Written evidence submitted by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association

The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) is a registered charity and a professional membership association. The majority of members are barristers, solicitors and advocates practising in all areas of immigration, asylum and nationality law. Academics, non-governmental organisations and individuals with an interest in the law are also members. Founded in 1984, ILPA exists to promote and improve advice and representation in immigration, asylum and nationality law through an extensive programme of training and disseminating information and by providing evidence-based research and opinion.  ILPA is represented on advisory and consultative groups convened by Government departments, public bodies and non-governmental organizations.

The topic the Committee wishes to examine is large and ILPA has written on it extensively, over many years. Therefore, in what follows, we have sought to make headline points and to direct you to some of our existing work.  We should be happy to provide further evidence and assistance to the Committee as the enquiry develops.

Executive Summary

1. ILPA considers that the government’s approach to immigration should be  based on evidence and respect for the rule of law. 

2. It is necessary to consider carefully when it is relevant to treat persons as migrants, and when it is not and to ensure that policies toward migration are not dealt with in a silo in the Home Office but that immigrants and migrants are treated in line with government policy in areas relevant to them.

3. Prerequisites for a successful immigration policy and its implementation are consolidation of primary legislation on immigration and respect for the rule of law, including ensuring that decisions can be challenged before an independent tribunal and that there is legal aid for those who cannot pay for representation.

4. The enquiry should resist a reductive approach which weighs persons under immigration control in terms of the economic benefits they are perceived to bring and regards migration as a problem to be solved.

5. We draw particular attention to the questions of circular migration and integration which the decision to leave the EU throws into particular focus.

6. We address the situation of EU migrants already in the UK and third country nationals such as the trafficked and those seeking asylum, whose rights are protected by EU law. We also consider migration policy post Brexit and draw particular attention to the position of the devolved administrations.

7. We observe that the ‘impact of migration on communities’ should not be taken for granted or discussed in a monolithic fashion.  We highlight the impact of the ‘hostile environment’ on migrants with lawful leave and on British citizens.

8. In ILPA’s view it is not possible to build greater consensus because the source of consensus is likely to be a common view of the evidence and at the moment we detect little interest in evidence from those opposed to immigration. 

9. There is a need for consensus on whether there will be skills gaps post Brexit, whether at highly skilled or low skilled levels, that cannot be filled in a timely fashion by those with permission to work in the UK.  In ILPA’s view these gaps will increase post Brexit and it is not possible or desirable to fill gaps entirely from the resident labour market, whether in the immediate, medium or long term. 

Response

• What approach should the Government take to different kinds of migration – for example skilled, unskilled, family migration, students and refugees?

1. An approach based on evidence and respect for the rule of law. 

2. At the moment we detect little appetite for evidence. We suggest that the priority for any study of immigration is how to create the conditions in which decisions about immigration based on evidence and the rule of law can be taken, and evidence and analysis weighed.

3. Until there is a degree of consensus on premises in immigration, there will be no consensus on conclusions.  An ostensible consensus which says “We all agree that there are pros and cons”, when there is, in reality, no agreement on what those pros and cons are, does not advance the debate.

4. Government and the opposition must not promote or sustain illusions about migration and indeed must make efforts to counter misinformation and inaccuracies.  We draw attention to the work of Dr Rob Ford, which is summarised in his briefing for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Migration: Public Opinion and immigration: policy briefing.[1] He draws three lessons for policy makers:
• Do not oversimplify the issue – voters accept it is complex;
• Political messages about immigration matter because they influence public opinion;
• Voters lose faith in politicians who over-promise and under-deliver on immigration.

5. The net migration target, which ties the government to a target which, even after Brexit, it cannot control because the net migration figure is affected by emigration and by persons coming to the UK to seek asylum, sets the government up to under-deliver.

6. Parliament and the Committee have a number of tools that can be used in efforts to create a climate in which evidence can be heard:

• Connections at different levels, including at a local level, where interlocutors are known to those to whom they speak;
• A process of enquiry which can subject opinions to debate and challenge;
• A media profile providing an opportunity for extensive coverage.

7. It is necessary to consider carefully when it is relevant to treat persons as migrants, and when it is not.  Matters to be addressed by persons under immigration control moving to an area may be the same matters as would need to be addressed if British citizens and the settled from another part of the UK moved to the area. We must ensure that migration is does not loom large in debates where it is not relevant.

8. To this end, it is important to ensure that policies toward migration are not dealt with in a silo in the Home Office but that migrants are treated in line with government policy in areas relevant to them.  E.g.

• Student policy part of policy on higher education;
• Policy on citizens and the settled being joined by family members in line with policies on support for family life;
• Migration of persons to work, skilled and unskilled, to be led by analysis of labour market needs;
• Refugee policy to be integrated with policies on advancing human rights, the rule of law and tackling the causes and consequences of conflict and insecurity.

9. Treatment of refugees and migrants, whether in respect of detention or opportunities to challenge decisions, or simply the dignity that they are afforded, should accord with respect for the rule of law. Refugee and migrant children should be treated as children first and foremost and migrants and refugees should be characterized as is most relevant to the matter in hand: whether as users of public services; elderly persons; local residents; women etc.  It is not the case that in all these scenarios immigration status is a person’s most relevant characteristic, or indeed is relevant at all.

10. Levels of forced migration are high and countries with many fewer resources than the UK, such as Turkey and Lebanon, are home to millions of the displaced. As we write, persons are drowning in the Mediterranean and suffering from exposure to the cold across Greece and in the Balkans.  Within the EU, unaccompanied children are homeless, sleeping in parks and informal settings, begging.   People are living in substandard conditions, and are resorting to exploitative and dangerous, including unlawful, work to survive.  Resources devoted to the response are wholly inadequate and persons who arrived in May have not been registered yet.  Channels of accountability are weak. Legal channels for most people are harder to access and navigate.  Those with family members in the UK or in other EU States, or with other bases on which to argue to be allowed to come to the UK, for example the Syrian Persons Resettlement Scheme and the Dubs’ amendment (s 67 of the Immigration Act 2016) are struggling to make their case.  The UK has failed to respond to levels of movement and suffering of biblical proportions. One example was the clearance of the Calais camp: everyone saw the problems coming, months, even years, in advance, and yet children were caught up in the violence attendant on the clearance of the camp and left sleeping rough.  There is a disjuncture between foreign and international development policy and Home Affairs policy on the treatment of those affected by conflict.

11. We suggest that the following are prerequisites for a successful immigration policy and its implementation:

• Consolidation of immigration law, at the level of primary legislation, not only at the level of the immigration rules.[2] The law should be clear and intelligible: it is not.  Levels of bureaucracy around decision-making and the hostile environment are extensive, costly and inefficient. 

• Respect for the rule of law, rather than a system comprised of provisions which fail to respect the rule of law and human rights but then contain savings provisions “save where to do so would breach human rights.”[3] This invites litigation and the risk that rather than prevention of unlawful treatment there is only post hoc redress.

• Ensuring that decisions on immigration can be subject to challenge in the most simple and direct way possible: through rights of appeal to the First-Tier tribunal rather than elaborate systems removing rights of appeal by certification and thus redirecting challenges to judicial reviews in the High Court or Upper Tribunal.[4] This is another aspect of respect for the rule of law.

• The restoration of legal aid in immigration cases, funded by a ‘polluter pays’ approach.[5]  The rights at stake are of profound concern to persons under immigration control and their British or settled family members. This is another aspect of respect for the rule of law.

12. See further ILPA’s evidence to the House of Lords’ Select Committee on the Constitution[6] and ILPA’s evidence on legal aid, including, most recently its briefing for the Commons’ debate on Access to Justice.[7]

13. We highlight also JCWI’s five principles for Post-Brexit immigration policy.[8]

• New laws and policy must be led by evidence and pursue realistic and deliverable goals.
• Immigration policy and law in the UK must promote and respect the requirements of the rule of law.
• No community should be left behind: the economic benefits of migration should be shared amongst us all through reinvestment in communities, infrastructure, jobs, and education.
• Immigration policy should encourage long-term integration and the formation of stable, cohesive communities of migrants and non-migrants alike.
• Respect for human rights and equality must be integral to our immigration system.

14. Finally, immigration cannot be considered in isolation from the wider questions of globalization.

• What are the benefits and problems with different kinds and levels of migration, for the economy and society?

15. The enquiry should resist a reductive approach which weighs persons under immigration control in terms of the economic benefits they are perceived to bring and regards migration as a problem to be solved rather than a situation to be taken into account in drawing up policies. Persons, including British citizens, move and migrate.

16. We draw particular attention to the questions of circular migration and integration which the decision to leave the EU throws into particular focus.

Circular migration

17. The advantages of circular migration are that it is a way to counter the brain drain from countries from which the UK takes students or borrows skilled workers.  It is a way to build understanding and goodwill between different countries.  It also functions to limit permanent migration.

18. Current approaches to migration of third country nationals do not encourage or support circular migration. 

19. Circular migration of EU nationals and their family members, whether for work or because of relationships, is currently possible but outside this context opportunities for circular migration are very limited.  There is much in the current debate that is reminiscent of the 1960s and the passage of two Commonwealth Immigrant Acts to put an end to circular migration, in that case of British citizens, then called ‘Citizens of the UK and Colonies’, who were born outside the UK.[9]  It is arguable that those who would reduce immigration are repeating the decisions of their counterparts in the 1960s. Like a Citizen of the UK and Colonies before the 1960s, an EEA national can come to the UK and then leave, safe in the knowledge, until the referendum in the case of the latter, that they could return at any time.  This produces ‘migrants’ rather than ‘immigrants’; people who can come, and then can go. 

20. Since the Commonwealth Immigrant Acts put a stop to circular migration in the 1960s, levels of insecurity for third country national migrants coming to the UK have been much higher.  It is difficult to get to the UK and, having done so once, there is no guarantee that if they leave, they will be able to return.   Thus the pattern of migration from the Commonwealth since the 1960s has been to come and to stick around until settlement, better still British citizenship, is achieved.  In most cases this takes six years. By that time, for many, the UK has become a permanent home. The enquiry should ask: how will circular migration be facilitated post Brexit?

Integration

21. Separate systems for migrants give rise to bureaucracy and reduce flexibility of response.  They may function to confine migrants in particular parts of the country.

22. EU nationals are in very many respects treated in the same way as British citizens and the settled. Once their status is settled, their entitlements are relatively uncomplicated although proof of entitlement is becoming an increasing problem; particularly for their third country national family members. Those exercising rights of free movement are increasingly finding that they cannot manage without residence documentation.

23. There are fewer barriers to EU nationals’ full participation in the communities in which they live than exist for those who status entails a set of exclusions.  Provision can be made for them through mainstream services.  Much less separate bureaucracy is required.

24. The Committee could usefully examine to what extent this has led to EU migrants moving to different parts of the UK as compared to third country nationals. The enquiry should ask: what can we learn from EU nationals in the UK about participation of migrants in their communities?

Safety

25. The treatment of migrants and refugees in the UK has served to undermine the rule of law in the UK. This is a problem with both the laws that have been passed, and their implementation.

26. The UK has, not once, but five times, been found to have breached the prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment in its treatment of the mentally ill in immigration detention with other cases having settled or pending.  Settlements in compensation cases are routinely the subject of confidentiality agreements so it is not possible to ascertain the scale of the problem.

27. The detained fast-track was suspended[10]  following a series of judgments that it carried an unacceptable risk of unfairness, including findings that the fast-track procedure rules were ultra vires the powers of the Tribunal Procedure Committee, which has the power to make procedural rules ensuring that justice be done and that the tribunal system is fair. [11] By “allowing one party to the appeal to put the other at serious procedural disadvantage without sufficient judicial supervision”, the rules were not securing these objectives and the Committee was acting outwith its powers.[12]

28. Aside detention, the effect of enforcement policies and the hostile environment is all too often to make the lives of migrants, including those without lawful leave, intolerable, marginal and unlawful.  This harms them and it harms us all, creating the conditions for exploitation and suffering. See further below.

29. The evidence suggests that racists and xenophobes consider that Brexit has given them a mandate to voice and enact their hatred and intolerance.[13]  This, combined with lack of challenges to racism and xenophobia, is creating a climate in which hate crime can thrive and is making communities less safe. See the Home Affairs Select Committee’s ongoing enquiry into hate crime and its violence consequences. 

30. By failing to afford basic guarantees to persons under immigration control and failing to afford them the protection of the law the UK is damaging its society for all, not just for those under immigration control, or those mistaken, often as a result of prejudice and stereotypes, for such persons.  The suggestion that persons under immigration control are in some way to blame for this ignores existing power relations.

• What approach should be taken to EU migration as part of the Brexit negotiations – for example, points-based systems, or work permits; and geographical variations?

31. As to EU nationals, different issues are presented by EEA nationals already present in the UK and those who may come in future. 

32. British nationals and their family members resident elsewhere in the EU, who had no vote in the referendum, have a great deal at stake in any Brexit settlement.  We consider that the Committee should take evidence from them.  Young people aged 16 to 18 in the UK had no vote on Brexit but may have aspirations to study or work elsewhere in the EU which depend upon the post-Brexit dispensation. We consider that the Committee should take evidence from them.

Those EEA nationals and their family members already in the UK

33. A rights-based and, in view of the considerable logistical challenges, pragmatic, approach is required. The House of Lords EU Select Committee report on acquired rights[14] is a good blueprint.  See ILPA’s evidence to the enquiry[15].  Like the Select Committee, ILPA considers that a minimum, although not minimal, approach to EU nationals and their family members could and should be put in place prior to any negotiations taking place.  This package of rights could then be enhanced in the course of negotiations, including on the basis of reciprocity.

34. ILPA recommends a standstill clause and that the relevant date for the application of any protection should be the date of leaving the EU.  One simple measure would be to provide that all those who have permanent residence at the cut-off date should retain the equivalent of their rights as a permanent resident.  Those who do not yet have permanent residence should, as a minimum,  be allowed to qualify for permanent residence once they meet the current conditions for permanent residence set out in EU law.

35. Beneficiaries of a standstill provision should include all EEA (not only EU) citizens and Swiss and their qualifying non-EEA family members, including persons exercising derived rights.  Account must be taken of Articles 21, 45 (workers) and 49 (establishment) and 56 (services) (and predecessor provisions) to cover all free movement of persons. There should be equal treatment of all beneficiaries, while not closing off the possibility of special arrangements in the future in the event of particular difficulties (e.g. in Irish cross-border cases).

36. Consideration should be given, for simplicity’s sake to giving rights of permanent residence to persons with a certain number of year’s residence, e.g. five, without looking at detail within that period.  Provision should be made for de facto EU residents, e.g. the economically inactive partners of British citizens who do not have comprehensive sickness insurance and are thus not treated as exercising treaty rights as self-sufficient persons, but who have built lives and families here. For this group and to avoid other complications we strongly suggest that rights of access to the NHS be treated as comprehensive sickness insurance cover.

37. Provision must be made for particular groups including British citizens returning from periods of residence as a qualified person in other EU member States; persons with rights acquired through residence which includes residence in the Channel Islands / Isle of Man and persons exercising derived (“derivative”) rights. We draw particular attention to retained rights, which provide important protection in situations where people are at particular risk, including because of protected characteristics under UK equality law.  Persons involuntarily unemployed due to sickness, injury or redundancy can retain their status as workers. Family members who have resided as such with the qualified person in the UK can retain a right of residence in certain circumstances such as bereavement or divorce. 

38. As to practical considerations, ILPA considers that there should be a special post-EU status, set out in a separate set of UK rules, separate from current leave under the immigration rules (e.g. the rules on indefinite leave to remain).  The demands of the ‘hostile environment and the frequent need to prove immigration status make evidence of status essential.

Rights of third country nationals protected by EU law

39. The UK having opted out of the common immigration policy, those third country nationals whose rights stand to be affected most by Brexit are persons seeking international protection and the trafficked.  The latter group face a double blow: loss of cooperation in criminal matters and data-sharing risks increasing impunity for traffickers, while they also risk losing the guarantees of the EU directive on trafficking[16] which provides protection additional to that provided by the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.[17]

40. The UK elected to opt-into the EU trafficking directives, being free not to do so or to enact its own parallel provisions covering some but not all of the matters covered by EU law.  It is therefore anticipated that the UK will, for the most part, wish to retain equivalent protections to those contained in the Directive.

41. The UK will remain a party to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings[18] post Brexit, but EU Directive 20011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA will no longer be applicable. 

42. If Brexit means that the UK ceases to participate, or that restrictions are placed on its participation, in EU information sharing systems then its ability to fight organized crime may be affected. This has particular implications for its ability to fight trafficking in persons.

43. Initially, when the UK exercised its opt-out from the Directive, the Home Office argued[19] that the provisions of the Directive did not add to the protection of trafficked persons in the UK.  The Home Office stated that opting in would require the UK to make mandatory provisions at the time discretionary in UK law and that these steps would reduce the scope for professional discretion and flexibility and might divert already limited resources. When the UK decided to opt in,[20] it identified that it would need to amend existing trafficking offences to confer extra-territorial jurisdiction over UK nationals who commit trafficking offences anywhere in the world; to make mandatory appointing special representatives to support child witnesses during police investigations and criminal trials and to set out the rights of trafficked persons to assistance and support.[21] 

44. The terms of the Directive emphasise the importance of protecting trafficked persons and put this on an equal footing with the implementation of criminal measures. It sets out criteria for issuing a residence permit to trafficked persons. Article 12.2 of the Directive requires member States to ensure that trafficked persons have access ‘without delay’ to legal counselling, and, to legal representation, including for the purpose of claiming compensation. It requires that legal counselling and legal representation be free of charge where the victim does not have sufficient financial resources. Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights will continue to provide protection to trafficked and enslaved persons and has, in particular, been recognized as a source of positive obligations toward them.[22]

45. See further ILPA’s submission to the House of Commons Justice Committee Inquiry on Implications of Brexit for the Justice System,[23]

46. The position in respect of asylum and humanitarian protection is more confused.  The UK has opted into the latest version of the Dublin regulation: Dublin III,[24] which imposes obligations to reunite persons seeking asylum, particularly unaccompanied children, with family members in a particular member State but also allows member States to send persons seeking asylum back to the first European Member State they reached.  Post Brexit those who make it to the UK, and there is no reason to suppose that UK controls will be any stronger than they are now, will remain in the UK to have their claims determined there. It must be doubted whether EU States will want to give the UK unlimited access to the Dublin regime post Brexit, since the UK is primarily as a ‘sending’ rather than a ‘receiving’ State under Dublin and one which, without Dublin, would be taking a greater share of those refugees who reach the EU.

47. As to the other asylum directives, the UK has not opted in to the ‘recast’ directives and originally the Government suggested that when the recast directives came into effect it would no longer be bound by the original version of the directives.  This was recognized to be incorrect as a matter of law, but it means that there is ambiguity in the Government’s position as to whether it would want to continue to apply the standards in the original directives post Brexit.  The directives give effect to obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and to the European Convention on Human Rights, by which the UK will continue to be bound but these do not cover all areas, in particular procedural guarantees, and the rights to be afforded persons seeking humanitarian protection.

Migration policy post Brexit

48. There is no reason to assume that EEA nationals and their family members coming to the UK after Brexit will be front of the queue for any special treatment under migration policies, any case for placing them at the front would need to be made out on its merits.  There are other contenders for preferential treatment: Commonwealth citizens; persons in need of international protection; the family members of British citizens are just three examples. 

49. The changes wrought by ending EU migration in its current form could include (depending upon the settlement reached):

• A great reduction in circular migration, with the only means to guarantee the possibility of circular migration being taking British citizenship.
• A greater number of persons unable to be reunited with close family members.  These would include elderly parents in families at all income levels, and spouses, partners and children for families on low incomes.  The change will affect British citizens and the settled in relationships with EEA nationals and EEA nationals settled in the UK and their family members. Other British nationals and settled persons will be no better, and no worse, off.
• Employers and those entering into contracts for services having a smaller pool of persons from which to make their initial choice of worker, at all skills levels. So called “low skilled” migration will end: outside EU migration there are currently no immigration routes to enter for the purpose of doing work below certain qualification and salary levels, but there are jobs in, for example the care, agricultural and food processing sectors for which it has to date not proven possible to recruit in sufficient numbers from British citizens and the settled. As to skilled migration, EEA nationals and their family members represent a flexible, rapidly deployed workforce enjoying the benefits of circular migration.  We have seen no evidence the Tier 2 skilled migration cap of 21,000 per annum can be maintained post Brexit.

Geographical considerations

50. Immigration is a matter reserved to the Westminster parliament but many matters affecting the rights and entitlements of EEA and third country nationals, for example in housing law, are devolved.  Different parts of the UK have different needs for skilled or unskilled workers and this affects not only their policies on migration for work but on attracting persons more generally, for example by granting enhanced rights to family members. 

51. References to common membership of the EU underpin the devolution agreements.[25] 

52. Northern Ireland shares a land border with the EU, with the Republic of Ireland.  The relative prosperity of Northern Ireland and the Republic may be altered radically by Brexit, leading to increased pressure from the Republic to police the border.  If the UK, temporarily or permanently, sits outside the customs union and single market there will be customs controls along the border and in the UK customs officers have the powers of immigration officers and vice versa.[26] Preserving the common travel area against such a backdrop will be a challenge. See Brexit UK-Irish relations, the report of House of Lords EU Select Committee[27].  See further ILPA’s evidence to it.[28]

• What steps should be taken to manage the impact of migration in communities?

53. The ‘impact of migration on communities’ should not be taken for granted or discussed in a monolithic fashion.  Wherever migration is cited as the proximate cause of a problem or improvement it is necessary to ask: would that problem or improvement have existed or occurred without migration? Would it have existed or occurred if persons had moved from other parts of the UK rather than from outside the UK?  If migration is one cause of a problem or improvement, what are the others?

54. The hostile environment has an impact beyond migrants with no lawful leave and indeed beyond migrants to British citizens and the settled more generally.  It is a discriminatory de facto ID system that most affects the poor and those who struggle to organize documentation, whether British or not. It introduces new levels of bureaucracy and functions to restrict access to work, to benefits, to private rented accommodation and to health care becomes problematic.  It has other specific effects, such as creating the prospect of the re-introduction of forced evictions.[29] It mandates ‘sheep and goats’ identification on a daily basis.  The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration has drawn attention in his reports on the hostile environment to the failure to evaluate its impacts and whether the policy is delivering on its objectives.[30]

55. Greater levels of resources and devolution of control over resources to devolved administrations and local authorities who are closer to seeing what needs to be done may assist in the rapid provision of services, but devolution of control without increased resources can lead to scapegoating.

• Is it possible to build greater consensus behind immigration policy? What steps would be needed to do so?

56. Not at the moment because the source of consensus is likely to be a common view of the evidence and at the moment we detect little interest in evidence from those opposed to immigration. 

• How should trade-offs between immigration policy and economic policy be handled?

57. There is a need for consensus on whether there will be skills gaps post Brexit, whether at highly skilled or low skilled levels, that cannot be filled in a timely fashion by those with permission to work in the UK.  Discussion can then follow of whether those gaps can and should be tolerated, and in what circumstances.  There is currently evidence of skills gaps: see the work that goes into drawing up the shortage occupation lists and the employers satisfying the resident labour market test. ILPA takes the view that these gaps will increase post Brexit and that it is not possible or desirable to fill gaps entirely from the resident labour market, whether in the immediate, medium or long term.  Beyond skills gaps there is the question of the UK’s being able to recruit and retain leaders in their field.  In immigration debates this is often described as attracting ‘the brightest and the best’ with no clarity on the meaning of ‘best’.  The hackneyed phrase nonetheless points to a deeper concern: that there are circumstances in which what is needed is not someone who can do a job, but the best person for the job.

58. The need for skilled and unskilled labour will not disappear post Brexit. If it reduces, this is likely to be because of recession rather than positive factors.  Where controls on migration create gaps in the labour force, whether at highly skilled or low skilled levels, this has consequential economic effects, as does limiting the ability rapidly to fill these gaps.

59. As to low-skilled labour, we draw attention to the report of the Migration Advisory Committee on this topic.[31]  Jobs such as seasonal agriculture work are difficult to fill from British citizens and the settled.  Population is sparse in many areas where the work is needed and workers from elsewhere are faced with the prospect of living apart from their families in rudimentary conditions.  Workers filling these jobs are coming for less than six months and in no way affect the net migration target.

60. As to highly skilled, see our comments on the Tier 2 cap above.

61. As to Brexit negotiations, the question as generally been phrased as whether accepting free movement is a price worth paying for remaining in the single market, otherwise expressed as whether giving up the single market is a price worth paying for limiting immigration, although there are some who wish to remain outside the single market in any event.  We suggest that there has to date been little or no consensus as to which information about the economic implications of the different options is soundly based, even insofar as such information has been understood.  See response to the first question.

62. ILPA has provided evidence and analysis we have to parliamentary enquiries, see references in this document passim and see http://www.ilpa.org.uk/pages/eu-referendum-position-papers.html 

63. Post Brexit, the economic effects of Brexit and of immigration are a matter of evidence, and depend upon the nature of the Brexit deal; the nature of immigration policy and levels of uncertainty about either. Again, there is a need to create a greater appetite for evidence and for the evaluation of evidence before there can be a sensible debate.  We stand ready to contribute to that debate with evidence on immigration but at the moment do not identify a context in which our evidence and analysis can be heard.

Adrian Berry

Chair

ILPA

18 January 2016

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