Written evidence from The Rights Practice (CHI0025)

1. Key points
1. There has been an increase in repression since President Xi Jinping came to power. Critics of the government and human rights activists risk detention and torture. Domestic policy is increasingly seen through a national security lens.
2. China is closing down many independent channels for international engagement while investing increased resources into state led initiatives abroad.
3. The UK should work towards greater reciprocity and openness in its relations with China, not only in trade and investment, but in relations at the non-governmental level.
4. Human rights and the value of civil society should be central to the relationship.

2. Recommendations
1. We recommend dropping all reference to a “golden relationship” (para. 16).
2. We recommend the adoption of a new public diplomacy strategy for human rights (para. 17).
3. We recommend the British government cooperate closely with informed British NGOs and colleagues across Europe to monitor the impact of the Law on Overseas NGOs (para. 18).
4. We recommend monitoring process indicators, including the participation of lawyers and civil society, as an indicator of the effectiveness of the Human Rights Dialogue (para. 19).
5. We recommend consultations with civil society to ensure the People to People Dialogue meets the aspirations of genuine people to people exchange or the initiative should be given a new name (para. 20).
6. We recommend that the British government match resources directed at the Chinese judicial establishment with support to the lawyers working to defend the rights of citizens (para. 21).
7. We recommend that the Foreign Office and the British Embassy take a creative and ambitious approach to their future support to the promotion of human rights in China (para. 22).

Introduction

3. The Rights Practice welcomes the decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee to launch an inquiry into UK-China relations. We share the Committee’s view that this is an important relationship with a complicated history. The relationship has the potential to influence significant global goals: climate change, human rights, sustainable development, security and trade. We believe that respect for human rights and wider values should be foundational to this relationship and this message should be conveyed publicly and across government.

4. The Rights Practice was founded fifteen years ago to support those working for human rights in China through our partnership programme and improving access to justice. The organisation is a registered charity and receives funding from the European Union, bilateral donors and private foundations. Among our areas of concern are the use of torture and the death penalty and participation in public life, including the role of NGOs. In recent years, we have received modest funding from the FCO to support visits to the UK by Chinese lawyers. The Rights Practice was founded by Nicola Macbean, Director of the Great Britain-China Centre (1988-95).

Context

5. 2017 will be a critical year for the Chinese leadership as President Xi Jinping seeks to consolidate his authority at the 19th Communist Party Congress in the autumn. Since President Xi came to power there has been a marked increase in repression, curtailing the freedoms of many people and contributing to a more closed society. The media, academia, civil society and the legal profession are all more inhibited from participating in public life. Many speak of a society increasingly governed by fear. Repression seeks to maintain the Party’s monopoly on power through disciplining, marginalising and silencing critical voices. There is an increasingly anti-Western rhetoric. Repression undermines China’s capacity to address the social and political challenges of a rapidly modernising, yet increasingly unequal society and facilitates serious human rights violations. It also limits our ability to understand what is happening and to engage across Chinese society.

6. Recent years have seen a marked decline in investigative reporting by Chinese journalists amid demands for “positive reporting” and a more compliant official media. The detention of ‘citizen journalists’, the criminalisation of “spreading rumours” and the closure of unauthorised websites limit the Chinese public’s ability to share news within a society where the right to information is already limited by pervasive censorship and the ‘Great Firewall’, which blocks numerous foreign websites, including Facebook and Twitter. Against this background, China is stepping up its own state media activities overseas.

7. Chinese universities are state institutions and subject to Party control. Party Document #9[1], widely distributed in 2013, has had a chilling effect on public discourse with its assertion that universal values, civil society and a free media are all part of efforts by the West to undermine China and the leadership of the Party. Academics face increasing restrictions on overseas travel or convening meetings in China with international participants. Chinese academics on overseas visits report concerns that critical comments will be reported to their embassy; these may be conveyed to the Ministry of State Security with potential ramifications for their institution and the individual in question. Chinese government funding of Confucius Institutes in universities around the world, including the UK, has raised concerns about academic freedoms.

8. Recent years have seen the expansion of civil society activity in China with growth in the number of grassroots NGOs and ordinary citizens participating in informal associations, social media, and charity. Grassroots organisations help to address a range of social challenges from environmental protection to domestic violence, workers’ rights and people living with disabilities.  Some groups play an advocacy or campaigning role and speak out on human rights issues. Although the Chinese authorities are turning to NGOs to provide local services they have also come to fear civil society as the catalyst for a so-called “colour revolution”. For example, on the eve of international women’s day in March 2015, the police detained five young Chinese feminists in a pre-emptive action to stop them coordinating a small campaign against harassment on public transport; they were held without charge for over a month.

9. Many grassroots organisations have been unable to register as domestic NGOs and have registered as businesses in order to be legally incorporated and apply for funds. This has made them vulnerable to accusations of unlawful economic activity; the authorities have used this charge as an excuse to target and shut down a number of influential think tanks and NGOs. One example is the anti-discrimination organisation Yirenping.  Since 2014, several of its offices have been raided and staff detained on charges of “illegal business operations”, in some cases for six months. Yirenping’s founding director is now in the USA as he believes it is unsafe to return.  In addition to the risk of detention, staff working for grassroots, advocacy NGOs face frequent harassment ranging from police demands to meet with them to threats to evict them from their offices or homes.

10. On 1 January 2017, the Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs’ Activities in China came into effect. This law is intended to legalise and regulate the activities of overseas NGOs in China. Overseas not-for-profit organisations will need to obtain the approval of a “professional supervisory unit” (PSU), a government agency in a relevant field, and then register with the police. There is no requirement that PSUs agree to supervise an overseas NGO. In the current political climate it is expected that many will be very cautious, wary of the ramifications for them of approving an organisation working in areas such as law and human rights. The list of approved PSUs was only released on 20thDecember 2016. It is too early to measure the impact of the law, but many organisations have withdrawn staff and operations pending registration and greater clarity on how the law will be implemented.

Rule of law

11. From the early 1980s China began to rebuild its legal system after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. President Xi Jinping reiterated the commitment to ensuring the rule of law when he came into office. Developments over the past several years, however, suggest what one observer has called a “turn against law”. Recent reversals undermine the assumption that economic growth would enable China to transition to a rule of law with liberal independent institutions. The most recent and potentially significant reversal was the remarks by Supreme People’s Court President Zhou Qiang[2] rejecting the “erroneous influence from the West”, including judicial independence and the separation of powers. Domestic setbacks are mirrored in China’s more equivocal commitment to international law, including, but not limited to, international human rights law.

12. In July 2015, China launched a crackdown on lawyers, legal assistants and legal activists (‘709’). Hundreds of lawyers were summoned by the police or local lawyers’ associations for questioning. Many were detained and then released within hours or days while some remain in detention. Lawyer Ms Wang Yu, who visited London in March 2015, was detained for over a year before being released, following a coerced, videotaped “confession” critical of foreign support. British investigator Peter Humphrey was also pressured to make a televised confession after his detention in Shanghai and the withholding of medical treatment[3]. Show trials of several legal activists were held in August 2016, with lawyer Zhou Shifeng sentenced to seven years for subversion. Several lawyers, including Li Heping, who has worked with The Rights Practice to address the use of torture, remain in detention facing charges of state subversion. In all of these ‘709’ cases the lawyers were held for six months in “residential surveillance in a designated location”, a form of incommunicado detention the UN Committee Against Torture recommends abolishing[4]. The majority were denied access to lawyers contrary to Chinese law and international standards. Those released from detention centres have remained subject to police surveillance and are unable to travel freely or meet with anyone but close family. Released detainees report that they were subjected to physical or psychological torture. A significant number of lawyers and other human rights defenders have been subject to international travel bans since July 2015.

13. China’s rejection of the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on the status of reefs in the South China Sea may be indicative of a broader policy to reject the authority of international institutions. The abduction of Hong Kong bookseller and British citizen, Lee Bo, from the streets of Hong Kong and Swedish citizen, Gui Minhai, from Thailand are disturbing examples of Chinese police action outside their jurisdiction. Although the Chinese government engages with the UN human rights system it cracks down on civil society that attempts to use international mechanisms. Activist Cao Shunli died in police detention in 2014 after being prevented from travelling to Geneva to attend the Universal Periodic Review of China. 

14. China’s legal system is defined simultaneously by politics and underdevelopment. The initial period of legal reform, launched in the 1980s, addressed multiple development challenges from the lack of laws to the shortage of qualified judges and lawyers. The United Kingdom played an important role in this process providing training opportunities and sharing good practice, including in criminal law.

15. Today, law in China is dominated by political concerns. The image of China marching towards the rule of law is out of date. A national security agenda has influenced a raft of new legislation from the expansive National Security Law to the Overseas NGO Management Law. Minimal procedural protections in Chinese law, including access to a lawyer, can be set aside in cases involving national security or corruption. A ‘dual system’ is now at risk of becoming entrenched in China: ‘routine’ cases with no political significance are being treated with greater professionalism while cases that involve local or national political interests are being dealt with outside the law or with recourse to the many repressive measures available in flawed legislation. The anti-corruption campaign is marred by its extensive use of Shangggui[5], an extra legal form of arbitrary detention and interrogation of Party members which makes extensive use of torture.

UK-China Relations

16. The United Kingdom has a strong interest in a rules-based international order of which human rights’ protections are an important constituent part. The British government also has an interest in ensuring that the rights of British citizens in China and the many companies and other organisations that are engaged in business, education, development, professional and cultural exchange in the country enjoy legal protection from arbitrary actions by the state. We are very concerned by the perception that human rights are being downgraded in relation to trade and other diplomatic priorities. We believe that the language of a “golden relationship” contributes to this perception and that there is a risk that British government policy is held hostage by this language.  We recommend dropping all reference to a “golden relationship”.

17. Brexit and the new Trump administration in the United States risk weakening Britain’s strategy of working with like-minded countries to engage critically with China on human rights. The Rights Practice would like to see the British government continuing to work closely with colleagues across Europe to support the monitoring of human rights in China. The resources and expertise required are considerable and there are benefits from a Europe-wide approach. After Brexit, the British government will, however, need to find its own voice to speak out on the worst abuses. A failure to speak out will undermine the credibility of Britain’s commitment to human rights and respect for the rule of law. EU human rights policies, for example with respect to human rights defenders, should be reviewed and adopted as UK government policy. We recommend the adoption of a new public diplomacy strategy for human rights.

18. The implementation of China’s Overseas NGO Law is an issue of concern to many countries, but the United Kingdom has a particularly strong and diverse non-governmental sector which has been cooperating over many years with colleagues in China, from community arts to climate change, education and legal reform. It is not yet clear how restrictively the law will be implemented, but with China becoming more closed the law is likely to impede the growth of Chinese civil society and our own ability, not only to understand China, but to help China address growing social complexity. The issues raised by this law go well beyond bilateral relations and are part of a global shrinking of civil society space which is inimical to our liberal values.  We recommend the British government cooperate closely with informed British NGOs and colleagues across Europe to help monitor the impact of the law on overseas engagement with China and the development of Chinese civil society.

19. The Rights Practice recognises and shares the many frustrations with the UK-China Human Rights Dialogue with China.  We, nevertheless, support the principle of regular meetings. The Dialogue provides an opportunity to raise individual cases and signal issues of concern at a high level. The FCO has been willing to meet with NGOs working on human rights in China and has provided feedback on the content and process of meetings. Dialogue meetings in the UK provide a chance to demonstrate relevant UK practice through field visits. We welcome the inclusion in the last Dialogue of a presentation by a British human rights NGO. We believe the contribution of lawyers and civil society to the defence of human rights must be a consistent and persistent message from the British government. We recommend monitoring process indicators, including the participation of lawyers and civil society, as an indicator of the Dialogue’s effectiveness.

20. The Rights Practice is concerned by the low level of involvement of civil society in the People to People Dialogue. It is a misnomer and contributes to the perception that normal civil society and public engagement with China is possible. We recommend consultations with civil society to ensure the Dialogue meets its aspirations for greater people to people exchange or the initiative should be given a new name.

21. As the UK promises to embark on an ambitious, new phase of judicial cooperation with China, it is essential that careful thought is given to the nature of that cooperation. In light of the recent remarks from the President of the Supreme People’s Court and the crackdown on Chinese lawyers, questions must be asked about what international cooperation can realistically achieve in the current environment. The Rights Practice is concerned that high level cooperation with Chinese courts may validate China’s authoritarian legal system and unequal treatment before the law unless it is balanced by an equally high level cooperation with a diverse legal community in China. We recommend that the British government match resources directed at the judicial establishment with support to the lawyers working to defend the rights of citizens.

22. The Rights Practice appreciates the increase in UK government funding for human rights projects around the world. The Overseas NGO Law poses a challenge to programme work in China. If significant new funds are available, through other funding mechanisms, to support initiatives with official support, we urge the successor to the Magna Carta fund to partner with civil society. In the current environment in China, there will be few quick wins in promoting human rights. We recommend that the Foreign Office and the British Embassy take a creative and ambitious approach to their future support to the promotion of human rights in China.

January 2017