Written evidence submitted by Mr Alistair Lenczner*, Expedition Engineering (INV0006)

1.0              Introduction

This is a response to the Transport Select Committee’s Rail Infrastructure Enquiry (ref. link below).

https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/inquiries/parliament-2017/rail-infrastructure-17-19/

The response focuses in particular on the following aspect of the inquiry:

• “Whether Network Rail’s long-term planning process is effective in providing the industry with strategic direction beyond the five-year control period”

(*Note: Alistair Lenczner, Director at Expedition Engineering, has over 30 years’ experience in the planning and design of major projects including transport infrastructure and has a strong interest in the planning of transport infrastructure in the UK.)

2.0              Summary

• There is no unified strategic long-term plan that considers how the UK’s s rail infrastructure should evolve as an integrated system serving the nation for the coming 30 years and beyond.
• The UK has no single agency that takes responsible for the strategic long-term planning of the national railway network including both high-speed and conventional rail. 
• The Department for Transport’s (DfT) recently published document “Connecting People: A Strategic Vision for Rail” fails to provide a “joined-up” long term strategic plan for the UK rail network.
• Whilst Network Rail has a “long-term planning process” (LTPP) strategy, this essentially considers the national rail network within its separate regions (e.g. “Anglia”, “Scotland”, “West Coast Main Line”). There is no over-arching strategy for the evolution of the complete national network to meet the nation’s future needs including both passenger and freight capacity and connectivity.
• The planning of the UK’s new high-speed rail system (HS1 and HS2) does not adequately consider how the new high-speed lines integrates with the existing national rail network and other strategically important national infrastructure (e.g. airports and ports) to maximize economic benefits for the nation. 
• There are several cases where opportunities to improve connectivity between HS2 and conventional rail network have been overlooked (or ignored) and where no suitable provision made for future connections. As a result, the benefits of the HS2 project are likely to be significantly less that they might otherwise be.

3.0              Response to Inquiry

3.1              The Transport Committee rightly questions whether Network Rail’s long-term planning process is effective in providing the industry with strategic direction beyond the five-year control; period. Although Network Rail undertakes a “long-term planning process” (LTPP) on how the rail industry can drive and support economic growth, this is essentially limited to how the existing network can be upgraded. The UK compares poorly with countries such as France in terms of strategic long-term rail infrastructure planning.

3.2    The Department for Transport’s recently published document “Connecting People: A Strategic Vision for Rail” highlights the need to need to “forge new links between places, spurring development and economic growth”, however it fails to offer a clear plan for how the UK’s rail network should evolve as an integrated national system.  Whilst it refers to proposals for regional improvements and the prospect of reopening lines that were closed in the 1960’s, it fails to demonstrate how these would work together as part of a “joined-up” strategic plan.     

3.2              Network Rail’s LTPP does not include the identification and consideration of opportunities to create brand new additions to the rail network. Further, it does not properly consider how the combined Network Rail and evolving High-Speed Rail (HS1 and HS2) networks should work together as an integrated railway network where train services use both high-speed and classic rail lines for journeys across the entire country.

3.3              Network Rail’s focus on planning infrastructure investment in a succession of 5-year long Control Periods means that insufficient attention is paid to what the long-term objectives should be for the rail network in terms of how works. There is, in effect, no long-term strategic network planning that looks at how the UK’s railways should evolve over a 30-year period to provide the best economic outcomes for the nation as a whole. The division of the 5-year control period investments within separate regions also tends to lead towards a “siloed” view of the longer term national needs. 

3.4              The lack of effective long-term panning of the UK railways can be contrasted to how railway infrastructure is planned in some other developed countries. In France and Spain, for example, the new high-speed rail networks built over the past 30 years and more have been developed following strategic plans will an outlook of over 30 years. An advantage of such long-term planning approach is that rail infrastructure investments at a regional or local level can be seen in the context of how they will contribute the long term strategic plan. In addition, appropriate passive provision for future connections can be included within projects to avoid expensive infrastructure connection costs at a later date. 

3.5              The ability to see how local or regional rail investments can contribute to a long term strategic plan at a national scale can make a significant impact on how the economic benefits of an individual project are assessed. Without a good understanding of the wider potential benefits of a local rail infrastructure plan, poor investment decisions are likely to be made. 

3.6              Several cases can be highlighted where the lack of long term planning within the UK rail industry leads to inefficiencies and/or lost opportunities:

• The piecemeal approach to electrification on Great Western and Midland Main Lines. Lack of continuity leads to contractual inefficiencies and delayed benefits of electrification.
• The planning of HS2 as a “stand-alone“ project means that the HS2 infrastructure connectivity with the existing Network Rail network is sub-optimal:
• Lack of provision for through running from HS2 to Network Rail lines at Manchester and Leeds.
• No connection with HS1 (and so no connection to Europe)
• No infrastructure connectivity with Network Rail south of Birmingham.
• The planning of East West Rail as a “stand-alone” project means that it is likely to miss the opportunity for an inter-connection for passengers where it crosses the new HS2 line at Calvert. Such a connection would be likely to add significant benefits for both HS2 and the East-West Railway. 
• The lack of strategic co-ordination with the planning of new aviation capacity in South East England means that opportunities for a direct high-speed rail service to Heathrow and Gatwick airports is, in effect, being overlooked or ignored. 
• The lack of strategic co-ordination with the planning of new port infrastructure means that the opportunity for new intermodal freight logistic operations is likely to be overlooked.

3.7              It is recommended that long term strategic railway planning should be overseen by a national infrastructure planning agency (possibly part of the National Infrastructure Commission) whose responsibilities include ensuring that all railway infrastructure planning includes consideration for how individual projects fit into a “joined-up” strategic national infrastructure plan. Further, the agency should be responsible for making sure that the benefit to cost ratio of any project includes the total benefits accrued across combined infrastructure sectors and regions.

December 2017