Written evidence submitted by Lockheed Martin

Introduction

1. This written submission follows requests from the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, made during an oral evidence session on 17 October 2017, that Lockheed Martin provide supplementary information including responses to various published allegations about the F-35.  The allegations relate to F-35 Programme costs and transparency, interoperability of the F-35 with other assets, the Autonomic Logistic Information System (ALIS), handling qualities of the aircraft, and various technical points about aircraft weight, vibration and heating, engine ice protection, software performance, mission data files, the helmet and reliability and maintenance.

2. In addition, the Committee sent Lockheed Martin six supplementary questions following the oral evidence session on 17 October.  These questions covered the number of F-35 aircraft due to be procured by the UK in future years, cost of spares and logistics support provided by Lockheed Martin to date, definition of ‘disciplined communication’ in relation to ALIS operation, weight growth, use of Link-16 by US Armed Services, and flying qualities at transonic speeds.  The questions are included in the Annex.  The answers to the questions are included in the main text and cross-referenced in the Annex.

Background about the F-35 Programme and Lockheed Martin

3. The F-35 Programme was originally conceived in the early 1990s to develop requirements for a next generation strike aircraft. The Programme is managed by the Joint Program Office (JPO), which is a US Department of Defense (DoD) agency responsible for developing requirements for and acquiring the F-35 aircraft and associated weapons systems for the US Armed Services, international partners including the UK, and Foreign Military Sales Customers.

4. In 2001, Lockheed Martin was selected as the prime contractor for the F-35.  Pratt & Whitney was selected as the contractor for the propulsion system.  Whilst Lockheed Martin integrates the propulsion system and weapons as part of its systems integration role, the JPO places engine procurement contracts directly with Pratt & Whitney. As such, Lockheed Martin does not have direct visibility of those contracts.

5. Since 2001, a System Design and Demonstration (SDD) phase has been undertaken.  This has involved the development and testing of the entire aircraft system, including more than 65,000 operational test points and 9,000 test flights, as well as low rate initial production.  Low rate initial production will allow a more efficient ramp-up to full rate production and improvements to manufacturing processes. More than 250 production aircraft have been delivered.  SDD is due to complete by the end of 2017; however, the aircraft is already operational with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the United States Air Force (USAF). 

6. As the only Level 1 partner in SDD, the UK had significant input into the design requirements of the F-35 to ensure that it meets UK operational requirements.  For example, the F-35 has been designed to operate from the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers and the UK mandated the certification of specific weapons, including ASRAAM and Paveway IV. 

Cost

7. Lockheed Martin recognises that the F-35 represents a substantial investment for the UK to recapitalise its Combat Air capability and is committed to reducing the acquisition and sustainment costs.

8. The F-35 provides a game-changing capability for the UK Armed Forces and makes a significant contribution to the UK economy.  As a 5th Generation aircraft, the F-35 delivers advanced capabilities in low observability, sensor fusion, electronic attack and interoperability, giving pilots the ability to dominate any adversary in any environment.  The F-35 has also proven it can enhance the effectiveness of legacy combat and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets when operating together.

9. The benefits to UK industry from the Programme are significant; 15 per cent of the content, by value, of each F-35 aircraft is supplied by UK companies.  Whilst the UK’s programme of record is for 138 aircraft, those companies are providing content for the more than 3,000 aircraft in the overall Programme.   UK companies have already received $12.9 billion in F-35 related orders from Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney.  The F-35 Programme will support more than 500 companies and 20,000 jobs in the UK throughout the 30 year production phase.

10. In 2001, the UK Government contributed $2 billion towards the SDD phase of the F-35 Programme.  Through its fixed financial contribution to SDD, the UK secured a 25 per cent stake in the design specification – equal in influence to each of the three US Armed Services.  The Programme therefore incorporates UK-specific design requirements.  The arrangement also shielded the UK from any cost increases during the SDD phase.

11. There are three elements to the cost of F-35s:

1. Unit Recurring Flyaway (URF) Cost.  The JPO negotiates and publishes the price for each F-35 by Lot (formally referred to as ‘Low Rate Initial Production’ or LRIPs), including aircraft, engine and weapons system.  The table below shows the URF for each F-35B procured by the UK to date and expected aircraft numbers in future Lots.  The price of an F-35B within Lot 9 was $131 million (approximately £98.4 million at today’s foreign exchange rate) and within Lot 10 was $122.3 million (approximately £92 million at today’s foreign exchange rate). This represents a 6.7 per cent reduction from Lot 9 and approximately a 40 per cent reduction in cost since Lot 1.  Lockheed Martin’s ‘Blueprint for Affordability’ initiatives aim to bring the cost of each F-35B aircraft down to approximately $105 million by Lot 14.

2. Aircraft Modification Costs.  These are the costs for ensuring aircraft procured under early Lots meet UK standards for Initial Operating Capability (IOC).   Lockheed Martin has visibility of the costs for the aircraft (but not engine and weapons system) and, from this perspective, estimates that the UK is spending about 3 per cent of the original URF cost of their fielded aircraft to achieve a common UK IOC configuration.

3. Sustainment Costs.  The operating and support costs for the F-35 Programme are very customer dependent.  They broadly fall into three categories:

• Infrastructure such as logistics facilities, training environments, and maintenance, repair and overhaul facilities.  These infrastructure requirements are unique to each F-35 customer.  Lockheed Martin is contracted directly with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for a subset of bespoke facilities at RAF Marham including the construction and fit out of a logistics operations centre, integrated training centre and maintenance and final finishes building.  The value of these contracts with the MoD total £142 million.  The new facilities will be handed over to the MoD next year, aligning with the expected arrival of 617 Squadron to RAF Marham.

• A global pool of spare parts that are unique to F-35, support equipment to operate the aircraft, equipment to train pilots and maintainers, and Information Technology systems that enable aircraft operation and sustainment.  Each customer contracts directly with the JPO for these items and the financial contribution they make towards the ‘pool’ is based upon a cost-sharing formula.  This formula considers the number of aircraft each nation owns and their operational parameters (usage rates, deployment rates, etc).  The JPO then negotiates the aggregate requirement with Lockheed Martin on an annual basis and, in some cases, contracts directly with providers (for example, Pratt & Whitney for the propulsion system).  Lockheed Martin therefore does not have complete visibility of the costs to individual customers.

• Other generic costs outside the scope of the Programme, such as personnel and fuel costs.

Lockheed Martin is currently working with the JPO to ensure it (and its customers) have a full understanding of the technical characteristics of the aircraft and the drivers of sustainment costs.  A number of initiatives have been established to ensure the sustainment costs of the F-35 are equivalent to those of a 4th Generation aircraft.

12. Continuous Capability Development and Delivery.  Following the completion of SDD, the partner nations in the F-35 Programme are committed to developing enhancements to in-service aircraft through ‘Continuous Capability Development and Delivery’ (C2/D2). This will ensure that the aircraft retain their operational advantage over adversaries.  Lockheed Martin assesses that the F-35 is currently 10 to 15 years ahead of adversary capabilities.  The UK share of C2/D2 will be pro-rata, based upon the percentage of aircraft purchased across the global programme of record.  As a result, it is Lockheed Martin’s understanding the UK will be expected to pay approximately 4.5 per cent of the total cost to develop and integrate new capabilities into the F-35.

Transparency

13. The F-35 Programme is one of the most scrutinised defence programmes in history.  Lockheed Martin supports regular assessments by multiple US Government agencies as well as agencies of the partner nations, including the UK’s National Audit Office. 

14. Two primary US Government Agencies provide annual reporting on the F-35 Programme:

1. The Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) provides an annual report on current defence programmes, including the F-35.  Typically, this annual report is written in December and released to Congress in January for the prior year.  The DOT&E report focuses on Development issues as they relate to current or future Operational Test & Evaluation readiness. 

2. The United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) releases annual assessments of the DoD’s major weapon system acquisitions.  This report focuses on cost and schedule performance, implementation of key acquisition reform initiatives and knowledge obtained at key decision points.  The report is typically released in March covering the period from release of the last report.  As the F-35 Programme is moving toward the end of development and into full rate production, the GAO additionally released a report on F-35 sustainment in October.  The GAO Sustainment report focused on the status of the DoD’s efforts to sustain the F-35 fleet, the DoD position to enter into performance based sustainment, and progress made to reduce the F-35 sustainment costs.

Interoperability with other assets

15. F-35s can use two data links in support of their missions. 

16. F-35s are specifically designed to go into heavily contested airspace which no other platforms can enter, perform their missions and return without reliance on other assets.  They communicate and share their unprecedented (and very sensitive) sensor picture with each other over a purpose built data-link called ‘Multifunction Advanced Data Link’ (MADL).  MADL is a high bandwidth link which is designed to minimise the potential that an adversary can detect, intercept or jam transmissions, which could give away the location of the aircraft.

17. If operational circumstances permit and tactics, techniques and procedures are applied correctly, F-35s can communicate with other legacy assets via Link-16 and share their 5th Generation situational awareness.  Link-16 is a NATO standard, encrypted and secure, omni-directional data link.  It is employed on most NATO airborne and many surface assets, providing interoperability with F-35 without the need to modify existing platforms.

18. Link-16 can be operated in two modes – “receive/transmit” or “receive only”.  In receive/transmit mode, the F-35 can have two-way data communications with legacy platforms.  Alternatively, an F-35 pilot can turn off Link-16 transmissions and still receive communications from other platforms; operating in receive-only mode allows the F-35 to receive network command and control information and reduces the risk of exposure to an adversary’s intercept receivers.

19. In terms of wider interoperability, all F-35 partner nations have different defence architectures and platforms.  They therefore have options over where and how to invest to optimise the F-35 as part of their wider force.   Lockheed Martin is aware of and supports customer experimentation in this area, where the UK continues to be a thought leader.  For example:-

• Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems have conducted an integration study which explored including a MADL capability on the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers.

• The UK and US are experimenting with 5th to 4th Generation ‘gateways’ which allow (subsets of) sensor data to be relayed from F-35/MADL to other platforms.  Earlier this year, the UK demonstrated the ability to share MADL data with Typhoon aircraft in Trial Babel Fish III.  For the US Navy, in September 2016 Lockheed Martin participated in a live fire demonstration which showcased the integration of F-35 with an Aegis fire control system.  In this demonstration, the Aegis system successfully engaged an airborne target drone with an SM-6 missile using only the targeting solution provided by an unmodified F-35B.  This F-35 targeting solution was passed to the Aegis via a MADL datalink that had been integrated into the Aegis system.

20. The ‘Battlefield Airborne Communications Node’ (BACN) is an airborne communications relay produced by Northrop Grumman. Lockheed Martin has no knowledge of BACN including the F-35 MADL as one of the communication waveforms that it supports in its current operational form. Whilst customer experimentation is taking place, Lockheed Martin is unaware of any F-35 operators who are using anything other than Link-16 to integrate F-35s with legacy assets.

Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)

21. ALIS is an information technology system that supports virtually every aspect of F-35 aircraft operations and sustainment.  Lockheed Martin has been incrementally developing and fielding ALIS in parallel to the first production of F-35 aircraft and their delivery to operational units.  The latest version of ALIS (version 2.0.2.4.4) is currently being fielded.  To date, ALIS has supported and sustained more than 110,000 flight hours across a growing operational fleet that now numbers more than 250 aircraft.  Version 3.0 will be fielded by the end of 2017 at the conclusion of SDD.  Future updates are planned throughout the life of the F-35.

22. Bandwidth.  ALIS includes unit-level servers and a central server (Central Point of Entry or CPE) in each partner nation.  The CPE is linked to the F-35 Global Sustainment System which is based in the US. When F-35s are operating from ships, unit-level servers are deployed to support each operational squadron.  These servers interact with the country’s CPE using ship-to-shore bandwidth.  F-35 aircraft themselves do not rely on this bandwidth for their flying operations.

23. Earlier this year, testing by the US Navy showed that on-board flight and maintenance operations are supported at 8MB bandwidth with ‘disciplined communications’.  The US Navy tests included eight F-35 aircraft.  Three types of ALIS communication are supported by the ship-to-shore bandwidth:-

1. Routine Messages. Many ALIS communications from deployed units are routine and reflect information generated during an aircraft sortie.  The bandwidth required for routine messages is proportional to the number of sorties flown within a defined period of time rather than a function of the number of aircraft supported.

2. Data / System Maintenance Updates. These include activities such as updates to aircraft technical data and cyber security updates to the server.  They are scheduled at periodic intervals.  They can be relatively large in file transfer size (Gigabytes).  To minimise the potential for conflicting message traffic, these updates are typically scheduled in periods of low activity.

3. Discretionary Messages. ALIS provides for discretionary messages to ask questions of, and seek guidance from, engineering authorities.  An example could be a local maintenance unit encountering an irregularity that cannot be addressed from the available technical data.  It is common practice for these discretionary messages to include photographs to better describe the issue.  There have been past instances when operators and engineers have attached very high-resolution images to individual requests (much higher resolution than required to illustrate the issue), thereby consuming a higher amount of ship-to-shore bandwidth.  Discipline in ALIS messages dictates that discretionary file attachment size be managed to fit within the available bandwidth limitations of the ship-to-shore channel.

24. Cyber Security.  The cyber threat to all defence capabilities is real, growing and evolving.  The F-35 Programme has specific cyber protection requirements as part of the Joint Contract Specification.  These requirements evolve as the threat evolves.  Cyber testing is a robustly resourced and recurring activity across all aspects of the Programme including the air vehicle, training systems, mission software, reprogramming laboratories and logistical support systems (including ALIS).  To date, ALIS has been put through more than 2,000 cyber security tests.

25. Lockheed Martin undertakes security assessments of ALIS in its laboratories prior to delivery to customers; each system has met the cyber security standards set by customers.  The JPO, in which the UK is fully engaged, undertakes its own security assessments on the systems when received and whilst in operation. Lockheed Martin learns from this field testing and incorporates the JPO’s findings in the ongoing development cycle for ALIS.  The UK has full access to the results and outcomes of cyber security testing.

26. Intellectual Property.  Like any system developed by industry, ALIS incorporates Intellectual Property owned by the developer.  However, customers have complete and unfettered use of ALIS and its technical data for the sovereign operation of their aircraft.  This is required by US DoD Federal Acquisition Regulations.  Under the Regulations, the US Government also receives unlimited rights to use all technical data that is Government-funded and a contract deliverable.  An unlimited rights licence authorises the US Government to use such data for any purpose whatsoever, including providing it to foreign partners and industry competitors.

27. Any future upgrades to ALIS as part of its development cycle will be driven by user requirements, not Lockheed Martin.  These upgrades will be negotiated by the JPO, which has access to full cost and pricing data. 

28. File Download Times.  Data collected during an aircraft’s mission is recorded on the aircraft Portable Memory Device (PMD).  As data is being collected, it is stored in an encrypted form on the PMD to minimise the potential for compromise.  After the F-35 returns from a sortie the data stored on the PMD must be decrypted before it can be used or analysed.  Early versions of the data decryption equipment took significant time to perform this process – approximately one minute to decrypt for each minute of recorded data.  An updated version of equipment was developed which significantly reduces the time required to decrypt the data.  With the present equipment, it takes approximately 12 seconds to decrypt each minute of recorded data.  The decryption times with the updated equipment have been deemed acceptable by the operational community.

Handling Qualities

29. The F-35 Programme is now fielding an aircraft whose flying qualities meet user requirements.  A hallmark of the Programme and the nature of SDD has been the speed with which issues are identified and triaged, a root cause is established, corrective action developed, and a solution incorporated into the production configuration.  That has been true for every flying quality anomaly identified in test flights.

30. Transonic Flying Handling Qualities.  Flying at speeds close to Mach 1 – sometimes called the “transonic flight regime” – has traditionally been a very challenging flight regime for all supersonic aircraft.  The F-35 Flying Qualities team has been actively tracking aircraft performance when operating in the transonic flight regime.  F-35 Control Law software has now been optimised to improve handling qualities.

31. Current operational jets have been cleared and are operating at supersonic speeds with no reported flying quality issues.  Some specific flight qualities have been documented in the pilot flight manual, however they have no impact on the operational effectiveness of the aircraft.

32. The most recent F-35 flight reports support this position.   Whilst the full reports are not releasable by Lockheed Martin, an extract from a recent flight report by test pilot Billie Flynn is as follows:

Pitch, roll and yaw transients were negligible.  Clearly the latest flight control improvements have had a marked effect on the aircraft behavior in this environment.

The minor transients occasionally noted when dwelling in the transonic region have zero bearing on any pilot task or aircraft behavior.  The aircraft easily accelerates and decelerates without perturbation in this environment.  Today’s acceleration in level flight to supersonic for the missile firing profile exposed the aircraft to this issue but was not noteworthy.  Further in the missile firing profile, while accelerating out to 1.44M, the aircraft was rock stable throughout.  The deceleration with the Weapons Bay Door open both during practice and live fire runs was unremarkable.  I am confident that the aircraft behavior in this region is well understood and acceptable.

33. Manoeuvrability.  Reports about limited performance in air-to-air dogfights arose from misinterpretation of the results of isolated test flights conducted in 2015 as part of SDD. These tests explored the flying qualities of the F-35 using visual combat manoeuvring to stress the system. An F-16 was used as a visual reference against which to manoeuvre.  The test was successful in showing the ability of the F-35 to manoeuvre to the edge of its limits, without exceeding them, and to handle in a positive and predictable manner.

34. A more representative demonstration of the air-to-air capability of the F-35 comes from the recent Red Flag exercise conducted by the USAF in January 2017. Red Flag is a large force-on-force exercise conducted at Nellis Air Force Base several times each year over a period of approximately three weeks.  Eight F-35As from Hill Air Force Base were involved, along with RAF Typhoons.  The F-35s exhibited an air-to-air engagement ratio of greater than 20 to 1 (meaning that more than 20 adversaries were destroyed for every F-35 that was lost).  Furthermore, the F-35s made all the 4th Generation fighters in the exercise more effective because of their ability to share unprecedented situational awareness of the battlespace.

Other technical issues

35. Weight.  A focus on weight optimisation and minimal weight growth is essential for all aircraft, particularly the F-35B which relies on the vertical lift system to land on a ship.

36. The F-35B has an empty weight limit derived from customer requirements, which mandate that the aircraft return to land with approximately 4,700lbs of weapons and fuel.   This is referred to as ‘Vertical Landing Bring Back’ (VLBB) weight.  Aircraft which exceed the specified empty weight limit will experience a reduction in VLBB by the same amount.  The UK pioneered the Shipboard Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) manoeuvre in the F-35 to provide additional payload bring back margin, beyond VLBB.

37. All UK F-35B aircraft can safely land vertically.  The first two F-35Bs procured by the UK (delivered in Lot 3) exceeded their empty weight specification by less than ~50lbs for the first aircraft and ~100lbs for the second.  For these aircraft, there is no operational consequence.  All other UK aircraft through Lot 9 have been and will be delivered well under their weight requirement (the margin for Lots 8 and 9 was approximately 250lbs).

38. Since October 2010, there has been zero weight growth in the F-35B that was not driven by the addition of customer requirements.  This is unprecedented in modern fighter aircraft production. During this same period, there has been added weight of approximately 300lbs to accommodate additional requirements and new capabilities requested by customers.  With known improvements planned for incorporation though Lot 13, Lockheed Martin still expects the weight of the F-35B aircraft to be less than the specified empty weight by more than 200lbs (meaning they have more than 4,900 lbs of VLBB capability).

39. The actual weights of aircraft are monitored carefully during production.  There are relatively small trends over time that are rapidly analysed.  If an upward trend in aircraft weight starts to appear, root causes are determined and corrective actions implemented in the normal course of production.

40. Excessive Vibration and Overheating in Weapons Bay.  F-35 standard operating procedures are to open weapon bay doors on the ground in high ambient temperatures.  No thermal restrictions are in-place for aircraft whilst in flight.

41. The AIM-120 (AMRAAM) missile is qualified and certified to a specific set of environmental requirements.  During environmental characterisation of the F-35, it was discovered that the vibration environment of the weapons bay can exceed these requirements.  Work is underway by the JPO and the AMRAAM System Program Office to re-qualify the missile components to meet the F-35’s vibration environment.  These issues are considered areas for improvement in the weapons and not shortcomings in the F-35.

42. Horizontal Tail Overheats.  Earlier in programme tests, issues were observed with the durability of the coatings applied to the horizontal stabiliser on all three F-35 variants when exposed to heating from long duration use of engine afterburner at high Mach regimes. 

43. The cause was identified as an interaction of flow fields from the engine nozzle and aft body in a narrow combination of parameters involving flight regime, engine throttle setting and horizontal tail position.  The team developed improvements to the tail coating and the application process and the F-35B now meets its requirements in this area.  In addition, an on-board Conditional Event monitoring algorithm is being added to the aircraft’s Prognostic Health Monitoring System to continuously monitor the coatings and fairing structures, to inform inspection and maintenance requirements.

44. Engine Ice Protection.  No modern fighter aircraft, F-35 included, is designed for sustained flight operations in known ‘icing conditions’.   ‘Icing conditions’ generally refers to a specific set of atmospheric conditions where ice accretes on aircraft surfaces in flight.  A pilot will avoid known icing conditions in flight or exit the conditions should they inadvertently encounter them.

45. The JPO wanted to make the F-35 propulsion system more robust and able to operate in icing conditions when they occur at ground level.  An Engine Ice Protection System was therefore added into the F-35 engine by Pratt & Whitney to reduce the risk of ice accumulation on the engine front frame and increase the time an aircraft can run its engine on the ground. The system was recently disabled because of a field reliability issue; disablement will allow a root cause of the issue to be understood and corrections developed.  Pratt & Whitney and the JPO plan to have the Engine Ice Protection System reactivated and capable for incorporation in late 2018.

46. Software Deficiency Reports.  The F-35 Programme has a disciplined process to “triage” and prioritise deficiency reports (DRs) identified during integration and flight testing, as some may prohibit a critical operational capability whereas some may be a matter of inconvenience or preference.  Throughout SDD more than a thousand DRs have been triaged into various priorities and root cause and corrective action developed.  A Configuration Steering Board (CSB), in which UK representatives participate, determines which DR’s must be addressed by the end of SDD.  The latest release of the F-35’s core software configuration (Block 3F) in early October includes corrections for all deficiencies the CSB determined must be corrected prior to the end of SDD.

47. Mission Data Files.  The Mission Data Load for UK IOC will be developed by the UK in a facility known as the Australia, Canada and UK Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL).  ACURL will provide the UK with the ability to programme and validate F-35 mission data files using sovereign intelligence data.  Lockheed Martin is on track to deliver the laboratory equipment for ACURL next year, which will be installed in a facility being constructed by the US Government at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.

48. Helmet – Night Vision.  Pilot safety is the top priority for Lockheed Martin.  During a development test deployment on an LHD carrier (USS America), a pilot experienced less than optimum night vision image quality whilst performing a night landing in very low light conditions. It was found that the Night Vision Imaging System cameras incorporated in the Helmet Mounted Display were configured based on laboratory tests which could not at the time replicate low illumination levels at sea.  Software changes and improved image processing algorithms in the Night Vision Camera system have been incorporated in the helmet to address the issue.   US and UK test pilots now report viable system performance in environments with twenty times less light than during the test flight on USS America.  During September, US and UK test pilots from the Patuxent River F-35 Integrated Test Force evaluated the system in the most representative environment possible, on moonless nights, under cloud, far offshore, at low altitude, near large ships.

49. Helmet – Green Glow. The “green glow” issue is a function of the residual light emanating from the LCD display when the helmet display brightness is turned to the minimum extreme.  This has been a concern of pilots when flying in extremely low light conditions.  Whilst improvements have been incorporated into the helmet to reduce this phenomenon, some residual glow will remain as this is a function of the LCD display technology.  Lockheed Martin has therefore incorporated a feature which allows the pilot to momentarily blank the display to enhance night operations.  These improvements are receiving satisfactory review from operational users.

50. Lockheed Martin has also developed a prototype helmet incorporating a new display technology, Organic Light Emitting Diode, which eliminates the residual glow.   This prototype was successfully evaluated in carrier ship trials conducted in October.

51. Gunfire – Strafe Symbology.  Concerns with jittering or unstable strafing symbology, which could lead to poor gun accuracy, were reported in the summer of 2016 for earlier flight test software releases.  As part of SDD, the software has been fine-tuned to ensure stability of symbology and therefore gun accuracy.  Gun accuracy and lethality tests have been successfully conducted throughout 2017 on all three F-35 variants.

52. Reliability and Maintenance.  The F-35’s reliability is ahead of where Lockheed Martin has agreed with the JPO for this stage of Programme maturity.  Reliability for the aircraft is measured by Mean Flying Hours Between Failures (MFHBF).  Currently, the MFHBF for the F-35A is 6.5 flying hours between failures – which is better than the specification requirement of greater than 6.0 hours at maturity.  Maturity should be reached, based on total flying hours, sometime in 2020.  The F-35B is very close to where it should be at maturity with a measured value of 3.9 flying hours between failure versus a specification requirement of 4.0 flying hours between failures.  The F-35B is considered mature at 75,000 flying hours and – to date – the F-35B fleet has accumulated approximately 30% of that total.   Furthermore, approximately 70 per cent of all parts on the aircraft have not yet had a single failure.  That is unprecedented for a modern fighter aircraft.

53. The F-35 is also exceeding requirements in the area of Maintenance Man Hours per Flying Hour (MMH/FH).  For both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions, the F-35B has already achieved its required maturity MMH/FH of less than 9.0 man hours.  The F-35A, with more flying time and much more data, is measuring at 6.2 MMH/FH which is beating its required rate at maturity of 9.0 man hours.

3 November 2017

Annex: Supplementary Questions from the House of Commons Defence Select Committee

1. How many UK aircraft are due to be procured from Lots 12, 13 and 14 (described by Mr Babione as the “block buy and an economic order quantity opportunity”)?

See paragraph 11a.

2. What has been the cost to the MoD so far of spares and logistics support for the UK’s F-35Bs (as provided by Lockheed Martin)?

See paragraph 11c.

3. Mr Over referred to a US Navy exercise earlier this year that showed “with disciplined communication” an 8 megabit bandwidth was sufficient for ship to shore operation of F-35s. Can you define what constitutes “disciplined communication” and provide us with more details as to the number of F-35s that participated in this exercise?

See paragraph 23.

4. Mr Ruddock claimed that “there has been no weight growth” on the F-35B model over the past seven years. However, the DOT&E 2016 Annual Report (p.63) found that the actual weights of Lot 8 production aircraft “have increased slightly”, with “weight estimates for Lot 10 aircraft and later project weight growth of an additional 90 pounds”. Can you clarify this please?

See paragraph 38.

5. Mr Over claimed that the US is “exclusively using Link 16” for F-35-legacy assets communication and implied that the US were not relying on MADL for communication with legacy assets. Why then has the US invested in the Battlefield Airborne Communication Node? Can you clarify these comments please?

See paragraphs 19 and 20.

6. In response to Mr Docherty-Hughes’ questions about “objectionable or unacceptable flying qualities at transonic speeds” identified by the DOT&E 2016 report, Mr Ruddock said he was confident about controllability having seen “the latest reports”. Can you provide us with more detail about these reports (including copies of these reports)?

See paragraph 32.

Attachment

Lockheed Martin, Letter to the Times, 20 July 2017

Sir,

Your coverage of the F-35, “Trouble on Deck” (July 17), does not accurately reflect the current status of the programme, the aircraft’s capabilities, nor the detailed responses we provided to your questions.

We simply do not recognise your cost estimates, nor agree with the way you arrived at them. The costs of the jet, engine and fee continue to fall contract-to-contract with the most recent Lot 10 contract in February representing a 62 percent reduction in the F-35A price from the first contract in 2007. The F-35B that the UK is procuring is on a similar cost reduction curve that will ultimately bring the price of a 5th generation F-35 down to that of older 4th generation fighters.

Many of the programmatic issues raised in your coverage are historic and have long since been addressed. The performance of the F-35 speaks for itself and the best people to ask continue to be the operators and maintainers who understand the aircraft’s full potential and capability – not long time critics who have nothing to do with the programme.

For example, earlier this year the former lead of the F-35 Integration Office, Brigadier General Scott Pleus said in an interview with Business Insider that “the capabilities of the F-35 are absolutely eye-watering. The airplane has unbelievable manoeuvring characteristics that make it completely undefeatable in an air-to-air environment.”

The F-35 is combat ready and already making a game-changing difference to the defence of a number of nations. We are in absolute agreement with the assessment of Wing Commander Beck – who has had a key role in testing this jet – that it is “the best aircraft [he has] ever flown” and we are proud of the contribution the jet will make to the defence of the UK, the US and our allies around the world.

JEFF BABIONE

Executive Vice President and General Manager, F-35 Program, Lockheed Martin

17 November 2017