Written evidence from Martin Linton (MEP0016)

Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. My evidence is summarised in these 12 points and briefly explained below:

1. The solution to the conflict is known to both sides.
2. It can be achieved if sufficient pressure is applied.
3. The US is neither willing nor able to apply the pressure.
4. The EU has enough bargaining power but will not use it.
5. The UK is the country best placed to take the lead.
6. It should do so in interests of both Israel and Palestine.
7. It has taken some small steps in the right direction.
8. In the last three months it has started backtracking.
9. ‘Marking’ Balfour will add further incitement.
10. Palestinians are a problem, but not the problem.
11. The problem is Israeli impunity and Western weakness.
12. We need a strategy of incremental pressure.

1: The solution to the conflict is known to both sides.

The solution has been known for 25 years: two states based on pre-67 borders with agreed adjustments, with Jerusalem as the capital of both, negotiated compensation or return for refugees. It’s true that some Palestinians, and a tiny number of Israelis, (and probably most people in this country) would prefer a one-state solution where everyone has a vote. But this is not on offer. Nor is it ever likely to be. The choice is between two states and one state where most Palestinians do not have the vote - for the Palestinians a choice between independence and apartheid. (If the word ‘apartheid’ seems too crude, read the footnoted article[i].)

2: It can be achieved if sufficient pressure is applied.

The main physical obstacles to a two-state solution are the 150 Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Indeed they were built for the very purpose of being obstacles[ii]. But the West Bank settlers account for less than 5% of Israel’s population. Most live there only because of the subsidised housing and would prefer to live in Israel. The minority are religious settlers and the Netanyahu government is dependent on their support, but other governments would not be. Some fear that economic pressure would be counterproductive, but on the only occasion it was used, it worked. President George Bush (Snr) threatened to withhold US loan guarantees if Israel did not freeze settlement building and attend the Madrid peace talks in 1991. They did.

3: The US is neither willing nor able to apply the pressure.

Although President Bush’s threat worked, Bill Clinton accused him of being ‘anti-Israel’ and this undoubtedly contributed to his defeat in the 1992 presidential election.  Since then no American president has used economic pressure against Israel.  They have all condemned Israel’s settlement policy but continued to give Israel military aid of about $3½ billion a year. AIPAC, the main Israel lobby in the US, with an annual budget of $500 million, has been very successful in ensuring that most people elected to Congress are unquestioning supporters of the Israeli government – to the extent that they gave Netanyahu 30 standing ovations during his speech on Capitol Hill.

4: The EU has enough bargaining power but will not use it.

The EU is Israel's largest trade market and accounts for about a third of Israel's total trade. But Israel’s trade amounts to only 0.8 % of the EU total, so Brussels is in a very strong negotiating position. As a result the Israeli government is very sensitive to any threat to its trade with the EU. Even simple labelling rules issued by the EU in November 2015 requiring settlements goods to be labelled as such caused an “explosion” in Israel. The EU is a constant critic of settlement building, of house demolitions and of abuses of human rights. It is also the biggest financial contributor to the Palestinian Authority. Yet it rarely uses its negotiating position to bring about what it says it wants. Unanimity is required on major foreign policy issues and usually at least one country will block action against settlements.

5: The UK is the country best placed to take the lead.

Faced with the situation in the West Bank and Gaza, some UK politicians will say “it’s none of our business”.  Some will say “it’s awful, but there’s nothing we can do”.  Both are wrong. Issues like human rights are everybody’s business, including the UK’s. And the UK is better placed than almost any other country to do something about it.

This is not based on the argument that Britain has a special responsibility because of the Balfour Declaration (see below) and the British Mandate.  It is a conclusion reached by a process of elimination. The Palestinians, alone, cannot do it. Israel sees it as against its interest. The US, despite Trump’s desire to “do the ultimate deal”, is unlikely to do it. The EU will never agree.

For years the UK has hidden behind US inaction and EU indecision, but those excuses have gone. The only countries that command sufficient trust on both sides and sufficient authority to restart the peace process are the major European powers, the UK, France, Germany. The French tried to do it, but their initiative was undermined by the UK’s boycott of the Paris peace conference (see below).  The Germans feel unable to take a lead on this issue.  The only way forward is for the UK to take the lead.

6: It should do so in interests of both Israel and Palestine.

The advantage of a UK or UK-French initiative is that it could take a wider perspective on the conflict – presenting it not as the Israelis versus the Palestinians but as a search for peace and security in the interests of both countries and of the whole world.  Given the extent to which the Israel-Palestine conflict poisons the well of international relations and fans the flames of radicalisation,  it should not be difficult to make the case that a solution is in Israel’s interests too.

Obviously the Israelis and Palestinians will have to sit down at the same table and negotiate the details – no one can do that for them – but it is the right and duty of the international community to ensure that the conflict is resolved within the framework of international law.

7. It has taken some small steps in the right direction.

In November 2011 the  Foreign Secretary William Hague accepted that Palestine was ready for statehood and that, in principle, the UK should recognise Palestine, but that we should wait for the right moment: “We reserve the right to recognise a Palestinian state bilaterally at a moment of our choosing and when it can best help bring about peace.”

There have been many possible “right moments” - when the Kerry talks broke down in April 2014, when the House of Commons voted by 274-12 in favour of recognition in October 2014, when Sweden became the 136th country to recognise Palestine in October 2014, when France said it would recognise Palestine within a year in January 2016 – but every opportunity has been spurned.

In December 2013 the Foreign Secretary issued revised guidance on the Overseas Business Risk Register that "we do not encourage" firms to trade with illegal settlements and "we do not offer support" to firms that do. This was a very small step.  But it was a step on the right road.     

8. In the last three months the UK has started backtracking.

Two days before Christmas 2016 the United Nations Security Council voted 14-0 in favour of a resolution on Israeli settlements, describing them as a ‘flagrant breach’ of international law and calling for a total freeze. The UK played a leading role in persuading President Obama to lift his veto so that the motion could pass. But five days later – on December 28 – Theresa May issued a statement from Downing Street criticising a speech by the US Secretary of State John Kerry for focusing too much on settlements – implicitly distancing herself from the resolution. 

On January 10 Boris Johnson told the Commons the UK would be represented at the Paris peace conference. But when the peace conference took place five days later neither Boris Johnson, nor his junior minister, nor the ambassador was there, only an official who could not sign the communiqué.

On February 21 Boris Johnson appeared to reverse three more long-standing UK positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict, calling for negotiations “without preconditions” (which would allow the Israelis to continue building illegal settlements while talks are in progress), blaming the Palestinians for not “committing to dialogue” (as opposed to blaming both sides) and arguing that trade with illegal Israeli settlements was the best way to support the Palestinian economy (we do not encourage trade with the settlements and we do not believe that it helps the Palestinian economy - as a 2013 World Bank report showed, occupation costs Palestine’s economy $3.4 billion or 35% of gnp).

9. ‘Marking’ Balfour will add further incitement.

For Palestinians, already reeling from a series of U-turns by the new May government, the sense of betrayal will be complete if the Foreign Office goes ahead with plans to mark the centenary of the Balfour Declaration in November 2017.

Palestinians blame Balfour for everything that has happened to them in the last 100 years, the mass expulsions, the land seizures, the well-documented massacres[iii], the occupation – even though in fact he only promised to support a Jewish homeland in Palestine insofar as it could be achieved without “prejudicing the civil and religious rights” of the existing Palestinian population.

This promise was broken, not kept. No one could argue that the creation of the Israeli state, however laudable it may be considered in isolation, was carried out without prejudicing the rights of Palestinians. If the Government goes ahead with plans to involve the Prince of Wales and Benjamin Netanyahu in an event to ‘mark’ this broken promise it will be seen as a huge incitement and the most insensitive act since the British Raj sparked off the Indian Mutiny in 1857.

10. Palestinians are a problem, but not the problem.

Nothing in this evidence is intended to deny that Palestinians can make things worse for themselves or to imply the Israelis are always to blame. Fatah and Hamas are both very old-fashioned organisations. Corruption has not been fully dealt with. Both have fallen into the bad habit of postponing elections they don’t think they can win. Accusations abound of the abuse of legal process and human rights.

It is also true, as Lord Alderdyce has argued, that the onus falls on the Palestinians to create the conditions and build the coalition for peace. History shows that the occupier never gives away power. It is for the it is for the occupied to win power back. But we should remember that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation renounced violence in 1988 and recognised Israel as a sovereign state occupying 78% of historic Palestine (including more than half the land that the United Nations had promised to the Palestinians). The Palestinians have made their historic compromise. They have said they will accept just 22% of the original country.

When the last round of peace talks collapsed in April 2014, John Kerry make it clear when he was being questioned at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Netanyahu caused the collapse when he approved 700 new illegal settlements and failed to honour the deal to release the last batch of prisoners. It is still the Israeli government that is refusing to engage seriously in the peace process.  President Abbas has made it clear he will resume talks “the minute” the Israelis agree to honour the deal and stop building settlements.

11. The problem is Israeli immunity and Western weakness.

For twelve years since the death of Yasser Arafat, President Mahmoud Abbas has pursued a dual strategy of non-violent protest at home backed by international action. Whatever people think about his policies at home – and he has many critics – he has been let down badly by the international community who fail to follow the logic of their own policies. When there is no effective international action, this effectively hangs moderate Palestinian politicians like Mahmoud Abbas out to dry. His strategy is rendered ineffective, his authority undermined, his political enemies vindicated.

The UK government makes frequent condemnations of settlements and demolitions, but these are empty phrases now. If one condemns something often enough without taking action against it, then it is a fair deduction that one does not really mean it. This is the deduction that the Israelis have made. When the Israeli ambassador is called in to the State Department to hear protests about new settlement approvals, they say: “We know they don’t really mean it.” When Arab Israeli MKs point out in the Knesset that the UK has condemned settlement building, Jewish Israeli MKs just laugh. “The UK may say that, but they don’t do anything about it,” they say.

Nobody in Parliament is advocating a boycott of trade with Israel. The main aim of the BDS campaign is a boycott by civil society rather than government.  The issue of “boycotts” is a red herring to divert attention from the real issue.

12. We need a strategy of incremental pressure.

The logic of the government’s own policies require a readiness to exert some form of pressure on the Israeli government.  William Hague talked about “incentives and disincentives” in 2011.  The business guidance issued in 2013 is a form of disincentive, a step along this road. Whether it is called “disincentives” or “sanctions” is a matter of semantics.

We could start by strengthening existing business advice, so that we discourage and advise against trade with illegal settlements. Another approach would be to stop public procurement contracts with companies operating in illegal settlements or supplying checkpoints or walls inside occupied territory.

It took the EU only 18 days to impose economic sanctions on Crimea following the arrival of Russian troops in February 2014[iv]. They did not immediately reach for the heaviest sanctions but used their imagination to devise appropriate actions, such as travel bans and asset freezes. They banned cruise ships from docking at five Crimean ports and they suspended Visa and MaterCard services.

A similar step-ladder approach could be adopted, targeting banks that offer mortgages in the settlements or outposts, travel bans on leading settlers and asset freezes on companies benefiting from land, water or mineral resources taken illegally from the occupied territories.

Martin Linton is the editor of Palestine Briefing, a parliamentary newsletter and briefing service, and director of Travel2Palestine, which organises fact-finding visits to Jerusalem and the West Bank. He was Member for Battersea 1997-2010.