Written evidence submitted by Gary McKenzie
Maintaining the Royal Navy’s Amphibious Capabilities (including HMS ALBION and HMS BULWARK)
The Royal Marines
The Royal Marines Commandos are the UK Armed Forces elite specialist light infantry and the envy of our NATO partners. Whilst the Corps is not part of the UKSF, it is without doubt a special service force and, indeed, it provides a significant and dis-proportionate level of troops to our Special Forces. We cannot afford to reduce the capability and size of these frontline troops.
The UK Amphibious Task Group
Of course, having an elite specialist light infantry (with expertise in the littoral) without the associated delivery capability would be quite ridiculous. The Royal Navy’s ALBION Class Landing Platform Docks are the key part of the Amphibious Task Group, but before we look at the capability of these ships, we should consider the wider task force and how it has changed in recent years.
The core components of the ATG are the LPDs, HMS OCEAN (Landing Platform Helicopter) and the BAY Class Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliaries) operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Up until the 2010 SDSR, we had four LSD(A)s, but in 2011 we sold RFA LARGS BAY to the Royal Australian Navy (now HMAS CHOULES).
The shortage of amphibious platforms has been further exacerbated by the RN’s shortage of other surface assets, notably frigates and destroyers that are now at minimum numbers. This shortage has forced the Navy ‘to think further out of the box’ and we have seen Bay Class ships being used for Atlantic Patrol Task (North) and the counter narcotics/hurricane relief role. One less ship again being available for amphibious operations.
The decision to sell forward repair ship RFA Diligence in 2016 has required the use of another BAY class platform to fill the gap and to fulfil the role of forward support to our submarines and ships. One less ship again being available for amphibious operations.
Our mine-hunting activities in the Gulf continue unabated and these small ships require local ‘mother ship’ support. Surprise surprise, once again the RFA BAY class is being used to fulfil this key role. One less ship again being available for amphibious operations.
At best, especially when considering the need for ship refits and maintenance periods, the RN Amphibious Task Group now can perhaps count on the availability of just ONE LSD(A).
It has recently been announced that our sole LPH, HMS OECAN is to be sold to the Brazilian Navy and without replacement.
Logically then, going forward into 2018, with HMS BULWARK in refit, the Royal Navy will have practically just HMS ALBION and an LSD(A) to support amphibious activities in the littoral, which is ludicrous. And now, some rather badly informed parties seem to be suggesting that we should sell the LPDs themselves – unbelievable!
We need ships that can operate in the key area of the littoral: LPDs, LPHs and LSD(A)s. The QUEEN ELIZABETH carriers are not capable of operating in the littoral, they are far too big and too valuable an asset to risk in inshore waters. True, they can carry troops and project forward power. They will have a big rotary wing lift capacity for the air insertion of Royal Marine commandos, but we must remember that helicopters have a limited range and speed. With the carrier out in deep water, it will be necessary to cross-deck troops to platforms already in position in the littoral – i.e. to the LPDs and LSD(A)s. This cross-decking will allow the simultaneous deployment ashore of sufficient combat power to fight and to win.
Ship to Objective Manoeuvre
Successful STOM requires the capability of simultaneous air AND surface assault. The latter is achieved by organic landing craft assets carried by ALBION, BULWARK and OCEAN. With the demise of OCEAN, we lose 4 Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP Mark 5) and with the strong likelihood of just one LPD being on task, our ‘main body’ carrying LCs will number just 4 LCVP and 4 of the larger Landing Craft Utility (LCU Mark 10). The LSD(A) is likely to be carrying the Offshore Raiding Craft for force protection and pre-landing force operations, but will use the LPD’s LCs to discharge its troops via surface manoeuvre. The LCUs, which are uniquely carried and operated by the LPDs are the only LC assets that can land main battle tanks such as CHALLENGER 2 during the combat stage. The MEXEFLOTE motorised rafts carried by the LSD(A)s are only suitable for follow on operations. In other words, to land further large vehicle assets once the beach landing has been successful and a beachhead has been established.
Command and Control
The LPDs are the Command and Control platforms of the Amphibious Task Group, carrying both the 1-Star Commanders (the Commodore of the Task Group and the Brigadier 3 CDO Brigade, Commander Land Forces) and their respective planning/battle staffs. These commanders need to be embarked together and in a platform, which is in the littoral – the LPD.
Cannibalisation
A recent National Audit Office report on the Royal Navy’s cannibalisation of equipment and parts has shown the depth the Navy has been forced to go to keep some platforms at sea. History is repeating itself. The same happened to the predecessors of ALBION and BULWARK, when INTREPID was cannibalised to keep FEARLESS at sea. In practice that gave us one working LPD. We cannot allow the same to happen with BULWARK, the alongside LPD in refit.
Summary
The QE class carriers, as capable and as welcome as they are, are not panaceas and cannot contribute directly to the ATG. We must maintain our core amphibious capability and expertise, which can only be done via the LPD and LSD(A) combination, coupled with support from the CVN and possibly one of the strategic ro-ro ferries.
There can be no question of disposing of the LPDs, or of reducing the fleet to just one LPD. Both HMS ALBION AND HMS BULWARK are essential elements of the RN orbat.
3 December 2017