Written evidence submitted by Vice Admiral (Rtd) Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB

Thoughts on Military Options for North Korea

Any military action undertaken by the UK in the present North Korean crisis will be governed more by political than military considerations and by the impact the UK’s action may have on its geostrategic vision of itself.  It will be discretionary, and its significance and success will not be judged simply by the outcome of the crisis; unlike in 1950-2, the UK will not be able to exercise a decisive military role, nor change the outcome of any conflict.  It may however be able to affect, one way or another, its geostrategic positioning, its perceived reliability as an ally, its impact on global events as a member of the P5, and its overall deterrent capability. 

On the other hand, any contribution will be small, disproportionately expensive in financial, human and general resource terms, will not be sustainable over a long period, may expose it to financial and other sanctions from Russian and Chinese interests, and could, at worst, result in involvement in escalating and lengthy combat operations and substantial loss of blood, treasure and force structure, which will be very difficult and slow to replace.  In the worst case, the UK’s military capability could be very seriously reduced for a considerable period of time.

This makes it par excellence a political judgement and a crucial test of the UK’s military capability, following the very substantial reduction in her fighting capability since 1998, and especially since 2010.  It is a very public, and globally visible, test whose outcome may significantly change the international perception of the UK.  It is not an easy decision and there are no good and safe options.  Having said that, I shall now address some of the military factors, and because I know them best, the naval and maritime factors involved.

North Korea

I am not an expert on North Korea, and have no access to MoD thinking, Intel or other privileged information. However, thinking about the problem, possible options for North Korea include one or more of the following:

1. To continue to ramp up rhetoric and demonstrative actions by such things as limited, deniable raids on South Korean forces, or threats to allied forces or territory, and test firings of missiles.
2. To hold US and its allies’ territory or forces at risk, as a form of “diplomatic” blackmail.
3. To continue to try to develop reliable and effective long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, probably with nuclear warheads.
4. To mount small (irritant) attacks/raids on South Korean forces and territory and perhaps on her allies too.
5. To make significant incursions into South Korea or, more probably, major invasion in response to any aggressive military action by the USA in order to engage the active support of China and, possibly, of the Soviet Union for their general anti-US stance.
6. To launch a missile(s) attack either by conventional or nuclear means as a demonstration, to try to provoke a response, or as a deliberate act of war.
7. Should serious combat break out, to carry out intense cyber and other forms of attack on the homelands of coalition forces.

Responses

Technically and legally the nature of the response to any of these things, or to other things I have not thought of, is a matter for the United Nations which, thus far, has shown a considerable degree of rhetorical unanimity on the subject.  In practice, and given the rhetoric of President Trump, there is a high chance that the nature of the response will in fact be determined principally, and possibly without consultation, by the USA – “We will deal with it”.  It could, in theory, range from a continuation or hardening of diplomatic and financial pressure on both North Korea and China through to a “de-capitation strike”, the destruction of nuclear and/or ballistic missile sites by either conventional or nuclear means, or a nuclear response to any nuclear use by North Korea. A “left of field” and softer option is of course to allow North Korea to have limited nuclear weapons and try to control them by treaty and by deterrent measures.  This is effectively to accept the most likely outcome and then to try to reach broad agreement, or at least a degree of stability.  The risk is that such an approach may accelerate nuclear proliferation in the region, and indeed more widely – something likely to happen anyway now the “cat is out if the bag”, whether we like it or not.  My personal guess (and it is only a guess) is that it is most likely to involve in due course some sort of conventional surgical strike on North Korean ballistic launch sites, with several possible unattractive consequences.

The key question is, of course, what might be the North Korean follow-on response?  In the worst case it could provoke an attack on South Korea and particularly on Seoul which is geographically very vulnerable.  It is conceivable that some sort of attempt might be made against Japan or the US Pacific territories too.  The consequences of this are difficult to predict but, given the apparently irrational nature of the North Korean regime, are likely to be extremely grave, and uncertain as to scale, longevity and final outcome and of course to have an uncertain and certainly adverse global impact.

We can, however, be fairly sure that if complete collapse of the North Korean state and regime was likely through US military intervention, the Chinese would be very unlikely to stand aside and at that point, calculation of risk becomes almost otiose.

The UK Response

It is against this background that the UK must decide on its course of action, which can hardly be other than to support to a greater or lesser extent and by diplomatic, economic or military means, the chosen course of action of the USA’

If military campaigns in the present century have taught us nothing else, they should have taught us certain key lessons:

1. You can start military action at a time of your choice, but stopping it is much more difficult and requires both sides to co-operate.
2. The course of conflict is always unpredictable.  If you do not have a clear strategic goal as the desired end state, it is almost impossible to make the right tactical decisions en route.
3. Military operations almost invariably last for longer than envisaged, and require very large quantities of reserve or relief manpower, of stores, POL and other logistic support, and substantial technical support and damage repair facilities.  Deployed units have to be regularly relieved.  We may not have the stockpiles or replenishment capability to do this for very long at intensive combat levels.  I hardly need add that it would involve huge expense.
4. There are likely to be losses of both people and equipment which may take a long time and great expense to repair, but which may require very swift replacement.  You are likely, in a serious conflict, even if you win, to finish with significantly reduced forces, and a weakened economy, for at least a very significant period and are likely therefore to be more vulnerable to other potential opponents.
5. Only ready forces – that is to say forces which are fully manned, properly trained and supported logistically for combat operations can be deployed immediately into a potential combat zone.  Even so, to deploy significant combat-ready forces to North Korea may well take weeks rather than days, other than a few lead elements.  It is not possible to generate combat-ready forces overnight, particularly if manpower, training, exercising and support have been reduced for financial reasons, as they have.  This will have an impact on force rotation or reinforcement, which is certainly limited; this in turn will affect the length of time we can sustain any operation.  The speed with which any military contribution can be put together is a key factor in any supporting military effort. This is an area which should be rigorously probed with any government or official witnesses. 
6. It is important to understand that small units (individual ships say, or small formations of other forces), deployed as deterrents or demonstrations of intent can very easily become hostages if adequate back-up support is not readily available.  The fate of HM Ships Repulse and Prince of Wales in 1941 is a dire warning.
7. It is of critical importance that we should have considered, and are prepared for, the various possible consequences of military action, including of course issues of prisoners, civilian casualties, public services and utilities, forms of government of conquered territory, eventual disposal of conquered (or lost) territory, etc.  It is also important to have some sort of exit strategy that leaves things better than they were before (a key element in Just War Theory).  Failures in all these areas are plainly apparent in our operations of the last couple of decades or so.  I imagine that the HCDC will wish to probe these areas.
8. We have to accept that a significant deployment in the Far Est is bound to have a ripple effect and will oblige us to reduce significantly other routine operations, including the defence of the UK base.

Perhaps above all, our leaders and population at large will need to understand that we are no longer able and equipped, through our own deliberate choice, to play a major military role in crises of this nature.  Our capacity to do this has reduced considerably, even since 2010 and substantially since 2003.  It is essential that we temper our dreams to fit the forces we have seen fit to provide for ourselves.  This may well mean a considerable change in our national self-image and comportment, but it is one which our political and financial decisions and actions will have forced upon us, and which has not been fully considered in the framing of our defence policy.  A sharp touch of reality is needed, which seems to be markedly lacking in some of our political rhetoric.

Naval Deployments

Against this background I have a few remarks to make about naval deployments – it seems wiser to leave Army or Air Force matters to experts in those fields.  Naval possibilities might be:

1. The despatch of a “battle group.”  This would take some while to assemble, and deployment under the most suitable current flagship, HMS Ocean, is possible.  No other suitable flagship will be available for several years yet, and Ocean is due to be disposed of next year.  However, following the loss of the Harrier force, she can deploy no strike aircraft and probably only a small (battalion size) Marine force (given enough time a brigade size force might be assembled provided the two LPDs were available   She would require some escort protection and a full supporting logistic and support train, including access to base facilities (in Japan?).  She could, with occasional stand-downs, be kept on station for some months.
2. One, or possibly two, SSN’s capable of land attack (with cruise missiles), some ASW, intelligence gathering and Special Force insertion operations.  The passage time for such vessels, assuming they are manned, operational and have a full outfit of cruise missiles embarked, is probably of the order of at least 3 to 4 weeks.  Once the cruise missiles had been fired, the SSNs could revert to a more normal ASW or ASVW role, though it must be noted that a re-ammunitioning with appropriate weapons might be required – not a trivial operation far from home bases, although well practiced.  At this range from home, there is at least a risk that this would be a “one-shot” option. With only 6 SSN’s, and the need to cover the safe deployment of our own nuclear deterrent, it is not obvious that they could be kept on station indefinitely.
3. A Type 45 destroyer or other escorts could be attached to a US (or perhaps Australian/UK or Japanese/UK task unit).  Unfortunately, financial constraints seem to have prevented the installation of cruise missiles on these ships, but they could certainly make a contribution to the defence of a US or International Task Force and provide important political support to a US led coalition.  Such a contribution could in theory continue for a long period provided the units remained reliable. (But see my point above on other tasks)
4. SSBN targeting.  This is self-explanatory – a nuclear strike either as a de-capitation strike or as a retaliatory strike.  I regard this as a very unlikely option for the UK, and will discuss it no further.
5. Naval Fires Support to land operations.  Certainly an option for small operations where only light precision fire would be needed.
6. Insertion of Special Forces by one of several possible means.

It is possible that other options exist which I have not thought of.

Conclusion

There appear to be no good options in a situation which, not for the first time in the last century or so, has been allowed to continue to its inevitable and predictable crisis point without any decisive political action being taken earlier on.  There are only risks, and of course political reputations, at stake.  Public, and probably political, opinion will certainly need to be very well managed in the event of any intervention plan.

Key issues would seem to include:

A recognition of the critical danger of the situation in place of the more normal denial of unpleasant truths.

The overarching policy and strategic goals, desired outcome and rules of engagement

Careful consideration of possible developments and our planned reaction to them.

The nature, purpose of any military contribution and resultant make up of any task force.

Adequate commanding, manning, training, preparation, storing and rotation of a force.

The deployment timescale bearing in mind that, unlike the Falklands or Libyan campaigns, we are not in control of all the levers of events.

The potential length and direction of development of any campaign (very difficult) and identification of reserves and relief forces, whether British or other.

The availability of in-theatre support facilities.

Management of public opinion in UK to prepare people for the event, and give legitimacy to planning and preparation for some of the more serious possible consequences. Ideally work on this should start as early as possible

An exit strategy.

And finally, our conduct in any Korean emergency and its outcome are likely, one way or another, to have a lasting impact on international perceptions of the UK.  I cannot resist, perhaps unhelpfully, remarking that the middle of the Brexit negotiations is a very unfortunate time to be confronted with this problem, but nothing much can be done about that. It merely shows that ignoring a problem tends, over time, to make it worse.

4 December 2017