Written Evidence from Dr Lee Jones (BUR0027)

THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN RAKHINE STATE

The present violence is partly rooted in British colonialism in Burma. Although there have been Muslim communities in what is now Rakhine state since the ninth century, most of the group now identifying as “Rohingyas” arrived during periods of Mughal rule and especially under British imperialism (1824-1948). The British encouraged large-scale Bengali migration to address labour shortages on Burmese agricultural plantations. Immigration peaked at 480,000 in 1927, in a population of 13 million. In response, the anti-colonial nationalism of Burma’s majority ethnic group, the Bamar, became strongly infused with racist, anti-Indian and anti-Muslim sentiment. There were anti-Indian riots in 1930-31 and anti-Muslim riots in 1926 and 1938. Led by Bamar, these did not spread into Rakhine. However, during the Japanese invasion in World War II, the ethnic majority in Rakhine state – the Buddhist Rakhine – launched anti-Muslim pogroms, displacing many Muslims into British-held India. The British organised Rohingya volunteer forces to attack Japanese forces, but these often raided Rakhine communities. These forces also accompanied British troops when they reconquered Burma and suppressed Rakhine militias. A consequence of this WWII-era forced displacement is that many returning Muslims were subsequently viewed as “illegal Bengali immigrants”. This is how the vast majority of the Myanmar population view Rohingyas today. They are not accepted as one of the country’s indigenous ethnic minorities.

Today’s violence is also rooted in the racialized nature of the Myanmar state. The post-colonial state has always been dominated by the Bamar, and claims to citizenship rights have been made dependent on asserting an indigenous ethnic identity. This prompted Muslims in Rakhine to identify themselves as part of a “Rohingya” ethnicity – a term not widely used before the 1950s. This claim was never formally accepted, but Rohingyas were courted politically during Burma’s democratic period (1948-62), enjoying voting rights and even being elected to parliament. However, Burma’s subsequent military regime was openly hostile, rejecting this claim to indigenous ethnicity and stripping the Rohingyas of their rights. Rohingyas were increasingly depicted as “illegal Bengali immigrants” and a crackdown in 1977-78 prompted some 200,000 people to flee into Bangladesh. Although most subsequently returned (including via forced repatriation) the 1982 Citizenship Act deliberately made it almost impossible for them legally to prove citizenship. They were subsequently stripped of their remaining rights and subjected to increasingly brutal control measures. This drove around 250,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh again in 1992. Repatriation and continued and escalating maltreatment created the conditions for the emergence of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed group which attacked security personnel in October 2015 and August 2017, prompting massive crackdowns and the most recent mass exodus.

Anti-Rohingya violence is partly driven and justified by the racist, xenophobic and paranoid nature of Bamar-Buddhist nationalism. As noted, Bamar nationalism channelled anti-Indian and anti-Muslim sentiment from the 1930s, reflecting resentment towards the powerful role that Indian migrants had acquired in business, finance and landholding. Furthermore, the colonial-era influx of Muslim migrants and Christian missionaries fostered a siege mentality among Buddhists. After independence, many ethnic-Indians fled, and another 300,000 departed after Burma’s military regime nationalised landowning and all significant businesses. Anti-Muslim riots occurred under the military, in 1997 and 2001, and the Islamophobic Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu – now a key figurehead of “MaBaTha”, the Association for the Protection of Race and Religion – was jailed for incitement in 2003. MaBaTha, and the post-2011 “969” movement, which encouraged Buddhists to boycott Muslim businesses, are the latest manifestation of this form of nationalism. Fear that Buddhism will be eclipsed by a demographic tidal wave from “illegal Bengali immigrants” is now widespread, despite the fact that only three percent of the population is Muslim and 89 percent are Buddhist. These factors explain why there is widespread popular support for discriminatory legal measures to “protect” Buddhism, and for the harsh treatment of Rohingyas, including after the latest waves of communal violence in 2012 and today. Indeed, Myanmar society has rallied around the military and Aung San Suu Kyi during the current crisis, arguably displaying greater unity than at any time in the last 50 years.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

China quickly affirmed its “strong support” for Myanmar’s security operations against ARSA. China probably sees the crisis as an opportunity to regain diplomatic ground lost since 2011, when Myanmar suspended China’s Irrawaddy hydropower dam project in Kachin, plunging bilateral relations into crisis and prompting fears that Myanmar had been “lost” to the West. China also has economic interests in Rakhine state, including a US$2.4bn oil and gas pipeline linking Kyaukphyu to western China, with plans to develop a US$10bn, 4,000 acre special economic zone and US$20bn 1,215km railway as part of Beijing’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. China wishes to see its projects protected; renewed civil war in eastern Myanmar (Kachin and Shan states) have threatened Chinese investments there, too. However, despite Chinese rhetoric about “non-interference”, Beijing has become increasingly involved in Myanmar’s internal affairs, both to protect its investments and to curtail refugee flows from Kachin into China. Its special envoy remains actively involved in the sluggish peace process in eastern Myanmar, and offered to help mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh on the Rakhine situation in May 2017 (Myanmar rejected this). Beijing can therefore recognise that Myanmar’s heavy-handed, securitised approach to managing ethnic conflict is unhelpful and is open to “creative involvement”.

Bangladesh is primarily interested in removing the Rohingya refugees as soon as possible. Bangladesh does not recognise the Rohingya as Bengali emigrants and will not settle them permanently. In previous rounds of forced displacement its top priority was repatriation – forced if necessary. At the start of the present crisis, Foreign Ministry officials pledged to cooperate with Myanmar against ARSA – a pledge renewed this month. An initially unwelcome posture towards refugees was only reversed when the flow became unstoppable and Bangladeshi Islamists mounted massive pro-Rohingya protests. Refugees place enormous strain on the impoverished border region and are seen as a potential breeding ground for Islamist extremism. The influx has further destabilised the secular Awami League government of Sheikh Hasana, as the Islamist opposition party (the BNP) and social movements (Hefazat-e-Islam) demand a more forceful response, including sanctions on Myanmar and even arming the Rohingyas for “jihad”.

India’s Hindu nationalist government squarely backs the Myanmar government, partly due to its need for cooperation against Naga insurgents in the border region, and partly for communalist reasons. Indian leaders are concerned about Rohingya refugees flowing from Bangladesh into India. 40,000 are already there and the Indian government openly wishes to expel them. India’s posture is creating tensions between Bangladesh’s typically pro-Indian Awami League government and the Bangladeshi military, which has long been suspicious of India.

ASEAN has taken a measured approach, expressing “concern” about the “humanitarian situation”, but also condemning ARSA’s attack and welcoming Myanmar’s commitments to protect civilians, end the violence, restore normal socio-economic conditions, resolve the refugee problem, and deliver humanitarian aid. ASEAN did not criticise Myanmar overtly but did call for “increased humanitarian access” and “urged” Myanmar to implement the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (aka the Annan Commission). ASEAN’s majority-Muslim nations have historically been more concerned about the Rohingya issue, applying pressure on Myanmar in 1992, 2012 and 2015. Indonesia sent a special envoy to Myanmar shortly after the most recent violence. Embattled Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has exploited the Rohingya issue for domestic purposes, joining a march in December 2016 calling for an end to “genocide”, then supporting an aid convoy to Rakhine. Now, Malaysia has formally disassociated itself from ASEAN’s latest statement as a “misrepresentation of… reality” as it ignored the “disproportionate” use of force and subsequent “atrocities”, which demand international action.

The United Nations has been vocal but ineffective. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has identified it as a “textbook case of ethnic cleansing”, a position backed by the Secretary-General, who has also demanded humanitarian access, safe return for refugees and the granting of nationality to Rohingyas. However, the UN Security Council is deadlocked. As “penholder” on Myanmar, the UK organised two closed-door consultations and one open meeting, but this did not generate even a formal joint press statement. Western and some Southern states have taken a strong stance, but Myanmar’s traditional allies, notably China, have been more reticent, foregrounding their condemnation of ARSA and emphasising the complex roots of the crisis. China has called for “patience”, “support and help” for Myanmar as it seeks to restore order and resolve the situation, while Russia warned that “excessive pressure on Naypyidaw” would only “aggravate the situation”. There is no immediate prospect of any resolution from the Security Council, still less concrete actions like sanctions.

The UK

• The UK took the lead at the UN, as noted above.
• The UK has also used bilateral channels, particularly access to Aung San Suu Kyi, to express concern, with a visit by Minister of State Mark Field on 27 September. This has not yielded any notable results. Aung San Suu Kyi has essentially repeated her publicly stated views, which include demonstrably false claims that clearance operations have finished. Like many admirers of Aung San Suu Kyi, the UK government has realised that she is not a “saint”. Indeed, she has done virtually nothing to challenge rising Islamophobia and anti-Rohingya sentiment. She is apparently unwilling to challenge popular opinion on these issues or to risk her relationship with the powerful military. Her own remarks about “global Muslim power”, her antipathy towards a Muslim BBC journalist, her decision to exclude Muslim candidates from the National League for Democracy’s 2015 election campaign, her long silence over the assassination of a prominent Muslim legal advisor, and her own office’s use of the term “Bengali” all suggest that she may even share popular prejudice. However, she ostensibly remains committed to implementing the Annan Commission’s recommendations and this remains the main point of entry for diplomacy.
• The UK also decided to suspend training programmes for the Myanmar military. This was undoubtedly a mistake. Such a nominal action could have no possible impact on the military’s behaviour except to further alienate it; indeed, the Myanmar army promptly stated it would never engage with Britain again. The UK now has no real access to the military, compounding a problem created by two previous decades of sanctions policy (see further below).
• Footage of the Foreign Secretary quoting Kipling at the Shwedagon pagoda (filmed in January 2017 but released in September) has also provoked a Buddhist-nationalist backlash. The poem offensively refers to Buddha as an “idol made o’ mud” and the “Great Gawd Budd”, while its opening line, “come back, you British soldier”, reminds Myanmar citizens of Britain’s colonial role, which helped to create the Rohingya situation. Coupled with meaningless virtue-signalling, such as the taking down of Suu Kyi’s portraits or stripping her of the freedom of the city of Oxford, Myanmar nationalists perceive such incidents as expressing an “imperialist” attitude and a desire to “humiliate” Myanmar. As the headline of one newspaper article put it: “Britain is Still Being Beastly to its Former Colony Myanmar”.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Sanctions will not work. Some politicians and campaigners in the US, UK and EU are demanding targeted sanctions and/or an arms embargo. This would have absolutely no positive impact. My book, Societies Under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work (Oxford University Press, 2015), shows that previous Western sanctions against Myanmar were counterproductive, delaying the country’s transition to an electoral regime. Despite a Western arms embargo, the military imported US$2.48bn of weapons from 1989-2010 – mostly from China – and doubled in size. It is consequently ludicrous to expect that an embargo now will “end Rohingya suffering”, as Amnesty International has claimed. Sanctions targeted personally at senior military personnel, officials and businessmen were also completely ineffective. These individuals rarely wished to travel to or transact with the West. Accordingly, barely US$1m in personal assets were seized in the US and Europe. Proxy companies were established to circumvent business restrictions, and passports issued in new names to evade travel bans. A 2008 leaked US diplomatic cable concluded: “sanctions may have complicated their lives, but… it remains business as usual”. Crucially, these sanctions had no political effect. None of the targeted entities deviated from their established political strategies. Insofar as sanctions made things more difficult for the junta, this only slowed their forced march towards “discipline-flourishing democracy”. The 2008 constitution, which they largely crafted and now governs Myanmar’s political system, is essentially identical to the terms offered to opposition forces in 1993. There is no reason to expect that sanctions today will have any more substantive impact than before. The military’s security concerns remain paramount and, as noted, the population is now more squarely behind it than perhaps ever before. Sanctions would be a pointless exercise in virtue-signalling and would only further alienate Myanmar’s nationalists and complicate the resolution of this extremely complicated issue.

Rather than sanctions, engagement is required:

• The civilian government’s pledge to implement the Annan Commission’s recommendations must be secured as the basis for any future resolution of this problem. The military probably do not accept this pledge fully, but it remains the only way forwards. Pressure needs to be brought to bear, and extensive support and aid provided, for the rapid implementation of all of the recommendations. Addressing the issue as a human rights and development challenge for both Rakhine and Rohingya populations (as the Commission wisely did) is the only approach capable of winning local consent, since Rakhines see international agencies as profoundly biased towards the Rohingyas. 
• The refugee crisis must be addressed through a massive aid and development initiative. Bangladesh will not absorb the Rohingyas and third-country resettlement is historically paltry, so the only solution is their safe and voluntary return to Rakhine state. However, while this occurred following two previous crises, the scale and nature of this episode makes this even more difficult today.
• Aid is urgently required for the Rohingya refugee camps. For reasons specified below they are not likely to return in the immediate future.
• The terms under which Myanmar will certify and accept returnees need to be clarified and assistance provided to help refugees qualify. Myanmar will only accept “bona fide” refugees who can prove residency in Myanmar. This will be extremely difficult because: Rohingyas were stripped of their identity cards in 2015; many will have lost other documents during successive rounds of violence and displacement; and many villages have been deliberately destroyed this time, leaving no one to verify that a given individual once lived there.
• Upholding the non-refoulement principle is essential but very challenging. In 1992 most Rohingya refugees did not wish to return to Myanmar. The subsequent deterioration of living conditions means that most will not want to return now, either. Essentially, refugees are being asked to volunteer to be repatriated into concentration camps. No one would willingly do so. After 1992, many refugees were forcibly repatriated by Bangladesh, even under UN High Commission for Refugees supervision. Strong safeguards and independent monitoring will be needed to prevent this being repeated.
• A massive development effort is required to make Rakhine state a safe, decent home for all of its residents. Rohingya refugees will not voluntarily repatriate until their security is assured and decent living conditions provided – per the Annan Commission’s recommendations. A huge development programme is needed to improve socio-economic conditions and to replace destroyed housing. Crucially this must be aimed at both the Rohingya and Rakhine communities. This is not merely to counter allegations of bias but reflects the appalling living conditions of many Rakhines, which are sometimes scarcely better than those of displaced Rohingyas. Essentially, a “Marshall plan” is needed for Rakhine state, a desperately impoverished region. A donor consortium should be organised to support the Myanmar government’s implementation of the Annan Commission’s recommendations. Chinese involvement should be sought as part of its “Belt and Road” ambitions. If projects are run through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, they will be governed largely according to international best practices, avoiding the corruption and forced displacement that often accompany other large-scale infrastructure projects. If the Myanmar government refuses or blocks such assistance, the effort should be redirected to the Bangladeshi borderlands to help the de facto absorption of refugees into what is also a very impoverished area.
• In the longer term, racism and Islamophobia in Myanmar must be tackled through programmes aimed at challenging and changing public perceptions and discourses. As noted above, these attitudes are deeply entrenched, with roots in the colonial experience, so they will not be changed overnight. However, the indifference or enthusiasm with which the population has greeted the Rohingyas’ present plight demonstrates the necessity of promoting change. Voices of reason, moderation and accuracy must be amplified through support for scholars, journalists and civil society organisations willing to challenge popular narratives. Support should also be provided to the Myanmar government on how to mainstream religious and communal tolerance through school and university curricula, and on how to tackle extremist mobilisation. Programmes to encourage the development of an inclusive, civic form of nationalism, rather than a divisive, racialized one, should also be encouraged.

October 2017

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