Written evidence from Middle East and North Africa Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (MEP0055)

 

Section One: Introduction

 

Section Two: The implications of the UK’s history in the region for UK policy.

 

Section Three: The merits of the UK’s policy in support of a two-state solution:

 

Section Four: The consequences of failure to progress towards and deliver a two-state solution, and possible UK policy responses.

 

Section Five: The UK’s relationship with Israel

 

Section Six: The UK’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the global Palestinian Diaspora

 

Section Seven: The regional context and the co-ordination of the UK’s policies with the international community.

 

Section Eight: How UK policy is influenced by other states and interested parties.

 

Section 9: Conclusion

 

 


Section One: Introduction

  1. The UK’s longstanding position on the Middle East Peace Process is clear and has not changed: to support a negotiated settlement leading to a safe and secure Israel living alongside a viable and sovereign Palestinian state; based on 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, Jerusalem as the shared capital of both states, and a just, fair, agreed and realistic settlement for refugees.
     
  2. We have set this position out in recent contacts, notably the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Israel and the OPTs on 7/8  March 2017 and the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary’s meetings with Prime Minister Netanyahu on 6 February 2017.
     
  3. The roots of this conflict are complex and run deep.  As a result there are numerous obstacles to a two-state solution, including continued settlement activity, terrorism, and incitement, and no single factor should be focused on as the reason for the lack of progress.  Overall, new impetus is certainly needed, and accordingly the Government welcomes President Trump's interest in working for a peace deal that meets the requirements of both parties.

Section Two: The implications of the UK’s unique history in the region for UK policy.

 

  1. The UK’s long history of engagement in the Middle East includes our significant role in the creation of the state of Israel and in supporting over several decades the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and working for a just and lasting peace.

 

  1. The Balfour Declaration ties Britain to the origins of the State of Israel. The original Palestine Mandate committed Britain to work for the establishment of a Jewish homeland but was silent on the political development of the Palestinian Arabs. UN Resolution 181, of 1947 which brought the mandate to an end, envisaged the partitioning of the mandate into two states, one Jewish and one Arab. 

 

  1. Today the Balfour Declaration remains a focal point of debate among both Israelis and Palestinians with considerable strength of feeling expressed by both communities. It is seen by many in the region as signifying HMG’s historical support for Jewish national aspirations, as well as the strong links between Britain and Israel. So, although it represents a positive factor in our relationship with Israel, the Declaration does remain a source of friction in Britain’s relations with its Palestinian and other Arab partners.

 

  1. It should be stressed that Britain’s history in the Middle East goes beyond the Balfour Declaration. Britain has a record of consistent engagement and a deeper understanding of the region and its politics than other leading nations.

 

Section Three: The merits of the UK’s policy in support of a two-state solution.

 

  1. The steps that the UK has taken to fulfil this policy.

 

  1. Helping promoting security and stability in the broader Middle East is a UK national interest.  The numerous current conflicts and tensions have repercussions well beyond the region and cause significant human misery and wasted potential.  These have many causes, but one of them is the unresolved conflict in Israel and the OPTs, so making progress here remains a priority for the UK. 

 

  1. For over 50 years UK policy has been to work for a settlement which provides both security for Israel within internationally recognised borders and justice for the Palestinians. After the Six Day War in 1967, the UK drafted and sponsored Security Council Resolution 242 which affirmed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every State in the area can live in security." That resolution has since become the foundation stone of subsequent efforts at achieving a peaceful solution, and the UK has continued to work for a settlement through the UN and other multilateral and bilateral channels. This has included behind-the-scenes work in the region and support for major initiatives such as the Camp David process and the Oslo Accords.

 

  1. Clearly the UK cannot deliver progress working alone. In particular, given the United States’ special role as guarantor of Israel’s security, any real progress towards a peace settlement is bound to involve the Americans.  We therefore make use of our close relationship with Washington to support and encourage progress on the MEPP.   We also support broader engagement through the UN system, through allies and partners in the region, and through the Middle East Quartet (the UN, US, EU and Russia), which was created in 2002 and which had former Prime Minister Tony Blair as its Special Envoy from 2007 to 2015. The Quartet has a particularly important role through its mandate to mobilise international assistance to the Palestinians and to develop plans to promote Palestinian economic development.  It also has an important role to play in bringing Israelis and Palestinians together as we seek to move the peace process forward. 

 

  1. The capabilities that the UK possesses to influence this outcome.
     
  1. The UK has a range of capabilities which we can deploy in support of a settlement:

 

  1. Political: We have a strong political relationship with Israel, with excellent levels of access.  Our Ambassador routinely sees Israeli Ministers and we also have good access to key ministries and Members of the Knesset.  Senior Israeli delegations regularly visit the UK and call on the Government. In February 2017 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited London and met the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and in March the Foreign Secretary visited Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. All these contacts enable continued exchanges of views on our respective analyses of the situation and current thinking on policy.

 

  1. We also have frequent and high-level contact with the Palestinians. Senior UK visitors to Israel usually spend half their time in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).  This gives us regular, high-level access into the Palestinian Authority.  Senior Ministers see President Abbas, while junior Ministers see Prime Minister Hamdallah and other Palestinian ministers.  The British Consulate General in Jerusalem has better access than most other diplomatic missions in the OPTs, with relatively regular calls on top level decision-makers from the President down.  The Government has a policy of no contact with Hamas but we are able to see all four Gaza-based ministers of the Palestinian Authority (non-Hamas) as well as a range of Fatah PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council) members in Gaza.

 

  1. We have wide-ranging and effective networks with civil society and human rights organisations, as well as local diplomatic missions and international organisations. We are able to use these to act in concert with others and engage the right organisations for our project and human rights work. 

 

  1. Defence: The Defence Section of the Embassy has very good access to the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Israeli MOD which enables regular and effective political engagement with the COGAT (Coordination of Government Activity in the Territories).  We and Israel have well-established links in defence, intelligence and capability development, including an annual Defence Strategic Dialogue and a military dialogue with the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). 

 

  1. The British Support Team (BST) provides expertise, project management and mentoring to the PA Security Forces (PASF), as part of a US-led effort.  This gives the team tactical-level influence on PASF commanders, instructors and students.  The Senior British Officer has the lead liaison with the PASF, ensuring constant access to the Ramallah-based two-star service chiefs.  This gives us excellent insight into the status and politics of the security sector and (in conjunction with our contacts in the Ministry of the Interior) substantial influence over policy issues, in particular on coordination, training and personnel. 

 

  1. Development: The DFID Team in Jerusalem has built a strong dialogue with PA Ministries and the international development community. This network shapes priorities and has led to positive results e.g. agreement with the Israelis on Palestinian electricity debt, attention paid to fiscal leakages. The UK is one of the top western donors to the OPTs, providing £349 million in support of Palestinian development from 2011-15.  We have provided significant support to the PA, both direct financial aid and broader building capacity for reform, particularly on financial management. DfID’s membership of the cross-donor group, which coordinates humanitarian assistance from the international community, provides a concerted voice on core issues e.g. lobbying against demolitions/ illegal settlements. DFID also  co-Chairs (with the PA Ministries) the Security Sector and Public Administration Working Groups of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (a forum for international donors which meets annually under UN auspices). Section Six contains further detail on UK assistance to the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Diaspora.

 

  1. Other levers: Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority pay close attention to UK public statements on MEPP-related issues and as a result our declaratory diplomacy is perhaps more visible in this region than elsewhere.  Though statements do not often directly influence actions by the parties - e.g. Israeli settlement decisions – avoiding public comment could be perceived by both sides as tacit support for these policies.  Our aim is to maintain an objective approach to Israel and the Palestinians, condemning actions by either party which violate international law or make a peace settlement more difficult including  settlements, demolitions, and terrorism.

 

  1. EU policies to differentiate between Israel and the OPTs: In 2012 the EU agreed that all agreements between the State of Israel and the EU must indicate their inapplicability to the OPTs. This principle applies to all EU agreements and funding programmes, and these all now make a distinction between the State of Israel and Israeli settlements. In particular, products from settlements do not benefit from the current EU-Israel Association Agreement which governs EU (and hence British) trade with Israel, and in November 2015 the EU issued an interpretative notice advising Member States that products from Israeli settlements should be labelled as such, and not labelled as products of Israel. Such differentiation ensures that the privileges the EU affords Israel is not extended to its occupation of the OPTs. This principle of differentiation is also enshrined in the new UN Security Council Resolution 2334, agreed in December 2016.

 

  1. Impact of our positions in the UN and other international fora: The parties pay close attention to the voting positions of the UK in the UN system and multilateral fora generally. There is a disproportionate focus on Israel by many UN bodies (e.g. at this year’s Human Rights Council (HRC) session, five out of fourteen country resolutions concerned Israel).  We actively work to mitigate this, for example, e.g. shifting the EU position in 2013 to be silent during the HRC Item 7 General Debate on Israel, and at this year’s HRC signalling that we would vote against all future resolutions on Israel unless there were changes to handling.
     
  2. Equally the UN has an important role on signalling commitment to the international order and the principles of a possible MEPP settlement. This was most recently expressed through our vote for Security Council Resolution 2334, a resolution which both included calls to end incitement and terror and set out our long-held position that Israeli settlement activity is illegal and undermines the viability of a two-state solution. 

 

  1. Finally, there are a number of campaigns calling for boycotts of Israel. The British Government has made its position on boycotts clear.  While we do not hesitate to express disagreement with Israel whenever we feel it necessary, we are firmly opposed to boycotts.  We believe that imposing sanctions on Israel or supporting anti-Israeli boycotts would not support our efforts to progress the peace process and achieve a negotiated solution. For that reason we oppose the Boycotts, Sanctions and Divestment (BDS) movement.

 

  1. The viability and potential opportunities of a two-state solution. The obstacles to the achievement of a two-state solution.
     
  1. For over 70 years, the international community has pushed for the partition of the territory that made up Mandate-era Palestine, considering it the optimal way of addressing conflicting claims to the land. In recent decades, the dominant approach to partition has been the ‘two-state solution’, involving an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Despite strong differences of opinion on the detail of such a solution, there is considerable consensus on its broad contours. This is reflected in a large degree of international convergence, including from the US, the EU and, to some extent, the Arab League, on the broad outline of any eventual deal. And although their policies have tended to shift over time, it is also the official policy of both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority who have in the past entered into quite detailed negotiations on the basis of a two state model.

 

  1. Polling amongst both Palestinians and Israelis continues to show a fairly high level of support for a two-state solution in principle, though this may be partly because of a lack of faith in any alternatives. However, the longer agreement on a two-state solution remains elusive, the more momentum other options will gain.
     
  2. That is why a two-state solution has been the goal of all international efforts to promote a just and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians. We continue to believe that it remains the most viable and plausible option for a comprehensive and sustainable settlement. We also believe it is the best way to protect Israel’s Jewish and democratic character and realise Palestinian national aspirations. It would also deliver economic benefits: it is estimated (by the Rand Corporation) that a two-state solution would boost Palestinian GDP per capita by 36% and Israeli by 5% by 2024.
     
  3. That said, it is, of course, up to the parties to decide what sort of peace process they would be prepared to accept. However, until we see evidence that an alternative to a two-state solution would be acceptable to both sides, it makes sense to continue to work to promote a settlement within the two-state framework, however challenging that may be.

 

  1. The practical barriers to a two-state solution are significant and numerous but not insurmountable. The main barriers to achieving a two-state solution are political. The most important practical challenges relating to the ‘final status issues’ are:

Section Four: Consequences of failure to progress towards and deliver a two-state solution, and possible UK policy responses.

  1. Continuing failure to deliver progress towards final status negotiations brings various risks:
  1. That facts on the ground eventually preclude the possibility of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state. The recently increased pace of settlement, plans for new settlements deep in the heart of the West Bank, and (if they ever enter into force) moves to retroactively approve unauthorised settlement outposts all undermine the viability of the two-state solution. They could leave Palestinian Territory in the West Bank as a series of disconnected urban areas, not a contiguous State.
  2. That there is another upturn in terrorist violence. We welcome the reduction in the level of violence that has been seen in recent months, but remain deeply concerned about the risks of further waves of violence. The longer that there is a lack of progress towards a peace settlement, the greater the risk of another outbreak of violence, especially in Gaza.
  3. Increasing lack of trust and a hardening of positions on both sides as settlement activity continues and with abject conditions for many Palestinians, especially in Gaza, could encourage Palestinian opinion around more maximalist demands. Continued lack of progress on a peace process could fuel further radicalisation and violence and threaten the political legitimacy of moderates in the PA. Further incitement from elements on the Palestinian side would further erode trust within Israel.

Section Five: the UK’s relationship with Israel

 

  1. As the Prime Minister made clear on 6 February 2017, the UK is a “strong and close friend of Israel.” In the centenary of the Balfour Declaration, we value our contemporary relationship as well as the historic links.

 

  1. There is extensive contact between the countries at the political level: following his first visit this year, Prime Minister Netanyahu plans to visit Britain again in November 2017 as part of the commemorations to mark the 100th anniversary of the Balfour declaration.

 

  1. The Minister for Trade, Minister for the Middle East and Africa, Minister of State for Development and Minister for Transport also have plans to visit in the first half of 2017. We hope to hold our annual Strategic Dialogue with Israel (led by the FCO and Israeli MFA) in June 2017.

 

  1. There is also rich and extensive contact between our Parliaments: Speaker Bercow visited Israel and the OPTs 12-14 February, and there are numerous Parliamentary visits in both directions. In 2015, we established the UK-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Group.

 

  1. Bilateral ties between our countries are strong. Annual two-way trade in goods and services between the UK and Israel is worth more than US$6 billion.  2016 saw some record breaking deals announced, including a deal for Rolls Royce is to supply El Al with Trent jet engines for El Al’s new Dreamliner fleet, a deal worth £1 billion, and Elbit winning a £500m contract to deliver the UK Military Flight Training Systems programme.  The UK is the number one destination for Israeli Foreign Direct Investment in Europe. There are now more than 300 Israeli companies in the UK, creating thousands of UK jobs.

 

  1. Cooperation in science and academia is also growing strongly. UK-Israel tech relations are at an all-time high: through the facilitation of the UK-Israel Tech Hub, (a government backed body supporting collaboration between tech firms in the two countries) British and Israeli companies pursued over 80 innovation partnerships between British and Israeli companies, of which 29 have been concluded with total deal value of £62 million. The Tech Hub’s innovative model will soon be rolled out in a number of other countries under the Prosperity Fund.  Alongside this, the Britain-Israel Research and Academic Partnership (BIRAX) is a £10 million 5-year programme which funds cutting-edge collaborative research to tackle some of the world’s most challenging conditions and diseases. BIRAX will soon move on to the subject of ageing. Israel is a world leader on cyber, and UK Ministers and officials visit regularly to learn from Israeli best practice. DCMS are developing a £20m Cyber Security Schools programme, based on Israel's successful Magshimim programme.

 

  1. Beyond the immediate MEPP issue, the UK and Israel share many regional perspectives and face common challenges. We are united in our opposition to Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. We share a common enemy in Da’esh. And we have a shared interest in regional stability and counter-terrorism more broadly. 
     

Section Six: the UK’s relationship with the Palestinian Authority and the global Palestinian Diaspora

 

  1. The UK is a close friend of the Palestinian Authority. We enjoy a productive bilateral relationship, based on our support for a two-state solution, our development support to the Palestinian Authority and its state-building efforts, and our strong bilateral trade, educational and cultural links.

 

  1. At the political level, we engage closely with the PA, through Ministerial discussions, and the diplomatic work of the British Consulate General in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Mission to London. In October 2016, the Foreign Secretary met Palestinian Foreign Minister Dr Riyad al Maliki in London and he visited the OPTs in March 2017. Visits by the Minister for Trade, Minister for the Middle East and Africa, and Minister of State for Development are due to take place in the first half of 2017.

 

  1. The UK continues to be a strong supporter of and leading donor to the Palestinian Authority and its state-building efforts. The UK provided £349 million in support of Palestinian development from 2011-15 and provided over £72 million in 2015-16 to help build Palestinian institutions, deliver essential services and support economic development. We work in close consultation with the PA to ensure that our assistance is fully coordinated with the Palestinian National Policy Agenda. In 2016/2017 the UK provided £25 million to the PA to help to pay the salaries of up to 30,000 teachers, doctors, nurses, midwives and other essential health and education public servants in the West Bank on an EU vetted list. This will enable around 25,000 young Palestinians to get an education, provide up to 3,700 immunisations for children, and around 185,000 medical consultations this year.

 

  1. DFID’s financial assistance is accompanied by a package of technical assistance to help strengthen PA core state systems and build PA capability and accountability. The TA will focus on (i) public administration reform, including institution-building at the centre-of-government to strengthen policy, planning and communications, and strengthening of social sector line ministries to underpin improved service delivery; (ii) public financial management (PFM) reform to underpin fiscal stability, and reduce the fiduciary and corruption risks associated with financial aid; (iii) revenue reform, to strengthen tax enforcement and improve the business environment. 
  2. Within the security sector, the UK, in collaboration with the international community, has invested £17m since 2008 in professionalizing the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), in support of a two-state solution.  The UK support focuses on basic training and joint leader training and education in accordance with the rule of law. In collaboration with the team of the United States Security Coordinator, we support the training and education of 6,000 members of the Palestinian Security Forces annually and provide technical assistance to strengthen civilian oversight and accountability of the security forces.

 

  1. All this aims at supporting the viability of a future Palestinian state that can deliver services to its people and provide stability for both Palestinians and Israelis.  We already recognise that the PA has made important progress on state-building which has been well-documented by the IMF and the World Bank, which judged in 2011 that Palestinian institutions were ready for statehood, and we too also believe that the PA has the capability to run an effective, inclusive, and accountable state.  We continue to call on the Palestinian leadership to work towards genuine and democratic elections for all Palestinians, including local elections in both the West Bank and Gaza.  We support efforts by the PA to return to Gaza, to ensure that good governance is extended throughout the territory which will become a Palestinian State.

 

  1. Our policy on Hamas remains clear: Hamas must renounce violence, recognise Israel and accept previously signed international agreements.  Hamas must make credible movement towards these conditions, which remain the benchmark against which its intentions should be judged. Hamas’ military wing has been proscribed in the UK since 2001. The UK retains a policy of no contact with Hamas, in its entirety.

 

  1. Finally, there are a large number of Palestinian refugees from the 1947 and 1967 conflicts living throughout the wider Middle East as well as in the West Bank and Gaza. Many are living in very difficult circumstances and the UK provides support to them through a number of channels, the most significant being assistance routed through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The UK has been a long-term supporter of UNRWA, providing over £60 million in 2015/16 in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The UK’s funding has enabled UNRWA to provide basic education, access to health services, legal counselling and social safety net assistance for the poorest Palestinian refugees. This support has been aimed at advancing Palestinian refugees’ human development though some critics argue that UNRWA support has served to sustain a permanent refugee community which, if left to itself, might have integrated/settled permanently in the host countries in the region

 

Section Seven: The regional context and the co-ordination of the UK’s policies with the international community

 

  1. Helping to deliver a just and lasting peace could be transformational in our relationships in the region. Although some neighbouring states have taken in large numbers of Palestinian refugees, they have not always been fully integrated into their host states’ societies and economies, and can present a burden on hard-pressed government budgets.

 

  1. Arab governments have largely moved away from the rejectionist stances of the Cold War period and today take a more pragmatic approach to a peace settlement. The Arab Peace Initiative, for a regionally backed process under which Israel would be granted recognition and normalisation of relations as part of an overall settlement, was welcomed by the UK at the time and we continue to think this remains an important contribution to the peace process. Such a regionally-backed deal could be attractive to Israel given the significant economic and political opportunities it could unlock (e.g. exploitation of offshore gas). With our close relationships with important states in the region, we work to encourage such a regional approach to peace when the conditions are right.


Section Eight: How UK policy is influenced by other states and interested parties.

 

  1. The Middle East Peace process is, of course, an issue of considerable public, parliamentary and media interest and supporters of both Israel and the Palestinians have active and well-organised groups in the UK. We actively work to build an international consensus in support of the peace process and are keen both to explain its policy and to hear the views of others. It is therefore natural that Ministers and officials regularly meet with or correspond with such organizations, including Parliamentary groups as well as a range of support bodies and NGOs. However, our long-standing approach to the MEPP is founded on basic principles which are well settled (a secure Israel and a homeland for the Palestinians and a recognition that a peaceful settlement is strongly in the UK national interest).
     

 

Section 9: Recent Developments and UK engagement on the MEPP

 

46    We believe the best way to make progress towards peace is through a return to bilateral negotiations, which take account of and confront all of the obstacles to peace and legitimate concerns of both sides. For this reason, the UK government is working hard to encourage both Israelis and Palestinians to find common ground, preserve the viability of the Two-State Solution, and confront Hamas terror and incitement. We are committed to working with international institutions and actors to support the two-state solution, and are leading efforts for reform and balance in the international arena. We joined international partners in giving strong backing to the Quartet’s report in July 2016. In December 2016, we voted for UN Security Council Resolution 2334 that tackled settlements, incitement and terrorism. And, in recognition that the best way to make progress towards peace is through bilateral negotiations, we had particular concerns about the January Paris Conference which risked hardening positions just before the transition to a new US President. So we were represented only at official level and did not sign up to its communiqué. We are driving efforts to reform the UN Human Rights Council so that it becomes an impartial voice, helping support the two-state objective. We therefore put the body “on notice” this March, voted against the Syrian Golan resolution, while maintaining our 2016 voting pattern on the OPTs resolutions. We will continue to work with the parties, the US and other members of the international community to achieve a settlement.