Written Evidence submitted by MillionPlus (STL0018)

 

  1. MillionPlus is the Association for Modern Universities in the UK, and the voice of 21st century higher education. We champion, promote and raise awareness of the essential role played by modern universities in a world-leading higher education system. Modern universities make up 53% of all UK undergraduates, and 38% of all postgraduates, with over one million students studying at modern institutions across the UK.

What are the impacts of higher education funding on the public finances?
 

  1. Higher education funding is highly productive in terms of its direct economic impact on the economy and the wider public finances. For example, it has been estimated that in 2014-15 UK universities generated £95bn of gross output in the economy, and supported more than 940,000 jobs across the UK.[1]
     
  2. The impact of funding in higher education on individuals who participate is also highly beneficial in economic terms. On average, graduates earn more throughout their careers than non-graduates (and therefore contribute more through taxation). For women, higher education qualifications deliver higher earnings than their non-graduate peers (notwithstanding the gender pay gap). More generally graduates are known to be more resilient in the labour market, are less likely to be unemployed, more likely to engage in further study and civic society, contribute to productivity and entrepreneurial activity. The latter is particularly true for modern universities as 72% of graduate startups active after three years are those promoted by the graduates of modern universities. There are also wider public benefits in terms of well-being and intergenerational aspiration.

 

  1. Under the post-2012 tuition fee and maintenance loan system in England and taking into account the replacement of maintenance grants by loans in 2016, the government invests £8.4bn in each student cohort.[2] For the majority of courses, this system replaced the direct investment by government in teaching grant and has been accompanied by a reduction in government-provided capital funding for teaching. Accordingly, a greater proportion of the costs of higher education has been transferred to individual students, through fees, with the government issuing and underwriting loans to cover the cost, and then clearing any debt that has not been repaid after thirty years. The impact on long-term public finances is therefore variable depending on the growth in graduate earnings (and thus ability to, and level of, repayments). However, there is an impairment recorded on the relevant departmental accounts linked with the Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) charge.

 

  1. Following the decision in October 2017 to increase the earnings repayment threshold from £21,000 to £25,000 with effect from 2018-19, Ministers have confirmed that the write-off (RAB charge) has been estimated at between 40%-45% (up from 30% currently).

    In the 2016-17 annual report and accounts, the figures forecast to be written-off are £3.5bn for 2017-18, £3.9bn for 2018-19 and £4.3bn in 2019-20.[3]
     
  2. Appendix A also demonstrates other levels of investment into the higher education sector, including direct research funding, teaching funding for high-cost subjects, and capital investment.

    o What is impact of student default on the long-term sustainability of the public finances?
     
  3. The government has indicated that it sees the RAB charge and associated write-off, not as a failure of the current system, but as part of the government’s direct contribution to funding higher education. For example, the Universities Minister, Jo Johnson MP, stated “It is a conscious investment in the skills base of the country, not a symptom of a broken student finance system”.[4]
     
  4. From 2018-19, graduates on the post-2012 fees and funding regime will commence repayment when they earn £25,000 or more and will pay 9% of their income over the threshold (for pre-2012 students it is currently set at £17,775 but on lower original fees).[5] This means that, in theory, the lowest earners repay the least, and the highest earners repay the most. However, recent analysis suggests that, with higher interest rates on loans, it will be medium earners who will proportionately pay the most over the course of the thirty-year period.Higher earners have the best chance of repaying in full (and thus ending their contributions), whereas middle earners are unlikely to ever reach that point and will have to pay at 9% of earnings for the full period.[6]
     
  5. The question of sustainability, therefore, is complex and essentially a political choice as to when direct investment is provided by taxpayers e.g. through increased teaching grants (and lower or no fees) while students are studying, or reduced (or no) teaching grant and higher fees while students are studying, with loan repayments and then taxpayer direct investment via loan write-off. These choices also influence how investment in higher education is recorded in the government’s accounts. The fee system increases cumulative debt by adding to the public-sector net cash requirement, for which the Treasury issues gilts (therefore increasing public sector net debt - PSND).[7] Funding principally via direct grant increases the PSBR (and potentially the deficit). 

 

  1. One of the challenges in assessing the costs and sustainability of the system for the individual and the public finances has arisen as a result of the many amendments that have been made, in particular since 2012. Costs and perceptions of sustainability but also fairness can be changed significantly as a result of ‘one-off’ decisions and amendments. For example, the abolition of maintenance grants in 2016 significantly increased the debts of students from the poorest households while the changes announced by the Prime Minister in October 2017 which increased the repayment threshold to £25,000 have been estimated to cost the Treasury an additional £2.85bn per year.[8] At the same time the level of student ‘default’ has been increased substantially. 

 

  1. The RAB charge has previously changed as a result of amendments to amount that the government sets as the discount rate (i.e. the amount it values future monies to be worth in relation to today). In 2015 it was announced that the discount rate would change from RPI plus 2.2% to RPI plus 0.7%. This resulted in a reduction in how much the funding system was estimated to ‘cost’ in the future (and resulted in a reduction of the then RAB charge to 30%) – although, this had no real bearing on levels of graduate repayments or the costs of the system.[9] 
     
  2. The complexity and the degree of flux within the system as a result of political decisions is one reason why its sustainability has come under scrutiny. Amendments to fee, funding and maintenance regimes require changes to accounting, administrative systems and welfare advice in institutions as well as the SLC. The administrative costs of making a complex system even more complex are never assessed nor would it seem taken into account.

 

  1. It is also the case that the sustainability of the current system does not exist in a vacuum. The repayment system is predicated on recouping from graduate earnings, and these are dependent in part on assumptions about UK economic growth.  Nonetheless, the capacity of higher education to improve productivity and add value to the UK economy and wider society means, as the OECD has pointed out, an extremely worthwhile investment including in periods of economic downturn.  
     

What is the economic rationale for post-2012 student loan interest rates?

 

  1. The rationale for the current interest loan rates are both economic and political. After graduation the interest rates are staggered dependent on graduate earnings, rising to a top level of RPI + 3% (6.1% in November 2017). This rests on the presumption that the system of repayments is progressive where the highest earners pay back the highest sums, enabling government to recoup more from those that can afford it, and in effect, subsidising those who are earning less or will not be able to repay at all or in full. 
     
  2. Setting interest rates at a higher level than that of government borrowing means that in principle the system is more financially sustainable for the government. However, some students may pay back a far greater sum than they originally owed. 
     
  3. The replacement of grants by loans and the addition of higher interest rates has added to the debts of students from the poorest households especially bearing in mind that all fee and maintenance loans increase by RPI plus 3% while students are studying. As a result, these students enter the workforce with higher debts, pay more in interest and are less likely to pay-off their student loans in full increasing, the write-off by taxpayers. Moreover, in spite of extending students’ reliance on interest-bearing maintenance and fee loans, the government has yet to fulfil its promise to introduce a Sharia-compliant Takaful alternative finance product for students.

 

o on what basis was RPI + 3% established? Is this fair, given the current Bank of England base rate (0.25% at the time of writing)?

 

  1. The rate was established by the Coalition Government as part of the agreement which introduced the 2012 fees and funding regime.


    Although the Bank of England base rate has rarely moved in this time, RPI has fluctuated significantly, from 0.9% in 2015/16 to 3.1% today (and, in fact, 3.6% in 2012/13).[10]
     
  2. The question of fairness of interest rates when compared to the Bank of England base rate, depends on a number of value judgements e.g. the extent to which the system should be funded via higher repayments per se and/or the balance of responsibilities for repayment between the individual and the state. It is certainly the case that as borrowing rates for the government are at a historic low, repayment rates have been disproportionately high in comparison. However, any adjustment to interest rates would be costly and likely to benefit higher earners.

 

Is RPI the right measure? What would the impact be of the Government applying an alternative reference rate to student loans?
 

  1. In November 2017 the Universities Minister outlined the government’s rationale for using RPI in a debate on tuition fees; “A longstanding feature of the system has been that it uses RPI, as that includes costs that are relevant to the basket of goods and services that students consume, including housing costs and mortgage interest costs. That is why RPI has been embedded in the student finance system historically”.[11]
     
  2. In our view, RPI is not a very good measure for calculating repayment. Moreover, the Office for National Statistics has repeatedly stated that it remains a “flawed” measure, and that they “do not recommend its use”.[12] RPI (currently set at 3.9%) is generally regarded as the highest measure of inflation. Accordingly, the likely impact of using another measure, for example CPI (3%), CPIH (2.8%), or the government’s discount rate (0.7%), would be to lower the interest rate, and increase the RAB charge.
     

o What are the implications of Brexit (for example could a weaker pound lead to higher inflation and higher interest rates)?
 

  1. Although it is difficult to accurately predict the implications of Brexit it is likely that a weaker pound will lead to rising levels of inflation, and higher interest rates. This will be partly through a higher relative price of exports, and a reaction to any inflationary rise being met with a likely increase in interest rates. The higher cost of borrowing will have an impact on the government in relation to financing higher education. However even if the government rate of borrowing were to double to 1%, it would still be far lower than that which it collects in repayment interest rates.  
     
  2. However, Brexit will have serious financial impacts on UK universities and the viability of courses for UK students. London Economics has modelled that a significant change in the UK’s classification of EU students e.g. classifying them as international students or removing loan support, would result in a large fall in the amount of EU students studying in the UK.[13] Owing to the fact that the spending power of EU students alone amounts to £3.7bn per year to the UK economy, the economic impact of this outcome must be considered now by the UK government and as part of the Brexit negotiations.[14]
     
  3. In addition, loss of EU staff, or the ability to continue to conduct research with European partners (or with what was previously EU funding) may also impact upon the ability and the attractiveness of UK universities, both across Europe and in the wider world. The loss of European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) (worth over £14bn to the UK between 2014 and 2020) will also impact on regions and universities in the UK which have been engaged in or benefit from ESIF investment. 
     

What is the rationale behind the repayment threshold?
 

  1. Amendments to the repayment threshold in 2012 and thereafter suggest that the rationale behind the thresholds is as much the result of political choices as economics.
     
  2. The setting of the repayment threshold at £21,000 for post-2012 students was a decision taken by the Coalition Government after discussion to mitigate against lower earning graduates being hit with repayments in a system that resulted in fees being tripled.[15] Similarly, the new repayment threshold of £25000 announced by the Prime Minister at Conservative Party Conference, may in part be seen as a response to calls for the government to act to help younger people and graduates.
     
  3. The general rationale remains the same – namely the threshold is designed to act as a progressive measure to ensure the lowest earning graduates do not end up paying the most for the higher education system. 
     

o Did altering the repayment threshold post loans being taken out undermine the perceived fairness or confidence in the system?
 

  1. In general, changing terms and conditions of an agreement in a way that is seen as detrimental is likely to undermine confidence in both the robustness of the system, and the integrity of the body that has changed the conditions.
     
  2. There is also a problem in terms of generational fairness, and motives, as students who were in the system under the 2006-2011 fee regime were not subject to the changes that were made to post-2012 students’ terms and conditions. One could attribute the lack of a change in the 2006-2011 students’ conditions in part down to the fact that the 2006-2011 student loan book was up for sale, and changing terms and conditions retrospectively may make the sale less attractive to investors. If one believes that the government were making changes to the terms and conditions to promote a fairer system, or in the best interest of the sector/students, it is difficult to understand why it should only impact upon some students within the loan and repayment system.
     

Would a graduate tax be preferable to the current model?
 

  1. MillionPlus published a report in 2010 on the viability of a graduate tax, in association with London Economics. This examined in detail how a graduate tax might work and the differences between a graduate tax system and a direct graduate contribution system linked with fees and loans.[16] The report pointed out that a graduate tax could be varied in terms of tax rates, to whom it applied and for how long, identifying options and costs associated with different scenarios. 

 

  1. A graduate tax would remove fee loans and replace these with direct government investment (and would therefore impact upon the deficit in a way that the current system avoids). The RAB charge for fee loans would decreased over time. However, in principle, a graduate tax would be a hypothecated tax, where the tax receipts would be allocated to an area of funding – as opposed to general taxation. This could raise similar questions about the balance of who pays for the system, how much direct investment universities received and how much graduates contributed to the costs of higher education.


Is the current system already effectively a graduate tax?

 

  1. Whilst there may be many practical similarities between the models, there are also fundamental differences between the tax and the loan system that mean, in reality, the two are not the same.
     
  2. Under a graduate tax, the tax is on graduate earnings and provides investment for higher education i.e. it is not directly linked to individual courses or cohorts of study or the accrual of interest currently applied to individual student loans as soon as they are taken out. Rather than students paying for their own education (plus interest), they would now be paying for the education of the next generation.

 

o How would the funding of universities be allocated under a graduate tax?
 

  1. The allocation of funding would be a matter for government. The Higher Education and Research Act 2017 has made substantial changes to the architecture of the sector, and the Higher Education Council for England (HEFCE) is being dissolved, with many of its functions being moved to the new Office for Students (OfS). As HEFCE would previously have been responsible for funding allocation, it is likely that the OfS would have to administer any allocation of funding under a graduate tax system. With the OfS given an explicit remit to enhance competition, and as a regulator of the sector and not a funding body per se, how the remit of the OfS would be able to effectively cope with any new responsibilities in this regard would be questionable. It is highly likely that the architecture of the sector would need to be re-evaluated (again) if any such change was to take place.
     

o Is a graduate tax a greater disincentive to study than a student loan?
 

  1. There is no evidence to suggest that a change would be a greater disincentive. However, the specifics of the terms around current loan repayment models compared to any proposed graduate tax would have a bearing on the opinions of students, so this is not a binary choice.

    Should all university courses receive the same level of government subsidy?
     
  2. The funding of higher education, through student loans, repayments and via direct government contributions (or subsequent write-offs) is an investment not a subsidy in a diverse and world leading sector that is of huge value and benefit to the UK.
     
  3. In terms of actual flows of investment, it is not currently the case that all courses receive the same level of investment. The reduction in the teaching grant since 2012 has resulted in the majority of subjects and courses receiving no levels of direct government investment. However, some high cost courses e.g. STEM receive some direct grant.
     

 

  1. Regarding the ability for universities to all have access to the same level of funding via the student loans system (i.e. £9250 per academic year), it is unequivocally in the best interests of students and the sector as a whole, if all universities remain on a level playing field in terms of access to investment in their students. The reliance on higher student fees to fund universities has triggered a comparatively narrow ‘value for money’ debate focused on the cost of particular programmes and the fees charged. Assessing the costs of funding higher education to taxpayers in this very narrow way ignores the wider value of investing in higher education which has been documented by the OECD. This includes the greater economic resilience of graduates in changing labour markets, the added value and contribution of graduates to employers and local communities and the fact that graduates themselves contribute to intergenerational aspirations and outcomes.

 

  1. This no economic justification for the introduction of differential fees. Research by the Institute of Fiscal Studies has confirmed that family background is the major determinant of higher graduate earnings and career prospects, even ten years after graduation.[17] The imposition of a policy of differential fees linked with graduate earnings or courses would therefore serve to:
     
  1. Like teaching grant before it, tuition fee income is used to fund and support a wide-range of university functions and activities. These include access agreements (a statutory requirement for all universities charging fees in excess of the lower fee cap); academic, professional, technical and support staff costs directly associated with teaching activity; wider costs of administrative and corporate functions; recruitment and admissions activities; quality assurance; compliance with regulatory and data regimes required by professional and higher education sector bodies; course development and validation; student welfare and support services including hardship funds and partnership work with employers, schools, colleges and other stakeholders.
  2. It is highly misleading to suggest that tuition fees should, or could, only take account of the costs of teaching a particular course and/or be linked with narrow constructs such as contact hours. Such a simplistic approach ignores the wide range of education and associated activities in which universities engage and the impact on university business models of the significant changes in teaching funding and student support regimes introduced since 2012.
  3. The IFS study acknowledged the impact of context and geography on graduate salaries and concluded that ‘Given regional differences in average wages, some very locally focused institutions may struggle to produce graduates whose wages outpace English-wide earnings, which includes those living in London where full time earnings for males are around 50% higher than in some other regions, such as Northern Ireland’. Differential fees linked with graduate salaries would not only be unfair but would also remove investment from many universities in regions where economic growth has been lower than that in London and the South-East.
  4. Imposing differential and lower institutional fees on the basis of graduate earnings would reduce funding and the unit of resource in those universities with the most socially inclusive student cohorts. This would have the effect of reducing investment in universities that contribute the most to social mobility and effectively reverse the government’s policy of providing pupil premium funding in schools.
  5. The imposition of differential fees by subject or course would be similarly counter-intuitive and would take no account of the fact that earnings are lower in some sectors of the economy and that patterns of graduate employment differ. For example, graduates engaged in the UK’s world-leading creative industries often start by developing portfolio careers and/or engage with micro or small businesses where earnings are initially lower.
  6. The earnings of graduates working in the not-for-profit and in public services are unlikely to match those that can be gained in some parts of the finance sector while earnings associated with courses that attract a majority of female students may be lower because of the gender pay gap.
  7. Notwithstanding the conclusions that graduate earnings are much more a reflection of the individual rather than the university or the course studied, the IFS study identified the statistical difficulties of linking, with accuracy, graduate earnings with university course. The latter are often categorised in broad terms in official statistics. Many students study degrees which are multi-disciplinary in scope and progress to a wide range of different employments and occupations.
  8. The suggestion that lower graduate earnings are the result of poor quality courses or institutions is entirely without foundation. All UK universities are quality assured and intervention in the market to impose lower differential fees would undoubtedly impact on perceptions of quality both within the UK and overseas. There is no justification for this assertion but every likelihood that the imposition of differential fees would damage not only the standing of universities at home and overseas but also be entirely unhelpful to the students and graduates of these institutions in terms of their future employment and career prospects.

o Does the lack of differentiation in the price of courses offered suggest there has been market failure in the provision of higher education?
 

  1. No. Under the current system the lack of differentiation is an economically rational outcome of the current market and the deregulation of student numbers. Since 2012 teaching grant provided by the government has reduced from £5107m to £1386m (see Appendix A), and at the same time student loans (at their maximum) have replaced this level of funding. This is very important to note, as fees may have tripled since 20102 but this has not meant that income has tripled; it has stayed relatively static.
     
  2. It is also a necessary and logical feature of a market that links personal contribution to the system (through loans and repayments) to a student’s individual education. This means that universities will wish to invest as much as they can on their students in order to enable them to be successful.
    Again, this is a logical decision based on making a university highly competitive.
     

What impact have the 2012 student loan reforms had on the finances of the higher education sector?
 

  1. The post-2012 system has not seen income rise at the same rate as tuition fee increases. As Appendix A and B demonstrate, the impact on more teaching focused institutions, as opposed to those more heavily focused on research, has been more pronounced, as research income has remained relatively stable whilst there have been large fluctuations and reductions in funding for teaching. Clearly, if direct funding via the teaching grant was restored, the dependence on higher tuition fees would be less pronounced.  
     

How effective has the Government’s management of the loan book been and what are the incentives to maximise collection?
 

  1. The management of the loan book, via the Student Loans Company (SLC), has been problematic, not least due to the extreme complexity and number of changes and additions to the system. In addition to the changes which have been referenced, these have included amendments to advanced learner loans, the introduction of postgraduate loans, part-time loans (with different repayment regimes) and part-time maintenance loans with effect from 2018-19. These amendments have resulted in the SLC being focused on England although it has a wider UK remit and arguable it was unable to respond as promptly as might have been desirable in respect of the introduction of the Diamond review of fees and funding in Wales.  


Should the administration of collecting student loans be transferred to HMRC or another body from the Student Loans Company (SLC)?
 

  1. The level of complexity within the system is of greater impediment to its effectiveness than the body that administers it. It does also require greater levels of investment to boost performance, whether that be through the SLC or HMRC. In many cases, HMRC does already collect some of the loan repayments. However, its suitability to perform all the other functions of the SLC would need to be reviewed and risk-assessed.
     
  2. The potential impact on the devolved administrations of changing the architecture of collection would also need to be fully analysed, as ensuring there is integration in an already highly complex system would be critical to its success. 
     

What are the implications of the sale or securitization of student loans?
 

  1. Selling off a government asset will raise short term funds, but could ultimately see the UK lose out on higher longer-term repayments. This will be a political decision based on an assessment of taxpayer and Treasury benefit of any sale which will be at a discounted rate from its ‘value’. 

 

  1. In selling off student loans the government is essentially selling its financial stake in raising graduate earnings. Under the current model, and with the loan book in government hands, it is in the financial interests of the government to ensure that graduate earnings rise. This direct link would be broken by the sale and the severing of this direct correlation may be viewed as symbolic of the assessment that the government has made of the potential for the economy to grow. 

     

o What are the costs and benefits to the taxpayer of receiving this cashflow?
 

  1. MillionPlus has previously called for receipts from the sale of the loan book to be reinvested in higher education and we would reiterate the economic and wider public benefits that would be accrued if this cashflow was reinvested in this way.

 

o What are the implications for students and graduates?
 

  1. There should not be any direct implications for students and graduates in the event of sale of the loan book.
     

o Would the sale of student loans create a barrier to changing the terms of the loans to reflect a change in Government policy?
 

  1. Investors rely on stability and certainty and will wish to be indemnified against any future changes to the terms and conditions of the student loans that are included in the sale.

 

What are the implications of student loan repayments throughout an individual’s career on:

o The ability to get on the property ladder;
 

  1. Student loans are taken into account in mortgage applications although the extent to which they will impact on the ability to get on the property ladder will be highly dependent on personal circumstances but also regional variations in the property market. However, it should be noted that the impact of interest rates on the costs of repayments for ‘middle income’ earners e.g. £30-40,000 is considerable and adds disproportionately to the cumulative contribution of these earners through the tax, NI and student repayment systems.

o the ability to save for retirement; and
 

  1. Analysis by London Economics and the University and College Union (UCU) has highlighted that, particularly in middle years of working, loan repayments will have an impact upon disposable income and savings ability, particularly when coupled with higher marginal levels of tax rates, and greater levels of dependency.[18] This may be mitigated for those with higher earnings, but the squeeze that is put on graduates at certain parts of their lives does need further analysis by government.
     

o the incentives to find work.
 

  1. Again, this may be down to personal circumstances, but on average it is unlikely to be a major determinant in a graduate’s incentive for find work. Repayment is set at 9% over a threshold, so for lower paid jobs it will have less on an impact and for higher paid jobs it should not be too burdensome on their net income. 

 


 

Is it clear to prospective students what they are signing up to when they take out a student loan?
 

  1. It fair to assume that, owing to the complexity of the system, the rate of change, and the terminology used to describe it, it is unlikely that most students will fully comprehend how the system operates, especially regarding terms and conditions. In particular the application of interest rates may not be as well-appreciated as other aspects of the system.

 

o Are the SLC’s assumptions on affordability assessments to determine maintenance loans effective and transparent?
 

  1. The labelling of the majority of under 25-year-old students as ‘dependents’ and means testing their parental income to determine their level of need should be reviewed although this is more a matter for government than the SLC. Similarly, a sliding scale of income from a minimum of £25000, which is below the average income of a family with two working adults, should be reviewed.
     
  2. This is also a significant issue encountered by families with more than one child at university at the same time, due to SLC assumptions. Families with more than one ‘child’ as a student at university effectively see the amount they can receive in maintenance support diminish for the second, third, etc. student. This often means families or the students themselves have to make up the shortfall, which can be a barrier to accessing higher education for some. This anomaly is a result of the income assessment made of the parents not taking full account of the costs a family may be paying for their first child at university. For example, irrespective of actual cost, the system only allocates £1,130 as a deductible amount from the means testing for the second child, and again for the third and so on.[19] Assumptions should be based on the most accurate data, and any barrier that this may erect for students, or forcing families to choose which member scan go on to study at a university, would be deeply troubling and should be examined.    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix A

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Appendix B

 

 

[1] http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/policy-and-analysis/reports/Documents/2017/the-economic-impact-of-universities.pdf

[2] London Economics analysis provided to MillionPlus

[3] http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2017-11-14/113057/

[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jo-johnson-delivering-value-for-money-for-students-and-taxpayers

[5] http://www.studentloanrepayment.co.uk/portal/page?_pageid=93,6678511&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

[6] https://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LE-Impact-of-student-loan-repayments-on-graduate-taxation-FINAL.pdf

[7] http://www.cps.org.uk/files/reports/original/171017113325-TuitionFeesAFairerFormula.pdf

[8] London Economics analysis provided to MillionPlus

[9] http://wonkhe.com/blogs/spending-review-2015-loans-rab-and-the-discount-rate/

[10] https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/timeseries/czbh/mm23

[11] https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-11-27/debates/FF85BF9A-C7BC-4150-954F-2415DA1427D3/UniversityTuitionFees

[12] https://www.ons.gov.uk/news/statementsandletters/statementontheredesignationofcpihasanationalstatistic 

[13] http://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/The-determinants-of-international-demand-for-UK-HE-FULL-REPORT.pdf

[14] http://www.millionplus.ac.uk/documents/Brexit_-_whats_best_for_our_universities_and_students.pdf

[15] http://www.hepi.ac.uk/2016/06/07/3367/

[16] http://www.millionplus.ac.uk/documents/reports/GRAD_TAX_REPORT_FINAL.pdf

[17]https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/wps/wp201606.pdf

 

[18] https://londoneconomics.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LE-Impact-of-student-loan-repayments-on-graduate-taxation-FINAL.pdf

[19] https://blog.moneysavingexpert.com/2017/10/11/warning-parents-2-children-wholl-go-uni-save-now-systems-biased/