Written evidence from Transport for London (RLS0028)
1.1 Thank you for inviting us, as the Mayor of London’s integrated transport authority, to contribute evidence to this inquiry. Our purpose is to deliver the Mayor’s transport strategy and commitments to keep London moving, working and growing, and to make life in our city better. We reinvest all of our income to run and improve London’s transport services.
1.2 Safety and security are our top priorities across our network. Our rail services are very safe with millions of daily journeys completed without incident. The pressures placed on our services however have never been greater with over 4.8m passenger journeys taking place on the London Underground alone each day and 5.7m across London Overground, TfL Rail, Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and London Trams. London’s population is growing rapidly, at the same time our budgets are becoming tighter. Despite these pressures, the safety and security of our customers, the public, our staff and suppliers remains paramount.
1.3 In addition to answering the specific questions that the Committee raised with us, the submission presents our views on the current system of management, investigation, regulation, enforcement and policing to ensure the safety and security of passengers, workers and the public.
2.1 Our thoughts remain with those affected by the tragic tram derailment and we continue to do all we can to offer our support. To date, this support has been largely financial to cover funeral and other expenses, lost earnings, counselling and medical care.
2.2 The Sarah Hope Line is available for all those affected by this incident and is run by our specially trained staff who are able to provide practical and financial help. They can make referrals to partnering agencies offering support, counselling and trauma care depending on the needs of each individual case. The service is there for anyone who has been involved in, or affected by, a life-changing incident on our network.[1]
2.3 Through the Sarah Hope Line, we continue to encourage anyone requesting interim financial support, to lodge a formal claim. We are engaging proactively with the law firms representing the majority of claimants, to ensure that the arrangements and communication are as efficient as possible, including processing appropriate interim payments and referrals to counselling and therapeutic support quickly.
2.4 Following discussions with Insurers, liability has been admitted by Tram Operations Ltd (the operator of the service and a subsidiary of First Group plc) and Tramtrack Croydon Limited (our subsidiary) in relation to civil claims arising from the derailment and those people who have submitted claims have been informed accordingly. The Sarah Hope Line is also contacting claimants to inform them.
2.5 The investigations into the derailment are still underway and we continue to work with the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB). We will take on board all recommendations of the RAIB’s final report once it is published.
2.6 We also continue to work with the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) and the British Transport Police (BTP) to support their investigations and our own investigation is progressing. We will also take on board recommendations from these investigations once made.
2.7 A programme of work to install fixed chevron signs at four sites on the tram network with significant bends has been completed. Work is also underway to install lineside digital signs to complement the chevrons and will warn drivers of the approaching speed limit.
2.8 We are exploring the development of in-cab systems for monitoring and managing speed, including a Tram App for drivers to provide live tracking and speed warnings.
2.9 We also working with Tram Operations Ltd to monitor the enhanced driver management arrangements that it has put in place. These include a more frequent programme of speed checks; briefings on fatigue management; accompanied driving through the area of the derailment where requested; and counselling.
2.10 In addition, we held a trams summit on 24 January 2017 with tram operators from the UK and Europe and industry bodies, to explore the systems and regimes applied elsewhere to monitor and manage speed. The best practices identified at the summit are being used to inform our response to the Sandilands derailment.
3.1 We are determined to maintain our record as one of the safest railway operators in the world. Against a backdrop of increasing demand, our safety record has improved significantly over the past twenty years through a clear focus on areas of risk and action taken to manage the movement of customers through our stations and onto our trains, as well as increases in capacity to accommodate larger numbers.
Stations and trains
3.2 As well as managing congestion on a day-to-day basis, we are delivering a number of significant infrastructure projects to increase capacity on our network in one of the biggest capital investment programmes in the world.
These include:
3.3 Looking further ahead, Crossrail 2 is required not just to unlock future growth, but to keep London’s transport system moving as demand for services continues to increase. Without urgent action, in the coming years sections of the Northern and Victoria lines are predicted to become so overcrowded that in the morning peak, five people will have to squeeze into every square metre of Tube space. Crossrail 2 will prevent this from happening.
3.4 In addition, many Tube and rail stations will become so overcrowded that they will frequently need to be closed to new passengers at busy times. Crossrail 2 will stop this from being required at five of the six busiest rail stations, including Waterloo, Euston and Victoria – keeping London moving.
Crowd management and congestion control
3.5 We have well-rehearsed procedures in place to manage crowds within stations and to prevent dangerous overcrowding. Our stations have local control plans which cover congestion management, evacuations and emergency response/incident management arrangements. These plans are reviewed regularly to ensure they remain robust and up-to-date.
3.6 Our station control measures can involve temporarily preventing customers from entering the station because of crowding. This involves keeping the station open for exit and interchange while managing the flow of customers to maintain a safe and reliable service. Temporary station controls normally last only a few minutes and other entrances often remain available during that period for customers to use.
3.7 We apply these station control measures in order to manage risks in other parts of the station, for example, holding people at the gateline to ensure platforms, escalators, stairs or other parts of the station do not become too overcrowded and/or become a safety risk.
3.8 However, even with these controls in place, customer accidents do occur on our rail network. Accidents at the Platform-Train Interface (PTI), the gap that customers must cross between the platform edge and train, and on escalators and stairs account for the majority of these accidents and the most serious injuries often occur in these areas. We have robust systems in place, however, to minimise these risks including the following improvement programmes:
Safety on escalators and stairs
3.9 The greatest proportion of customer accidents on the Underground happen on escalators – approximately 40 per cent of all accidents (approximately 1,000 accidents each year out of approximately 1.3bn journeys).
3.10 Many of these accidents are relatively minor, but some are more serious and we are working to ensure that we take all practical action to reduce the likelihood of our customers having an accident. There are fewer escalator-related incidents on the Overground and DLR as they have fewer escalators.
3.11 Our analysis of customer accidents indicates that few escalator accidents are due to crowding. The majority are associated with customers being overburdened, e.g. with luggage, who are rushing, and who are under the influence of alcohol.
3.12 As many of the customer accidents on escalators result from customer behaviour, our escalator safety initiatives focus on messages which will reduce the likelihood of accidents. In 2015-2016, we trialled 12 initiatives on the Underground aimed at reducing customer accidents with a view to understanding which initiatives had the most effect on customer behaviour.
3.13 Some of the messages are explicit (e.g. encouraging customers to ‘Hold the handrail’), while others are more subtle (e.g. red markers at the entrance/exit of the escalator to highlight the approach/exit). A number of the successful initiatives are now being introduced at other Tube stations and lessons learned have been shared more widely across the UK rail industry.
3.14 Our escalators are built to high standards – very few of the accidents result from faults with the escalator. We have signs highlighting appropriate behaviour at the top and bottom of escalators and a number of safety posters around the network.
3.15 We have standards for our stairs to make sure they are well lit, clean and have handrails for example.
Step-free access
3.16 We are also increasing accessibility to many of the stations across our network. Through the Step-Free Access Programme, many Underground and Overground stations have had lifts installed to provide a safer route between levels for customers who may be more vulnerable on stairs e.g. those with mobility issues, carrying luggage or children. Over the next five years, some £200m will be invested to make over 40 per cent of Tube stations step-free, which is an increase from 26 per cent currently.
3.17 We also apply our high standards to newly acquired stations. Since the Liverpool Street to Enfield Town, Cheshunt and Chingford routes became part of the Overground, we have carried out improvement works to platforms, stairs and station facilities to improve accessibility. As we improve White Hart Lane station, for example, we will improve access from street level to the platforms, including new lift access and new platform canopies.
Platform-train interface
3.18 We pay close attention to ensuring we effectively manage customer safety at the platform-train interface (PTI). We clearly define the platform edge using white and yellow lines. We have ‘Mind the Gap’ visual and audible warnings, Train Operator mirrors and CCTV and closing door audible alarms. In some locations, we have extra controls - under platform lighting, floor vinyls and barriers at platform entrances to discourage customers from rushing or to guide them to parts of the platform with smaller gaps, door sensors and Platform Edge Doors.
3.19 We have changed the layout of some of our stations where we think this can influence customer flow and positioning. Our station staff play an important role in reminding customers to take care when boarding and alighting from our trains and are responsible for ensuring that the train can safely depart from the platform.
3.20 We have also trialled new approaches such as installing blue lights along the platform edge at Baker Street station and realigning nosing stones at a number of platforms to reduce the gap between the train and the platform.
3.21 Both approaches have clear PTI strategies which set out how this risk is managed and plans to further improve how we manage this risk. Not all PTI customer incidents result in an injury, however, with almost half of all incidents reported involving no injury to the customer.
3.22 Lessons learned have been shared more widely across the UK rail industry and, working in collaboration with the Railway Safety Standards Board, form the UK’s Platform-Train Interface Strategy.
General crime
4.1 We make a significant investment – over £70m - in transport policing services provided by the BTP for the Underground, DLR, London Trams, Overground, TfL Rail and priority areas of the suburban rail network. Our funding accounts for around a quarter of the BTP’s total national policing budget.
4.2 Our public transport system remains a safe, low crime environment. However, following ten years of sustained crime reduction and 2014/15 having the lowest crime levels on record, we saw an increase in crime on the network in 2015/16 with a further increase seen in 2016/17.
4.3 As confirmed by the BTP, the increases are largely driven by changes in the reporting and recording of certain offences – namely violence against the person and sexual offences. This trend reflects wider increases seen across London and the UK generally, as well as our efforts and those of the BTP to encourage customers to report offences, such as unwanted sexual behaviour and hate crime, and to make it easier for them to do so. Sexual offences, violence against the person and public order offences account for around 45 per cent of crime on our rail networks.
4.4 The increase in the number of reported sexual offences is considered to be a positive outcome from Project Guardian. A ground-breaking initiative to tackle unwanted sexual behaviour on public transport in London, Guardian was launched jointly in July 2013 by the TfL, BTP, City of London Police and the Metropolitan Police Service.
4.5 The partnership has been working to increase confidence in the reporting of sexual offences (a crime that is widely recognised as being under-reported across society), reduce the risk of becoming a victim, challenge unwanted sexual behaviour and target offenders. The high profile ‘Report It to Stop It’ communications campaign is running in parallel with ongoing, targeted police activity and investigation of these offences.
4.6 The increase in violence against the person incidents is largely due to an increase in low level violence, most commonly pushing and shoving at busy commuter times when services are at peak capacity. Common assault makes up the majority of recorded offences.
4.7 The sporadic and spontaneous nature of offences makes it difficult to predict and target them effectively through police and enforcement activity alone. We are working with the BTP to develop a problem-solving approach to deal with violence against the person with targeted action plans focused on transport hubs which have seen the largest volume of offences.
Terrorism
4.8 The Underground is a high profile, open, crowded and economically critical transport network. In common with other crowded places across the UK, it is likely to remain a potential target as long as this challenge exists.
4.9 Our ability to manage this risk relies on measures embedded in regulations set by the Department for Transport (DfT), which carries out compliance activity to ensure that necessary standards are being met.
4.10 Our front line staff have an important role to play, such as regular station checks and using the HOT protocol to handle suspicious items.[2] Poster campaigns ask customers to be vigilant and report anything suspicious. We also seek to design risk out by using safer specifications of glass and construction methods to reduce the potential for concealment and the consequence of blast. In addition, we have CCTV on every station and on many trains as well as BTP officers patrolling the network.
4.11 As has been underlined by the terrible incident in Westminster recently, the UK continues to face a severe threat. We maintain a constant readiness to respond and to do everything possible to protect people from risk. Our front line staff all have access to radios with emergency facilities that can let them summon help when required or request an adjustment to our operations.
4.12 We have a 24/7 incident management capability in place with a nominated senior manager co-located with the BTP Control Room, ready to take the lead in an incident and to coordinate evacuation and joint working with the emergency services and other agencies across London. We have a Director-led Major Incident Command Group which can mobilise to ensure strategic safety objectives are met.
4.13 We work closely with a range of other organisations to ensure we are equipped with up-to-date knowledge. We develop our arrangements with the DfT and BTP and take part in joint exercises. We are expanding our own programme of exercises and involve relevant front line people and those in command and control roles so that they can develop and practise the required skills and knowledge. In addition, we have worked with the BTP to introduce armed police officer patrols on the network.
5.1 The increase in retail facilities at some stations, particularly mainline termini over recent years, has clearly made these locations better for customers. Those who work in shops and restaurants will also be able to add the informal surveillance that can help rail staff and police keep these places safe.
5.2 Although our stations tend have less space for such activities, we do have our own programme of expanding the facilities we provide for our customers. Through our close working with the BTP, we are aware that there can be an increase in certain crime types such as retail theft. Our crime prevention specialists work alongside our commercial department to ensure that advice in preventing crime can be considered as part of building and operating these facilities.
5.3 We successfully introduced the Night Tube on five lines last year (Central and Victoria in August, Jubilee in October, Northern in November and Piccadilly in December). Usage has been above our initial forecasts – around 3.9m journeys since the new service was launched. In addition, it has been estimated that more than 2,000 permanent jobs will be supported by the Night Tube.
5.4 There has been a positive knock-on effect to the local area around bus stops and on night buses, with a reduction in crime close to stations since they opened for Night Tube services. This is attributed to customers having shorter waiting time for transport.
5.5 We worked in great detail on the safety and policing aspects of the Night Tube, including identifying any problems that could arise, and putting robust plans in place to make sure the service works well for customers and local communities. This included working with our policing partners. More than 100 BTP officers are on patrol when the Night Tube is in operation.
6.1 We would work within whatever regulatory system was in place for managing safety on the railway (including the mainline railway and the non-mainline/light railway). The existing regulatory framework sets out clear requirements and provides the ORR – our health and safety regulator – with appropriate powers to advise, guide or, where required, instruct or prohibit activities on the railway.
6.2 Having a single health and safety regulator for the railways managed and operated by us is an effective and efficient approach, which promotes consistency and the sharing of lessons learned and good practice. The ORR has a single, dedicated TfL team focused on health and safety.
6.3 This regulatory framework requires our railways to hold a Safety Authorisation and/or a Safety Certificate. The arrangements for managing safety risks are set out in our safety management systems, which define health and safety roles and responsibilities; set arrangements for safety mechanisms; involve workers in the process and ensure continuous improvement. These systems are reviewed regularly.
6.4 These powers provide us with an independent view of our arrangements. Inspectors also investigate complaints from employees, contractors and members of the public on a variety of issues. The ORR’s TfL team does this across all of our railways. We have a close working relationship with the regulator where we aim to be transparent and open – proactively informing it when we have issues, as well as when we have taken positive steps to improve health and safety.
6.5 The ORR has a TfL Intervention Plan which sets out key areas of focus for our organisation. The Plan’s focus is on the issues of highest priority across our railways. These are currently escalator safety; the safe introduction of the new rolling stock on the District, Circle and Hammersmith & City lines; Train Operator competency at TfL Rail, and health and safety monitoring at the DLR.
6.6 We also work closely with the ORR with respect to the incident investigation progress and responding to actions arising from Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) reports. We are committed, for example, to act on all of the RAIB’s findings for the Sandilands tragedy, as mentioned earlier. We value the independent scrutiny that the current regulatory framework provides.
7.1 We have established strategic and tactical Health, Safety and Environment improvement plans. These include how we ensure our staff and contractors can work safely in a railway environment and/or on railway projects. The focus of these improvement plans varies across the railway, e.g. workplace violence is a high priority for our stations teams, while safe access to the track environment is a priority for our maintenance teams.
7.2 Our improvement plans take into account the 12 priorities contained with the rail industry’s health and safety strategy: Leading Health and Safety on Britain's Railways. This was developed by leaders from across the rail industry, including us, to provide a framework for the collaborative improvement of health and safety performance. We are tracking measureable and achievable targets for each and progress is monitored by the senior teams within our organisation.
7.3 We have a legal duty to manage fatigue for safety critical staff who work on the railway. Our policy in this area sets out specific requirements for managing fatigue of both safety critical staff and non-safety critical staff and is based on guidance from the ORR. We provide advice and support to local managers and staff about how fatigue can be managed effectively, particularly for those who work shift patterns/at night. In addition, we carry out checks, inspections and audits, of our own management teams and of suppliers.
7.4 The Sentinel scheme, also used by Network Rail, is applied to the management of contractors undertaking construction work on the Tube and on our projects that take place on Network Rail infrastructure. The scheme is the mechanism by which authorised parties are confirmed as ‘fit to work’ i.e. competent to undertake their allocated tasks and suitable rested ahead of working on the railway. As such it is a key safety control for our contracted workforce. We are at present evaluating its wider implementation across our organisation.
Suicide prevention
8.1 Suicides on our rail network are thankfully rare and the number of incidents is stable or declining, even though the number of passenger journeys overall is increasing. Each is a tragic event for the person involved and for their family and friends. They are also traumatic for members of the public who witness them and for our staff and the emergency services who respond to them.
8.2 The availability of well-trained staff at our stations is central to our suicide prevention strategy. Our Underground and Rail stations are staffed throughout the hours they are open to the public and almost all are gated to prevent unauthorised access. CCTV coverage is extensive and customer help points are widespread.
8.3 We work closely with other organisations involved in this field, including the BTP, Network Rail, train operators, health authorities and the Samaritans. We established a fixed-term contract with the charity, for example, to deliver a series of one day training courses for our Underground station staff. Seven hundred staff participated in these courses, which were designed to equip them with the knowledge to identify a potentially vulnerable person and then to safely intervene. The contract also delivered a guide which we distributed to all station staff.
8.4 Following this, we have worked with the Samaritans to develop a video-based learning tool that can be an additional means of ensuring our people have the right knowledge and skills to help prevent suicide on the network. This video describes the techniques that can be used along with real life staff talking about how they have intervened successfully.
8.5 Our submission to the Health Select Committee’s inquiry into suicide prevention provides more information about our work in this area.[3]
Managing trespass
8.6 Trespass is fundamentally dangerous, aside from the risk to the trespasser, there are consequential risks to staff who respond to incidents. Trespass can also be a cause of significant disruption for our customers. The design and management of our infrastructure (ticket gates, clear signage on platforms, tracks have effective lineside perimeters and depots having high standards of fencing) means that accidental trespass is very unlikely.
8.7 We have identified a series of interventions for preventing and responding to trespass. The presence of police on our network and of our staff at all Underground and Overground stations from the first to last train provides a robust visual deterrent to trespass, as well as the ability to respond, report and escalate incidents as required. As mentioned earlier, front line station staff and train operators have radio access which allows them to report any incidents of trespass and ensure a safe response. In emergency situations they can also instantly contact with the relevant control centre. Customer help points can also be used by customers to report cases of trespass.
8.8 We ensure our physical barriers are regularly inspected, well maintained and include a high standard of perimeter fencing.
8.9 We use targeted campaigns to influence the behaviour of people who may trespass and warn customers of the dangers of encroaching into operational areas. For example, our most recent poster campaign discouraged customers from attempting to retrieve property dropped on the track. In addition to this, our schools programmes help young people understand how to safely travel around the Capital. A free presentation is available for all London primary schools and around 20,000 secondary school pupils participate in our programmes each year.
8.10 We also use technology to prevent trespass. CCTV at stations is a deterrent and supports incident management and criminal investigation. In high risk areas intruder alarms, motion sensing detectors and CCTV cameras link to Line Control Centres to allow a swift response to incidents.
8.11 To identify any further risk control measures, we are planning to review our most recent data to further understand the causes and motivations of trespass. Trials of enhanced signage on platforms appear to reduce the numbers of incidents and we are analysing the results of the trials and identifying options for further improvements. Reducing trespass forms part of our strategic improvement plans.
March 2017
[1] https://tfl.gov.uk/campaign/incident-support-service
[2] The HOT procedure is based on the premise that unattended items are not Hidden and are found in public areas in plain view; not Obviously suspicious; and are Typical of what is regularly encountered. All our front line staff are trained to use the HOT procedure.
[3] http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/health-committee/suicide-prevention/written/41249.html