IDC Inquiry: DFID’s work on the Rohingya Crisis

Written evidence submitted by Action Against Hunger

Executive summary

1. Global attention on this crisis must be maintained, with a focus on political solutions as the displacement of people continues even from the fringes of the conflict affected region. The crisis cannot be solved by humanitarian or development programs but through political will, diplomacy, conflict resolution and the realisation of human rights.
2. Humanitarian actors appreciate the UK’s significant contribution to the Rohingya Crisis Appeal Fund, however the Humanitarian Response Plan is only 30.6% funded. All donors need to ensure the plan is fully funded and funds are quickly disbursed. Beyond the emergency appeal, long term funding is also needed as the crisis is not expected to be resolved soon.
3. The UK’s role in achieving the recent UN Security Council Statement on the action of the Government of Burma in Rakhine State is welcome[1]. The UK should now use all bilateral, multilateral, and regional platforms to urge the Myanmar authorities to immediately end the violations and crimes in northern Rakhine State, allow humanitarian agencies and independent investigators access to Rakhine State; and the Rohingya refugees who wish to do so to return to their home voluntarily, in safety, and with dignity. The UK should ensure all appropriate avenues are considered to investigate alleged international crimes and ensure accountability.
4. The humanitarian community is concerned that “Temporary Processing Centres”, may be established in Burma that will become permanent camps for Rohingya remaining in Rakhine and potential returnees.
5. In Burma, DFID have long been one of the main supporters of integrated humanitarian and development programming in Northern Rakhine State (NRS), and should continue to plan with partners new interventions that are flexible, take account of the access-security volatilities, and help partners explore new modalities for principled engagement.
6. DFID should plan new programmes and modalities flexibly to allow for changing modalities (local partnerships, direct implementation, support to ministries). DFID should also consider funding a “Whole of Rakhine” approach.
7. In Bangladesh efforts should be supported to speed up all authorizations required to allow timely deployment of humanitarian staff and goods and to ease any bureaucratic constraints.
8. Hosting communities in Bangladesh, now supporting around 900,000 refugees, were already facing difficulties and they should be included in the international humanitarian response.
9. Authorisation to operate and access affected populations are challenges for humanitarian actors in both Bangladesh and Burma. They also face administrative constraints, including travel authorizations, visa and banking issues. As the leading donor in response to the crisis, the UK is in a strong position to advocate for tackling barriers to humanitarian access.
10. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, WASH and health facilities in camps and settlements are all severely overstretched, as are psycho-social support services for children. Scaled up food security and nutrition, WASH, shelter and health services are all therefore needed.
11. In Rakhine state, Burma, the lack of access of INGO health and nutrition services since 25th August will have lead to worsening levels of malnutrition and ill health.

About Action Against Hunger/ Action Contre la Faim (ACF)

12. ACF is an international humanitarian organisation committed to ending child hunger and malnutrition. ACF works provides life-saving support in over 45 countries, including a number of fragile and conflict affected states.
13. In Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh, Action Against Hunger services have reached nearly 500,000 refugees since 27 August 2017.
14. In Rakhine State, Myanmar, ACF has been one of the lead humanitarian agencies for over two decades carrying out one of its largest programs for the diagnosis and treatment of malnutrition in the world. ACF has been unable to implement any activities in northern Rakhine State since mid-August due to strict access restrictions imposed by the Government of Myanmar.

What are the origins of the plight of the Rohingya people and their status in Burma; and what was the catalyst for the recent resurgence of their migration from Burma to Bangladesh?

15. Several UN internal and public reports have analysed the conflict in Rakhine[2], the plight of Rohingya people particularly regarding citizenship, statelessness, persecution, ethnic tensions, historic displacement, nationalism, chronic underdevelopment and acute humanitarian needs.
16. This combination of factors has created a protracted crisis across Rakhine State, which worsened after inter-communal violence erupted in June 2012, and again deteriorated in October 2016, after an armed opposition group attacked several Border Guard (BGP) posts in northern Rakhine State (NRS).
17. ACF’s services in NRS were suspended on August 15, 2017. On August 25, 2017, the same armed opposition group staged a series of coordinated attacks against BGP and Tatmadaw posts. The subsequent military clearance operations, ongoing skirmishes and ethnic violence sent 609,000 people fleeing for their lives; and the remaining more than 200,000 in urgent need of food, water and protection. Over the course of the following weeks, there have been widespread allegations of attacks on civilians, of threats and violence being used to drive people out of their homes, and of serious human rights violations including the killing of civilians and large-scale burnings of villages in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships.
18. It must be clarified that people fleeing Rakhine State are doing so due to violence, persecution and/or extreme coercion; and therefore the international community should approach this crisis as predominantly a refugee crisis that encompasses serious human rights violations. This is therefore not a case of migration as implied by the question. Under international law the people fleeing are refugees, not migrants[3].

What is the likely scale of the current crisis; what are the prospects for a political solution within Burma resolving the migration of the Rohingya people and mitigating the humanitarian situation?

19. Bangladesh has opened its border to refugees from Rakhine State.  In Cox’s Bazar, more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees are estimated to be sheltering. 609,00 people crossed the border from Burma between 25th August and 5th November, having fled violence and persecution which began then in Rakhine State. Refugees continue to arrive although the rate of new arrivals has slowed. The total number of people in need estimated in the Bangladesh Rohingya Crisis Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) is 1,200,000 including 300,000 Bangladeshi host communities affected. The HRP finds that to meet all humanitarian need, an estimated total of US$585,000,000 will be required but the plan is currently only 30.6% funded. It identifies the largest capacity gaps ‘in the WASH, Food Security, Site Management, Shelter NFI and Protection Sectors’.
20. Action Against Hunger has found that the public health emergency risk continues to be high, with a large part of the population continuing to be in perpetual motion in search of food and other basic services and a safe area to settle. The supply of food and services is inadequate for the scale of the crisis.
21. Bangladesh has now proposed opening a new site next to the Kutupalong camp near Cox’s Bazar, which is intended to host 14000 shelters accommodating 6 families each. Such mega camps, with huge concentration of refugees, can present humanitarian actors with extreme difficulties in meeting needs.
22. In Rakhine State, Burma, there was, prior to the recent crisis, already very high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition. Undernutrition and mental health needs are a major concern across Rakhine, but particularly in the northern townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where rates are well-above emergency levels. There are serious allegations of human rights violations, although the extent of this, or the scale of the displacement, has not been verified by any international agencies, as the Government of Burma is still denying access to independent monitors to all areas.
23. There are still no clearly defined conditions under which refugees in Bangladesh will be able to return to Burma, and there are ongoing discussions regarding the establishment of “Temporary Processing Centres”, which the aid community fears will become permanent camps similar to those in Central Rakhine, as a solution for Rohingya remaining in Rakhine as well as potential returnees.
24. The Myanmar/ Burma Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) are still being defined, but there is likely to be approximately 900,000 people affected in Rakhine State alone, with approximately 200,000 of those in northern Rakhine State, and the rest a mixture of stateless and local populations in Central Rakhine. These figures however do not account for an unknown number of possible returns during the course of 2018.
25. In Sittwe Township (the capital of Rakhine), after a brief interruption of nutrition and MHCP activities in early September, all camp-based Outpatient Treatment Program (OTP) nutrition centres have operated reasonably unimpeded, catering to both camp and host community populations.
26. Community level activities have been the most affected by a variety of access barriers including non-standardized procedures for Travel and Activity Authorizations, new army and police checkpoints with varying requirements, pressure from hardliners on village leaders and administrators, fear and intimidation of both aid workers and businesses that are seen to be cooperating with the UN and INGOs. ACF is one of a few organizations that have recently been granted the relevant authorizations but access remains sporadic.

Has DFID’s response to the crisis been appropriate? Does the UK have an effective long term strategy?

27. In 2016 DFID published a new   Strengthening Humanitarian Preparedness and Response (SHPR) Programme in Bangladesh, which included a key pillar on supporting Rohingya refugees, and was intended to cover a 3-year engagement period. This length of commitment was welcome and unlike any other donor at that time.
28. Since the recent crisis, humanitarian actors in the region greatly appreciate the UK’s contribution to the Appeal Fund, however, with the HRP only partially funded, there is a continued need for humanitarian life-saving assistance now, along with political and policy measures to ensure the effective delivery of assistance and humanitarian access.
29. DFID has largely funded the response to the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) so NGO actors are contracted by UNOPS instead of DFID directly.
30. In Burma, DFID should continue to leverage the experience and knowledge of INGO partners in northern Rakhine through the help of its Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Program (HARP). DFID have long been one of the main supporters of integrated humanitarian and development programming in NRS and should continue to plan with partners new interventions that are flexible, take account of the access-security volatilities and help partners explore new modalities for principled engagement.
31. Authorisation to operate and access affected populations are challenges for humanitarian actors in both Bangladesh and Burma. They also face administrative constraints, including travel authorizations, visa and banking issues. As the leading donor in response to the crisis, the UK is in a strong position to advocate for tackling barriers to humanitarian access, such as alleviating bureaucratic impediments, including changes to the procedure for obtaining travel authorisations as well as informal measures such as de facto bans on gathering of more than five people; standardization of administrative approvals for I/NGO actors, Visas for surge and support from international staff; advocating for Government stakeholders to refrain from all unfounded public accusations against humanitarian organizations[4]
32. Beyond the immediate need this is likely to be a protracted crisis, given the political problems underlying it. A lesson from past crises of this nature is that long term funding should be provided from the outset.  In view of the political stalemate, there is a substantial likelihood the crisis will be protracted.

What are the most pressing needs to be met; what estimates are there of the scale of each such need?

33. Refugees arriving in Bangladesh come mostly from northern Rakhine State which due to the aforementioned root causes has very high levels of food insecurity and one of the highest malnutrition rates in Asia (between 17-19% global acute malnutrition GAM). People arriving in Bangladesh are therefore already highly vulnerable and in need of emergency food aid and nutrition services. Up to 90% of new arrivals have reported eating just one meal a day, and do not have a sufficiently diverse food intake. The host community of Cox’s Bazar also experiences severe challenges accessing sufficient food with 57% of the population food insecure. The HRP estimates that 300,000 people require emergency nutrition support including 150,000 children under 5 and 55,000 pregnant women.
34. WASH and health facilities in camps and settlements are all severely overstretched, as are psycho-social support services for children. Scaled up food security and nutrition, WASH, shelter and health services are all therefore needed.
35. In Rakhine state, Burma, the lack of access of INGO health and nutrition services since 25th August will have lead to worsening levels of malnutrition and ill health. With just a projected three-month cessation of activities, ACF estimates that more than 11,800 children with Acute Malnutrition and 1,700 Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLWs) will not receive necessary treatment through ACF services. In addition, 13,250 anticipated beneficiaries reached through ACF’s longer-term Livelihood, Food Security and WASH interventions are not receiving support as planned[5].
36. The lack of access to ACF’s nutrition and Mental Health and Care Practices (MHCP) services in northern Rakhine will increase illness and deaths among these undernourished children and women as they become increasingly susceptible to disease and have very limited access to medical services. Except for downtown hospitals, there is very limited access to government health services. Without intervention children detected with moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) will rapidly deteriorate to severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and be more prone to life-threatening infections such as pneumonia and diarrhoea. Children diagnosed with SAM are nine times more likely to die than well-nourished children.
37. Given the pre-existing situation in terms of poor psychosocial status and care practices, a deterioration in caregivers’ emotional status and capacity to provide appropriate care to children is anticipated. Deterioration/disruption of breastfeeding practices, optimal interaction with children, hygiene practices and increased psychosocial distress is of particular concern for pregnant and lactating women and caregivers of SAM children below two years old.
38. Central Rakhine has also been heavily impacted by the crisis. According to project data, ACF has seen an 18% increase in admission of SAM cases during July-September, compared to the same period last year, despite suspension of activities for one week in early September. This trend is expected to be amplified in the coming weeks if there is not a full resumption of INGO activities in the IDP camps.

How effective has the co-ordination been between the multilateral agencies, donor countries and NGOs on the ground?

39. The impact of the refugee crisis on NGOs and CSOs, especially many national and international actors with pre-existing programming with the refugee populations, has been heavy. The speed of the influx of refugees coupled with insufficient resources has created a need to shift rather than add capacity for many organisations.
40. In Bangladesh, the operational integration of new NGO actors (international & national) is improving, albeit slowly, with the support of ICVA, the INGO Forum & the NGO Coordination Support Cell in the Inter Sector Coordination Group (ISCG).  
41. There is continuing ambiguity over what will be the short-medium term empowered coordination structure, with a possible dual mandate of humanitarian response and repatriation, would look like, between the three key UN actors, the IOM, UNHCR & the UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
42. In Bangladesh, access to basic means of communication like mobile phone in certain parts of the new settlement zones is also limited although an emergency telecommunication cluster has arrived in Cox’s Bazar which may help address this.
43. In Burma, there is still a strong need to ensure a holistic, joined up coordination response to Rakhine State. There needs to have a consolidated integrated operational planning and coordinated response of humanitarian assistance in Rakhine, so that one structure sits across the state and covers the humanitarian needs across the whole state. Currently, planning and response are segmented by having UNHCR lead in northern Rakhine and OCHA only in Central Rakhine. This unnecessarily duplicates coordination mechanisms at all levels, creates a bottleneck for the newly created Rakhine Coordination Group and disenfranchises Clusters from the needs in northern Rakhine. Presence of OCHA and UNHCR in the same locations should not have to mean an undermining of each agency’s mandates or leadership on specific issues.
44. The INGO Forum is currently supporting inter-agency efforts to define pressure points and possible new conditions for engagement in Rakhine; with the aim of coming to a common understanding on broad topics, red lines and dilemmas. Donors in Myanmar have been quick to react and align their advocacy points with regards to protection issues, repatriations, citizenship verification, coordination structures and strongly discouraging set-up of new camps in NRS.
45. DFID has been involved in these efforts and taken stances aligned with recommendations from INGOs and other international partners. Despite efforts, there are likely to be non-traditional donors and actors that will choose to distance themselves from any potential joint positions. It would thus be important to ensure that DFID continue to advocate towards such actors as Turkey, Malaysia, India and China where possible.
46. More broadly, coordination amongst donors has been challenging in this fast paced environment and actors like us can struggle to understand the advocacy positions of donors and their ability to address them in a timely manner with the government.

What cooperation has the humanitarian effort received from (a) the government (b) civil society in (i) Burma and (ii) Bangladesh?

47. In northern Rakhine State, Burma, the space for national, international and civil society actors to operate is very restricted by the Burmese government.     The Government has put enormous pressure on aid actors, including by publicly accusing some INGO staff of supporting terrorist activities, thereby fueling pre-existing anti-UN and INGO sentiment and hostility.
48. ACF does not anticipate being able to resume activities before the end of the year. However, ACF does expect to resume activities in Maungdaw and Buthidaung by the beginning of 2018. This is contingent on government authorisation and being allowed unimpeded access by populations.
49. On 17 October the Office of the President established a Committee for the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance (UEHRD). According to the Government of Burma, the Committee will be responsible for the provision of humanitarian aid, the coordination of resettlement and rehabilitation efforts, carrying out regional development, and working towards durable peace. Practically speaking it is not yet clear what the UEHRD will do or how it will operate. The Government of Burma has introduced several committees, structures and policy review processes, so there is a risk the new one will add to the bureaucracy. The creation of the UEHRD could improve the coordination of humanitarian aid in Rakhine, as long as it helps streamline efforts and does not add to the various barriers to aid delivery or further restrict space for national, international and civil society actors.
50. Neutral and impartial actors are needed in Rakhine and the first aim of the UEHRD ‘to carry out the provision of humanitarian aid’ could be problematic if it means direct implementation by the Government of Burma with little oversight. The Burmese Government and the UEHRD should make use of the non-government actors already in Rakhine but if the government bring in new actors to deliver programmes that lack capacity and are not conflict sensitive, they could potentially waste resources, duplicate efforts and do harm.
51. Access may be slightly improving for some health service providers - the Rakhine State Ministry of Health (MoH) is encouraging partners with MoH Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) to resume activities in northern Rakhine. However, the process for applications is far from clear or straightforward, and the lack of standardization means that agencies often apply ad hoc, with little indication of possible success.
52. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, there is a lack of clarity on the links between the ISCG Coordination in Cox's Bazar and Dhaka level coordination & liaison with the Government in Bangladesh. This problem with government coordination is expected to continue as the role of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the Resident Coordinator or Humanitarian Coordinator are not clarified or agreed with the government.
53. In Cox’s Bazar, the Bangladesh army has been engaged in centralizing distribution of relief and control rooms have been set up in different locations to reign down on unorganized distributions, which were causing havoc. The army is taking a central role in the current phase of the crisis, in providing an operational coordination lead on a number of key sectors. Land, congestion, settlement services and access continue to be the central part of discussion on the ground and with the government. In the camps, the cooperation with and coordination under the Bangladesh Armed Forces Division (AFD) guidance/oversight is expected to continue.
54. While the official stance of the government of Bangladesh has been to allow a limited number of new international aid agencies to operate in Cox’s Bazar, in terms of project administrative approvals (FD process) for many agencies, including the ones who had permission to work before, organisations are facing considerably delays, in spite of repeated assurances over recent weeks.

What impact has the crisis had on DFID’s country programmes in (a) Burma, and (b) Bangladesh country programmes? How should DFID change its programmes in response?

55. In Burma, DFID’s planned response for northern Rakhine under its HARP facility, to bridge humanitarian and resilience-building initiatives with funding specifically tailored for protracted crisis, has been put on hold, at least for Maungdaw District.
56. All plans and strategies in NRS, Burma, from pre-August 25th will no longer be directly applicable and are likely to need revision, once in depth assessments can be carried out on the ground.
57. DFID should plan new programmes and modalities on a variety of plausible scenarios, but must keep their funding flexible to allow for changing modalities (local partnerships, direct implementation, support to ministries). DFID should also consider funding a “Whole of Rakhine” approach that allows agencies to maintain vital presence and humanitarian, development and peace-building programs in Central Rakhine townships, while allowing these same quickly-adaptable funds to be used for northern Rakhine as new entry points and engagement modalities develop.

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