Written evidence submitted by London TravelWatch (RLS0027)

Submission to the Transport Select Committee inquiry into improving the rail safety

1      Introduction:

London TravelWatch is the official body set up by Parliament to provide a voice for London’s travelling public, including the users of all forms of public transport. Our role is to:

• Speak up for transport users in discussions with policy-makers and the media;
• Consult with the transport industry, its regulators and funders on matters affecting users;
• Investigate complaints users have been unable to resolve with service providers, and;
• Monitor trends in service quality
• Provide input to rail franchise and concession competitions, industry consultations and inquiries by public bodies.

Our brief covers the wider London Railway Area[1] that includes all of London’s airports and areas of commuting to and from the capital.

Our aim is to press in all that we do for a better travel experience all those living, working, or visiting London and its surrounding region.

Our remit and experience focuses on London’s transport systems – however, we feel that there are lessons that to be learnt from this that can be applied universally rather than just to the specific London modes that we cover.

2              The Inquiry

London TravelWatch welcomes the House of Commons Transport Committee’s inquiry, looking at improving the rail safety, and thanks the Committee for asking us to give evidence at their recent hearing.

3              We turn now to the specific questions raised.

4              The Department and Network Rail's progress in implementing recommendations made by the previous Transport Committee on level crossings, and further actions which could be taken to reduce harm at level crossings.

London TravelWatch notes that there has been some ignorance on the part of train operators and Network Rail about the recommendation arising from the tragedy at Elsenham station[2] - that where a station is divided by a level crossing, separate ticketing facilities should be provided at all platforms to reduce the need to use level crossings. In 2015 London TravelWatch was asked to approve a ticket office closure at Roydon[3] on the Hertfordshire / Essex border operated by Greater Anglia. This is on the same railway as Elsenham station and managed by staff that were familiar with the Elsenham tragedy, despite a change of franchisee in the meantime. However, the initial proposals did not include any provision for an additional ticket machine or cycle storage on the Cambridge bound platform, which meant that there would be more crossings of the railway to purchase tickets or store cycles than would be necessary. After London TravelWatch pointed out the recommendations of the Elsenham inquiry, the operator subsequently changed their plans to include an extra ticket machine and cycle storage at the station. This has reduced the need for passengers to cross the line unnecessarily and is now a much better passenger experience than previously.

However, this was an instance we picked up because of another issue, and we think it would be worthwhile DfT, Network Rail and train operators auditing other such stations to ensure compliance with the Elsenham recommendations.

Harm at level crossings is also a function of road user behaviour. Roads using level crossings are generally minor, and maintained by local authorities over which we have no remit. However level crossings in the London area are used by pedestrians, cyclists and buses, for which we do have a remit. For bus passengers level crossings can have a major impact on bus service reliability, either if the bus uses the level crossing or if the closure of the crossing causes traffic congestion on other adjacent roads. Bad behaviour by road users is often in our view associated with frustration at the length of time that barriers at level crossings are closed – in the London area the increase in frequency of trains over the past two decades has often led to increased ‘down time’ of barriers leading to increased stoppages for road vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians.

Our recommendation would be replacement of level crossings in urban areas which have high usage with bridges or traffic management schemes that allow closure but redirect traffic in a safe but proportionate way by an alternative route. This is essential for safety but also for practical traffic management reasons.

5              The Department, British Transport Police (BTP) and British Transport Police Authority’s (BTPA) progress in implementing recommendations made by the previous Transport Committee on security on the railways, the effectiveness of current measures to reduce violent crime, and the appropriateness of the BTP’s current priorities.

Generally we think that the BTP does a very good job of protecting passengers and investigating crime on the railway. It does so because it has the specialist knowledge to do this effectively. There are some crimes such as cable theft that are distinctive to the railway. We would not support proposals that would see the BTP subsumed into regional forces that would have other priorities and be likely to lose any specialist knowledge quickly.

6              The effectiveness of the current system of rail safety management, investigation, regulation, enforcement and policing, including the ability of industry and government bodies to coordinate effectively.

Generally, the current system is effective because of the close working relationships of the specialist bodies involved. This is not to say that the system cannot be improved – it needs to, as technology and risks change. However, just because good results are achieved in performance indicators, this does not necessarily indicate that a system is optimal. Performance indicators should be regularly reviewed and changed if necessary, with contracts for operation able to deal with potential changes part way through their duration.

7              The effect of the result of the EU referendum on the current framework for rail safety and security

It would be of concern to us if any change to the law resulting from the EU referendum would lead to a lessening of rail safety and security standards or a diminution of their enforcement. But this is a complex area that needs detailed assessment.

8              The extent to which growing passenger numbers, infrastructure upgrades, and major infrastructure projects may impact on the safety of passengers, workers, and the public

In most cases an increase in passenger numbers will, in itself improve safety, because it means that there is more ‘passive observation’ and therefore the temptation to perform a potentially unsafe action is reduced. However, increased passenger numbers mean that crowd management at busy stations needs to be recognised as a distinctive need, especially when services are disrupted. The growth of usage means that some stations previously experiencing  moderate usage, and with low staffing levels, graduate to much bigger numbers of passengers without any change in facilities or staffing levels. Without regular review of usage levels there are potential problems with staffing or facilities becoming inappropriate.

Similarly an increase in passenger numbers, coupled with disruption, can lead to instances where delayed passengers ‘self evacuate’ from trains directly onto the track. Here we recommend the practice adopted by London Underground and some other train operators of information provision by train staff at a minimum interval of every 2 minutes even if no further information is available and a policy of evacuating stranded trains after a period of 45 minutes, regardless of whether it is thought that a train will be able to move shortly thereafter.

9              The scope for further improving the management of infrastructure and train operation, including strategies for maintaining assets in poor weather conditions and minimising accidents and near misses caused by rail worker fatigue

We are not able to comment on rail worker fatigue, but in the case of infrastructure management, effective strategies for managing vegetation, lineside rubbish and graffiti should mean fewer incidents occurring in poor weather conditions.

10               The adequacy of measures to protect persons at the platform-train interface

This an issue to which we attach great importance, as do (from our research[4]) passengers and non-rail users alike. For non rail users the presence of step-gaps is a principal reason for choosing not to use the rail system. However, measures to reduce these gaps are available and can often be relatively inexpensive to install.  But they provide big benefits in terms of safety improvements and improved service reliability, because station dwell times are reduced. We recommend the Committee look at the innovations at platform 1 at Tulse Hill station and platform 4 at Elephant & Castle station to see the very effective treatments that have been pioneered by GTR using false platforms. Other on-station measures include the use of sacrificial surfaces (rubber skirtings at the platform edge) at stations operated by Heathrow Express.

Similarly, we are aware that on-train technological solutions for gap filling are becoming increasingly viable. Some  European train manufacturers now as a matter of course fit all of their new trains with devices integral to door operation that eliminate any gaps. However, we are not aware of any British manufacturers who have adopted this simple technology.

We are also acutely aware that the British railway industry can be quite resistant to change, putting significant obstacles in the way of any significant change of established practice. In this respect there is a need for a change of culture from one of resistance to one of ‘what do we need to do’ to get this result. Tackling the issue of step-gaps is probably the major improvement that would transform the travelling experience and safety of Britain’s passengers (especially those with disabilities, or with baby buggies or heavy luggage) at the present time.

11              Progress on current initiatives to improve railway worker safety and further actions which could be taken to improve the safety of railway workers, including those individuals working on infrastructure construction and on the tracks, and those exposed to occupational hazards

London TravelWatch is not in a position to answer this question.

12              The effectiveness of measures to prevent trespass and fatalities on the railways and other approaches which could reduce the numbers of fatalities and injuries

London TravelWatch would commend the measures employed by TfL Rail and London Overground since they took over responsibility for routes from Liverpool Street that have seen a significant improvement in performance, that can be attributable in part to the presence of station staff on platforms. This has significantly reduced the numbers of trespass incidents, injuries and fatalities because the staff presence has meant they can intervene with vulnerable passengers, and manage crowds more effectively at busy stations. We would recommend that these simple but effective measures be adopted more widely as fewer incidents of this nature mean less disruption, more reliable services and potentially reduced incidences of crowding.

13              Industry complacency

London TravelWatch staff use the rail network extensively, and have on occasion witnessed unsafe working practices or actions by passengers. Attached in Appendix A are two examples of email correspondence to train operators resulting from observations by our staff.

At Bedwyn station the subsequent investigation by the operator found that unsafe practices had been occurring with both staff and passengers over many years previously, but the site had not been identified as a problem previously because no accidents had occurred. Staff members of both Network Rail and First Great Western were subsequently disciplined for their actions.

In the example in Croydon, contractors working on the replacement bridge were a) working in very unstable, filthy and unhygienic conditions, and should have removed the rubbish first before commencing work and b) by pushing the rubbish including tin cans on to the track, were creating a new hazard of electrical short-circuiting. Network Rail says on their website that now they require contractors to clear sites before commencing work and after completing it too. In this case the pressure to complete works within the allotted ‘possession’ time leads to a temptation to ‘cut the corner’.

14              London TravelWatch recommendations and conclusions

In summary, London TravelWatch recommends the following priority measures to improve rail safety:-

• Full implementation of the recommendations of the report into the Elsenham Level Crossing Accident report, including an audit of all stations that require passengers to use a level crossing to pass between one platform and another to ensure that all such platforms have ticketing facilities and other measures to reduce the need for passengers or other users to cross the line

• Adoption of a cross-industry programme of measures at stations and on trains to reduce or eliminate step-gaps between the train and platform, including the promotion of innovative low cost solutions

• Regular review of by train operators of station usage in relation to station staffing, including platform management, to ensure that appropriate levels of safety and security are in place, and that staff are available to intervene in appropriate cases (see TfL Rail)

• For level crossings in urban areas with high levels usage by road users, cyclists and pedestrians, consideration of the case for replacement of these either with bridges or with appropriate traffic management schemes that allow closure but redirect traffic

• Retention of the British Transport Police as a specialist, independent force.

• Regular review of performance indicators for transport operators, including the ability to change this part way through a contract.

7 March 2017

Appendix A

Item 1 – email from London TravelWatch to First Great Western 24th September 2012

Dear […] and […],

I thought I would write and say thank you for inviting me to the National Rail Awards on Thursday. It was a really enjoyable evening and it was pleasing that your company had some well deserved success.

On Saturday 22nd September 2012 I had been walking with a friend along the Kennet and Avon Canal and arrived at Bedwyn station at approximately 1520 to catch the 1538 towards London. However, on arrival at the station I found a teenager sitting on the edge of the platform with his legs over the track talking to a group of friends. I immediately got him safely back on the platform properly and told him of the risks that he had exposed himself to, although they were polite the teenagers were not happy that I had told them off. 2-3 minutes later a HST passed through at full line speed.

The teenagers then left the station so were obviously not there to catch a train.

Then at 1531 the inbound service from the London direction arrived, and just after it moved into the siding, I noticed two people, who had just got off the train, (at that point I assumed to be passengers as they were not wearing hi-vis clothing), walking down the ramp of the platform and crossing the line just by the sign that says ‘Passengers must not cross the line’. I shouted a warning to them, and ran towards them, but was interrupted by another passenger who said ‘Don’t worry he works for the railway he knows what he is doing, and the other one lives in the village’. As I got closer I saw that one was an FGW employee, and the other was an elderly man, carrying his shopping. They had walked arm in arm across the track and I did not see them make any attempt to check for trains coming on either track. In fact they were so deep in conversation, that when I approached them and said ‘ I am sorry I shouted at you earlier’, the railwayman replied that they had not heard me. I explained to them that a few minutes earlier I had to deal with teenagers on the platform. The elderly man then walked off towards the bungalows in The Knapp where I assume he lived.

At 1537 the 1538 service came into the platform and so I boarded it. The FGW employee did not as he then proceed to put up notices about improvement work.

There are a number of aspects to this that I found extremely disturbing :-

1. Throughout both incidents a Network Rail maintenance gang was present at the station, one man doing some repairs to the AWS on the approach to the station from Reading, and he would have had complete view all of the time of both incidents, and presumably would have seen the teenager sit on the platform edge a long time before I arrived on the station, and could have at least shouted a warning or even called the second person was inside the NR building at the side of the station (and only came out when the 1538 departed) to deal with the issue.
2. I can think of no reason why the FGW staff member would assist a passenger across the track at this point. There is a bridge (admittedly a longer walk), and if the passenger had a mobility impairment then even if they were not able to manage the slope / stairs up to the bridge, they could have stayed on the train whilst the reversing manoeuvre had taken place, but given the trip hazards on the track I don’t think this a plausible excuse.
3. The FGW staff member was not wearing hi-vis clothing so I suspect was a member of station staff, and not authorised to go on the track.
4. There is no CCTV coverage at the station, and I suspect that the casual attitude of the people involved in both incidents would suggest that this is a fairly common occurrence here. I would suggest it would be worthwhile getting the BTP to do a visit to both Marlborough St.Johns and Hungerford John O’Gaunt schools to which the local children go to, to remind them of the dangers of playing / hanging about around the railway.
5. There were about 10-12 passengers waiting on the platform who also saw both incidents, and in particular I thought that the example of the FGW employee sent the wrong message to anybody witnessing this.
6. Physical interventions to reduce the risks of these incidents reoccurring might include installing CCTV and replacing the platform ramps close to the bridge with the latest NR design of steps / fencing.

I have to say I left Bedwyn in a bit of shock at both witnessing these incidents, and having to speak to both sets of people.

I have tried to give as full a picture as I can recall but if you need any further information please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

Tim Bellenger

Director, Policy and Investigation

Item 2 emails to Network Rail and London Borough of Croydon regarding unsafe actions at Network Rail site – 3rd March 2014.

To Network Rail

Dear […],

I thought I would draw your attention to my observations of the Goat House Bridge replacement (near Norwood Junction), that occurred at weekends In January 2014. I attach a copy of an email that I sent to Croydon Council on the 15th January 2014 which lists a number of issues which I had observed that I thought were more relevant to the relationship between Network Rail and the Council some, but not all, have been subsequently resolved. However, on subsequent weekends I was concerned to see that Network Rail’s contractor were still working in significant amounts of accumulated rubbish, whilst doing the bridge strengthening works, and not removing it. In some cases it was simply moved aside or pushed down to track level. In addition they parked their vehicles on private land nearby and did not leave this in good condition either such that local volunteers had to clean it up:-

http://insidecroydon.com/2014/02/18/lots-of-happy-talk-as-residents-do-the-sensible-thing/

Similarly in the past I have noted at station works at West Norwood and Bellingham contractors working in the rubbish rather than removing it (although these might have been contracted to train operators).

Aside from the passenger concerns about rubbish and litter, from a travelling environment perspective, and on potential impact on performance, this I think poses a health risk to contractors if the rubbish is left rather than removed prior to work starting. I was wondering what arrangements Network Rail have to require contractors to ensure that any sites that they work on are cleaned before they start their major works?

Yours sincerely

Tim Bellenger

Director, Policy and Investigation

To London Borough of Croydon

Dear […],

I am contemplating making a complaint to Network Rail about the Goat House Bridge works.

I live nearby and had heard that the bridge closure was overrunning and that the road would not be open until Tuesday 14th January 2014 rather than the planned date of the previous day. I was quite surprised therefore when I walked through the site at around 1945 on Sunday 12th January 2014 to find not only no work going on, but no sign of any workers at all. The closure of this bridge has had a major disruptive effect on bus passengers on routes 75 and 157 – and there was very little notice for them that their journeys were still going to be disrupted on the Monday. Similarly for other bridge users the only notice said ‘possession over-running’ which is probably a bit meaningless.

I am also concerned about the amount of damage that Network Rails’ contractors seem to have done to the surrounding roads such as the High Street and Penge Road by their crane operations etc, and the shear amount of rubbish that has been left or accumulated on and around the site. Examples include :-

• A large and dangerous pothole created in the High Street on the northbound carriageway near to the traffic lights
• Broken and dislodged kerbs on the approaches to the bridge from both sides
• Uneven pavement surfaces and rutting of tarmac
• Blocking of street drains with mud and debris from the bridge works
• Damage to the triangle of land in the High Street used for parking vehicles
• Failure to clear accumulated rubbish on Network Rail owned land on both sides of the bridge before work commenced – the triangle of land mentioned above is covered in such.

I assume that Network Rail must have some agreement with you to repair this damage? If they have and they are going to rectify things please let me know and I won’t make an issue with this with Network Rail. I have some photos I could let you have if this is helpful.

On a separate matter, I have been informed by a number of local residents about their unhappiness with the diversion of bus route 410 away from its normal route between Norwood Junction and Crystal Palace for two days before Christmas on account of the Harris Academy Crystal Palace entrance exams, which diverted buses between 1000 and 1600 on both days. This caused quite considerable inconvenience to users, particularly elderly and disabled people on account of the long and often steep walks to alternative stops and routes. I have noted that Harris have required buses to be diverted away on a number of occasions for quite considerable times in the recent past, and the disruption to bus passengers is in my view unacceptable. Are or have Croydon made Harris Academy aware of the disruption that diverting the 410 bus causes?

Yours sincerely

Tim Bellenger

Director, Policy and Investigation