Written evidence submitted by the London Assembly [OSG 117]

Summary

• The Mayor of London is not subject to the same accountability arrangements that exist for local authorities or the new combined authorities. However, there are lessons to be learned from the London Assembly model and the way it has scrutinised the Mayor’s decision making.
• The London Assembly is a separately-elected body, with its own budget and staffing resource. The scrutiny arrangements are divorced from local interests and Members take a strategic approach to holding the Mayor to account. 
• The London Assembly holds the Mayor of London to account via Mayor’s Question Time and cross-party subject committees.
• The work of the London Assembly has made a significant contribution to the governance of London. Its work has also influenced public debate, led to service improvements, highlighted financial irregularities and contributed to changes in Mayoral and government policy.
• In undertaking this work, the Assembly uses a range of routes to ensure that the voices of Londoners are heard.
• Since the Greater London Authority Act 1999, subsequent legislation has added to the Mayor’s powers. While the Assembly has also been subject to additional powers, these have not adequately kept up with the increased remit of the Mayor.
• Broader summonsing powers of people and papers would assist the London Assembly in its work, as would the publication of a forward plan of key Mayoral decisions.

1. Introduction

1.1  The London Assembly comprises 25 politicians who are elected to hold the Mayor of London to account and investigate issues of importance to Londoners. London Assembly Members are elected at the same time as the Mayor. Eleven represent the whole capital and 14 are elected by constituencies. The London Assembly carries out investigations into issues through cross-party committees, which often look at long-term issues facing London. It also holds the Mayor to account through monthly Mayor’s Question Time meetings.

1.2  The London Assembly welcomes the CLG Select Committee’s decision to look at the effectiveness of local government scrutiny. While there have been benefits of this function, it clearly has not operated in the way, or at the scale, that was expected when it was introduced in the Local Government Act 2000. Given the lack of ringfenced resources and their subsequent paring away, there are questions as to whether the current model provides more or less scrutiny of councils’ decisions, policy and delivery than what was in place under the previous committee system.

1.3  The GLA was established by the GLA Act 1999 (subsequently amended by the GLA Act 2007, Localism Act 2011 and Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011). The Assembly is therefore outside the Local Government Act 2000. However, after 16 years’ operation, there are lessons to be drawn from the scrutiny of the Mayor of London, particularly given the emergence of combined authorities and Mayors for other city regions.

1.4  The following submission highlights the effectiveness of the various ways the Assembly holds the Mayor to account and it identifies where Assembly powers could potentially be strengthened to improve that effectiveness. Given the differences between scrutiny at the GLA and local authority level, we are not responding in detail to all questions and have primarily provided information as it relates to the London Assembly. This submission draws on material previously submitted to the Committee in relation to its inquiries on the GLA Act 2007 and fiscal devolution.

2. The differences between the London Assembly and local government scrutiny

2.1  The Mayor of London is not subject to the same accountability arrangements that exist for directly elected mayors, or cabinets, in local government. Some provisions of the GLA Act require greater accountability, some less. Executive decisions are not subject to a forward plan and budgets may not be amended or rejected by simple majority - but the Mayor is required to answer publicly to the Assembly for those decisions.

2.2  The Mayor holds all executive power and the Assembly’s ability to override decisions is limited to amending budgets and, as of 2012, rejecting statutory strategies. These powers both require a two-thirds majority vote, the same threshold required to amend the United States Constitution or for Congress to override a Presidential veto.

2.3  The most visible accountability tool at City Hall is Mayor’s Question Time (MQT). In contrast to local government mayoral models, the Mayor of London is required to appear in public before the scrutiny body ten times a year to answer for decisions made and their outcome. Prior to MQT, the Mayor must provide a written report to the Assembly about their recent decisions and activities, and Assembly Members may submit questions for written answer within a legally-specified time limit.

2.4  These provisions ensure that mayoral actions are publicly reported and challenged with Assembly Members setting the agenda by their choice of subjects for questioning.

2.5  Mayoral administrations, including the activities of GLA functional bodies (for example, Transport for London), are also held to account through Assembly committees. Ten cross-party committees scrutinise the Mayor’s budget, which amounted to around £16 billion in 2016-17. One of the committees is statutory—the Police and Crime Committee—with a second to be added from October 2017 to scrutinise the work of the new London Fire Commissioner. Working groups are also established from time to time. Currently, we have working groups on EU Exit and Devolution. Committees and working groups examine both the development and implementation of the Mayor’s statutory strategies and also hold proactive investigations into relevant issues of importance to London. Examples of these are included below.

2.6  The centre piece of the Assembly’s work programme is detailed scrutiny, and approval, of the Mayor’s draft budget, which includes the spending of Transport for London and the Metropolitan Police Service, among other bodies.

3. Whether powers to summon witnesses are adequate

3.1  We cannot comment on the provisions for councils but we do find that our effectiveness is limited somewhat by our powers. Successive governments have long accepted that as the powers of London’s Mayor change then the powers of the Assembly should also move in tandem. Legislation that changed Mayoral powers in 2007 and 2011 also increased the powers of the Assembly, introducing the ability to reject statutory strategies and non-binding confirmation powers over some senior posts.[1] However, as the CLG Committee’s own report in 2013 found, as the Mayor’s powers and responsibilities have grown, the Assembly has been left behind.

3.2  The Assembly’s powers to summons people and information are restricted to prescribed categories of people and organisations within the GLA group, or those with a formal contractual relationship with the GLA to talk about that contractual relationship. Such tight prescription is no longer suited to the nature of the Mayor’s role or the complex structures of London government and governance.

3.3  The Assembly’s ability to scrutinise the Mayor and investigate relevant issues of importance would be strengthened if its summonsing powers covered all pertinent individuals within the GLA group, including the Mayor, and London-wide bodies that are appointed or formally influenced by the Mayor or have a significant role to play in achieving the Mayor’s strategies. This would strengthen the Assembly’s role by making sure that it has timely and unfettered access to the appropriate people and information.

3.4  The external bodies covered by this change would include those that have a significant role to play in delivering the Mayor’s strategies, in providing London wide services, and in the governance of London.

3.5  For example:

• The London Ambulance Service has no direct accountability to Londoners. The Assembly believes that this represents a democratic deficit that would be most appropriately filled by the Assembly, given its strategic London-wide role.
• The Environment Agency holds information that is directly relevant to the Mayor’s environmental strategy and responsibilities, and carries out activities in support of the strategies. The Assembly should have the right to access that information.
• Utility companies provide universally-required services to Londoners and should be answerable for their standards of delivery.
• English Heritage exercises considerable authority over planning and the protection of London’s build environment and should be accountable for its decisions in respect of London.

3.6  There are some specific examples of where such powers would have been beneficial for Assembly investigations. For example, the Education Panel has found it difficult to engage the Regional Schools Commissioners. Without a power to summons, the Panel relies on their good will to appear and this has been difficult to secure on occasions. Similarly the London Assembly’s Police and Crime Committee works on the basis that to hold MOPAC (Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime) to account, it must understand how the Met is performing. The committee relies on the good will of the Met to attend its meetings once a month, but the organisation is under no obligation to do so.

3.7  In summary, Members, on a cross-party basis, are of the view that broader summons powers would assist them in their work, given the complexity of London governance.

4. The potential for local authority scrutiny to act as a voice for local service users

4.1  One of the roles of the London Assembly is to highlight issues of importance to Londoners. We work hard to ensure that the voices of citizens and service users are accurately reflected in our work. Not all topics lend themselves to public engagement. However, where they do, we use a number of ways to involve the public including focus groups, round tables, site visits and open mic events at committee meetings.

4.2  Investigations that have included a significant element of public participation and have secured impact include:

• The Transport Committee’s investigations on the accessibility of the tube network and door-to-door transport services, along with constant pressure from individual Assembly Members, led TfL to improve services for Londoners with mobility problems,[2] for example, by making more of its stations step free. Various routes were used to engage service users including a roundtable with disabled passengers, and inviting door-to-door users to an open question and answer session at a Committee meeting with TfL.
• Site visits often provide a channel to speak directly with service users. The Housing Committee has visited gypsy and travellers’ sites, including an unauthorised encampment (with the consent of the borough concerned). This gave the committee first-hand insight into life on such an encampment, which would have been difficult to replicate via any other means, as well as the opportunity to hear the views and experiences of an extended family of travellers. And the Health Committee’s work on TB was informed by a visit to the Whittington hospital TB unit, where Members were able to question patients directly about their experiences.
• A seminar on London’s bus services in 2014 with over 100 attendees including passengers, industry and borough representatives, successfully pressed TfL to improve its engagement processes  on service changes and making its bus fleet more environmentally friendly.
• The Assembly’s investigation into taxi and private hire services involved significant engagement – we were able to hear from passengers, operators and drivers through committee meetings, focus groups and a survey. This led to a series of recommendations that were accepted by the Mayor and TfL on increasing passenger safety, extending provision of ranks, improving the complaints process, and making services more accessible.
• The Health Committee’s work on access to health services for deaf people included a half-day seminar with providers and service users, a BSL call for evidence and meetings with the cross-borough Deaf forum. This work led to the rapporteur being invited to participate in the NHS England Advisory Group on improving experiences for Deaf patients.
• A rapporteurship review on waterway moorings for the Environment Committee brought together residents, boaters and the Canal and River Trust to discuss thorny issues. These discussions took place both at waterway locations and in a City Hall round table and led to amendments to the London Plan.
• An ongoing investigation by the Environment Committee into management arrangements for parks and green spaces was featured by campaigning website 38 Degrees and has received over 1,500 written contributions and emails. The report of the investigation is forthcoming.
• The views of service users and ‘experts by experience’ are extremely valuable to Health Committee work. Where possible, the committee has sought to engage service users directly through calls for evidence, via social media, and hosting events such a seminar on LGBT mental health. Given the sensitivities around this topic, the committee has also developed links with service user representative organisations such as local Healthwatch teams. The committee’s findings on LGBT mental health have been used by the London Health Board to develop the Mayor’s mental health programme, Thrive.

4.3  Accessing the views of different groups sometimes requires meetings to take place in private, either because they are dealing with sensitive issues, vulnerable or marginalised groups or, in the case of accessing business views, issues of commercial confidentiality. This is often the only way to ensure views from particular stakeholders are heard. For example:

• The Transport Committee recently held two private meetings with bus drivers and bus operators. These had to be conducted on a confidential basis for them to feel comfortable in sharing honest feedback on a range of safety issues.
• The Housing Committee recently held a series of informal private sessions with developers, consultants, trade bodies and others working (or hoping to work) with TfL to develop the organisation’s land assets. In some cases, these stakeholders did not feel able to express frank views in open session. They felt that this would have risked damaging their ongoing and future relationships with the Mayor and/or with TfL.

4.4  However, working in this way does pose challenges for the Assembly as our preference is to put as much information as possible in the public domain. The tension between complying with our transparency requirements and ensuring sensitive issues are reflected in our work is an ongoing challenge.

4.5  We are also increasingly using digital platforms for this purpose. Forums such as the Mayor’s Talk London and others such as User Voice have been invaluable in giving us input on issues such as ticketing for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and the increase in delivery van traffic in London. We have also used Twitter and Google forms for surveys, for example to feed into the Transport Committee’s investigations on motorcycle safety in London. The Regeneration Committee used a Google form survey to connect with artists and community groups about its investigation on culture-led regeneration and the risks of gentrification. There are clear methodological drawbacks to such surveys and we do not use these routes if we are looking for a response which is representative, but they can be a very effective way of drawing the voices of Londoners into our work. In addition, we are increasingly trialling the live use of social media during Committee meetings to elicit questions from the public and service users which are then put to guests.

4.6  It should be noted that work involving a high degree of public participation can be very resource-intensive.

5. The role of scrutiny in devolution deals and the scrutiny models used in combined authorities

5.1  Some combined authorities have approached the London Assembly to understand our approach to scrutiny. However, there do not seem to be many parallels. Our model of scrutiny is very different to what seems to be being developed in other city regions.

5.2  In our experience, the London Assembly scrutiny model offers a number of advantages:

• The electoral system for the Assembly is designed to ensure that the membership proportionally reflects the opinions of the electorate and the Assembly is not dominated by one political party. This helps to ensure that there is effective challenge of the Mayor and a check and balance on the Mayor’s decisions.
• Its only purpose is as a scrutiny body. In combined authorities, scrutiny members are sourced from constituent authorities. The elected members, even when in ‘scrutiny mode’, will inevitably be concerned with how Mayoral policy affects their area. There are therefore risks that the scrutiny arrangements are not adequately divorced from local interests and that those scrutinising the Mayor have dual roles and, potentially, confused democratic mandates.
• In London, Assembly Members represent large constituencies or are list Members with a London-wide remit. They have therefore been able to take a more strategic approach to holding the Mayor of London to account and to assess how decisions might benefit the capital as a whole.
• The Assembly has a ring-fenced budget and the teams that support its scrutiny are independent of the Executive (see section 8 below).

6. Examples where scrutiny has worked well

6.1  Impact is a difficult concept for organisations like the Assembly. Many impacts are hidden, some may take many years to occur, and it may be impossible to attribute impact to specific investigations. Nevertheless, we do capture evidence of impact and report this in public every quarter through the GLA Oversight Committee and every year through our annual report.

6.2  One of our key functions is to influence public debate. There are many recent examples of our scrutiny performing this role:

• The Transport Committee’s investigation into traffic congestion, London Stalling, published in January 2017, received significant media attention during the investigation and after the final report was published. The committee engaged with business groups, transport experts and representatives of road users including cyclists, motorists and taxi drivers, and surveyed Londoners. The committee’s scrutiny prompted the Mayor to produce his own congestion action plan, and also contributed to a growing consensus in favour of changing how people pay to use roads to better reflect the causes of congestion.
• A 2014 investigation by the Police and Crime Committee concluded the Met had not made a convincing case for why water cannon were needed.[3] In summer 2015, the Home Secretary refused to license the use of water cannon, using many of the reasons cited by the committee, and in July 2016 the new Mayor announced that he would be selling them.
• The Environment Committee highlighted concerns over the robustness of emissions testing in its report Driving Away from Diesel, in July 2015, before the Volkswagen “dieselgate” scandal broke and the true extent of the problem became globally known that autumn.

• The Health Committee’s investigation into TB was successful in bringing the issue of TB up the agenda:[4] it subsequently became a specific reference in Mayor Sadiq Khan’s manifesto and is expected to feature in his revised heath inequalities strategy. To develop its findings, the committee commissioned a survey of 1,000 Londoners to assess levels of awareness of TB.
• In March 2016, the GLA Oversight Committee published a report on the procurement process for the design of the proposed Garden Bridge.[5] This highlighted a series of procedural errors in the procurement process and, along with action by individual Assembly Members, has led to the Mayor asking Margaret Hodge MP to undertake a comprehensive review.

6.3  Our work can also lead to service improvements. Our investigation into the 7 July 2005 London bombings uncovered systemic weaknesses in the emergency response and ensured action was taken by the GLA group and others to address those weaknesses.[6] Work by individual Assembly Members and the Budget & Performance Committee directly led to the introduction of PAYG daily caps to help low-paid and part-time workers and to TfL installing windows on Routemaster buses that opened. And work by the Transport Committee resulted in the TfL cancelling the planned closure of its Capital Call minicab service for disabled people.

6.4  The Assembly maintains an interest in promoting transparency as an essential part of good governance and decision making. Its work therefore contributes to improving governance and highlighting financial irregularities. For example, we undertook two major investigations on this topic in 2013 and 2016 which led to recognition across the GLA Group of the importance of transparency with, for example, improvements in information released on senior pay, contracts (TfL now routinely publishes major contracts in full) and Mayoral advice (the previous Mayor agreed to publish annual advice from TfL on fares decision). And the Budget and Performance Committee looked at the award of a TfL contract to Bombardier for TfL’s Sub-Surface Upgrade Programme (SSUP). It discovered that it was five years behind schedule and is now forecast to cost nearly £900 million more than originally expected.

6.5  Finally, by subjecting policy to in-depth, well-resourced scrutiny, the Assembly has secured changes to Mayoral and government policy: 

• The Environment Committee’s work to highlight air pollution as a public health issue (particularly Every Breath You Take in 2009) was a, potentially important, factor behind the Mayor and national government commissioning and publishing estimates of the long-term mortality impact of particulate and nitrogen dioxide pollution. This has helped to show that these are among the most serious environmental threats to health in the UK. The idea of a central London ultra low emission zone (ULEZ) was advocated by the committee early in the Mayoralty of Boris Johnson, and brought forward by him as a proposal towards the end of his time in office. The committee pushed for the ULEZ to be brought in sooner and with wider coverage, which influenced several candidates in the 2016 Mayoral elections and is now being taken forward by the current Mayor.

• Survey and focus group work from the Transport Committee’s Future proof report on taxis and private hire[7] led to the adoption of almost all of the committee’s 19 recommendations and the development of the Mayor’s taxi and private hire action plan.
• The London Plan now gives War Memorials recognised status and protection as a result of recommendations made by the Assembly to the Mayor.[8] 
• The Mayor changed the Housing Supplementary Planning Guidance to guard against the system being manipulated to maximise developer profits over other objectives, in line with the Assembly Planning Committee’s recommendations.

7. Examples where scrutiny has worked not so well 

7.1  There are examples of where our work has not had the impact we might have hoped for. There are many explanations for this but one is our inability to do pre-decision scrutiny. For example our report on the Garden Bridge may have been able to help avoid wasted public expenditure if we had been able to look at the issue before the investment decisions were taken (see paras 8.4 & 8.5 below).

7.2  A further issue which continues to be a challenge is the need to be able to flex scrutiny programmes to incorporate topical issues. In depth, well-researched scrutiny requires significant planning and preparation to ensure that it is thorough and takes account of a wide variety of opinions. However there is also a need to be able to react to events quickly and this is an increasing priority for us. We have effectively been able to incorporate ‘real time’ or topical scrutiny into our work programmes on issues such as the Notting Hill Carnival, violence in and around the London Stadium during football matches and electoral fraud in London. Following the referendum on leaving the EU, our Economy Committee cleared its work programme to examine the likely effects of Brexit on a range of sectors important to London. It was one of the first contributors to the debate, holding a public meeting in July, hearing from the Trades Union Congress, the Institute of Economic Affairs, and the University College London European Institute on the key issues facing London once the UK leaves the EU.

7.3  The Environment Committee has had recent success with shorter discussion items at the end of its meetings, including on Heathrow Airport, diesel bans in cities around the world, and on floods caused by bursts in trunk water mains. These additional sessions have responded to topical issues and engaged press, public and local government with great interest. However, it should be noted that this approach is resource intensive and can put pressure on the progress of the committee’s longer-planned business.

7.4  We have found the use of working groups, panels and rapporteurs (an investigation led by a single Member) to be useful ways to respond to issues on top of established committee work programmes. Recent examples of issues dealt with in this way include modular housing, biodiversity in new housing developments, the future for small theatres in London and online crime. Again, it should be noted that all of these pieces of work required resources equivalent to a full investigation. However, they do have the advantage of involving a smaller number of Members which makes scheduling meetings easier.

7.5  The inclusion of quick-turnaround scrutiny needs to be balanced with in-depth research. Both have their place and we remain of the view that our work programmes need to maintain a blend of different approaches.

8. Other comments

Resourcing

8.1  If overview and scrutiny is to effectively hold the executive to account and contribute to better public policy and decisions, it needs to be adequately resourced. Being a separately elected body with its own budget[9] and staffing resource means that the London Assembly can set its own priorities and carry out its functions with minimal interference from the executive. A key part of the CLG Committee’s inquiry will be to establish to what extent scrutiny bodies established under the Local Government Act 2000 have been able to access adequate resources and operate independently from executives in order to be effective.

Joint working across authorities

8.2  It may be worth considering the way local authorities’ scrutiny functions can work together to provide a more strategic overview of services or indeed to realise economies of scale. We have some experience of working with London boroughs. Borough officers and cabinet members regularly contribute to our work and while more could be done, we have found that our impact can be enhanced by the local application of many of our investigations. For example, our materials on investigations into TB and, separately, end of life care, were used by London boroughs to develop their own local scrutiny work.

8.3  However, our scrutiny work often highlights comparisons across London boroughs and therefore can shine a light on good or poor performance (e.g. on flooding risks or recycling rates) which is sometimes not well received by those councils which may be at the bottom of the performance tables.

Pre-decision scrutiny

8.4  The Mayor of London’s decision-making process would be enhanced if more information were in the public arena before a decision was made and the Assembly had the opportunity to influence the Mayor’s key decisions before they take effect. It would expose significant decisions to a range of views and questions, resulting in a more transparent and accountable decision-making process. It would contribute to maintaining public trust and confidence in mayoral decision-making as well as the quality and effectiveness of those decisions.

8.5  The way to do this would be for the Mayor to publish a forward plan of key decisions to be taken over the subsequent three months. This proposal would also place an onus on the Assembly to identify and challenge potentially poor decisions before they take place, rather than challenging decisions only after they have demonstrably failed to effectively and efficiently achieve their goals. This proposal would bring the GLA into line with the arrangements to ensure that local authorities are transparent and accountable. The GLA is the only local authority that is not required to publish a forward plan. This anomaly should be addressed.

9. Conclusion

9.1  Having a powerful, directly-elected individual as Mayor of London has been a success. The London Assembly has contributed to that success by ensuring effective scrutiny takes place. We believe that our scrutiny of the Mayor works and have cited a number of examples above where policies and services have been changed or improved for the benefit of Londoners.

9.2  We secure impact in many different ways: evaluating programmes and policies, proposing amendments to strategies, investigating new areas of policy and doing some creative, early policy development. However, our influence could be strengthened if we were able to undertake more pre-decision scrutiny and have sight of a forward plan of decisions. Currently, the only elements where we can influence before decisions are taken are the budget process and the production of statutory Mayoral strategies.

9.3  With the growth in directly-elected, powerful mayors across England, the debate about how best to hold them to account is growing. Scrutiny has an important role to play in this but it needs to be properly resourced and independent from such Mayors otherwise it will be set up to fail.

March 2017