Dr Vesna Bojicic- Dzelilovic, Associate Professorial Research Fellow, Civil Society and Conflict Research Unit, LSE – Written Evidence (BUB0027)

Has there been a radicalisation of Islam in the region? If so, what have been the driving forces and what are the consequences for the region? How can UK policy respond?

1. Under socialism- and roughly up until the onset of the wars in the 1990s, the Muslims living in this region tended to follow a secular tradition. A penetration of radical Islam started during the wars and has intensified since. The presence of Wahhabi and Salafists, particularly in parts of  Serbia’s Sandzak  and Bosnia and Herzegovina, has grown over the last 25 years, and  their reach extends beyond the religious sphere.  They provide a variety of public services, including education, health care, and childcare; they also provide financial assistance to poor households, and other forms of assistance needed by local communities. Their presence is also influencing social norms. Manifestation of this is visibly greater number of women following an Islamic dress code, an alcohol ban operating in many public venues, and the importance of public display of respect for religious rituals such as daily call for prayer. The roots of the phenomenon are in the combination of stalled democratic processes in the region, ascendance of authoritarianism and its instrumental use of religious identity, and widespread poverty.

2. These developments have attracted scores of sensationalist commentaries from the local and international actors, along the lines of the Balkans being a hotbed of radical Islam. While such claims can not be substantiated at present- and the number of followers of radical Islam is believed to be moderate- it is important not to lose sight of broader trends in the region and geopolitically. More recently, and especially linked to the conflicts in Libya and Syria, the region seems to be attracting a growing number of investors from the Arab world. They invest in commercial business but also in property- for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina many newly built settlements for Arab customers have popped up in various parts of the country. Turkey is also an important economic actor in the region, but its influence extends into other spheres in areas where Muslims are majority. This reinforces an image of ‘silent islamisation’ in some of the communities, which is a source of concern for non-Muslim population, and works against peace and reconciliation in the region. To this mix, the problem of the Balkans becoming the final frontier for the migrants trying to reach Western Europe should be added when considering potential destabilisation of the region in the medium to long term.

3. Local religious groups, some of which have strong ties in the Arab world, provide the backing for radical groups often  in exchange for financial and other support. Local political elites’ conduct in relation to local Islamic community and foreign actors, by either openly or tacitly encouraging more prominent presence of Islamic tradition in the region, is equally important in understanding the role of Islamic groups and the prospect of radicalisation that their increasing presence may give rise to. 

4. The UK has long tradition of educational and cultural exchange with the countries in the region which can be stepped up- both by bringing people to the UK on educational grants as well as supporting directly local educational and cultural institutions. The UK can also use its political leverage among some of the local political elites to break the cycle of opportunist behaviour that instrumentalizes religious identity. 

What actions should the UK take to support efforts against corruption and organised crime in the region? What impact is corruption and organised crime in the region having in the UK?

5. Insufficient understanding of the nature of the phenomenon of corruption and organised crime in the Balkans among policy makers has impaired many internationally- sponsored initiatives to fight it. At the core of this issue is the existence of close, often symbiotic relationships among political elites, commercial actors and organised crime linked through transnational networks. Those close ties underpin extra institutional forms of governing that permeate political, judicial and economic institutions. To break up those structures would require a broad- based approach that targets those linkages so that covert support and protection to corruption and organised crime from within the political establishment is eliminated.

6. A support to justice institutions, and in particular to strengthening independent judiciary, is of immense importance. Strong support is also needed to civil society organisations working on corruption and organised crime, and to independent media. Many of the earlier initiatives supporting civil society and independent media have been phased out as a result of shifting priorities of donor countries despite the severity of the problem. The UK should also continue its support to the existing regional and international initiatives to fight corruption and organised crime in which the countries of the Balkans are involved.

7. Some of the most prominent organised crime groups in the UK have their origins in the Balkans, notably the Albanian ones. This exposes the UK institutions directly to the risks associated with global illicit flows of people, goods and money, and presents a threat to domestic security.

What are the key economic challenges facing the countries of the region? Is there a constructive role to be played by the UK? What are the commercial interests of the UK in the region?

8. For all the countries in the region ensuring broad- based growth by diversifying their economies, and improving competitiveness presents a main challenge. The region has been hard hit by the global financial crisis because the economic model prior to the crisis was based on growth in domestic consumption facilitated by the availability of credit through the affiliates of West European banks. Production base is narrow in most countries and hence they export limited range of goods, concentrated in low value added sectors. This has resulted in large trade deficits and high rates of unemployment. Long term unemployment which ranges between 63%-81% of total unemployment with more than 70% of the unemployed in the region out of work for more than a year on average, is of particular concern- both in terms of economic as well as political and security implications.

9. The UK’s economic relations with the countries in the region are weak; the UK is not a major trading partner for any of the six non- EU member countries. The UK along with Germany is a main driving force behind the Berlin initiative for the Western Balkans aimed at reenergising regional cooperation. This includes investment in infrastructure which is of crucial importance for improving development prospects in the region. This opens opportunities for the involvement of UK companies in what could be a major infrastructure investment cycle in the region.

Youth unemployment is extremely high in most countries of the Western Balkans. How is this manifested among young people? How can the UK engage more effectively, and to what end, with young people of the region?

10. There is a huge sense of disillusionment and despair among unemployed youth in the region. This creates strong incentive to emigrate. In some countries, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina, an accelerating trend of emigration of young and educated people is turning into a serious brain drain problem. Lack of employment is foremost associated with nepotism and corruption which leads to young unemployed people’s disengagement from public life. Unemployed youth is also vulnerable to extremist ideologies, and in the region where ethnic tensions remain dormant, this can be potentially destabilising. 

11. Any other form of engagement the UK can offer is secondary to that of engaging the unemployed youth professionally which provides a sense of self-worth, opportunity and perspective.  Having an opportunity for work experience even for a limited period of time is crucial for providing young unemployed people a bridge towards more permanent jobs. In this regard, providing short term apprentice funding could be one form of help. Longer term, focusing on educational exchange the UK can contribute to the reform of the curricula that would address skills mismatches as one of the key factors driving high youth unemployment.

Submitted 21 September 2017