Written evidence from Free Tibet (CHI0030)

Executive summary

• In recent years the UK’s relationship with China has had a strong focus on trade, but has lacked a correspondingly strong focus on human rights.
• The UK has done some good work through the European Union in challenging human rights abuses in Tibet. The UK’s imminent departure from the EU will require a more robust commitment to raising these concerns directly with China.
• China continues to pose a risk to regional security and flout international law through its human rights abuses in Tibet.
• At the civil service level the FCO has been a useful point of contact and has been willing to raise our concerns with China and provide useful feedback.
• At ministerial level we have found the FCO to be defensive and not forthcoming. This may change under the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Alok Sharma.

About Free Tibet

Free Tibet (www.freetibet.org) is a London-based international campaign organisation. Our vision is a free Tibet in which Tibetans are able to determine their own future and the human rights of all are respected. Free Tibet’s research partner, Tibet Watch (www.tibetwatch.org), promotes the human rights of the Tibetan people through monitoring, research and advocacy. All of the information provided by Tibet Watch about events in Tibet is verified and corroborated as far as is possible within the limitations which apply in Tibet.

This submission draws from seven of the topics prioritised by the Foreign Affairs Committee in the terms of reference for this inquiry. Free Tibet has evidence to contribute on each of these topics based on observations it has collected in monitoring the actions of the UK government on Tibet, and from meetings with FCO personnel at ministerial level and on the FCO’s China desk.

The current state of UK-China relations

The relationship between trade and human rights

1. Ministers in the FCO, both in parliament and in meetings with NGOs, including Free Tibet and Tibet Watch, have repeatedly stressed that the UK’s foreign relations with China do not make either trade or human rights an exclusive priority. For example, in a parliamentary debate on Tibet in December 2014, the then Minister of State, Hugo Swire, responded to statements on “whether there is a binary choice between human rights and investment in doing trade with China” by stating: “I utterly reject that. I do not think that there is such a choice, and I do not apologise for this Government’s desire to rebuild the economy as part of our long-term economic plan to attract increasing inward investment from China.”[1]

2. In practice, we have noticed a much greater focus on trade to the detriment of human rights, particularly in our interactions with Minister of State Swire between 2012 and 2016. 

3. Prior to the State Visit of President Xi Jinping in October 2015, the then Minister of State, Hugo Swire met with Free Tibet and a number of China-related NGOs on 13 October. We sought specific information from the minister about how human rights would be addressed during the visit – such as the level at which discussions would take place, whether particular issues or cases would be addressed and so on.  Mr Swire declined to provide that information, stating “you wouldn’t expect us to tell you that in advance of the meeting”.  Mr Swire failed to explain why it was inappropriate for HM Government to advise stakeholders of the government’s plans in regard to this important issue.  His silence gave rise to concerns that the information was not being provided because there was no plan to raise human rights in a substantive way during the visit. 

4. Similarly, in advance of the visit, Mr Swire failed to respond when the same information was requested via a Written Parliamentary Question[2]. In addition, in response to an Urgent Question during the visit itself[3], Mr Swire said: “I am sure that many Members on both sides of the House will want to know what was discussed and when.  I shall do my best to answer that question, although I stress that the state visit is still under way”[4].  However, neither in that reply nor since the visit has information been released providing any detail as to whether human rights discussions took place.

5. China has become the UK’s second largest non-EU import partner behind the United States and in the decade preceding President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK, during which trade deals worth up to £40 billion were signed between the two countries[5], the percentage of imports to the UK from China doubled from 3.3 percent, in 2004, to 7 percent of UK imports, in 2014.[6] With China now the world’s second largest economy and with the UK’s imminent departure from the EU’s single market, the UK’s increased reliance on trade with China is understandable.

6. Nevertheless, trade should not supersede human rights concerns. This is also reflected in UK public opinion. Two independent opinion polls commissioned by Free Tibet and conducted by ICM in 2010 and 2013 found that the vast majority of those polled (74% and 69% respectively) agreed that human rights were as or more important than trade with China[7]. In a poll conducted by YouGov for Free Tibet in 2015, 69 percent of respondents agreed with a statement from the Dalai Lama on the government’s policy on Tibet and China: “Money, money, money. That’s what this is about. Where is morality?” Only 8 percent disagreed.[8]

7. This view has been echoed by the Foreign Affairs Committee. In April 2016, the Committee’s chairman, Crispin Blunt MP, stated: "The actions and words of ministers in the Foreign Office have undermined the excellent human rights work carried out by the department.” The Committee said that the government gave the impression of prioritising trade and security with China, as well as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, creating a perception that human rights were not a priority[9].

The European Union

8. Through the EU, the UK has contributed to some highly welcome statements and resolutions raising concerns about human rights violations in Tibet, the most recent of which was a strong statement on Human Rights Day in 2016, in which the EU raised concerns about the criminal justice system in China, increased suppression of the right to freedom of expression, and a number of political detainees, including the Tibetan language advocate Tashi Wangchuk[10].

9. At Free Tibet we have frequently been told when raising cases of political prisoners with the FCO that the most effective route to get action is through “working with our EU colleagues” and the UK’s views are often represented in public statements of concern issued by the EU. Under the umbrella of the European External Action Service, the UK can contribute to these constructive statements while also being shielded from China’s direct anger. Without the EEAS, the UK government will need to work on its own to make these necessary interventions on human rights violations in China.

“Interference” in foreign affairs

10. Governments that challenge Beijing over its human rights violations in Tibet are frequently accused by the Chinese government of interfering in China’s internal affairs. As part of the process of shaping a more equally balanced relationship, and ensuring that China plays a more productive role in international affairs, the UK government should acknowledge that China’s view of what constitutes “interference” in other nations’ affairs is subject to a double standard.

11. China consistently refers to Tibet as an “internal” matter at international fora and in response to criticism from governments and inter-governmental bodies. In contrast, the Chinese government has repeatedly attempted to influence governments and private organisations over Tibet. Examples included Beijing exerting pressure on a gallery in Bangladesh to close down an exhibition about Tibetan self-immolations[11], attempting to prevent a balloon in the colours of the Tibetan flag from participating in ballooning events in the UK and France[12], and attempting to press the organisers of the Glastonbury festival not to permit the Dalai Lama to speak there[13].

12. Recent economic and diplomatic pressure on the governments of Slovakia and Mongolia following non-officials visits by the Dalai Lama has elicited apologies from both governments, and commitments not to host the Dalai Lama again[14]. These contradictions in what constitutes “interference” should be noted, and there should be more effort to speak out by international governments, including the FCO, when another nation’s sovereignty is put under such aggressive pressure by China.

The consequences of challenging China

13. It is our view that the FCO and the UK government drastically overestimate the consequences of angering China, and have been too ready to accommodate it at the expense of raising human rights concerns. Meetings between former Prime Minister David Cameron and then Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg with the Dalai Lama in 2012 were criticised by Beijing and subsequent diplomatic relations between the UK and China were reported to be “in the deep freeze”. In fact, trade between the UK and China actually increased during this period[15]. The reality is that China requires trade as much as any other country, as emphasised by President Xi Jinping’s statements on the importance of free trade to China at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos in January[16]. The UK government should not overestimate China’s ability or willingness to punish such an important trading partner or allow these fears to deter them from upholding international law.

The UK and China’s approach to International law and security

14. In terms of international and security policy, China is the largest and arguably exclusive threat to Tibet. Since being invaded in 1950, Tibet has been controlled and ruled by China, which has introduced policies that threaten Tibet’s culture, environment, language, religion and national identity.  While it is impossible to systematically evaluate the views of Tibetans inside Tibet, it is clear that many oppose Chinese rule in principle, in addition to opposing specific Chinese government policies in Tibet.

15. China criminalises activities defending or asserting Tibetan freedom and national identity, or which express implicit or explicit opposition to Chinese rule.  These activities are usually defined as “separatism”, an imprecisely-defined “state security” crime which carries severe legal penalties, including the death penalty[17].  Suspects of state security crimes are routinely denied access to legal representation and can be held for months before their cases go to trial. The trials themselves will often be closed and not meet international standards for what constitutes a fair trial.

16. As a result, and in addition to the general failure of Chinese criminal law to comply with internationally-recognised human and civil rights provisions, the “separatism” law reduces legal protections available to those charged with the offence and provides a legal justification for criminalising and punishing political, social and cultural activities by Tibetans.  In this context, the focus on rule of law does not address legal discrimination against, and persecution of, Tibetans.

17. The FCO’s focus on rule of law in China is useful and welcome, but given the context of legal discrimination against Tibetans, care needs to be taken to ensure that this emphasis on rule of law does not become actively counterproductive by transmitting any signal to China that the UK places a higher priority on a stable legal framework for business to operate in than on the defence of citizens’ fundamental human rights.

The UK’s engagement with China on human rights

18. Although the UK government and FCO have been far too reluctant to publicly criticise human rights abuses by China, they carry out a number of useful activities as part of their human rights work in China and Tibet. These include receiving and acting on information from NGOs such as Free Tibet, the UK-China Human Rights Dialogue and the information gathering and trial observations carried out by its consulates in China.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office

19. Free Tibet’s relationship with the FCO is primarily through the China Department.  Our interaction consists of: (a) provision of information about current events in Tibet (through distribution of press releases and meetings with officials); (b) submitting full thematic reports about developments in Tibet; (c) participation in consultations prior to the UK-China Human Rights Dialogue; (d) requests to take up individual political prisoner cases; (e) ad hoc meetings or correspondence in relation to campaigns or emerging issues; (f) occasional meetings at ministerial level (as part of wider Tibetan or China-related groups).

20. Our experience of working with the China Department has generally been positive. The staff are accessible and demonstrate appreciation for the information that we provide. The China team have stressed that it is hard for the government to obtain this information itself from Tibet. They are also willing to act on the information we provide, such as seeking additional details about individual cases. They invite us to participate in meetings in advance of the UK-China Human Rights Dialogues so that we can brief them and ask them to raise specific concerns with their Chinese counterparts. They also provide useful feedback after these dialogues. Prior to her appointment, the British consul in Chengdu personally visited Free Tibet’s office to gain our insights on the situation in Tibet. This engagement is welcomed and appreciated.

21. Our relationships at ministerial level have not been satisfactory in recent years. Free Tibet participated in meetings with the previous Minister of State Hugo Swire in 2014 and 2015 in the company of other NGOs. In both, his level of engagement was low, leading to concerns that the meetings were “box-ticking” exercises rather than genuine consultations. Our experience was that he approached these meetings extremely defensively and was unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of criticism or engage in constructive debate. 

22. The new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Alok Sharma, was proactive in inviting NGOs working on China and Tibet for a briefing prior to the November 2016 UK-China Human Rights Dialogue. Although the meeting was brief and it is still too early to judge the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State’s performance on human rights, this proactive approach, and his willingness to listen and engage during the meeting, were promising signs and were appreciated. We also appreciated that Mr Sharma attended part of the Dialogue with China, in contrast to Minister of State Swire.

UK-China Human Rights Dialogue

23. The UK-China Human Rights Dialogue has been taking place for two decades now, with mixed results. Free Tibet has been critical of the dialogue and has raised concerns in the past that its existence allows both governments to claim they address human rights concerns despite the lack of concrete improvements in human rights for people in Tibet and China. This conclusion is echoed by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in its Annual Report in 2009, which stated that “there is little evidence that the British Government’s policy of constructive dialogue with China has led to any significant improvements in the human rights situation.”[18] For such reasons, Free Tibet has in the past called for the Human Rights Dialogue to be suspended.

24. The Human Rights Dialogue is, nevertheless, another useful forum to raise the cases of political prisoners and, with a greater level of involvement from civil society, could be a useful exchange. Free Tibet was encouraged by the presence of a Chinese civil society organisation, the China NGO Network for International Exchanges, in the November 2016 dialogue, even if the group in question was close to the Chinese government. We were encouraged by the relatively quick speed in which feedback from the November Human Rights Dialogue was provided to the NGOs that had briefed the Minister of State in preparation for the dialogue and we hope that this swift process of conveying feedback can continue.

25. Free Tibet feels that the Human Rights Dialogue can be made more transparent and useful by making the content of the discussions during the Dialogue, and any action steps arising from it, public. Making this information publicly available would make both parties of the Dialogue more accountable. 

Further observations

26. While the FCO’s human rights report is generally accurate and a valuable resource, and provides a specific section on Tibet, we remain gravely concerned that the government does not confine its content to the human rights situation. Both the report, and replies to us from the China Department when we raise human rights concerns, routinely contain a proviso stating that the UK regards Tibet or the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the People’s Republic of China and that it does not support Tibetan independence. We find this proviso unhelpful and urge the FCO to remove it.

27. We also value the work of the FCO consulates in China, which do useful work in terms of information-gathering as well as exercising the UK’s influence, such as observing trials of Tibetan prisoners. Their work is another example of the FCO doing good work behind the scenes on human rights in China. It has been Free Tibet’s experience that international scrutiny on political detainees has contributed to them receiving shorter prison sentences and improved prison conditions.

Recommendations

• To conduct the Human Rights Dialogue in a transparent fashion. Operate on the presumption that the fullest possible disclosure of plans and activity is desirable in the interests of accountability and to allow stakeholders to contribute to UK policy development.
• Provide strong and swift support to other nations that are effectively having their domestic policy dictated to them through Chinese economic and political pressure.
• Place any strategy, targets and performance related to the Human Rights Dialogues in the public domain.
• Continue to actively solicit the input of stakeholders prior to Human Rights Dialogues and push for Chinese and Tibetan civil society organisations to be among these stakeholders.
• Provide comprehensive information about political and diplomatic level activity to allow stakeholders to effectively evaluate UK policy on China.
• Remove the proviso from the FCO’s human rights reports and statements on Tibet that the FCO does not support Tibetan independence and sees it as part of China.

January 2017