WRITTEN EVIDENCE FROM THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (KUR0015)
Introduction
1. Relations between Kurdish political groups in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran are shaped by their objectives, personal relationships, and competition for power and resources. Relationships between some groups are fractious and tense, while others have strong affiliations or co-operate on specific issues.
2. UK policy towards these groups depends on the extent to which their interests and values align with our own. Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria play an important role in the fight against Daesh. We have a close and strategic relationship with Iraqi Kurdish groups, providing them with political and military support; we maintain links with several Syrian Kurdish groups as part of our efforts to support a long-term settlement to the Syrian conflict; and we maintain contacts with some Kurdish associations in Turkey, and with the Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP). We do not have links with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is a proscribed terrorist group in the UK, and we do not have any significant dialogue with any Iranian Kurdish group.
Relations between Kurdish groups
3. Iraq’s main Kurdish political parties are the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and, more recently, Goran. In Turkey, the main parties are the HDP and the Democratic Regions Party (DBP). The three main Kurdish movements in Iran are the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the PKK-linked Partiya Jiyane Azadi Kurdistan (PJAK) and the Communist Revolutionary Organisation of the Workers of Kordestan (Komaleh).
4. The main Kurdish groups in Syria are the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is reportedly linked to the PKK and acknowledges Öcalan’s leadership; the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which is the PYD’s armed wing; and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which comprises Syrian Kurdish factions that are not aligned with the PYD.
5. Kurds in Turkey are diverse in terms of political affiliation, language and cultural and religious identity. The Turkish government contains a number of Kurdish ministers and large numbers of Kurds support the ruling AKP. Some Kurds are employed as “village guards” to aid security forces in countering terrorism. Of parties perceived as predominantly Kurdish, the largest is the HDP and its affiliate the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), which competes only in local elections. The HDP and DBP are widely seen as influenced to some degree by the anti-capitalist ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, the authoritarian founder of the principal Kurdish armed insurgent group in Turkey, the PKK. The PKK is headquartered in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, and is proscribed as a terrorist group by the UK, US, EU and NATO. Off-shoots include the PKK youth wing (YDG-H) and the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), who have claimed responsibility for several deadly attacks in major Turkish cities. Other smaller Kurd-focussed parties include the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK PAR) and the religion-focussed Free Cause Party (HUDA PAR) – both of which are opposed to the PKK.
6. The relationship between Iraqi Kurdish groups has varied over time, punctuated by a KDP-PUK civil war in the 1990s. Following the overthrow of Saddam in 2003 they presented a united voice to Baghdad and have generally voted together within the Iraqi parliament. But since 2015 there have been tensions between Iraq’s Kurdish parties, and the Kurdish parliament was suspended from October 2015 until September 2017 as a result of a KDP-Goran political dispute. The KDP cooperated with parts of the PUK prior to the 25 September referendum on independence from Iraq, but following the vote – and Iraq’s reassertion of Federal authority over disputed territories – the PUK has appeared more divided and elements of the KDP-PUK relationship have deteriorated. We are encouraging all parties to work together and move on from past grievances for the good of the Kurdish people.
7. The KDP’s relationship with the PKK in Turkey and the PYD in Syria is poor. Not only do they have different visions of governance but the KDP has tacitly consented to Turkish strikes against PKK positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Although the different factions compete across the region more widely, they have proven able to come together when facing an existential threat such as that posed by Daesh in 2014.
UK support for Kurdish groups against Daesh and potential implications
8. The Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq have been a critical ally in the campaign to defeat Daesh. As part of the package of assistance provided by the Global Coalition to counter Daesh, we have provided the Peshmerga with military support, channelled through the Coalition and distributed based on requirements: UK training teams have trained over 57,000 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including 9,000 Peshmerga fighters; since September 2014 we have gifted £3 million of arms and ammunition to the Peshmerga; and the UK has given air support to the Peshmerga as part of the Coalition. We also maintain close and constant political contact with Iraqi Kurdish leaders from all parties. It is through this engagement that we are seeking to improve cooperation among Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and encourage the political and economic reform that will make its institutions and economy more resilient.
9. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a multi-ethnic alliance in which the YPG play a significant leadership role, have made a vital contribution to counter-Daesh efforts. The Kurdish National Council has also had a prominent role within the Syrian Opposition High Negotiations Committee working towards a lasting political solution to the Syrian conflict. The UK does not provide any direct assistance to the YPG or PYD, but as part of the Global Coalition, has provided military support to the SDF in the campaign against Daesh. We maintain political and diplomatic contact with several Kurdish groups to influence their policy and work towards a political solution to the conflict, encouraging commitment to pluralism and pressing for cooperation with the wider Syrian opposition. We have also used our occasional contact with the PYD to express concern over reports of human rights abuses by its associated security forces and over links with both the Asad regime and the PKK.
Kurdish territorial gains
10. In 2014, Daesh captured large swathes of territory in northern Iraq that was disputed between Baghdad and Erbil. As the Kurds pushed Daesh back, they occupied many of these disputed territories, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Since the Kurdish Referendum on 25 September, the Federal Government in Baghdad has reasserted control over these areas through largely peaceful means. The UK wants to see a sustainable, long-term, peaceful and sustainable solution to the governance of these territories, in line with Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. Both sides must be willing to negotiate so that a representative, inclusive and capable form of governance can be found which ensures stability.
11. The YPG has previously sought to achieve territorial contiguity for Kurdish areas in Syria. However, in 2016 Turkey supported Syrian opposition groups to take territory from Daesh and establish a presence between the Afrin and Kobane “cantons”, preventing YPG efforts to join the cantons. Turkey’s recent intervention in Idlib is also partly aimed at preventing further YPG territorial gains.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s referendum on independence
12. The UK’s consistent and longstanding position has been that a unilateral referendum on Kurdish independence from Iraq would pose a risk to stability, both inside Iraq and in the region. We reiterated this message publically and privately to Kurdish leaders and our policy has been clear: any Kurdish referendum or steps towards independence must be part of a political process agreed with the Government of Iraq in Baghdad.
13. We believe that a strong Kurdistan Region within a strong and successful Iraq is the best way to ensure stability and an economy that works for all of Iraq’s people, including the Kurds. Prior to the referendum, we worked closely with the United States and UN on a dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil that would have offered the Kurdish leadership an alternative to the referendum. Those negotiations would have been time-limited, supervised by the international community, without preconditions and on all outstanding issues. Former Kurdish President Barzani rejected this offer and pressed ahead with the referendum. Since the referendum, the Government of Iraq has moved to reassert its control over disputed territory by deploying its armed forces, with limited clashes and loss of life. It has also closed Kurdish airspace to inbound and outbound international flights.
14. We are concerned by the recent tensions between the Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government. We are monitoring the situation closely and encouraging both sides to de-escalate tensions, de-conflict troop movements and engage in technical dialogue to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to conflict. We are also urging the Government of Iraq to withdraw those forces, including Popular Mobilisation Forces, who are perceived by some in the Kurdistan Region as sectarian, and whose presence could provoke conflict. Over the longer term we want to see substantial negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil on all outstanding issues, enabling the relationship to be placed on a more stable footing. The focus must return to defeating Daesh, preventing its re-emergence and building a more stable, prosperous and inclusive future for all of Iraq’s people, including the Kurds.
Relations between Kurdish groups and countries in the region
15. The governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the regime in Syria all oppose any form of Kurdish statehood. Turkey, Iran and Iraq’s shared concern over the PKK and PJAK, as well as their joint opposition to the Kurdish referendum in Iraq, has resulted in tactical cooperation between the three states. But each deals with the different Kurdish factions according to their own strategic aims.
16. Countering the PKK is a key driver of Turkish policy at home and abroad. Domestically, since the peace process ended and the PKK returned to violence in 2015, many civilians and more than a thousand security force members have lost their lives in terror attacks. Large-scale counter-terror operations have been and continue to be conducted, especially in the south-east of the country. Many officials, Mayors and ten MPs from the HDP / BDP are in detention in Turkey – mostly charged with terror offences. While recognising Turkey’s right to tackle the serious threat posed by the PKK, we have urged the Turkish authorities to ensure full protection of fundamental and political rights in that process. We have stated publicly that we want the PKK to cease attacks on Turkey and have encouraged the Turkish authorities to consider a return to the negotiating table in order to find a long-term peaceful solution to this more than thirty-year conflict. Concern to counter the PKK is also a major factor in Turkish policy towards Syria and Iraq.
17. The referendum in Iraq, which Turkey and Iran opposed, has changed the Kurdistan Regional Government’s relationship with its neighbours. Before the referendum, relations between the KDP and Turkey had been well-developed due to shared opposition towards the PKK, strong commercial ties and a good personal relationship between President Erdogan and former President Barzani. But President Barzani’s decision to press ahead with the referendum has negatively affected the relationship and led to a strengthening of ties between Ankara and Baghdad.
18. Iran has significant Kurdish minorities who enjoy the right to representation in the Iranian Parliament. It has used force to counter armed groups such as PJAK and attacked KDP-I positions inside Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran maintains a working relationship with all Kurdish parties in Iraq, but its ties with the KDP have also been negatively affected as a result of the referendum. Despite its concerns over domestic stability, Iran has also maintained historic links to Öcalanist groups in pursuit of its objectives across the region. This includes working alongside YPG units to achieve tactical victories in Syria.
19. Likewise, Russia has maintained links with Kurdish Marxist groups which it inherited from the Soviet Union. Russia has called for the PYD to have greater involvement in the political processes to end the conflict in Syria and has allowed them to set up an office in Moscow.
Objectives of Kurdish groups
20. There is not a single objective which unites all Kurdish groups; their objectives and interests differ both within countries and across the region. Since 2014, the Kurds in Iraq and Syria have been united in the fight against Daesh, which posed an existential threat to their interests in both countries.
21. It would be difficult politically for any Kurdish parties in Iraq to oppose independence given popular aspirations for an independent state. But there are significant differences between the parties over the means and timing of any push towards independence. The 25 September referendum was driven by the KDP and particularly former President Barzani; Goran and parts of the PUK opposed it. But Iraq’s Kurdish parties are united in seeking to address perceived grievances with Baghdad around revenue sharing – including the Kurds’ share of the federal budget and international finance – and security / governance arrangements for the disputed territories.
22. Both the PYD / YPG and the KNC support a political solution to the Syrian conflict which enshrines Kurdish autonomy within a federalised Syrian state. Neither organisation has explicitly called for outright Kurdish independence from Syria. The YPG’s ideological platform is influenced by the anti-capitalist and “democratic confederalist” ideas espoused by PKK leader Öcalan, and endorses extensive decentralisation of power to local communities. The YPG has introduced self-avowedly decentralised political structures in areas under its control and claims to support direct democracy in some layers of decision-making. Some concerns have been raised over the PYD / YPG’s lack of tolerance of Kurdish opposition, and alleged demographic engineering of acquired territory.
23. While a range of Kurdish groups will play an important role in any settlement for Syria, we would not support a unilateral push for autonomy by the PYD or any other group. The UK continues to support the territorial integrity of Syria and has made clear that the exact nature of Syria’s eventual political settlement, federal or otherwise, will be for all Syrians to determine as part of the political process in Geneva. Once territory is liberated from Daesh’s rule, the population will need an inclusive and legitimate local authority that can protect and represent them. We are committed to working for a political transition to a government which protects the rights of all Syrians, including minorities. This also represents the best guarantee of long-term success against Daesh.
24. While the PKK’s original objective was to achieve Kurdish independence from Turkey, since the 1990s this objective has changed. Öcalan now claims to advocate ‘democratic autonomy’ for Kurds, with a focus on equal cultural and political rights within the Turkish state rather than secession. The HDP / BDP have supported the “democratic autonomy” vision, with a particular declared focus on respect for minority rights. Frequent PKK deadly terrorist attacks in Turkey continue.
Likelihood and location of future conflicts involving the Kurds
25. There is an immediate risk of further violence within Iraq, with several potential sources. They include: Arab-Kurd – tensions between Kurdish and Iraqi government forces, including Popular Mobilisation Forces, are high along the Green Line and there is a risk of miscalculation; Kurd-Kurd – relations between the KDP and the PUK are fractious following the Iraqi Government’s reassertion of authority in the disputed territories; and civil unrest – clashes in mixed population areas (Kurds with Turkmen and / or Arabs) within the disputed territories could spark conflict. Such conflicts could potentially draw in Iraq’s neighbours.
26. Developments in Syria will also undoubtedly play into the thinking of the Turkish authorities regarding the possibility of a return to negotiations with the PKK. Terrorism orchestrated from the PKK’s stronghold in the Qandil Mountains of Iraq, or from Sinjar, may continue to provoke Turkish airstrikes and occasional military intervention.
27. In Syria, there remains a further (or continued) conflict between the Syrian Kurds and other groups, including: the Syrian regime, seeking to recapture SDF / PYD held territory; Daesh remnants deploying guerrilla tactics in Kurdish-held areas; and military clashes between the YPG and Turkey.
November, 2017