Written evidence submitted by William J Taylor OBE
Retired Royal Marines officer
The Royal Marines and the Royal Navy’s Amphibious Capability
The first and most important observation to make in relation to the United Kingdom’s amphibious capability is that the requirement to retain or dispose of it, or any other component of the defence and security capability should be driven by strategy. If the United Kingdom wishes to be able either to impose its will on another nation; to challenge the activities of non-state actors such as IS operating in ungoverned, or alternately governed space; or to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens wherever they may be in the world, then it must be prepared to invest in the necessary means to facilitate these activities. Under most circumstances, it may be possible to achieve these outcomes through the application of diplomatic or economic pressure. This implies that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and legislative frameworks necessary to exert the necessary leverage must be properly considered and resourced. However, in those circumstances where diplomatic or other pressure cannot achieve the desired outcome, government may need to resort to force, or the threat of force. If government opts to use force, then it must decide whether it is prepared to accept limitations on its ability to execute operations, set by the availability of friendly third party countries, ports, airfields and fixed infrastructure. If yes, then there is no need for amphibious, or other ‘theatre entry’ capabilities. If no, then there will be a need for a range of capabilities wide enough to provide both military options and the associated diplomatic leverage.
The United Kingdom is currently one of only four or five nations in the world that have the capability alone to project combat configured force over strategic distance. With allies (in the case of the UK, particularly the Netherlands Marine Corps and the US Marines Corps) this ability is significantly increased in terms of depth and breadth. The combination of helicopter carrier (HMS OCEAN) and well docks (HMS ALBION and BULWARK) provides the necessary flexibility to be able to command, insert, logistically support and recover a force independent of fixed infrastructure. While popular imagery of amphibious operations is focused on the beach, no amphibious force commander plans to conduct a ‘Saving Private Ryan’ style beach landing, particularly against a defended beach. Under ideal circumstances an amphibious force will use the sea as a manoeuvre space in order to create the conditions that allow landings to take place as close to, or even on a strategic objective. A beach is best secured from inland, rather than by direct assault from the sea and if needed, a beach can be secured to allow the landing of heavier equipment and logistic support, which make the force survivable and give it resilience. Air assault needs a lot of flight deck spots, and ideally on a dedicated platform. Surface manoeuvre by landing craft and the movement of heavy equipment needs dock space for large landing craft. Both of these depend for success on the ability to land the largest possible force in the shortest possible time in order to create a local numerical tactical advantage for the landing force. So the six flight deck spots on HMS Ocean and aviation support facilities, combine with the eight dock berths in HMS ALBION and BULWARK to provide the commander with maximum flexibility. Working in reverse, the eight landing craft could comfortably evacuate around 1000 people from a beach in a single lift if required. The synchronisation and co-ordination of both air and surface elements requires dedicated command teams and facilities, all of which are housed in the ALBION class ships.
The Royal Marines and the ALBION Class ships are at the heart of a capability which provides United Kingdom politicians with flexibility and choice. They provide a sovereign capability to respond to international events – independent of others. They provide the choice to signal an intent to do so, by announcing the decision to load and sail the force. The deployment of the force provides diplomatic leverage. The deployment can be used to rally the support of likeminded allies and in doing so increase both the capability of the force and the leverage it exerts. The force can remain at sea almost indefinitely while the diplomatic process continues – it’s hard to do that with an aeroplane full of troops. The force can be turned around and sailed home without committing to military action, or it can stop, exercise and conduct demonstrations in home, or allied waters to reinforce the diplomatic message. On arrival the force can remain over the horizon, in international waters – hidden in plain sight. In extremis the force can land – at a time and place of its choosing to conduct military operations – and can be extracted without leaving a footprint. No other military capability in the United Kingdom order of battle delivers this level of political freedom of manoeuvre.
In 1997 the amphibious force was the only self-contained joint force in the United Kingdom defence order of battle. Within the span of command of the Commander task Group and the Commander landing Force were all of the elements needed to conduct operations, from assault troops, to artillery, engineers, support and reconnaissance helicopters and logistic support. The 1997 Strategic Defence Review removed the support and reconnaissance helicopters from the order of battle as part of the creation of the Joint Helicopter Force. The decisions taken in the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review were based in part on a series of ‘Future Character of Conflict’ (FCOC) experiments. A mis-appreciation of the nature of the amphibious capability, in part due to the lack of understanding in the wider and senior naval community and in part as a result of a deliberate policy of undermining the amphibious capability by the Army led to a conclusion that the amphibious capability was not a cost effective way of delivering the level of effect that had been assumed in the experiment. The result was a reduction in the level of ‘ambition’ for the amphibious capability from Brigade to Commando Group. This was a very significant reduction in capability and provided the opportunity for savings against the assets needed to deliver the brigade scale of effort. The consequences included the sale of a Landing Ship Dock Auxilliary (LARGS BAY) and the mothballing of the second ALBION Class ship. This also allowed the Army to withdraw the Rifles battalion from the Brigade order of battle, to halt the expansion of 24 Commando Engineer Regiment to full strength (removing a squadron), to reduce support in 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery and to review and reduce the Army contribution to the Commando logistic Regiment. At the same time, the Royal Navy sought to bolster the case for the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers by inventing the concept of Carrier Enabled Power Projection, which suggested that the Carriers could be used as replacement helicopter assault and command and control platforms. This has had two major effects on the Royal Marines, firstly a reduction in operational capability; we can no longer field a brigade level amphibious force and secondly, the recent removal of 42 Commando from the order of battle means that the Brigade had lost its integrity as a fighting formation. There are ways around this. Commando units could re-structure along the lines of Special Forces squadrons (or like the Australian Commandos), but this would require a wholesale review of Special Forces and Special Operations Forces – and critically; investment.
Finally, there is the impact on morale. The Royal Marines have been engaged in a semi-permanent fight for survival since the Nott Defence Review of 1981. The Falklands War of 1982 won a brief respite and revitalised the procurement of replacement amphibious shipping. However, the net effect has been of heavy and continuous operational deployment overlaid against a background of a steady morale sapping fight for survival. The Royal Marines have felt that they have needed to outperform the Army on every measure and as a result have become lean, efficient and highly capable and by any measure have succeeded. At the same time, the Royal Navy has made a series of platform based procurement decisions that have seen their absolute numbers reduce to the point where the Royal Marines have apparently ‘grown’ to represent a larger percentage of overall naval manpower. There is growing resentment in the Royal Marines that the Navy are being forced (by the Army and Air Force) to make good their manning shortfalls from within and are using the Royal Marines and the amphibious capability as trade space.
Further significant reductions to the Royal Marines would undermine the ability to field the Commando Brigade as a brigade. With that, it would be difficult to justify the retention of dedicated artillery, engineer and other supporting units. The Army would asset strip the Brigade in order to fill gaps in their own order of battle, and most importantly to elevate an Army brigade to the point that they would no longer need to lean on the Commando Brigade to fill rotations in operational cycles. This would leave the Royal Marines Commando units isolated and dependent on the Army for support on operations. Most importantly it would fatally undermine the integrity of the Commando Brigade as a coherent force, leaving the remainder prey to be picked apart piecemeal. The rump of the Royal Marines would be unlikely to survive a Defence Review, without a radical reappraisal of role.
5. What do you think the impact has been of having one of the two Albion class ships at extended readiness, so that only one is available for deployment?
Naval, and for that matter Army force generation cycles work for the most part on rules of three. Three hulls to generate one continuously available for operations, three brigades to generate one continuously available for operations. The Commando (parachute/air assault) brigades and the amphibious shipping have been notable exceptions to this rule. For the most part they have generated one continuously available high readiness brigade. The hull availability of the amphibious shipping has been continuously compromised by the absence of the second ALBION Class LPD. It has been possible with a combination of HMS Illustrious (until 2014) and HMS Ocean (to be paid off in 2018) to mix and match platforms to generate a level of capability. However, given the alternate employment and availability of the Landing Ships Dock Auxiliary the gaps in availability of the ALBION class have compromised what can be carried, how much can be carried and what can be landed by the amphibious force. This significantly reduces the operational flexibility and advantage of the amphibious force.
There is a suggestion that the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers can be used as helicopter platforms under the Carrier Enabled Power Projection concept. There are multiple flaws with this notion, the first and most important of which will be the availability of the hulls. Both hulls will be needed near full time to work around maintenance, leave and support cycles in order to provide the number of sea days needed to establish and maintain currency of the air group if the carriers are to be effective in their primary role. The Queen Elizabeth is not equipped to embark or command and control amphibious forces and will not be so until refitted. The Prince of Wales will have had some design modifications made, but the priority given to amphibious training and support is not likely to sustain any credible level of capability. Neither ship has a well dock and the availability of the Landing Ships Dock Auxiliary is such that they cannot replace the capability of the ALBION class. The levels of reduction to the Royal Marines apparently under discussion (1000 men and the ALBION Class ships) would effectively mean the end of the United Kingdom amphibious capability.
What does this mean? It means accepting that United Kingdom military deployments overseas will always depend on the availability of third party access, basing and overflight. Are there credible alternatives within the existing force structure? No.
Amphibious deployments tend to be programmed as part of wider ‘whole of government’ engagement, particularly in the Mediterranean and with NATO partners. This has the valuable effect of preserving some of the funding. Exercises in North Norway as part of the NATO northern flank reinforcement have been subject to steady erosion over time as the requirement for arctic warfare capability has been questioned. These exercises have always included a significant amphibious component, the relevance of which can be quickly deduced from a brief look at the Soviet Petsamo/Kirkeness campaign of 1944 and more recent Russian employment of amphibious force in Georgia, Ukraine and Exercise Zapad 17 in the Baltic Sea.
Training and exercises are a relatively small, but ‘discretionary’ element of the Ministry of Defence budget. As such they are prey to ‘in year’ reductions as the department tries to balance the books and deliver ‘efficiencies’ (cuts). There are usually enough activities programmed to establish and maintain the required levels of readiness. Much of this activity can be delivered at relatively low cost in home waters.
The Royal Marines recruit bright young people. The average recruit comes from a stable family with a high level of educational attainment; over 90% are above the national average, just under half are qualified for entry to tertiary education, over 40% are qualified for officer entry. These young people are highly aware of news and current affairs and very connected via social media. They are highly unlikely to ‘cling to the life raft’ as the Royal Marines are steadily reduced in size. It will become more and more difficult to recruit people of the quality that characterise the Corps and those that are serving have the motivation, skills and self-confidence to strike out and succeed elsewhere – it is what they are trained to do. Who jumps on to a sinking ship?
Royal Marines Chivenor is home to around 1200 service personnel plus their families and dependents (total around 2,500) and is the second largest employer in North Devon behind North Devon Health Trust. Royal Marines Barracks Condor (Arbroath) and Bickleigh (Devon) are similarly located in rural communities. Their closures will have significant impact on local shops, schools and communities. Aside from the obvious impact, spouses and partners, often teachers, nurses and other community workers play an obvious role in local community. What would happen if you took between 1,200 and 2,500 people out of your local community ‘ecosystem’? The good news is that the barracks sites, once sold will provide space for yet more soulless housing developments.
The Royal Marines and the United Kingdom amphibious capability deserve no right for special consideration. The need for the Royal Marines and the amphibious capability should be reviewed and scrutinised for relevance alongside all other components of the United Kingdom armed forces. The core strategic question remains; if the United Kingdom wishes to remain a global, rather than a regional European power, it must decide whether or not it wishes to retain the sovereign capability to act independently of others in the pursuit of its national interests. If so, it must be prepared properly to prioritise and resource military capability that will best and most flexibly enable the widest possible freedom of political action. Self-contained and self-sustaining amphibious forces, supported by carrier based air forces that can be deployed exploiting the global maritime commons and landed at a place and time of their choosing provide unparalleled levels of flexibility. Turning the question on its head; if not amphibious, then what else?
15 December 2017