement in 1990.

 

The importance of amphibious capability to UK Defence

 

  1. The composite operational tapestry required for modern amphibious operations requires a range of options for theatre entry and we hope to demonstrate below that they are intertwined and complementary. Deleting the capability for a sea-based theatre entry for in favour of air theatre entry involving infantry and light equipment only, depending upon the QE Class with a split inshore and offshore role and the BAY Class LSD (A)s would seriously degrade the UK’s amphibious warfare capability and commensurately raise operational risks. Amphibious capability offers an assault over beaches and thus provides the speed and flexibility to outflank opposition ashore and can also carry the benefit of surprise to an unalerted enemy.

This delivers both deterrence and the achievement of victory (preferably by thus preventing descent into actual conflict) easier and quicker, and thus saving lives and equipment. We believe it is a vital operational capability for the UK armed forces, and not simply something nice to have.

 

  1. We would also note that this is a capability with a global reach, not dependent on ports or airfields or rights of overflight. The warfighting value of amphibious capability is self-evident, but its role in supporting maritime security, disaster relief and defence engagement is also considerable. The 2015 SDSR put a great deal of emphasis on the increasing importance of these tasks to UK Defence, and the versatility of amphibious platforms makes them ideally suited for these purposes.

 

The Royal Marines

 

  1. The Royal Marines have a 353 year history as an embarked force and this gives them a unique understanding of naval problems and capabilities that no other British military force has shown itself ready quickly to achieve. As an integral part of the RN, 3 Commando Brigade, acting as a Brigade Group with the necessary supporting elements, is trained specifically as the front line ashore in amphibious operations.  Units are trained to levels of fitness and preparedness, regarded as exemplary world-wide.  One Commando (or battalion) is at 12 hours ‘notice to move’.  

 

  1. Commando units need to be constantly:

 

 

Albion class LPDs

 

  1. The ALBION-Class ships (ALBION and BULWARK) are designed to provide the core of an Amphibious Task Group (ATG), their single significant shortcoming being lack of rotary-wing hangerage.

 

  1. The predecessor LPDs, FEARLESS and INTREPID, were acquired at Army request to convey and land tanks and heavy equipment. Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) command capabilities as an amphibious Headquarters Ship were progressively installed, never achieving a first-rate standard.  In the 1982 Falklands conflict the amphibious assault had to be commanded from FEARLESS.  Her Amphibious Operations Room (AOR), upgraded at recent refit, was adequate and able to control the landing craft and helicopters as well as naval gunfire support.  The maritime Operations Rooms of neither LPD, however, had been upgraded fully to command an Amphibious Task Group comprising initially some 23 ships, increasing to over 30 as the conflict developed, embracing the full inventory of Military Lift, Anti-Submarine, Anti-Surface and Anti-Air assets required.  In the past, a properly designed Headquarters Ship had provided these.

 

  1. Each LPD could accommodate by design a Commando with a proportion of its equipment, the remainder being borne by the Knight-Class Landing Ships Logistic (LSLs).  However sufficient accommodation for full CATF and CLF staffs in FEARLESS was lacking. There was inadequate accommodation and office space for the extra staff officers necessary to co-ordinate the operation, and it became a challenge to find sufficient space for the full Commando and other supporting elements which were added to the Brigade (such as light armour). A consequence was that some staff members had difficulty remaining in contact and influencing how the planning and execution ran.  This was particularly noticed in the logistic problems that ensued.  That it was reasonably successful was thanks largely to the support of the ship’s company, but all these problems were, we understand, resolved by design in the ALBION Class ships, now apparently under threat.

 

  1. In sum, for the UK to react to and anticipate aggression against its legal responsibilities, the continued use and maintenance of the ALBION class is vital to the UK’s standing and deterrent capability, especially beyond the NATO geographic area.  Without these ships and a capable landing force involving the highly specialised corps of Royal Marines, the UK’s standing amongst World navies in terms of flexible deterrent capability will be massively diminished. 

 

Alternatives to current capability

 

  1. There are no proper alternatives in the UK Armed Forces to replicate the capabilities of the two ALBION Class ships or the Royal Marines.  The ALBION Class ships are specifically designed and built to take the staffs of both CATF and CLF as well as to carry and control landing craft, and support helicopters and to operate them.  They also have the capability to command a naval task group, namely the escorts and logistic ships that may be essential.  This is clearly all better done in one ship, as spreading the tasks amongst others is likely to create confusion.

 

Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier

 

  1. The QE Class provides a viable alternative to HMS OCEAN, paying-off in March 2018, as a Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH), i.e. operating rotary wing aviation in support of the Amphibious Task Group, but not OCEAN’s additional capability of small landing craft (LCVPs) and Mexeflote capability.  The QE Class offers the ability to operate 6 Chinook helicopters (i.e. usefully greater capacity than OCEAN) and has increased hangar capacity for Landing Force (LF) materiel, can host more troops, has greater lift capacity to move materiel from the hangar to flight deck, and could retain the ability to operate some degree of fixed wing aviation.  The QE Class brings an enhanced afloat Command and Control capability that could supplement the ALBION Class as the Amphibious Task Group command ship and the ability to integrate a QE Class into an ATG is addressed in emerging doctrine.

 

  1. However, the QE class is not currently configured or equipped to host a Joint CATF/CLF staff, as it lacks dedicated Amphibious Operations/Maritime Operations facilities.  There are, obvious challenges in operating a ‘deep water’ Capital Ship requiring ‘sea room’ for fixed-wing operations close inshore (say within 30nm of the coast).  Any such ‘hybrid’ fixed and rotary wing aircraft option, with aircraft devoted to completely different tactical objectives, will constrain both: fixed-wing Air Defence effectiveness, and hence limit a key element of air superiority in the amphibious operational region; and rotary wing demanding long transit times, with slow build up ashore of only light forces.  There are, in short, incompatibilities in mixing the inshore delivery and offshore support roles. 

 

  1. The QE Class ships are not built with a dry-dock and cannot carry the landing craft that are essential for landing troops and heavy equipment such as tanks.  Helicopters can land troops and light equipment, as was done in the Suez campaign. However, this covers only part of the inventory spectrum in modern warfare.  A landing must be supported by an efficient logistic system that is not limited in scope by lack of facilities to get vital kit, including heavy equipment, ashore quickly. Other practical issues may intervene, as they did in 1982, where there were not a sufficient number of helicopters to transport the numbers of troops required. Helicopters not equipped to fly at night were unable to do so after dark, unlike the landing craft, which are able to operate around the clock.

 

  1. We understand the QE Class has accommodation for one Royal Marine Commando or Army battalion.  This would be very helpful in any amphibious operation as a follow-up unit.  Carrier strike and air defence are likely to be vital.  It is unlikely to be most-effectively deployed inshore, and indeed the QE Class should not in principle be placed at inshore risk.  If kept well offshore in combined Air Defence, Strike and Amphibious roles, transit times between ship and shore will be long, and build-up ashore consequently slow and the more vulnerable with light forces and equipment only.  It could suffice for a minor operation such as disaster relief.  It would constitute no more than a somewhat limited deterrent element.

 

  1. Thus, in our opinion, the QE Class are not suited for anything more than a minor landing operation in a peace-time environment. Certainly it is not a viable operation under an operational environment when air support will be essential not just to the Landing Force but, as in the Falklands in 1982, to all assembled forces, ashore, inshore and offshore.  It should be remembered that during the Falklands campaign 173 of the total of 255 lives of servicemen and merchant seamen, approximately two-thirds, were lost at sea due to air attacks.  The remaining 82 were lost in land fighting.  The reason for this was not reckless inefficiency but penny pinching that meant ships were inadequately armed against air attack and the need to use Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Merchant ships in unduly exposed situations, none of which were armed before the campaign.  Efforts were made to arm the Landing Ships Logistic (LSLs), which had mountings for 40mm Bofors guns.  This offered a very limited and therefore inadequate armament, but that could not be achieved with the merchant ships or larger Royal Fleet Auxiliaries in time.  At least it may have given the LSL ships companies a degree of hope, in the knowledge that the navy did their best to help support them. 

 

Bay class landing ship dock (auxiliary)

 

  1. These three specialised logistic ‘force-multipliers’ were designed and built as successors to the LSLs (a fourth has been sold to the Royal Australian Navy).  Each can carry 24 Challenger tanks or 150 light trucks.  Cargo capacity is substantial: 200 tons of ammunition or 24 twenty-foot ISO containers.  They can carry 350 troops, or some 700 in overload conditions.  There is a generous flight deck, and docking capacity for one large landing craft (LCU) or two small ones (LCVP).  Two mexeflote (mobile pontoons) are strapped one each side. The BAY Class doubles the ALBION Class carrying capacity in terms of vehicle and Landing Force personnel.  It can thus project a Company Group ashore in a single off-load.  It can also be fitted with a helicopter hangar at some load reduction. 

 

  1. However, ALBION and BULWARK are equipped to operate as an integrated part of a Task Group, indeed to command it with an organic suite of self-defence systems (Electronic Countermeasures; towed array). In the all-important Command and Control field (including communications and data handling), the BAY Class falls woefully short of the ALBION Class capability in every respect.  It has utterly insufficient capability to provide command facilities for a robust Amphibious Task Group and is completely incapable of providing group or force command capability.  The required space, equipment and personnel and associated expertise, training and warfighting preparedness comprise a significant element of the ALBION Class capability that RFAs of the BAY Class entirely lack.  RFAs are not equipped with more than basic radio or radar and associated operational command equipment, and usually have no electronic warfare equipment at all. Thus it is adequately fitted for disaster relief, and has sufficient command and control capability for such a relatively simple task in benign operational terms.

 

  1. Whilst ALBION and BULWARK are constructed to internationally recognised Defence Standard (DEFSTAN), the LSD(A)s are built to a commercial standard that does not demand the DEFSTAN level of survivability. However, commercial standards do bring some positives such as heat containing bulkheads which reduce the requirement for constant monitoring and containment.  A notable difference is that an LPD is manned to enable concurrent damage control and war-fighting whereas the LSD(A) does not have sufficient manpower to dedicate personnel to these tasks concurrently.

 

  1. RFA ships are manned by Merchant Navy personnel. Although proven to be courageous and loyal, they are not trained for war to the extent RN officers and ratings.  Originally, RFAs were unarmed so that they could enter almost all ports without hindrance; now they carry some defensive arms and thus may be as restricted as RN ships by some nations. RFAs are also normally slower and less manoeuvrable than warships.

Use of Army units in place of Royal Marines

 

  1. Because of the complexity of an amphibious operation in planning, from the selection, approach and timing to the beaches and landing sites, and then the execution and associated logistical challenges, we do not believe there are any adequate alternatives to the Royal Marines (RM) as the initial landing force.  They have specialised in this role, manned the landing craft, are integrated closely with the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) support helicopters and have a long history of close association with the Royal Navy (RN) that gives them an ethos and understanding that no other military unit has or can possibly achieve within likely operational time-lines.  They are a vital part of the Naval Service and, with the experience of 5 Army Brigade in 1982, we do not believe it is wise to suggest an Army unit can replicate them in almost any way. 

 

  1. In World War II, the Army did provide assault troops who spent years in training to be successful.  In terms of the preparation necessary, the 3rd Infantry Division, the leading division on Sword Beach in Normandy on 6 June 1944, started its Combined Operations training at Inveraray in the spring of 1942.  Over the following two years, it carried out numerous exercises and rehearsals, some in the same shipping that was used in the actual assault, and on terrain that replicated the actual beachhead as realistically as possible.  The 50th Infantry Division, which headed the landing on Gold Beach, had already carried out two amphibious landings, in Sicily and Italy, by June 1944. 

 

  1. Conclusive operational experience is that non-specialist formations need extensive training for amphibious operations. Without that immediate capability, both deterrence and the punch that underwrites deterrence is neutered.

 

Importance of ships taken up from trade (STUFT) to support amphibious operations

 

  1. The importance of CANBERRA, container ships and other STUFT in 1982 was indeed vital. The number of militarily useful registered merchant vessels has been continually reducing for years.  A look at the latest MOD equipment figures which contain details about militarily useful British merchant vessels show year-on-year reductions in a number of key categories of merchant vessels. Means would probably need to be found to charter ships on the open market.  Care would evidently be needed to ascertain ownership and crew composition.  Having met these ‘bars’, ship’s companies will go to most places and endure hazard if sufficiently remunerated. 

 

Training

 

  1. The current level of training and exercising is not sufficient to sustain an amphibious capability at high readiness. Commonly this insufficiency is a consequence of competing programme priorities on tight budgets for units and reduced availability of aviation and surface active force elements.  It is challenging to maintain the currency of ALBION Class and OCEAN command teams as they do not operate regularly in their Amphibious Task Group role with the associated warfare assets (Anti-Air, Anti-Surface and Anti-Submarine) that they would need to command in an operational amphibious setting.  Intelligent use of high-quality simulators can mitigate this difficulty, but only up to a point. The history of amphibious operations and some disastrous failures underlines the fatal consequences of penny-pinching on training, tempting as this may be in moderating short-term budgetary crises. 

 

Morale and Service satisfaction

 

  1. In 1981 there were similar rumours circulating about the future of the Royal Marines and the LPD amphibious ships HMS FEARLESS and INTREPID. This caused morale in the RM and RN to be badly affected.  The reason for it was explained as ‘operational’ but members of the Naval Service saw it, correctly, as simply a Treasury cut.  It added to the conviction that the Ministry of Defence was both Treasury-dominated and unable to resolve inter-service arguments constructively. Today there is the same belief that the UK has done its best to ignore our defence commitments to our close allies. This belief is sustained by the outcome of a succession of defence and security reviews, and the 2010 SDSR in particular, being remarkably limited in true strategic vision, and inadequately funded. There is a feeling that near-terms political prerogatives rather than unfolding longer-term risks will continue to shape the armed forces, notwithstanding the need for constant refreshment and training to achieve the preparedness essential for competent and decisive results. There is no doubt that unit morale and satisfaction with Service life has and will suffer because of this.  There is already a considerable degree of doubt and dissatisfaction. This is clear from discussions with retired ratings and marines, who remain in close contact with their service and keep a close eye on today’s problems, as well as talking to serving personnel and civilians.

 

Conclusion

 

  1. We believe, therefore, that there are no adequate alternatives for UK Armed Forces to replicate the capabilities of either the ALBION class ships or the Royal Marines in the UK’s amphibious roles, which may be vital and required at very short notice, as was the case in the Falklands Campaign and elsewhere.  The ALBION Class vessels are essential for the prompt and successful mounting and delivery of an amphibious operation, a Joint Service operation that is often described as the most complicated of all military operations. The maintenance of the Royal Marines, together with their current provision of supporting elements by the Army, at their current strength is an essential and core amphibious capability. To reduce these forces would relegate the UK to a residual amphibious capability of a low order, credible mainly for disaster relief.  The UK’s ability to support its legal responsibilities to defend its Overseas Territories and to other defence agreements would be largely negated.  Funds therefore need to be found, either elsewhere in the Defence budget, or from an enhanced budget, and not from the already much reduced maritime share.  Within the Ministry of Defence’s responsibility there are a number of assets with no genuine warfare capability.  These should be properly evaluated and judged for their true value in defence.

 

Amphibious capability with all its current elements is a major joint-service asset.  The reductions being considered would reduce UK Defence in terms of:

 

This will result in our both our national capability and our contribution to NATO being significantly reduced.  Nations with markedly different agenda whom we need to impress as a force for stability and good sense in the world will be delighted.  The damage such a removal of capability would do to defence co-operation with allies, particularly where the close relationships with the US Navy and US Marine Corps are concerned, would be very serious.

 

20 December 2017