Written evidence from Daniel Seidemann, founder of the Israeli NGO, Terrestrial Jerusalem (MEP0060)

The UK Policies on Israel-Palestine, 2017: The State of Play

Executive summary

• Traditionally, UK policies and approach to Israel-Palestine have been marked by a high level of engagement. The policies characteristically bipartisan, in a manner that has lent them consistency and coherence regarding the major components of the conflict, from settlements expansion and the war on terror to support for the two-state solution, etc.
• More specifically, UK has periodically engaged both Israel and the Palestinians to great effect, whether in generating today’s widely accepted parameters of the two-state solution, or in preventing or containing crises on the ground.
• In recent years, UK approach to MEPP has pivoted significantly, a shift marked by a growing reluctance to maintain its level of involvement in Israel-Palestine while focusing on UK-Israel bilateral relations, and by refraining from critical engagement with the Israeli government on policies and actions that are in violation of long-standing UK positions.
• This shift went largely unnoticed until the end of 2016, when a series of acts and omissions by Her Majesty’s government disclosed how significant this change has become.
• The consequences in this shift are stark: it encourages PM Netanyahu in his belief that he may pursue policies that undermine the two-state solution while improving relations with the rest the world, and to do so without addressing the core grievances of the conflict. However unintentionally, the shift undermines the already beleaguered forces of moderation in Israel and Palestine, who persist in their pursuit of a political resolution of the conflict.
• We believe that the interests not only of the UK, but of Israel and the Palestinians as well would be best served by a measured return to UK’s traditional approach, calibrated to meet the new and challenging realities.

I.              Introduction

For the past twenty-five years, this author has monitored on a daily basis the Israeli-Palestinian relations in Jerusalem, seeking to contain the conflict that grips the city, and explore ways in which the core grievances of both sides may be addressed in a permanent status agreement.

This work has given me a “front-row seat” in witnessing the developments in the city of this past quarter decade, and has led to an ongoing relationship with the UK in matters relating to both the acute crises that periodically erupt in the city, and the broader political processes that relate to its future political status. It is from this vantage point that I wish to share with the Committee the observations that derive from this involvement.

II.               Punching Above One’s Weight

While the United States has, during the past half century, has dominated the international involvement in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP),often marginalizing other players , the UK role was quite often more significant and consequential than those of other third parties.

A.              Covering the Conflict

Events in Israel and the OPT in general, and in Jerusalem in particular, unfold at a frenetic pace. Disinformation emanating from all the involved stakeholders is more often the rule, than the exception. As the lead player, the US diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv (the US Embassy) and Jerusalem (the Consulate) have large staffs, with talented young diplomats assigned to cover a specific area of the conflict.

The UK missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are only a fraction in size of those of the US. But however “out-manned” and “out-financed” the UK missions are, the FCO in Tel Aviv, East Jerusalem and London has consistently stood out in the quality of their systematic coverage of the conflict in all its aspects, in the depth of its analysis and in the manner these have been shared with other relevant organs of the UK’s defense, intelligence and development communities.

C.              Coherence and continuity

Those of us engaged over time in the geopolitical issues of this conflict are accustomed to the fact that changes in foreign governments invariably lead to significant shifts in their policies regarding the conflict in general and Jerusalem in particular. However, traditionally, this has not been the case with UK policies regarding MEPP. The fundamental UK approach to Israel-Palestine issues, from settlement expansion and the war on terror, to the two-state solution and its parameters has almost invariably been bipartisan. From this perch in Jerusalem, the transitions between respective Labor and Conservative government have, until quite recently, been virtually seamless.

This coherence and consistency of UK position also derives from another source. It is widely acknowledged that the diplomatic missions active in Tel Aviv tend to view things quite differently than those located in East Jerusalem and Ramallah. Influenced by the magnetic pull of the environs, reporting from the respective missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem differing so widely that they appear to be representing different countries altogether, and “turf wars” are common. Each at time will describe the other as suffering from the Stockholm syndrome – adopting the perspectives of either the Israeli government or the Palestinian authority, rather that maintaining the policies of their own capitals.

The FCO has devised a mechanism which mitigates the impact of this phenomenon. UK reporting on Jerusalem is written jointly by both the Consulate and the Embassy. No mere a technical improvement, this lends consistency and coherence to the reporting on and analysis of Jerusalem issue, and facilitates cooperative efforts between the Embassy and the Consulate rarely found in other missions.

D.               Timely and Consequential Interventions

Throughout the years, there have been a number of highly significant and consequential interventions on the part of the UK, and these are worthy of special scrutiny.

1.              The London Track

Permanent status Jerusalem has customarily been treated by Israel as the “third rail” of the Israel-Palestine conflict – an issue so sensitive and so volatile that one takes up the issue at great peril to oneself and one’s career. Consequently, serious deliberations on the political status of Jerusalem within governmental frameworks are rare indeed.

The only significant exception was initiated and conducted by the UK’s government, coming to be known as “the London Track”. Commencing in May 1997, and for more than four years, the FCO periodically convened a small group of Israeli, Palestinian and “international” experts,  along with senior Israeli and Palestinian figures (like the late Faisal Husseini, then PA’s Minister for Jerusalem Affairs and Yossi Belin, then Israel’s Minister of Justice) for in depth discussions on permanent status Jerusalem. While the deliberations were never published, lessons learned from the London Track were often fed into all subsequent formal negotiation processes from the Camp David Summit on, and remain part of the institutional memories not only of the FCO but of all those seriously engaged in permanent status Jerusalem.

2.              Saving the 2 State Solution: E-1 and Givat Hamatos

Two Jerusalem related settlement schemes are viewed as “doomsday settlements”, which, if implemented, could deal a mortal blow to the two-state solution. If built, E-1, between East Jerusalem and the West Bank settlement of Ma’aleh Adumim, would dismember any future Palestinian state, disconnecting the northern and southern halves of the West Bank, and preventing the urban integration of East Jerusalem into a future Palestinian. Givat Hamatos, in the southern flank of East Jerusalem, would create a buffer between East Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Each of these would make the creation of a viable, contiguous Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital virtually impossible. Consequently, the international community has consistently and intensely opposed to the implementation of either project.

In 2005, the late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon commenced construction at E-1, and a debate raged within the Bush administration: should the administration insist on stopping E-1 or not? Led by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, the UK seriously engaged the administration in Washington on the issue of E-1. This engagement, as confirmed to this author by Secretary of State Condaleezza Rice’s staff, had a great impact on her – and she, in turn, led the successful campaign to convince President Bush to engage on E-1. The President did so, and the construction stopped – and has yet to resume. This “lateral impact” of UK positions on the policies of the United States has received inadequate attention and appreciation.

In September 2014, Prime Minister Netanyahu gave the green light for the publication of tenders for the first 1,500 settlement units at Givat Hamatos. In the months that preceded the intended publication, and on at least two separate occasions, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain jointly de-marched Israel over Givat Hamatos, sending a message so clear and of such consequence that it could not be ignored. The UK played a critical role in conveying this message, one that directly contributed to Netanyahu’s last minute decision to cancel the tenders.  

As of this writing, construction has not commenced at either E-1 or at Givat Hamatos.

III.               The Shift in UK Policies

During 2016, the Israel-Palestine conflict was in a state of uncertainty and disarray. The Kerry talks collapsed, and all efforts to kick-start an alternate political process led to naught. The lack of any political horizon generated a de-stabilizing despair. Settlement activities surged (there was a 40% increase in building starts). Violent clashes engulfed Jerusalem, was spiked by murderous, lone-wolf terror attacks in the city and in the West Bank. Religious radicalization in and around the Temple Mount threatened to transform a containable political conflict into a zero-sum religious clash.

Against this backdrop, the international community struggled to identify modalities that could bring events under control, and renew a credible political process.

With the nature of the policies of the impending Trump presidency cloaked in unprecedented uncertainty, a series of international interventions then took place that created a “crescendo” articulating the international communities recommitment to the two-state solution. The approval UNSCR 2334, the most serious international engagement on Israeli settlements in recent years, was immediately followed by a major address by Secretary of State Kerry, sounding a grave warning about the fate of the two-state solution, and articulating the principles on which that solution was to be based. These were followed shortly thereafter by the second Paris conference, followed one day later by a meeting of the Council of EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels.

All of the positions expressed in these moves were very much in sync with traditional UK policies. Indeed, there have been unconfirmed reports that the UK played a major role in transforming a highly problematic UNSCR text on settlements drafted by the Palestinians – one that would likely have elicited a US veto - into a well-crafted resolution that allowed for an American abstention. Not surprisingly, the UK joined 13 other members of the Security Council in supporting UNSCR 2334, with only the US abstaining.

However subsequent developments now indicate that a major change has taken place in UK policies on Israel-Palestine – shifts that began subtly two or three years ago, and that had now come into the open in ways that can no longer be ignored. While there have been no principled revisions of traditional UK positions – settlements remain illegal and an obstacle to peace, support of two states has not waivered, etc. – we are witnessing a significant deviation from the traditional UK approach to MEPP: immediately after the UNSCR vote, the UK began to display a very severe case of “buyer’s regret”.

A.              While here was nothing in Kerry’s December 28 policy address that is not in line with traditional UK positions, two days later PM May published an aggressive rebuke of Kerry. Credible reports have indicate that this was the result of a highly irregular intervention by the Trump transition team almost a month before the inauguration, whereby they expressed their anger to the over UK support for UNSCR 2334 (a vote they had previously tried to prevent). Reportedly, the Prime Minister’s attack on Kerry was in response, and an attempt to placate the incoming administration.

B.              In an apparently related move, the Foreign Secretary did not attend the January 15, Paris conference, dispatching instead a lower level British official.

C.              On January 16, British officials played a pivotal role in obstructing EU Council Conclusions that would have allowed for a united European endorsement of the Paris conference communique.

D.              PM Netanyahu’s February 6 summit with PM May focused almost exclusively on bi-lateral relations - trade, intelligence sharing etc. - with only perfunctory reference to UK support for two states (support not echoed at the time, or subsequently, by Netanyahu) and opposition to settlements.

E.              In a bizarre twist, Netanyahu used his UK visit in order to carry out one of his increasingly frequent assaults on civil society in Israel, calling on Prime Minister May to stop funding the Israeli anti-occupation watchdog NGO “Breaking the Silence”. When it became apparent that Netanyahu was using the Prime Minister as a foil (Breaking the Silence has received no UK funding since 2011), PM May chose to hold, rather than break her silence, failing to clarify the matter even when requested to do so in Parliament.

F.              On March 23, after a series of resolutions highly critical of Israel’s actions in the occupied West Bank (two of which were supported by the UK), citing bias, the UK vowed to oppose all future such resolutions concerning Israeli occupation.

We wish to assert that these incidents are not a random compendium, but rather create a coherent picture of a significant pivot in UK policy.

IV.              UK Israel-Palestine Policy, 2017 – The State of Play

The picture we have described above is compatible with our observations of the changes in UK policies in recent years:

A.              The professional echelons of the FCO, DFID and other organs of the UK government remain as informed, as engaged and as professionally driven as in the past.

B.              No formal, principled changes have taken place in regard to the core issues of the conflict: support for two states remains firm, as does opposition to settlements and concerns about the aberrations of occupation.

C.               That said, policy changes emanating from the most senior governmental echelons have led to a significant reduction in the level of UK engagement in Israel-Palestine issues, including those related to the peace process and, when warranted, this has been replaced, in large part, by a focus on the bi-lateral UK-Israel relationship. The UK increasingly avoids adversarial engagement with the Government of Israel regarding policies and acts that are in violation of long-standing UK positions.

D.              The bi-lateral refocus of UK policies strengthens Netanyahu in his assertions that Israel need not address the issues relating to settlements and occupation order to have normalized relations with the  rest of the world, and that settlements may be expanded, and occupation perpetuated, with little or no consequences in Israel’s bilateral relations with its allies.

E.              At a time when civil society is under assault in Israel, the UK has scaled back its support of NGOs, including those watchdog organizations struggling to keep the prospect of a two-state outcome alive. The UK has distanced itself from its remaining support by outsourcing it to non-governmental third parties.

F.              UK’s growing reluctance to seriously engage on Israel-Palestine issues makes it difficult to cobble together a unified, coherent EU position, precisely at a time when such coherence is essential to maintain stability, and the very credibility of a two state solution.

G.              As noted above, in the past, joint engagement by the key EU member states in preventing devastating events – E-1, Givat Hamatos etc. – has proven to be effective. It is doubtful that such “acting-in-concert” is possible today – precisely at a time when the prospect of such schemes being implemented are becoming more likely.

V.              The View from the Trenches

I belong to the minority of Israelis who view the perpetuation of occupation as the greatest existential threat to the long-term viability of the Zionist enterprise in this generation – a view recently articulated by the former head of our Mossad, Tamir Pardo. The only way of ending occupation – the two state outcome – is in grave jeopardy, placing the prospect of a secure, democratic and Jewish Israel at great peril.

Civil society in Israel is under assault, and those groups and individuals striving to create sober and pragmatic means to end occupation, and to mitigate its nastier manifestations in the interim, are beleaguered as never before. We would not be able to persist in our efforts without the support and cooperation of friends, in Israel and abroad. We have consistently found such partners in the government of the UK, not only here in Tel Aviv and East Jerusalem, but in London, New York, Washington, Brussels, Amman and beyond.

While these cooperative efforts with the professional echelons of Her Majesty’s government are intact, the departure from the traditional policies emanating from the senior political echelons in the UK been undermining the already beleaguered forces of moderation in Israel. Put bluntly, the UK policies are currently less helpful than in the past, and at times have made the challenges we are confronting more, rather than less daunting.

In order to make the necessary course correction, the UK needs not abandon its aspirations for good bi-lateral relations with Israel, nor turn its back on the special relations with the United States. The re-calibration we recommend would require critically re-engaging Israel in earnest on issues of vital concern to the UK – settlements, an increasingly aggressive occupation and steps that undermine the democratic character of Israel – without sacrificing an empathetic engagement with the Israeli public and the government it has elected. It would maintain close coordination with the United States, but without sacrificing Britain’s unique voice or independent judgment. It would not be oblivious to the tectonic shifts in the nature of the UKs role in Europe, but neither would it preclude ad hoc cooperation on key issues of mutual concern to the UK, the EU and key member states.

What we propose now is a return to policies and approaches that have traditionally characterized the UK’s positions on MEPP, which, if resumed, would best serve the interests not only of the UK, but of Israel and the Palestinians as well.

Daniel Seidemann has been a practicing attorney in Jerusalem and a partner in a firm specializing in commercial law since 1987. Since 1991, he has also specialized the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Jerusalem.

Mr. Seidemann, and his colleagues in the NGO he founded, Terrestrial Jerusalem, are frequently consulted by senior decision-makers and governmental bodies in Israel, Palestine and in the international community on matters pertaining to Israeli-Palestinian relations and developments in Jerusalem. He has been conducting ongoing discussions on Jerusalem issues within the Arab world and with Christian faith communities in North America and Europe. He has participated in numerous Jerusalem-related projects, colloquia and back channel work.

In 2010, he was awarded the title of honorary Member of the Order of the British Empire in recognition of his work in Jerusalem.