Written evidence from Hugh Lovatt, Policy Fellow and Israel/Palestine Project Coordinator at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (MEP0024)
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- Executive Summary
- The two state solution remains the preferred outcome on both sides for resolving the conflict. However, the diplomatic path leading to such an end-game is increasingly eroding due to developments on the ground. Combined with the current diplomatic vacuum, this is empowering those who reject a two state approach and/or advocate alternative visions as a more realisable means of ending the conflict.
- In the short/medium term, the alternative to a two state solution will not be a one state solution, but the continued entrenchment of a one state reality through Israel’s prolonged occupation and creeping annexation of Palestinian territory. Absent any meaningful moves towards de-occupation it is doubtful whether the status quo put in place by the 1993 Oslo Accords can be maintained indefinitely without provoking a reaction on the Palestinian side.
- The absence of any realistic political horizon for Palestinian statehood, combined with Palestinian political fragmentation, represents a significant threat to long-term stability in the Occupied Territories and to Israel’s security. But as recent protests in the Palestinian territories have shown, the first target of Palestinian anger will likely be the Palestinian Authority, which is seen by many as the administrator of Israel’s occupation and a guarantor of the 1993 Oslo Accords.
- A new UK policy should take into account the emerging one state reality on the ground, acknowledging that while a two state solution may remain the desired outcome, negotiations alone will be insufficient to achieve this, absent efforts to create the political conditions necessary for their success. While continuing to defend the long term viability of the two state solution, HMG must put greater emphasis on de-occupation while tackling those factors that prevent the success of peace talks, and undermine the two state solution.
- Is the two state solution still achievable?
- A two state solution remains the preferred outcome for Palestinian and Israeli publics. A plurality of Palestinians continue to support a two state solution based on Israel’s withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. A majority of Israelis also support a two state solution in principle. Only a minority on both sides supports the idea of a binational one state solution.[1]
- Achieving a two state solution remains the goal of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). Since 1988, the PLO (as the internationally recognised representative of the Palestinian people) has become entwined with the drive for Palestinian statehood and the fulfilment of the two state solution as the means of ending Israel’s occupation. Pivoting to a one state solution would represent a Palestinian tabla rasa that would wind back the clock over twenty years, erasing the considerable progress achieved in terms of Palestinian institution building and international recognition of statehood. Neither the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah nor its public has shown any appetite for such a move, not least given the extensive system of international incentives that underpins Palestinian support for the current two state model.
- Even Hamas – traditionally one staters – has indicated willingness to accept a Palestinian state based on the pre-June 1967 borders. This policy shift is expected to be formalised shortly within a revised Hamas Charter that will accept non-violent struggle and remove previous anti-Semitic language. The expected election in April of a relatively moderate and pragmatic Politburo head would further consolidate Hamas’ shift.
- The Israeli government remains (nominally) committed to the vision of a two state solution. Increasing opposition to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state within the Israeli political system has not translated into increasing support for a one (binational) state solution that would give Israelis and Palestinians equal rights. Although the present Israeli government is unlikely to take meaningful steps to fulfil a two state outcome, it does have a vested interest in maintaining the vision of a two state process. This helps it retain a degree of Palestinian stability, deflect international criticism of its policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs), and acts as a fig leaf for a process of backdoor normalisation with Sunni Gulf states.
- However, the belief that Palestinian sovereignty through diplomacy is untenable will inexorably lead to growing popular support for other Palestinian liberation strategies. These could remain within a two state paradigm but place greater emphasis on a grassroots rights-based mobilisation, or alternatively could see armed confrontation as the most effective means for achieving statehood. A vanishing two state solution can also be expected to amplify Palestinian voices advocating for the establishment of a binational state centred on equal rights for all as the most realistic way of ending the occupation.
- Meanwhile, the disappearance of imminent political horizons for resolving the conflict has led to a convergence of voices on both the right and the left of Israeli politics in support of a “unilateral separation” from the Palestinians. This would formalise Israel’s hold over Area C (61 per cent of the West Bank) and allow for Palestinian self-governance in Areas A and B under continued Israeli security control. In effect, this would represent an entrenchment of the current reality and the fulfilment of long running Israeli policy objectives. This “end-game” for resolving the Palestinian issue was outlined in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 1993 book “A Place Among the Nations”.
- What are the obstacles to achieving a two state solution?
- A Broken Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). The MEPP that was born out of the 1993 Oslo Accords has proven unable to resolve the conflict or challenge those factors that undermine the prospect of meaningful negotiations and the viability of the two state solution. The MEPP is also faltering in its ability to manage the conflict, and maintain stability in the OPTs. Within the current political vacuum, in which a two state solution is receding from view, the MEPP in its Oslo configuration may now actually be doing more harm than good.
- Subsidising an unsustainable reality. British aid has been important in supporting Palestinian state-building and humanitarian assistance. Thanks to British funding, the IMF and World Bank have both declared Palestinian institutions to be “above the threshold for a functioning state”.[2] But in the absence of a realisable political objective, open-ended UK financial support is merely propping up an otherwise unsustainable reality. What progress has been achieved risks being undermined by the continuation of Israel’s occupation, and the limitations it imposes on Palestinian society. In addition, an excessive focus on support for Palestinian securitisation and security cooperation with Israel is having negative consequences on Palestinian democracy and plurality.
- Sustaining occupation. International engagement has established a system of incentives that underpins support on both sides for the Oslo MEPP model. Foreign aid to the PA has removed a large part of the financial and security burden that Israel, in its capacity as an occupying power, would otherwise have had to shoulder in administering the day-to-day lives of Palestinians. This has eliminated any financial incentives for Israel to end its occupation. Integrating the settlements into Israel’s socio-economic fabric has also generally caused few problems in its bilateral trade relations, which often encompass settlement entities or activities. Meanwhile, international engagement has given Palestinians and their leaders the trappings of statehood, but not brought them on-the-ground sovereignty.
- Negative political dynamics in Israel. According to Peace Now, there are approximately 585,900 Israeli settlers living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, representing around 7 percent of Israel’s population (585,900 settlers). However, despite representing only a small percentage of Israeli society, the settler movement exercises disproportionate political power within the Israeli Knesset and governing coalition. Furthermore, regardless of location or beliefs, few Israelis see resolving the Palestinian issue as a pressing issue. Given dynamics in the region and on the Palestinian side, Israelis favour a continuation of the occupation as the least bad option. The unconditional deepening of external ties with the UK and other states has further convinced Israelis that current policies can be sustained. Such perceptions will not change unless Israel’s aspirations, expectations, and understanding of the current reality are adjusted.
- Settlement building. Given the political climate in Israel, it is difficult to envisage any Israeli government stepping away from its active promotion of settlement expansion, let alone taking the measures necessary to achieve a two state solution in line with international (and Palestinian) expectations based on the 1967 Green Line. The growth of Israeli settlements (which control 42 per cent of the West Bank) and their absorption into Israel makes it increasingly difficult for any Israeli government to take steps that will be needed to allow for the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state: withdrawing from 95-98 per cent of the West Bank, and evacuating over 100,000 settlers.
- Palestinian political fragmentation and de-legitimisation. Absent any meaningful progress towards Palestinian sovereignty and de-occupation, the Palestinian political system is heading towards a moment of rupture. Palestinian politics remains characterised by deep fractures and growing tensions, as figures within the ruling-Fatah party position themselves for the anticipated succession to President Abbas. The ensuing crisis of legitimacy facing Palestinian leaders presents significant challenges in fostering the conditions necessary for a final status agreement, relaunching credible peace negotiations, and containing future rounds of instability. The UK and international community must share its part of the blame for this, given their rejection of free and fair elections in 2006 that saw the formation of a Hamas-led government under President Abbas.
- What should a new UK policy towards the conflict look like?
- The UK must recognise that the policies pursued over the last 20 years have only entrenched Israel’s occupation. Instead of more of the same, HMG should articulate a new set of policies better able to move the parties towards the end of occupation and conflict, and create the conditions needed for meaningful negotiations. A revised UK policy could include the following tenets:
- Continuing to defend the long term viability of a two state solution so long as both sides remain committed to this vision. HMG should continue defending the territorial basis for a future Palestinian state in line with international parameters by pushing back on Israeli attempts to erase the 1967 Green Line and to conflate Israel and the settlements at home and abroad.
- In doing so, HMG would be building on and re-affirming existing British practices of differentiating between Israel and the settlements within its bilateral relations. These are based on:
a) Domestic UK law. The UK has an obligation to protect its own domestic legal order from Israel’s internationally unlawful practices. Given the UK’s positions and commitments on the status and consequences of Israeli actions in international law, it is under an internal obligation to ensure that its actions do not confer recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Palestinian territory (including non-recognition of the validity of the settlement enterprise).
b) HMG policy. The British government has been constant in its view that Israeli settlements are illegal under international law, and that it does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over the OPTs.
c) FCO business guidance. The FCO warns UK businesses of clear risks related to economic and financial activities in the settlements given the fact that they are built on occupied land and not recognised as a legitimate part of Israel’s territory.
d) UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2334. The UK supported UNSCR 2334 in December 2016. Clause 5 of the Resolution calls on all states “to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967”.
- HMG commitment to two states and its position towards the settlements must be more fully reflected in the UK’s relations with Israel. By ensuring a more diligent exclusion of Israeli settlement entities and activities from its relations with Israel, the UK can better ensure these do not undermine its foreign policy objective of two states. This would constitute the fulfilment of Clause 5 of UNSCR 2334. Three possible steps include:
a) Identifying areas where UK law is deficiently implemented in relations with Israel. To this end, HMG could conduct an audit of existing UK-Israel agreements to ensure these exclude all settlement entities and activities. This would not constitute a boycott.
b) Ensuring that post-Brexit agreements negotiated with Israel include explicit territorial clauses limiting their applicability to within Israel’s internationally recognised pre-1967 borders. HMG should in particular ensure that any new UK-Israel Free Trade Agreement does not grant preferential tariffs to settlement products.
c) Ensuring that UK citizens and businesses act in full accordance with domestic and international law in their dealings with Israeli settlement entities, and enshrining current FCO business guidance into regulatory measures.
- Challenging Israeli cost/benefit calculations. Ultimately, it will have to be the Israeli public that decides to end the occupation. Allowing for the correct functioning of UK domestic law can help reveal to Israelis the difficulties in deepening (or simply maintaining) their external relations while expanding a settlement project that is not recognised by the UK. This is because Israel is in many cases required to exclude settlements entities in order to accommodate UK legal requirements, and continue accessing those aspects of its bilateral relations that it values. The alternative is to risk losing out on these relations altogether. By framing the negative implications of continued settlement activity, HMG can feed an Israeli debate over national priorities.
- Starting a conversation on alternative outcomes. Only Palestinians can choose how best to fulfil their right to self-determination. The disappearance of a two state solution will nevertheless produce policy challenges for HMG. Potential messaging could include:
a) Rejecting a 1.5 state outcome with unequal rights for Palestinian. Israeli leaders are using the diplomatic vacuum to kick Palestinian statehood into the long grass, while working to formalise Israel’s annexation of large settlement blocks in the West Bank. Such dynamics will stoke simmering instability in the Palestinian Territories, weaken the PA, and create a one state reality with unequal rights. Besides clearly stating its opposition to open-ended occupation and the entrenchment of a one state reality in which Israelis benefit from greater rights than Palestinians, HMG should actively work to disincentivise Israel’s illegal acquisition of Palestinian territory by supporting international accountability mechanisms.
b) Framing the consequences of a One State Solution (OSS). If the willingness and ability to achieve a two state solution no longer exists, then HMG should be explicit in indicating that the only acceptable alternative would be a one state solution with equal rights for all citizens. Such a warning would help frame the consequences that Israelis face, by highlighting the fact that undermining the potential for a Palestinian state jeopardises Israel’s Jewish and democratic character. Given that one state reality would turn the Jewish population into a minority, an Israel that encompasses a Palestinian majority could either be democratic, or Jewish, but no longer both.
c) Maintaining Israel’s obligations as an occupying power. Continued impasse in achieving a two state solution may lead Palestinians to demand equal rights within a binational state. However, pending a final agreement between Israel and the PLO and a formal end of conflict, HMG should continue to treat East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the West Bank as occupied territory. Removing the protections afforded to Palestinians under the law of occupation and relieving Israel of its responsibilities as an occupying power would otherwise risk accelerating a one state outcome in which a Jewish minority benefits from greater rights than a Palestinian majority.
- Rethinking UK aid policy. Dealing with the economics of the conflict is a vital ingredient in reaching a political solution. But such efforts should avoid the mantra of “economic peace” and instead support Palestinian economic sovereignty.
a) The litmus test for UK aid policy should be whether it supports Palestinian sovereignty or sustains Israel’s prolonged occupation. HMG should explore how aid can be shifted away from PA budgetary support and the promotion of an aid-dependent economy, in favour of Palestinian economic independence. This could include support for Palestinian accession to the WTO and revisions to the Paris Protocol, which has created a stunted Palestinian economy in the West Bank.
b) Action on the economic front cannot however become a substitute for political progress. The UK should use its leverage with Israel to ease restrictions on the Palestinian economy. HMG should in particular push Israel to allow Palestinian access to natural resources in Area C which could add a further 35 per cent to Palestinian GDP according to the World Bank, as well as to natural gas reserves in Palestinian territorial waters off the coast of Gaza.
- Supporting Palestinian reconciliation and democratic renewal. Conserving a credible Palestinian negotiating partner that is able to ensure broad-based buy-in for any future peace agreement – and maintain long-term stability – requires an inclusive Palestinian government, based on national reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. This is a process that must be owned and lead by the Palestinians themselves, but as a key donor to the PA, the UK has an influential voice in this conversation. As such, HMG should:
a) Push Israel to allow Palestinian elections in East Jerusalem and restore Palestinian national institutions there;
b) Leverage UK aid to the PA to promote more serious steps by President Abbas towards reconciliation with Hamas;
c) Re-assess HMG policy positions towards Hamas – prioritising its renouncement of violence and support for a two state solution as conditions for participation in Palestinian governance;
d) Provide re-assurances that a future Palestinian government of national unity supported by Hamas would not be boycotted, as happened in 2006, providing it adheres to the PLO platform.
About the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
ECFR is a pan-European think tank with its central headquarter in London and six national offices in Berlin, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw. It was established in 2007 by a council of fifty founding members, chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer, and Mabel van Oranje, with initial funding from George Soros’s Open Society Foundations, the Communitas Foundation, Sigrid Rausing, Unicredit and Fride. Inspired by the role American think-tanks played in helping the US move from isolationism to global leadership, ECFR’s founders set about creating a pan-European institution that could combine establishment credibility with intellectual insurgency. Today, it has over 50 staff from more than 20 countries, and receives funding from a wide range of charitable foundations, national governments (including HMG), companies and private individuals.
About Hugh Lovatt
Hugh Lovatt is Policy Fellow and Israel/Palestine Project Coordinator for ECFR's Middle East and North Africa Programme based in London. He co-authored ECFR’s influential 2015 report “EU Differentiation and Israeli Settlements”. He is regularly interviewed or quoted in international media, including by France24, Al-Jazeera, AFP, Reuters, and Newsweek. He previously worked as a researcher for International Crisis Group and as a Schuman Fellow in the European Parliament focussing on Middle-East policy. He also worked for the Aga Khan University’s Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations as an Arabic translator.
Hugh studied Arabic at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies at Exeter University as well as at the Institut Français du Proche-Orient in Damascus. He then went on to earn an MA in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, where he majored in Anthropology.