Written evidence submitted by the Human Security Centre

 

Background

 

The Human Security Centre (HSC) is an international, independent, not-for-profit foreign policy think-tank based in London. The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century.

The author of this evidence, Dr Rowan Allport, is an HSC Senior Fellow who leads the organisation’s Security and Defence team.

 

Executive Summary

 

This submission will focus upon the state-based security challenges within, and emanating from, the ‘European’ Arctic region

 

Contemporary developments

 

  1. The end of the Cold War saw a drastic curtailment in military activity in the Arctic region. For Russia, this was a matter of necessity. Economic collapse during the 1990s forced the abandoning of a large number of remote garrisons, and operations at even major bases were reduced to an absolute minimum. NATO, including the UK, took advantage of the reduced threat level by drastically scaling down its operational footprint in the High North.
  2. It is important to note that Russia has legitimate security interests in the Arctic. As with any nation, it has the right to defend its territory. Russia’s return to focusing on the region’s ‘hard’ security was initially justified by the country’s leadership on the grounds of the need to protect its increasing economic activity in the High North from border violations, as well as criminal and terrorist activity. However, it is also the case that Moscow has moved towards an emphasis on the state-based ‘threat’ to its Arctic interests at a time of heightened tension between itself and the West. The December 2014 publication of Russia’s updated Military Doctrine listed for the first time the defence of the country’s Arctic region as a core military task.[1] Similarly, the July 2015 revisions to Russia’s Maritime Doctrine placed new emphasis on the Arctic as both an economic resource to be exploited and as the route by which Russia can gain access to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.[2] In the words of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, renewed attention on Atlantic access was the result of “NATO's active development and the alliance approaching our borders”.

 

Russia: military capabilities

 

  1. Russia’s Arctic territory is host to much of its military capability. Recent force restructuring has also reflected the importance Moscow places on the Arctic region. In December 2014, the Arctic Joint Strategic Command (AJSC) was formed as the overarching headquarters for Russian forces in much of its Arctic region – including the territory covering the country’s border with Norway and the strategically vital naval bases in the Kola Peninsula. Although built upon the Russian Navy’s Northern Fleet, the formation also encompasses air and ground units in its locality. Key capabilities include:

 

3.1     Maritime Forces: The Russia Northern Fleet, headquartered in Severomorsk, represents the largest of Russia’s naval commands and contains many of its most powerful vessels. The latest assessments give the major surface units as the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov; the nuclear powered battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy; the cruiser Admiral Flota Lobov; and between five and seven Sovremennyy and Udaloy-class destroyers. The submarine combat fleet comprises of approximately six Kilo-class conventional submarines; ten nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) of the Alpha, Victor III, Sierra and Severodvinsk-classes; two cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) of the Oscar II-class; and seven ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Delta IV and Borey-class. However, not all of these vessels are available for use simultaneously due to maintenance requirements.[3] The ships are supported by a force of smaller combat units (corvettes and patrol frigates) and surface and sub-surface support vessels.

 

3.2     Air Forces: The AJSC’s air power is centred upon the 45th Air Force and Air Defence Army. This force is believed[4] to comprise of two[5] fighter-bomber (Su-24M) squadrons; one long-range fighter squadron (MiG-31); and air defence units equipped with, amongst other systems, the S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM). To these should be added naval aviation fighter-bomber (SU-33 and MiG-29K) squadrons that spend part of their time deployed aboard the Admiral Kuznetsov when the ship is on operations, as well as an assortment of maritime patrol, transport and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) units. Further aviation assets could be deployed from other Russian regions, including long-range bombers equipped with stand-off missiles.

 

3.3     Land Forces: The land forces permanently available to the AJSC comprise of the 200th Motor Rifle Brigade and 61st Naval Infantry Brigade, both based near Russia’s border with Norway; and the 80th Motor Rifle Brigade, based near the border with Finland. Both the 200th and 80th brigades are being equipped for Arctic operations. These units are supported by the 536th Fleet Independent Coastal Defence Missile Artillery Brigade, recently re-equipped with Bastion-P anti-ship missiles. Given sufficient warning, these formations could be supported by available Airborne and Special Forces assets from other regions, many of which are Arctic-trained.

 

 

  1. In addition to the aforementioned formation of two land brigades specifically equipped for Arctic warfare, recent years have seen Russia move to further develop its presence in the region. Thirteen airfields and ten radar stations within the Arctic Circle are being either constructed or restored. They are important statements of intent as regards the importance Russia places on the Arctic.

 

  1. A major concern for NATO is Russia’s apparent attempt to construct anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) ‘bubbles’ adjacent to alliance territory that possess the ability to limit NATO’s freedom to deploy and operate forces during wartime. Although Moscow’s use of this strategy in Kaliningrad and Crimea have gained the most attention, the deployment of the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and the Bastion-P anti-ship missiles to the country’s Arctic north-east gives Russia an ability to disrupt NATO activities in and around northern Norway without even having to deploy forces outside of its territory.

 

NATO in the High North: military capabilities

 

  1. NATO has long resisted taking a tightly defined role in Arctic security, and has significantly scaled down its operations in and around the region over the last quarter-century. Notable changes have included:

 

 

 

 

 

 

  1. Despite numerous discussions on NATO’s approaches to defence in the Arctic, differences of opinion in what any alliance set of priorities should be have prevented the adopting of a unified position. As European NATO’s leading state in the Arctic Circle, Norway has sought to give the alliance a distinct role in the region, although with limited success so far. Responding to Norwegian pressure in 2013, NATO’s then Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said “At this present time, NATO has no intention of raising its presence and activities in the High North.”[6] The communique released following the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw made reference to a need to be ready to “deter and defend against any potential threats, including against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory”, a requirement that implicitly includes the Arctic, but the region itself was not explicitly mentioned.[7]
  2. Nevertheless, Norway represents NATO’s Arctic territorial front line, and its forces represent the only NATO assets permanently within or adjacent to the ‘European Arctic’. Capabilities include:

 

8.1       Maritime Forces: The combat units of the Royal Norwegian Navy consist of six Ula-class conventionally powered submarines; five Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates; and six Skjold-class corvettes. They are supported by a small number of mine-countermeasure, patrol and support ships.

8.2       Air Forces: The Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) fields approximately 55 F-16 fighters and six P-3 Orion maritime patrol and ASW aircraft as its main offensive force. These are supported by a number of fixed-wing transport and surveillance aircraft, as well as ASW and transport helicopters. The RNoAF also possesses NASAMS II anti-aircraft missile batteries.

8.3       Land Forces: The Norwegian Army consists of a single brigade headquartered in the north of the country. The Russian border is patrolled by the Garrison of Sør-Varanger, which has a strength of approximately 600 personnel.

8.4       Home Guard: The Air Force, Navy and Army are supported by a force of 45,000 reservists.

8.5       Intelligence Service: The Norwegian Intelligence Service provides the domestic government and NATO with extensive electronic and communications surveillance capabilities through its land-based facilities in the Arctic Circle. It also operates the Eger and the Marjata, two of the most advanced surveillance ships in the world, to provide intelligence on Russian activity in the region.

 

  1. Norway freely admits that it is dependent on outside assistance to mount a sustained defence of the country. By the close of the Cold War, NATO had developed complex reinforcement plans, elements of which remain in place. Notably, as part of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N), the US Marines maintain a stockpile of sufficient material to support a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (and augment a Marine Expeditionary Brigade) in a series of underground and surface storage facilities in the centre of the country. Additionally, in October 2016, an agreement was reached between the US and Norway for 300 marines to be deployed in a rotational basis at Vaernes military base, some 600 miles from the Russian/Norwegian border. The UK also has a significant capability to support Norway’s defence (see ‘The role of the UK’ section). However, overall NATO resources available to support Norway have declined.

 

  1. A further notable posture shift in NATO’s north has been the closure of Naval Air Station Keflavik in Iceland. This facility acted as a key hub for ASW and air defence efforts, during the latter part of the Cold War supporting US Navy P-3s, USAF F-15 fighters and E-3 airborne early warning aircraft, and a variety of other NATO assets. These aircraft have now been withdrawn, with the base shut down in 2006, although occasional deployments are still made. This lack of a permanent garrison marks a step down in US involvement in the region. It should be noted that Iceland has no conventional military of its own.

 

  1. The US potentially remains the dominant regional power in the European Arctic region, but there are outstanding questions regarding force readiness, overstretch and political will. At the peak of its regional involvement towards the end of the Cold War, operations in the Arctic and near-Arctic were seen as a critical component of ‘favourable war termination' under what was known as the Maritime Strategy.[8] Amongst the most notable aspects of this approach would have been offensive operations conducted in the North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea and ultimately the Barents Sea centred upon multiple US carrier battlegroups. It is now doubtful if the US could deploy an overwhelmingly powerful force in a short timeframe without neglecting other commitments. Nevertheless, its ability to field a vast naval, air and ground force in almost any theatre it chose ensures that in a longer timeframe, a US-backed victory would be more dependent on political will than raw power. However, fundamental questions over the US commitment to Europe have emerged following the election of Donald Trump as president.

 

  1. An alliance-wide issue is that NATO’s training regime no longer includes dealing with threats within and emanating from the Arctic Circle on any major scale. Notably, the Cold War ‘Teamwork’ series of exercises saw the alliance rehearse the defence of Norway. ‘Teamwork 80’ witnessed 54,000 NATO personnel deploy to the region. In contrast, the far more limited ‘Cold Response 2016’ included only 15,000 participants.

 

  1. A specific issue facing NATO in countering Russia’s Arctic-based forces is a significant reduction on the emphasis of ASW skills. Most notoriously, the UK lost its fixed-wing ASW capability with the retirement of the Nimrod aircraft in 2010. However, this has only reflected a wider trend. The Netherlands abandoned its P-3 aircraft in 2006. The Royal Netherlands Navy has also seen a drastic fall in its fleet size, and Germany is currently in the process of replacing its ASW-focused Bremen-class frigate with the Baden-Württemberg-class, a type which does not feature a sonar or torpedo launchers.

 

The role of the UK

 

  1. As a member of NATO, the UK is committed to support the defence of Norway, and to contribute to the wider elements of Alliance security related to the Arctic. Specific capabilities of relevance to threats within or emanating from the Arctic are:

 

14.1   Maritime Forces: The Royal Navy possesses a core combat force of six Type-45 destroyers; thirteen Type-23 frigates; the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean; and two Albion-class landing ships. The submarine force comprises of seven Trafalgar and Astute-class SSNs and four Vanguard-class SSBNs. The SSBNs would not be directly tasked with Arctic-related operations, but would have to evade Russian Northern Fleet submarines in order to preserve the viability of the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The Royal Navy also possess a fleet of helicopters, including thirty Merlin HM2 ASW aircraft.

 

14.2   Air Forces: The RAF currently possesses seven fast-jet squadrons; a large fleet of fixed-wing transport aircraft and helicopters; and an extensive force of intelligence and surveillance aircraft. However, the RAF has lacked a fixed-wing maritime patrol and ASW aircraft since 2010.

14.3   Land Forces: The majority of the UK’s ground forces are not trained or equipped for Arctic operations. The most significant exception to this is 3 Commando Brigade, which as the main element of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force provides the leading land component of the British Arctic capability, and is specifically earmarked for use in Norway. Special Forces units would act in support.

 

  1. British forces are scheduled to undergo a number of enhancements that will elevate their ability to project power into the Arctic and near-Arctic region. The bringing into service of the Queen Elizabeth-Class aircraft carriers will theoretically give the UK an improved capacity to field air power and amphibious forces. Additionally, the continuing roll-out of the Astute-class submarines will upgrade the sub-surface fleet’s combat performance and persistence. In the air, the addition of two new Typhoon squadrons promised under the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review will bring much-needed capacity, and the purchase of nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft will plug the maritime patrol and ASW gap. On the ground, enhancing the deployability of the heavier elements of the regular Army through the recently announced restructuring could reduce the pressure on light rapid-reaction formations such as 3 Commando Brigade. Nevertheless, significant challenges will remain.

 

Potential scenarios

 

  1. Given its strong tendency to pursue its territorial and resources claims in the High North through diplomatic and legal channels, there is no reason to believe that Moscow would embark on an offensive military operation in the Arctic region in isolation. It should, therefore, be a working assumption that any conflict involving the Arctic directly or indirectly would emerge from a crisis elsewhere.

 

  1. The 1991 Gulf War provides a useful comparative model to the type of crisis NATO might face in Eastern Europe. Simulations have indicated that it is highly likely that a determined Russian invasion of the Baltic States would succeed within a brief period of time[9], presenting the alliance with a situation similar to that which confronted the international community in August 1990 following Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait. Like Iraq, Russia’s priority would be to forestall or disrupt an allied counteroffensive. This would see a requirement to deter, and if necessary prevent, a build-up of reinforcements from the US; and a need to throw the opposing forces off balance by threatening or initiating a broader (but still limited) conflict. In both of these scenarios, the Arctic region could play a critical role.

 

  1. Iraq’s ability to interfere with the Western build-up in the Gulf region in late 1990 was limited to diplomacy and propaganda. Baghdad’s lack of a ‘kinetic’ option helped make the war physically possible and arguably allowed for the conflict to be ‘sold’ politically. A key aspect of Russia’s 2015 Maritime Doctrine concerns the relationship between NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe and naval power projection into the Atlantic. This can be viewed as representing a threat to undermine the North Atlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) on which the alliance would depend to transport military resources from the US. Our own analysis and that of RUSI[10] has identified that both constrained resources and Russian doctrine means that any attempt by Moscow to interdict NATO’s SLOC would be limited in scope and duration. Nevertheless, even minimal alliance losses would be beyond anything experienced since World War Two, and could have a psychological impact beyond that of the material damage caused. The sub-surface, surface and airborne components of such interdiction would largely have to be staged out of bases in Russia’s Arctic.

 

  1. For the Royal Navy, even a purely defensive stance against such attacks would likely push resources beyond breaking point. The House of Commons Defence Committee recently identified that the Royal Navy has a “woefully low” number of frigates and destroyers.[11] Of the nineteen escorts, only eight of the Type-23 frigates possess a full, modern ASW capability. The nine new P-8 aircraft for the RAF will be welcome, but would be thinly stretched. It is unlikely that more than two Royal Navy SSNs could be fielded for offensive ASW. Furthermore, contemporary experience in ‘under-ice’ operations is lacking. The combination of limited submarine numbers, the demand for a permanent East of Suez SSN presence and a fatal explosion during a 2007 Arctic deployment meant that the Royal Navy was forced into a nine year Arctic hiatus which only ended in 2016.

 

  1. A further parallel with the Gulf War and any Russian defence of an occupied Baltic region would be the desirability to Moscow of widening the war in a limited fashion to complicate the military and political situation facing the allies. In 1991, Iraq attempted this by staging a ground assault on the Saudi Arabian city of Khafji and through firing Scud[12] missiles at Israel. Both operations forced the diversion of significant coalition resources. A limited operation, or even the credible threat of one against Norway would force NATO to commit a substantial force to the country’s defence – assets that would be unavailable for use in Eastern Europe.

 

  1. For the UK, the commitment of 3 Commando Brigade to Norway during a crisis in the Baltic would prevent one of the UK’s highest readiness and most effective formations being brought to bear in the main theatre of operations. Even if the ongoing restructuring of the British Army allows for a full division to be committed to a major land campaign without the need for 3 Commando, it would still represent a diversion of resources. Supporting such a force would also stretch already thinly spread British air, naval and logistical assets. Notably, the RAF’s fighter limited number of squadrons would have to be split between the defence of the UK, defending Norway and offensive operations in Eastern Europe.

 

  1. The Russian military also possesses the ability to launch limited strikes against the UK using cruise missiles launched from submarines, surface ships and aircraft. This capability was recently demonstrated during the Syrian conflict, with missiles being fired into the country using all three platforms. Almost all scenarios seeing such strikes against the British mainland would require Moscow’s forces to either sortie out of (submarines and surface ships) or transit through (bomber aircraft) the Arctic theatre. The damage such attacks could inflict would be constrained by both the wider demands on Moscow’s offensive forces and the UK’s air defences, but both military and political considerations would force significant resources to be diverted to countering them.

 

  1. Finally, and separate from the Gulf War analogies, there is also the scope for NATO to utilise the Arctic to its advantage in any conflict with Russia in Eastern Europe. The US Maritime Strategy of the 1980s – in which Britain played a major role – saw the ultimate endgame of a Norwegian Sea/Barents Sea campaign as direct attacks on Soviet military facilities in and around the Kola Peninsula. This envisaged the destruction of the Northern Fleet as an effective military force using tactics that would include the targeting of Soviet SSBNs. By endangering the core tenets of its national power, it was hoped that Moscow would agree to end hostilities. With sufficient political will, and full-scale US involvement, this ‘periphery strategy’ could be adopted as a tool to help end any conflict in Eastern Europe.

 

  1. As with more limited Arctic offensive operations, the UK would have only a supporting role to play in such an approach – although the entering into service of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers would afford the UK the ability to deploy a single but powerful ASW-focused carrier group in support of a wider US effort. The scale of the threat faced would, however, expose the Royal Navy to significant losses, and the fleet currently lacks the resilience to manage attrition.

 

Conclusion

 

  1. The UK and its NATO allies face clear challenges both within and emanating from the Arctic. However, there are also opportunities which – if appropriately handled – would help maintain deterrence in peacetime, and potentially assist in bringing a conflict between the alliance and Russia to a swift conclusion.

 

  1. We will refrain from offering a ‘list’ of specific policy recommendations in this submission given their necessary number and complexity. However, more broadly, a significant shift is required to move both NATO as a whole and the UK specifically into a position where they are able to address the challenges within, and emanating from, the Arctic region. The first step in this will be an explicit acceptance by NATO that the alliance’s mission makes involvement in the High North not just desirable, but unavoidable. The UK, lacking the direct territorial interests of Norway, Canada, Demark and the US – but with a rich history of political, military and scientific involvement in the region – is well placed to help facilitate this.

 

18 January 2017

 

[1] The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2015) The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation [press release] 26th June 2015. Available at: goo.gl/ZxKK8r (Accessed 20th December 2016).

[2] President of Russia (2015) Russian Federation Marine Doctrine [online]. Available at: goo.gl/vdHcXY (Accessed 20th December 2016).

[3] Hicks, K.H., Metrick, A., Stamp, L.S., Weinberger, K. (2016) Undersea Warfare in Northern Europe [online] CSIS. Available at: goo.gl/jP0lWD (Accessed 6th January 2017). pp.11.

[4] Perrson, G. (ed) (2016) Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective 2016 [online] FOI. Available at: goo.gl/6sSnxQ (Accessed 5th January 2017). p.82.

[5] Some sources give only one fighter-bomber squadron.

[6] O’Dwyer, G. (2013) NATO Rejects Direct Arctic Presence [online] Atlantic Council. Available at: goo.gl/y2i1xV (Accessed 6th January 2017).

[7] NATO (2016) Warsaw Summit Communiqué [press release] 9th July 2016. Available at: goo.gl/Ii0J45 (Accessed on 6th January 2017).

[8] Hanley, J.T. (2014) Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today. Naval War College Review 67 (2) [online]. Available at: goo.gl/1Gnkep (Accessed 3rd January 2017). pp.10-29.

[9] Johnson, M., Shlapak, D.A. (2016) Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. RAND [online]. Available at: goo.gl/BgRXWE (Accessed 3rd January 2017).

[10] Sutyagi, I. (2015) ‘Russia’s New Maritime Doctrine: Attacking NATO’s Sea Lanes of Communication in the Atlantic – Intent and Feasibility’. RUSI Defence Systems. Vol.14. Available from goo.gl/LrvPgE (Accessed 28/12/16).

[11] House of Commons, Defence Committee (2016) Restoring the Fleet: Naval Procurement and the National Shipbuilding Strategy. Third Report of Session 2016–17. London: The Stationery Office. pp.19.

[12] The weapons utilised by Iraq were Al-Hussain missiles, a domestically produced extended-range version of the Soviet Scud.